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COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW OF CURRENT 
REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT IN 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND 
BROADCASTING SECTORS 
The  comparative  overview  of current  regulatory  environment  in  telecommunications  and 
broadcasting sectors which follows  reflects the law of the Member States as  they  stood at  1 
October 1997. 
This  comparative  overview  should  be  read  in  conjunction  with  the  individual  national 
reports set forth in Annex II to this Study. 
All information contained in this Annex has been assembled in good faith and to the best of 
the ability of the Study Team. 
The information and views expressed do not constitute a legal opinion, and they should not 
be  acted  upon  without  independent  confirmation  and  professional  advice.  The  national 
correspondents cannot accept any  responsibility for loss arising from decisions based upon 
the national reports. 
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Introduction 
The  transformation  of today' s  telecoms  regulatory  framework  into  one  which  reflects 
tomorrow's multimedia environment will require a cross-sectoral evaluation of the common 
and key policy issues which underpin existing regulation in those sectors most immediately 
affected by  convergence,  namely,  the  telecoms,  broadcasting and publishing  sectors.  This 
cross-sectoral analysis should also extend, wherever appropriate parallels can be found,  to 
the information technology sector. 
To  this  end,  Annex  I  compares  and  contrasts  the  various  approaches  taken  at  the 
Community and Member State levels to  those regulatory issues which are likely to  be key 
drivers in the development of a multimedia regulatory framework: 
(  1)  Conditions  of  market  entry,  particularly  the  licensing  of  services  and 
infrastructure. 
(2)  Definitional  issues  ans1ng  out  of the  obsolescence  of platform-based  and 
technology-based categories for services. 
(3)  Conditions  of market  behaviour,  particularly  the  interconnection  of,  and 
access to, networks. 
(4)  Access to scarce public and private resources in a multi-operator multimedia 
market environment. 
(5)  The convergence of regulatory functions and authorities. 
Of course, the breadth and depth of technological and market convergence (see Chapters I 
and  II  of the  Study)  need  not  necessarily  result  in  an  identical  degree  of regulatory 
convergence.  The  same policy questions,  however,  will  have  to  be  addressed by  each of 
today' s  discrete  regulatory  frameworks,  which  are  organised  along  traditional  vertical, 
sectoral  lines.  The  lessons  learned  in one  sector  may  find  application  in  other  sectors. 
Indeed,  certain  issues  may  require  a  full  cross-sectoral  response,  or at  least  one  which 
entails parallel approaches across multiple sectors. 
Analy_sys 
-------------------------------------------------Comparative Overview of Current Regulatory Environment in Teleconununications and Broadcastmg Sectors/Licensing  Page 2 
1.  Conditions  of  Market  Entry: 
Infrastructure and Services 
The  Licensing  of 
The Regulatory Issues 
The  development  of a flexible  and  transparent  licensing  regime  for  infrastructure  and 
services will be a key  regulatory driver for the future provision of multimedia services. 
The formulation of such a forward-looking  licensing regime will need to  take place at a 
time when the traditional licensing frameworks  in the  telecoms and broadcasting sectors 
are in a state of flux. 
For  example,  the  telecoms  sector  is  witnessing  a  radical  shift  from  monopoly  in  the 
provision of voice services to  open competition across a full  range of  telecoms  services. 
Moreover,  telecoms  services and user needs  are becoming increasingly global in scope. 
Satellite technology in particular is  making national borders irrelevant in the design and 
delivery of services,  yet  licensing  remains  highly  fragmented  along  national lines.  The 
radical  change  from  monopoly  to  open  competition  is  being  driven  by  regulatory 
developments  at  the  level  of  the  European  Union.  The  adoption  of  a  harmonised 
Community licensing  regime and  the  market entry it will  facilitate  are  key  elements  in 
that process of liberalisation. The increasing harmonisation of licensing principles in the 
telecoms  sector should facilitate  the development of global  services and  should act  as  a 
counterweight to alliances among dominant operators. 
By  way  of contrast,  licensing  in  the  broadcasting  sector  is  regulated  primarily  at  the 
Member State  level,  except insofar as  Community competition rules  may  apply  or the 
content-related issues harmonised under the  Television Without Frontiers Directive' are at 
issue.  In broadcasting,  the  momentum  for  the  introduction  of greater  competition  has 
grown  because  of the  opportunities  made  possible  by  digitalisation,  rather  than  by 
harmonised  regulatory  intervention  ( e.g. ,  digitalisation  is  undermining  the  validity  of 
"scarcity", the traditional rationale for limiting the number of broadcasting licences). 
By  way of further  contrast,  the  publishing  sector has  never been restricted in terms  of 
market entry through formal licensing conditions,  and has  opted instead for  a system of 
self-regulation which is  largely administered through national  Press Councils or similar 
self-regulatory bodies. 
Directive  97 /36/EC  of the  European  Parliament  and  of the  Council  of 30  June  1997  amending 
Directive  89/552/EEC  on  the  coordination  of certain  provisions  laid  down  by law,  regulation  or 
administrative action in Member States concerning the pursuit of television broadcasting activities, OJ 
1997 L202/  60. 
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The working principles upon which the discussion in this Section is based are as follows: 
•  Regulatory  and  economic  elements  which  are  common  to  the  licensing  of 
infrastructure and services across industry sectors need to be identified with a view to 
determining  the  extent,  if any,  to  which  similar  regulatory  principles  should  be 
applied to the licensing of "multimedia" services and networks. 
•  Burdensome  and  fragmented  licensing  conditions  can deter  market  entry  and  limit 
effective  competition,  particularly  competition  in  international  and  high  value 
services. The Study Team believes that market entry restrictions can only be justified 
for  such fundamental policy reasons as  ensuring that certain public interest goals are 
attained,  that public services  are provided,  that scarce resources  are fairly  allocated 
and  that  market power  is  controlled.  The  Community's goal  should  be  to  reach  a 
consensus regarding the fundamental licensing conditions which cut across traditional 
vertical sectoral lines. 
•  The  separate  licensing  of technology-based  services  and  services  identified  with  a 
single delivery platform should in principle be avoided in the future. Such licensing is 
inconsistent  with  technological  convergence  and  would  undermine  the  important 
regulatory  goal  of platform  independence.  It would  also  undermine  the  important 
progress  being  made  towards  the  integration  of fixed  and  mobile  services  and 
networks. 
•  There will exist a number of "public interest" and content-related issues with respect 
to  which  there  is  no  broad  consensus  among  Member  States.  In  such  cases,  and 
consistent  with  the  principle  of  subsidiarity,  it  will  be  important  for  any  future 
regulatory model  to  identify clearly those aspects of regulation which fall  primarily 
within the competence of the Member States. 
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1.1  LICENSING POLICY GOALS 
Licences perform a number of policy functions.  To  the extent that some of those functions 
are no longer justified by specific public interest goals and discourage market entry and the 
provision of multimedia services, they  should not become part of the emerging regulatory 
framework for multimedia services. 
Historically, licensing has served a number of purposes: 
•  A licence represents government permission for  a private business to operate.  Licences 
often involve the payment of a one-off licence fee or a stream of continuing royalties to 
the  government.  To  this  extent,  licences  are  a  mechanism  for  taxation  which,  if 
excessive,  can deter  market entry.  In  view  of the  temptation  to  use  licence  fees  as  a 
source of general revenue,  such fees  should be no  greater than necessary to  cover the 
actual  administrative costs associated with the  granting of a licence.  Otherwise,  short-
term  revenue  generation may  lead  to  the  creation of long-term  inefficiencies  and  the 
lack of innovation usually  associated  with limited  competition.  Possible  exceptions  to 
this  principle  would  include:  (i)  licences  for  facilities-based  public  operators,  where 
licence  conditions  are  complex  and  administrative  and  supervisory  costs  are 
correspondingly high;  (ii) licences  allocating scarce resources,  where fees  equal to  the 
commercial  value  of the  resource  allocated  may  be justified  and  may  ensure  optimal 
use. 
•  A licence  is  often used  to  correct a market  failure  that  would  otherwise  lead  to  the 
misallocation or misuse of resources.  For example, the right to use a certain portion of 
the  electromagnetic spectrum needs  to  be controlled to prevent the  negative  effects  of 
radio interference that would occur in an unregulated environment. Another example is 
the  case  of public  rights-of-way,  or  wayleaves.  To  prevent  excessive  tearing  up  of 
public thorough fares  and the  associated inconvenience,  limits  may  be justified on the 
right  to  install  underground  or  overhead  facilities.  Licences  are  also  used  to  set 
conditions  on the  environmental  impact of certain activities,  such  as  the  construction 
and operation of telecoms networks, the siting of radio towers, and so on. 
•  Licensing can also be used to  create a  legal barrier to  entry  for new competitors.  The 
consequence  of using  licensing  in  such  a  manner  is  the  creation  of inefficiencies 
associated with a lack of competition (see above).  Licensing restrictions raise barriers to 
entry,  reduce  the  level  of competition  and  hamper  the  ability  of new  entrants  to 
challenge  the  market  power  of dominant  operators.  Licensing  may  also  introduce 
technological  distortions,  by  imposing  conditions  going  beyond  "essential  technical 
requirements" . 
•  A key  function of licensing is  to  grant permission to  use a scarce public asset,  and  to 
maintain public control over the use of the asset.  The element of scarcity has been one 
of the policy bases for imposing restrictions on the content of broadcasting, which uses 
spectrum that is  arguably a public asset in limited supply.  In the  telecoms  arena,  such 
policies have historically been predicated on the assumption of natural monopoly or the 
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scarcity  of bandwidth,  spectrum,  or processing  power.  This  approach  has  led  to  the 
imposition in many  countries of common carrier and  public interest obligations in the 
telecoms and broadcasting sectors. 
•  Another  function  of licensing  is  to  promote  the  attainment  of certain  public  interest 
goals and,  in particular, to ensure that the operator has  met certain  standards. The goal 
is to protect consumers from fraud or unsatisfactory products or services in those cases 
where  service  quality  is  hard  to  evaluate  prior  to  its  purchase.  Consumers  can  be 
protected by providing the regulator with the authority to issue cease-and-desist orders, 
impose  fines,  and  use  other  appropriate  enforcement  tools,  including  the  referral  of 
fraud to criminal authorities. 
•  Licences  can  also  be  used  as  a  means  of supervising  activities  considered  to  be  of 
public, cultural and democratic importance.  These policy goals have been of particular 
relevance in the broadcasting sector. 
The  functions  set  forth  in the  first  four  bullet points  above  are  fundamentally  matters  of 
economic  regulation.  As  such,  they  raise  such  issues  as  how  many  operators  should  be 
allowed to  provide infrastructure and services in a multimedia environment,  and the terms 
and conditions pursuant to which they should be allowed to do so. 
By way of contrast, the last two bullet points raise fundamental issues of public policy. 
Licensing requirements in the  telecoms and broadcasting sectors will be  assessed below in 
light of these prevailing forms  of economic and  non-economic regulation.  In keeping with 
the prevailing vertical models of regulation, the Study Team will review these issues on the 
basis of the current telecoms and broadcasting regulatory frameworks. 
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1.2  COMMUNITY  REGULATORY  FRAMEWORK  FOR  THE  LICENSING  OF  TELECOMS 
INFRASTRUCTURE AND SERVICES 
The harmonisation of licensing  conditions  for  telecoms  services  and  infrastructure  in  the 
European Union is being achieved at present through the use of two legislative instruments, 
namely: 
Article 3 of the Full Competition Directive;
2 and 
The Licensing Directive. 
3 
The  Licensing  Directive,  which  is  due  to  be  implemented  by  the  Member  States  by  31 
December 1997 (subject to certain derogations), defines a common framework for national 
licensing and authorisation regimes, based upon the following policy goals: 
•  a prohibition on the a priori limitation of the number of licences that may be 
granted,  other  than  to  the  extent  required  by  the  efficient  allocation  of 
frequencies  or, for the time necessary,  to  make available sufficient numbers 
in accordance with Community law; 
4 
•  a preference for the lightest possible regulatory regime; 
•  a preference for  general  authorisations  (as  opposed to  individual  licences); 
and 
•  authorisation of new services  not covered by an existing  authorisation on a 
provisional basis within six weeks of the  filing  of an application (subject to 
the  possibility  of Member  States  extending  this  time  limit  for  up  to  four 
months in objectively justified cases) . 
•  The harmonisation of: 
national procedures (award procedures must be open, harmonised 
and non-discriminatory); and 
the  conditions  which  may  be  attached  to  licences  (licence 
conditions  must  be  justified,  non-discriminatory  and  subject  to 
proportionality). 
Commission  Directive  96119/EC  of 13  March  1996  amending  Commission  Directive  90/388/EEC 
regarding the implementation of full competition in telecommunications markets, OJ  1996 L74/13. 
Directive 97/13/EC of the  European Parliament and of the  Council of 10  April  1997  on a common 
framework  for  general  authorisations  and  individual  licences  in  the  field  of telecommunications 
services, OJ  1997 L117  115. 
The Commission acceded to demands of the Member States to limit the number of licences if there is 
a  shortage of numbers  (Article  10),  but the  effect of this  is  limited  since  most  Member States  are 
obliged to  ensure  that  adequate  numbers  are  available by  1 July  1997  under the  terms of the  Full 
Competition Directive. 
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•  The  facilitation  of  cross-border  services  (but  without  any  obligation  of 
mutual recognition). 
In adopting the Licensing Directive,  there was general agreement among the Member States 
that the Directive should not apply to the rules adopted by the Member States governing the 
"distribution of audiovisual programmes intended for the general public, and the content of 
such programmes" . 
5 
1.2.1  Types of Licences 
Individual  licences  may  only  be  required to  the  extent  that  access  is  being  provided  to 
"scarce resources" (namely, access to frequencies, numbers and/or rights of way) 
6 or where 
the licensee is  subject to  particular obligations/benefits (e.g., universal service obligations, 
specific obligations arising from "significant" market power in conformity with Community 
law,  or the  provision of "public"  infrastructure  between  the  European  Union  and  third 
countries). 
Although  Member  States  may  require  an  individual  licence  for  organisations  providing 
universal  service,  the  same  is  not  true  of organisations  whose  only  obligation  is  to 
contribute  to  its  financing.  It is  widely  understood  that  an  individual  licence  may  be 
required by most Member States where a company wishes to provide basic voice telephony 
services and to establish and provide a public telecommunications network requiring the use 
of radio frequencies. 
The  Licensing  Directive  also  allows  Member  States  to  require  individual  licences  for 
anyone  offering  a  voice  telephony  service,  operating  public  networks  or  using  radio 
frequencies  in addition  to  the  situations  listed  above.  A  review  clause  can be  found  in 
Article  22,  however,  which  requires  the  Commission  to  reconsider  the  scope  of the 
activities which may be subject to individual licences as part of the 1999  telecoms review. 
A fee  may be imposed for the grant of an individual licence, but only insofar as  it reflects 
the administrative costs incurred in the administration of the licence.  The final text of the 
Licensing Directive leaves open the potential for  a licence fee  to reflect the costs borne in 
maintaining an independent regulator or administering a licensing regime in general, rather 
than the costs borne only with respect to the processing of a licence application.  The fee 
structure  must  be  published  so  as  to  be  easily  accessible.  Fees  imposed  to  recover 
administrative  costs  must  be  based  on  objective,  transparent  and  non-discriminatory 
criteria. 
The  Licensing  Directive  confers  a  great  degree  of flexibility  on  National  Regulatory 
Authorities.  For  example,  there  is  nothing  to  prevent  a  regulator  from 
Refer to Article 1(2) of the Licensing Directive. 
Refer to Article 3(3) of the Licensing Directive. 
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suspending/withdrawing a general authorisation or an individual licence for non-compliance 
with licence conditions.  However, there is  an obligation to  give the undertaking concerned 
an opportunity to state its views and to remedy any breaches.  Suspension decisions must be 
reasoned and made subject to appeal. 
1.2.2  Licence Conditions 
The Licensing Directive also identifies the conditions which may be attached to both general 
and individual authorisations, when the imposition of a heavier regime is justified. 
Conditions which may be attached to individual licences are: 
•  specific conditions set out in an Annex to the  Licensing Directive; 
•  those which may be attached to general licences (but only where justified); 
•  compliance with "essential requirements"; and 
•  information  requirements  necessary  to  verify  compliance  with  licence 
conditions. 
Conditions which may be attached to general authorisations are: 
•  compliance with "essential requirements"; 
•  information requirements which are reasonable in order to verify compliance 
with operating conditions; and 
•  specific conditions for example, the protection of consumers as defined in the 
ONP Voice Telephony Directive, 
7 universal service obligations, the provision 
of universal directory information, emergency services, and special 
arrangements for the disabled, and general interconnection obligations (as 
contained in the Interconnection Directive). 
8 
Directive  95/62/EC  of the  European  Parliament  and  of the  Council  of 13  December  1995  on  the 
application of open network provision to voice telephony, OJ  1995 L321/6. 
Directive  97 /33/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  30  June  1997  on 
interconnection in telecommunications with regard to  ensuring universal  service and  interoperability 
through application of the principles of the open network provision (ONP), OJ  1997 L199/32. 
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1.2 .3  Reporting Timetables 
The Full Competition Directive
9 imposes a number of filing  and information obligations on 
the Member States regarding their  telecoms licensing regimes. The following deadlines had 
to be satisfied unless derogations were obtained: 
•  notification  by  1  January  1997  to  the  Commission  of any  licensing  or 
declaration  procedures  for  the  provision  of voice  telephony  and/ or  the 
deployment of public telecommunications infrastructure; and 
•  publication by  1 July  1997  of any  such licensing or declaration procedures 
for  the  provision  of  voice  telephony  and/  or  the  deployment  of  public 
telecoms infrastructure. 
1.3  THE LICENSING OF "TELECOMS" SERVICES 
Historically,  the  European  Union  has  accorded priority  to  the  liberalisation of  telecoms 
services, rather than the infrastructure which can support such services. 
Under  the  terms  of the  original  Services  Directive  in  1990,
10  the  provision  of telecoms 
services was fully liberalised except insofar as: 
•  a  monopoly  over  the  provision  of voice  telephony  and  the  provision  of 
network infrastructure was maintained for  telecoms operators; 
11  and 
•  certain  types  of services  were  expressly  excluded  from  the  scope  of the 
Services  Directive because of their relative  market immaturity  at  the  time, 
but  which  have  since  been  expressly  liberalised  through  successive 
amendments  to  the  Services  Directive  (principally,  satellite  and  mobile 
communications, paging, and also telex). 
The discussion of telecoms services below addresses the following categories : 
10 
II 
•  voice telephony services over fixed lines; 
•  liberalised  or  "value  added"  telecoms  services  (including  on-line  and  on-
demand communications services); 
Article  3 of Commission Directive 96119/EEC  of 13  March  1996  amending  Commission Directive 
90/388/EEC  regarding  the  implementation  of full  competition  in  telecommunications  markets,  OJ 
1996 L74/13. 
Commission Directive 90/388/EEC on competition in  the  markets  for  telecommunications  services, 
OJ  1990 L192/10. 
According  to  Recital  18  of the  Services  Directive,  a monopoly  over  voice  services  could  only  be 
maintained in order to ensure a revenue base for universal service (i.e., the provision of a nationwide 
network). 
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•  mobile communications services; and 
•  satellite services. 
1.3.1  Voice Services 
The Regulatory Issues 
Market  interviews  indicate  that  the  ability  to  provide  voice  telephony  services, 
particularly during  the important transitional phase from monopoly to  competition,  is  a 
critical consideration in  the  strategic  investment decisions  of potential  new  multimedia 
market entrants.  Voice services are seen by many investors as  the short-term regulatory 
driver for  the  future  development of a portfolio of multimedia services,  most of which 
are  relatively  untested  in  the  marketplace.  As  a consequence,  it  is  important  that  the 
licensing  requirements  imposed  on  providers  of  voice  services  should  not  be  so 
cumbersome as to deter market entry. 
Conversely,  in  a  future  multimedia  market,  the  possible  (and  some  say  likely) 
commoditisation of voice services (see Chapters I and II  of the Study) may diminish the 
relative  importance  of such  services  relative  to  the  remainder of a multimedia  service 
package  (or  at  least  be  of relatively  low  economic  value).  The  Study  Team  see  this 
possible  market  development  as  exerting  pressure  on  regulators  to  adopt  the  least 
burdensome licensing regime for voice services (i.e., because the relative cost of market 
entry in the short-term may not be proportional to the  economic value of voice services 
in the longer term). In the transition from monopoly to free competition, it may therefore 
be  important to  subject  licensing  regimes  to  regular  review  so  as  to  ensure  that  they 
reflect the economic and social values attached to various services in a multimedia world. 
Insofar as the intrinsic economic "value" of voice services might diminish over time, the 
manner in which such services are licensed ought to  reflect the manner in which value-
added services are regulated.  Indeed, Member States  such as  Denmark, Finland and The 
Netherlands  no  longer require an individual licence for the provision of voice telephony 
services.  The growth of voice communications over the Internet will also have the effect 
of blurring the distinction between  "voice" services and other digitalised communications 
(at least from a technological viewpoint). 
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(i)  Timetable for Liberalisation 
In  accordance  with  the  terms  of the  Full  Competition  Directive, 
12  the  deadline  for  the 
liberalisation of public switched voice telephony is  1 January 1998 unless a Member State 
has  been  granted  a  derogation  from  this  obligation  on  the  basis  of its  less-developed 
network (or, in the case of Luxembourg,  its smaller network). 
13 
Countries such as  Sweden,  Finland and the  United Kingdom have liberalised voice services 
for  a  number  of years,  with  full  liberalisation  of voice  services  having  occurred  most 
recently in Denmark (1  July 1996) and in The Netherlands (1  July 1997). 
In  addition,  France  made  available  in  July  1996  (effective  in practice  by  early  1997)  a 
series of experimental multi-purpose telecoms licences (so-called "Lex" licences) which run 
for a period of five  years and are limited in terms of geographic scope and the number of 
subscribers that may be served (i.e., not exceeding 20,000). 
12  Article 3b  of Commission Directive 96119/EEC  of 13  March  1996 amending Commission Directive 
90/388/EEC  regarding  the  implementation  of full  competition  in  telecommunications  markets,  OJ 
1996 L74/13. 
Of the five countries which sought derogations-- Ireland,  Greece, Portugal,  Spain and Luxembourg--
the periods requested and granted are shorter than the maximum period available (namely, five years). 
The  longest  of these  derogations  was  obtained  by  Greece,  which  has  until  31  December  2000  to 
liberalise voice telephony.  In  the case of Spain,  the derogation regarding voice  telephony lasts  only 
until  1 December  1998,  and  was  in  any  event  conditional  upon  Spain  granting  two  national  voice 
telephony licences prior to  that date (i.e., to  Retevision and a third licensee),  plus the  right of cable 
TV  concessionaires  to  provide  local  voice  telephony  services.  See:  Commission  Decision  of 27 
November  1996  concerning  the  additional  implementation  periods  requested  by  Ireland  for  the 
implementation of Commission Directives 90/388/EEC and 96/2/EC as regards full competition in the 
telecommunications markets, OJ  1997 L4118;  Commission Decision of 12 February 1997 concerning 
the  granting of additional implementation periods to  Portugal for the implementation of Commission 
Directives 90/388/EEC and  96/2/EC as  regards full  competition in the  telecommunications markets, 
OJ  1997  L133/19;  Commission  Decision  of  14  May  1997  concerning  the  granting  of additional 
implementation periods to Luxembourg for the implementation of Commission Directives 90/388/EEC 
and  96/2/EC  as  regards  full  competition  in  the  telecommunications  markets,  OJ  1997  L234/7; 
Commission Decision of  10 June  1997 concerning the  granting of additional implementation periods 
to  Spain  for  the implementation of Commission Directives 90/388/EEC and  96/2/EC as  regards full 
competition in the telecommunications  markets,  OJ  1997  L243/48;  and  Commission Decision of 18 
June  1997  concerning  the  granting  of  additional  implementation  periods  to  Greece  for  the 
implementation  of  Directive  90/388/EEC  and  96/2/EC  as  regards  full  competition  in  the 
telecommunications markets, OJ  1997 L245/6. 
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(ii)  Scope of "Voice Telephony" Services 
For a telecoms  service to  be regarded as  voice telephony,  and hence a "reserved service" 
within the  meaning of the  Services Directive,  it must comply with all  the  criteria used to 
define the concept of "public switched voice telephony" as: 
"the commercial provision for the public of the  direct  transport and switching of 
speech  in  real-time  between public switched network termination points,  enabling 
any user to use equipment connected to such a network termination point in order to 
communicate with another termination point." 
14 
The burden of proof that  a new  service  actually constitutes  "voice telephony"  rests with 
national regulators. 
15 
(iii)  Regulatory Status of "Voice on the Internet " 
For some time, there has existed a degree of regulatory uncertainty in many Member States 
as  to  the  regulatory  status  of voice  communications  over the  Internet.  To  date,  however, 
"voice on the Internet" has been provided free of any licensing requirements at the Member 
State level, primarily because it has not as yet had a significant commercial impact. 
The classification of voice over the Internet as  "voice telephony"  would have a significant 
impact on the  future  development of such  services  in  the  short term.  In particular,  such 
services  might  be  subject  to  an  individual  licence  (and  all  the  attendant  costs  relating 
thereto) and subject to the payment of universal service obligations. 
Given the regulatory uncertainty regarding the classification of these services, the European 
Commission issued  in May  1997  a  "Draft position on the  status  of voice  on the  Internet 
pursuant to the  Services Directive" (the  "Notice").
16 According to the  Notice,  "voice on the 
Internet"  cannot at present be considered  "voice telephony",  as  that concept is  defined in 
the  Services  Directive.  More  specifically,  voice  on  the  Internet  does  not  satisfy  the 
individual elements of the legal definition of "voice telephony", for the following reasons: 
•  It is  often  the  simple  technical  non-commercial  provision  of a  telephone  connection 
between two Internet users. 
•  Internet telephony is usually effected via leased circuits, even if the call terminates on a 
public switched network. 
14 
15 
16 
Article  1  ( 1)  of  Commission  Directive  90/388/EEC  on  competition  in  the  markets  for 
telecommunications services, OJ  1990 L192/10. 
Communication by the  Commission to  the  European Parliament  and the  Council  on  the  status  and 
implementation of Directive  90\388\EEC  on competition  in  the  market  for  the  telecommunications 
services, OJ 1995 C275/2. 
Commission Notice concerning the status of voice on the Internet pursuant to  Directive 90/388/EEC, 
OJ  1997 Cl40/8. 
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•  Internet telephony can occur via cable television networks, which do not benefit from a 
monopoly over voice telephony. 
•  Internet telephony does not take place in real-time. 
1.  Legal Impact 
Prior to  the  release  of the  Notice,  the  regulatory treatment of voice  over the  Internet was 
uncertain  in  a  number  of Member  States,  with  only  Sweden,  Italy,  Germany,  Finland, 
Denmark  and  Austria  having  concluded  that  voice  over  the  Internet  was  a  liberalised 
service. Seen in this light, the main consequences of the Notice are: 
•  Voice  on  the  Internet  is  a liberalised  service  that  cannot  be  claimed  as  a monopoly 
II reserved service 
11  by incumbent national  telecoms operators. 
•  Member  States  cannot  impose  an  individual  licensing  requirement  on  Internet 
access/ service providers. 
•  Internet access/ service  providers may  not  be  required to  contribute  to  the  support of 
universal service. 
17 
The  Commission  indicates  in  the  Notice  the  need  for  proportionality  in  applying  any 
elements  of the  current regulatory  framework  to  Internet voice  telephony  services  in  the 
future, as and when it is considered to meet the current criteria. 
2.  Commercial Impact 
The potential  commercial  challenge presented  by  voice  on the  Internet,  regardless  of its 
regulatory classification, has been recognised recently by a number of telecoms operators. 
In Finland,  for example, Telecom Finland became the first incumbent telecoms operator to 
encourage the  use  of the  Internet for  voice  communications.  Rather than providing  such 
services itself,  Telecom Finland commenced sales in December  1996 of Vocaltel software 
(which allows PC  users equipped with a microphone and sound card to  talk to  users with 
similar equipment). 
More recently, in the summer of 1997,  a number of events took place which escalated the 
importance  of voice  on the  Internet.  In  Germany,  Deutsche  Telekom launched  customer 
trials  of a non-PC  based telephone-to-telephone Internet telephony  service ( "T-NetCall"), 
with  plans  to  commercialise  the  service  by  the  end  of 1997.  In  France,  the  telecoms 
17  The text of the  1997 French Decree on Universal Service, however, arguably subjects Internet traffic 
to  the  payment of universal service obligations,  which would be contrary to the position taken by the 
European Commission in its Notice. 
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regulator  (the  "ART")  approved  the  requests  of two  major  cable  networks  to  provide 
Internet access.  France Telecom announced that it was  in the  advanced stages of trials for 
telephone-to-telephone Internet telephony which bypasses the use of the personal computer. 
Earlier  in  1997,  Telia  of Sweden  obtained  a  Section  214  (international  facilities-based) 
licence  in  the  United  States,  citing  the  relative  importance  of Internet  traffic  between 
Sweden  and  the  United  States  as  a  prime  reason  for  its  decision  to  obtain  the  licence. 
According to  Telia, it now carries over three times  as  much "Internet" traffic (although the 
voice  component  of this  percentage  is  anticipated  to  be  relatively  small)  as  traditional 
"voice" traffic on this trans-Atlantic route. 
In  addition,  a number  of European  telecoms  operators  are  working  closely  on the  ETSI 
project known  as  Project  Tiphon,  which  is  aimed  at  establishing  common  standards  for 
Internet telephony  by  September  1998.  Companies  involved  in  this  project  include  most 
major  equipment  and  microelectronics  manufacturers  of  both  European  and  North 
American parentage. 
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,  .......................  , ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................  , 
Implications for Multimedia 
Defining the regulatory status of voice on  the Internet solely in  terms  of the existing regulatory definition of i 
"voice  telephony" highlights the inherent weakness of licensing new digital services along traditional sectoral  i 
lines. Even if  voice on the Internet communications were being made through a PSTN connection at either end,  ! 
the reality of digitalisation means that any communication, whether voice, data, images or sound on, is simply a ! 
stream of "bits" to  the provider of the Internet service.  Consequently,  an  Internet  Service  Provider ("ISP")  is  i 
not in a position to know the particular nature of any given communication, nor is the ISP able to differentiate  i 
voice  communications from  other streams  of traffic  in  multimedia  applications  such  as  videoconferencing  or  ! 
telemedicine.  I 
~  i 
! In any event, it is  the  use of enabling software which  allows an end user to  transmit voice messages over the  ! 
l Internet,  and  such  software  may  be  supplied  by  a  variety  of vendors  independent  of the  ISP.  In  these  ! 
i  circumstances,  it  would  be  a disproportionate  burden  to  subject  the  ISP  to  an  individual  licence for  voice  i 
i  telephony, both because of the high entry costs (licence fees) and because of the inherent difficulties of separating  i 
, voice from other traffic streams for purposes of  determining the ISP' s universal service obligation contribution.  . 
! The  growth  in  Internet  communications  may  require,  therefore,  a  radical  overhaul  of existing  regulatory  ! 
i  definitions (see Section 2 of  Annex I) to reflect the realities of digitalisation. In this regard, the increasing use of  i 
! voice  over  the  Internet  may  require  a re-evaluation  of the  need  to  distinguish  voice  telephony from  other  ! 
! communications services. Is  · 
;  ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................  ; 
18  The  Notice  has  been  updated  to  reflect  the  fact  that  the  dynamics  of convergence  are  having  an 
immediate impact on the existing regulatory definition for  "voice telephony".  As  is  acknowledged by 
the  Commission  in  its  revised  Notice:  "The  current  position of voice  communications  on  Internet 
under  Community  law  may  change  in  the  light  of  further  technical  and  market  developments". 
Accordingly, the Commission has undertaken to  review the scope of the Notice, and at least before 1 
January  2000.  Refer to  Status  of voice  communications on  Internet under Community  Law  and,  in 
particular, pursuant to Directive 90/388/EEC, OJ (1998) C 6/4 of 10 January 1998. 
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(iv)  Licence Requirements for Voice Services 
The Licensing  Directive  has  been  interpreted  by  most  Member  States  as  permitting  the 
individual licensing of voice services. 
Countries such as  Denmark and Finland,  however,  do  not require any licence whatsoever 
(merely  a simple pro forma  registration).  The  Netherlands  has  subjected the  provision of 
voice  services  to  a simple  authorisation procedure.  In the  United  Kingdom,  the  licensing 
regime  foresees  the  granting  of individual  licences  for  three  categories  of voice-based 
services (regional, national and international facilities-based). 
In Sweden,  individual licences were, until the enactment of the 1997  Telecoms Act on 1 July 
1997, only required for three types of services provided over a public network: 
•  voice telephony services to a fixed termination point; 
•  mobile communications services; 
•  other telecoms services that require the assignment of capacity of a telephony 
numbering plan. 
An additional  individual licence category has  now  been created  in  Sweden  under its  new 
1997 Telecoms Act for the provision of infrastructure. 
In the  transition to  full  competition,  countries  such  as  Finland,  the  United  Kingdom  and 
Portugal have  formally  separated national and international voice telephony as  part of the 
incremental liberalisation of voice services. 
Even where a formal regulatory distinction between national and international telephony has 
not  been  established  for  licensing  purposes,  effective  competition  is  consistently  most 
pronounced  in the  provision of international,  as  opposed to  national,  telephony  services. 
For  example,  in  Finland,  the  Finnet  group  achieved  a  market  share  of 56%  of the 
international voice market in the first year after Telecom Finland 's international telephony 
monopoly  came to  an end.  Similarly,  in  Sweden,  new  competitors  for  international voice 
services have secured more than 20%  of the market in a period of six years (and rising) but 
have had little competitive impact on Telia' s local telephony operations despite years of free 
competition.  As  regards  the  United  Kingdom,  new  entrants  have  succeeded  in  obtaining 
approximately  40%  of the  international  voice  telephony  market  since  the  introduction of 
full  competition  for  international voice  services. 
19  In Denmark,  Tele  Danmark has  stated 
recently that its  share  of the  outgoing  international call  market has  declined  from  90%  -
95% at the end of December 1996 to 80% by June 1997. 
19  According to 0 FTEL'  s document entitled "Market Information 1992/3 to  1996/7'' (December 1997), 
as at March 1997,  BT had 61%  of all international calls,  with Mercury Communications and Cable & 
Wireless  Communications  having  14%  and  6%  respectively,  and  all  other  operators  holding  the 
remaining  18%.  By  comparison,  BT'  s  market  share  for  local  and  national  calls  is  resilient, 
maintaining levels of 90%  and 80%  respectively. 
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These  figures  can  be  partly  explained  by  the  fact  that  international  telephony  has 
traditionally been the most lucrative segment of the  telecoms  sector.  More fundamentally, 
there is a strong regulatory rationale for  such developments.  For example, the only country 
in which serious competition at the level of local voice telephony has occurred is  Finland, 
where the members of the Finnet group, because of their widespread access to the customer 
directly through the  ownership of local  loop  facilities  (cable),  were  able  to  translate  that 
infrastructure  build-out  and  strong  local  telephony  market  share  into  a  significant 
competitive presence in international voice services. 
(v)  Licence Conditions 
In addition to  the criteria set forth in the  Licensing Directive,  licences for  voice telephony 
display the following characteristics: 
1.  Licence Fees 
Market  interviews  indicate  that,  with  the  exception  of  Germany,  individual  licences  for 
voice  services  are considered by  most licensees  to  be reasonable,  insofar  as  they do  not 
impose serious barriers to entry. 
Under  the  German  Licensing  Ordinance  of 28  July  1997,  for  example,  Class  4  voice 
telephony  service  licences  are  valued  at  3  million  D  M  for  the  whole  of the  German 
territory,  with  a  sliding  scale  of lower  fees  being  payable  where  the  coverage  is  less 
(according to the number of inhabitants in the covered area). 
20 The German licence fees  are 
applied  on  a one-off basis,  and  are not  subject to  an additional  annual  charge.  Although 
these  licence  fees  are  significantly  less  than  was  originally  proposed  by  the  German 
authorities  (i.e.,  40 million  DM),  most of the  smaller  new  market entrants  consider this 
licence fee to be prohibitive and contrary to the terms of the  Licensing Directive. 
In France,  operators need to spend an amount equal to 5%  of their investments (tax free) on 
research  and  development  ("R&D").  This  contribution  is  to  be  paid  annually,  and  the 
operators need to  submit a summary of the actions they have taken to promote R&D to the 
national regulatory authority and the Ministry of Communications. 
21 
In Spain,  neither Telefonica nor the second voice telephony operator,  Retevision, has  been 
thus far charged a specific fee  for the provision of voice services and,  although no licence 
fees  have  formally  been  charged  for  the  cable  TV  concessions  which  are  now  being 
tendered, bidders must agree to a specified "minimum investment" performance bond set at 
a percentage of the total investment (the performance bond for the Barcelona concession is 
set, for example, at four percent of the  Pta 20 billion (179m ECU) investment. 
20 
21 
A distinction is  drawn between area licences and  line  licences.  The  latter type  of licence  is  in  turn 
divided between local and long distance connections. 
Decree  of 27 December  1996  (No.  1175),  OJ  29  December,  Chapter  2,  Section  1,  Article  D. 
98(1)(g). 
_  Analy__sys _________  _ Comparative Overview of Current Regulatory Environment in Telecommunications and Broadcasting Sectors/Licensing  Page  18 
For a comparative list of licence fees,  refer to Table IV of Annex I. 
2.  Duration 
The duration of voice telephony licences varies from Member State to Member State. They 
may  be  of indefinite  duration (e.g.,  Spain  and  Sweden),  or may  range  from  25  years  in 
countries such as the  United Kingdom to 15 years in Italy  and France (refer to Table III of 
Annex I). 
Commercial  cable  TV  franchises  or  concessions  which  include  the  authority  to  provide 
voice  services  range  from  23-25  years  in the  United  Kingdom,  with  25  years  also  being 
most recently prescribed in Spain (all terms are renewable). 
As  is  usual  with  all  licences  of a  "personal"  nature,  voice  telephony  licences  are  not 
assignable except in certain limited circumstances, which always require the prior approval 
of the appropriate regulatory authority. 
3.  Licence Review Procedure 
With the  exception of such  countries  as  The  Netherlands,  United  Kingdom,  Sweden  and 
Finland,  there has been little practical experience with respect to the manner in which voice 
telephony licences are processed.  In those countries,  the usual period between the time an 
application is  filed and a licence for voice telephony is  granted currently ranges from four 
to six months in the  United Kingdom (a PTO licence), 
22  to six weeks in Germany.  Many of 
the  delays  currently  experienced  are  due  to  the  relatively  few  resources  enjoyed  by  the 
respective  national  regulators,  as  well  as  the  relative  immaturity  of their  respective 
licensing procedures. 
The length of the licensing procedure also often reflects the detailed information required of 
licence  applicants.  In  Germany  and  France,  for  example,  detailed  business  plans  and 
network rollout strategies  must be provided to  the  regulator in the  context of the  licence 
application.  Even in the  United  Kingdom,  the  Department of Trade &  Industry  regularly 
make enquires of existing licensees whether their operations are producing tangible public 
good.  A number of potential  licensees  have  commented that this  degree of intrusiveness 
into  private  business  planning  is  inconsistent  with  a  regulatory  framework  in  which  the 
number of licensees cannot be restricted  ab initio.  Moreover, they claim that many business 
plans will per force be general in nature, given that most voice telephony markets have yet 
to  be fully  opened to  the  forces  of competition.  Recent practice in the  United  States  and 
elsewhere suggests that the viability of an applicant's business case is best left to the market 
to judge ex post rather than by the regulator ex ante. 
22  In mid-1977, over 125  "PTO" licences were being processed by the Department of Trade &  Industry 
in  the  United  Kingdom.  At  the  time  of writing,  this  backlog  is  being  overcome  in  light  of the 
implementation into national law of the Licensing Directive. 
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1.3.2  Value-Added Network Services ("VANS") 
The Regulatory Issues 
The  provision  of  value-added  network  services  ("VANS")  has  been  liberalised 
throughout the European Union since the adoption of the  Services Directive in 1990. The 
regulatory treatment of the basket of services which are considered to  be VANS  should 
in  principle  cover  most,  if not  all,  forms  of new  digital  services.  Consequently,  the 
manner in which such services are  regulated in many Member States should serve as  an 
appropriate  model  for  the  licensing  of "multimedia"  services  in  the  immediate  future 
(with  the  absence  of licensing,  which  currently  characterises  the  publishing  industry, 
possibly being even more appropriate in the context of a competitive multimedia market). 
Because  there  has  not  been  full  harmonisation  of  national  " telecoms"  licensing 
frameworks,  the  approach  of the  Member  States  to  the  licensing  of VANS  has  been 
anything  but  consistent.  Indeed,  some  Member  States  appear  to  have  interpreted  the 
Licensing  Directive  as  providing  a  legal  basis  for  imposing  licensing  obligations  on 
VANS  that  were  previously  provided  free  from  regulation.  Insofar  as  this  tendency 
reflects  a  minimal  level  of  regulatory  involvement  (e.g.,  class  licences  or  simple 
notifications),  this  should  not  create  unnecessary  market  entry  barriers  for  new 
competitors.  Such  barriers,  however,  have  arisen in certain Member  States  whose  fee 
structures bear no  reasonable relation to  the costs  of administering VANS  licences.  The 
absence  of a harmonised  approach to  the  duration of VANS  licences  may  also  have  a 
material  effect on the  ability  of certain new  market  entrants  to  provide  pan-European 
services. 
Most important, the effects of digitalisation and compression have brought VANS to the 
forefront of the debate regarding the traditional regulatory lines of demarcation between 
the telecoms sector and the broadcasting sector. The discussion below explores the ways 
in  which  current  Member  State  rules  apply  to  certain  new  "digital  services"  whose 
characteristics  contain elements  of both  regulatory  frameworks.  The  discussion  which 
follows in Section 2 of Annex I explores a number of longer term means of resolving the 
regulatory  impasse  which  is  likely  to  occur unless  fundamental  definitional  issues  are 
resolved. 
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The  residual  category  of  telecoms  services  liberalised  by  the  Services  Directive  may 
conveniently  be  described  as  VANS.  These  liberalised  services  comprise  essentially  any 
transmission of data  and/or voice  signals  (other  than public  voice  telephony)  to  which  a 
telecoms  operator adds  some commercial value.  For example,  VANS  include a variety of 
network-based  services,  including  E-mail,  EDI,  on-line  remote  database  access,  protocol 
conversion  services  and  access  to  the  Internet.  VANS  can  be  offerings  to  the  general 
public, especially when the service is widely deployed geographically, and is offered to any 
user who wishes to subscribe. 
Although VANS were initially introduced to serve the needs  of corporate customers, today 
services  such  as  on-line  information  services  cater  to  a  much  larger  set  of customers, 
including  residential  subscribers.  VANS,  however,  can  be  distinguished  from  public 
offerings insofar as  regulators impose no obligations on providers of VANS  to  make their 
services  universally  available 
23  and  do  not  regulate  the  terms  and  conditions  pursuant to 
which  such  services  are  provided.  This  relatively  minimal  regulatory  interference, 
however, is not necessarily reflected in all Member States insofar as licensing is concerned. 
In the  absence  of full  compliance  with the  harmonised  terms  of the  Licensing Directive, 
VANS  are  subject  to  a  variety  of  declaration  and  authorisation  requirements.  These 
licensing requirements, in order of least to most onerous, can be summarised as follows: 
(i)  Notifications 
In  many  countries,  the  provision  of VANS  only  requires  notification  to  the  national 
regulatory  authority.  The  details  of the  notification vary  from  Member  State  to  Member 
State.  In most cases,  services  must be  notified prior to  the  commencement of operations 
(e.g. , France,  The  Netherlands  and  Sweden).  In  Germany,  however,  notification may  be 
delayed until one month after the commencement of operations. In  Belgium, the system is a 
hybrid  one,  consisting  of a  non-opposition  procedure,  in  which  a  service  is  deemed 
approved if the national regulator does  not oppose the provision of the  service within two 
months from the filing  of the notification.  In  Luxembourg,  the enactment of a new law in 
1997  has  meant  that  many  VANS,  which  had  been  previously  unregulated,  are  now 
required to satisfy a declaration procedure. 
In  some  Member  States,  notification  requirements  coexist  with  individual  authorisation 
requirements  for  the  vast  majority  of services.  In  such  instances,  services  subject  to  a 
simple  notification  requirement  are  often  defmed  very  narrowly,  which  means  that  the 
benefits of a notification are not available for most types of VANS. 
24 
Under a notification system,  the period of authorised operation is  by and large unlimited, 
provided that the  operator complies  with prescribed essential  requirements  of a technical 
An exception is found in the provision of leased line capacity by incumbent telecoms operators. 
For example:  Italy,  notification was until recently only  appropriate for  services not using leased line 
capacity;  in  Greece -until  March  1997  - notification was  only  appropriate for  services using  leased 
line capacity below 2 x 64 Kbp/s. 
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nature. The transfer of assets and/or operations is usually not restricted, nor are changes in 
the corporate structure of the operator other than a simple notification of that change for the 
purposes of ensuring that the new operator complies with essential requirements. 
Regulations adopted in  Greece in 1997 have introduced a unique fee  structure (at least for 
the  European  Union)  for  VANS.  The  fees  are  based  on  a  percentage  of the  operator's 
annual revenues (0.5%). Moreover, the fee is imposed retrospectively. Such a fee  structure 
for  VANS  - especially  those  subject  to  a  simple  notification  procedure  - is  difficult  to 
reconcile with the terms of the Licensing Directive. 
(ii)  General (Class) Authorisations 
The  United  Kingdom  is  the  only  Member  State  in  which  a  system  of general  (so-called 
"Class") authorisations applies to  all VANS provided within the European Economic Area 
("EEA").  This excludes international simple resale services which,  if provided outside the 
EEA, require an individual authorisation. 
Some systems which have historically required more restrictive individual authorisations for 
VANS are now in the process of embracing general authorisation regimes. This is the case, 
for  example,  in  the  latest  series  of legislative  proposals  tabled  before  the  respective 
Parliaments of Italy  and  Spain  with the  exception of a limited number of cases  in which 
individual authorisations will continue to  be necessary,  namely:  ( i)  where scarce resources 
are needed;  and  (ii)  in  the  case  of Italy,  when  specific  licensing  conditions  are  imposed 
which  would  determine  the  application of an  individual  authorisation  requirement  (e.g., 
obligations regarding:  (a)  the provision of universal service;  (b)  Open Network Provision; 
and (c) the regulation of dominant operators). 
(iii)  Individual Authorisations 
Greece,  Italy,  Portugal  and  Spain  still  have  regulatory  frameworks  which  require  new 
entrants  to  obtain individual  authorisations  to  provide  many  types  of VANS.  Legislative 
proposals currently being discussed by the Parliaments of Italy and Spain, would,  if finally 
approved,  abolish  these  individual  authorisation  requirements  for  the  vast  majority  of 
telecoms services. 
The duration of individual  authorisations  currently varies  among  Member  States  ( e.g. ,  9 
years in Italy,  10 years in  Greece,  15 years in Portugal) and all are subject to  renewal.  In 
Spain,  authorisations  for  the  direct transmission of data to  and  from network termination 
points  may  be  for  10  years  (renewable  for  successive  periods  of equal  duration up  to  a 
maximum of 30 years); other VANS are authorised for an indefinite period. This distinction 
is likely to be removed under proposed legislation. 
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The  transfer  of individual  authorisations  is  generally  prohibited  or  requires  regulatory 
approval  before  it  can  be  effected.  Also,  material  changes  in the  corporate  structure  of 
service providers are subject to regulatory approval. 
In some cases, the company seeking to provide VANS is  required to  establish a branch in 
the  country  of operation (e.g.,  Greece)  or have  a registered  address  in  a country  of the 
European Union (e.g., Italy, Portugal and Spain). 
Licence application fees  have been reported by operators to  constitute a significant burden 
in some of the countries listed above,  especially:  ( i)  in Italy,  where operators are required 
to  pay one  million lire up-front  for  their  licence  application,  plus  one million lire on an 
annual basis  for  each  site where switching equipment is  located;  and  (ii)  Portugal,  where 
500,000 escudos are due at the time of submitting an application, plus an annual fee  of two 
million escudos, plus 250,000 escudos for each renewal which is requested. 
In France  and  Germany,  although individual authorisation schemes  were maintained after 
their respective legislative overhauls in 1996, individual authorisations are for the most part 
(at least insofar as VANS concerned) linked to the use of radio spectrum or to the operation 
of public network infrastructure. 
(iv)  Licensing of "Multimedia" Services 
When VANS  were limited to  data or combined voice  and  data  transmissions,  they posed 
little threat to  the  regulatory status  quo;  they certainly did not create any  pressure on the 
traditional definitional boundaries between the  telecoms and broadcasting sectors. The onset 
of digitalisation,  the  use  of compression  technology  and  the  take-off  of the  Internet, 
however,  now  mean that  telecoms  networks  are  increasingly used to  carry visual  images 
(usually associated with the broadcasting sector). 
As  explained  in  Chapter  II  of the  Study,  ATM  technologies  and  a  range  of  xDSL 
technologies  are  facilitating  the  transport  of  such  images  over  traditional  telecoms 
networks. The introduction of multi-purpose cable systems and the spread of fixed wireless 
technologies such as Wireless Local Loop ( "WLL") are also making possible the combined 
transmission of data/voice/images, thereby enhancing the ability of operators to disseminate 
such multimedia communications. 
The Internet has  similarly expanded the possibilities for  multimedia transmission,  creating 
numerous transmission options  over many  different types of networks through the  use of 
the  IP  Protocol,  whether  for  business  purposes  (e.g.,  on-line  information  systems)  or 
entertainment  purposes  (on-demand  video  services).  We  discuss  below  the  different 
approaches to the regulatory treatment of these services at the Member State level. 
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1.  Germany 
The  only  Member  State  which  has  adopted  specific  regulation  regarding  multimedia 
services  is  Germany.  In its  new Teleservices  Law of 1 August  1997,  the  German Federal 
government  has  concluded  that  " teleservices"  should  not  be  subject  to  licensing  or 
registration requirements. The Teleservices Law applies to: 
"all electronic information and communication services which  are designed for the 
individual  use  of combinable  data  such  as  characters,  images  or  sounds  and  are 
based on transmission by means of  telecommunication (teleservices). "
25 
The  definition  of  "teleservices"  expressly  excludes  those  matters  defined  as 
"telecommunications" or "broadcasting" under German law.  Expressly included within the 
category of teleservices are: ( 1) services offered by means of personal communication ( e.g. , 
telebanking, data exchange);  (2) services offered for  information or communication, unless 
the  emphasis  is  on editorial arrangement to  form public opinion (data services providing, 
for example, traffic, weather, environmental and  stock exchange data, the dissemination of 
information on goods  and  services);  (3)  services providing access  to  the  Internet or other 
networks; (4)  services offering access to  telegames; and (5) goods and services offered and 
listed  in electronically accessible  databases  with interactive access  and  the  possibility  for 
direct ordering. 
26 
The Teleservices Law is  the first legislative instrument in which an attempt has  been made 
to define multimedia services in terms of the range of actual services offered, rather than on 
the usual basis of the technology used to deliver, or the nature of the infrastructure used to 
transport  messages.  Such  an  approach  constitutes  an  important  departure  from  existing 
practice, and is more consistent with the realities of the emerging multimedia marketplace. 
The  teleservices  approach,  however,  has  two  weaknesses,  namely:  ( i)  the  designation  of 
particularised services  may  trigger further  definitional  uncertainty  in  Germany  because  it 
may not be sufficiently future-proof; and (ii) the introduction of a  new definitional category, 
rather than the modification of existing regulatory boundaries, appears to run counter to the 
general thrust of convergence.  These issues  are discussed in greater detail in Section 2 of 
Annex I. 
The  Liinder  have  concluded  a  Treaty  with  the  Federal  government  which  purports  to 
implement  the  Teleservices  Law  in  a  manner  which  is  consistent  with  their  exclusive 
jurisdictional powers  over  "broadcasting"  matters.  Indeed,  it  is  the  understanding  of the 
Study Team that the  Lander will take an expansive view of the  scope of "broadcasting"  in 
relation to new multimedia services. This may create a worst  -case scenario in which market 
players  are  faced  with  a  dual  regulatory  characterisation  of  multimedia  services  as 
"teleservices"  and  "broadcasting".  The problems presented by  such  dual classification are 
likely to be resolved by the German Constitutional Court. 
25 
26 
Article 2(1) (unofficial translation). 
Article 1  (2) (unofficial translation). 
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2.  Other Member States 
Unlike the situation in  Germany,  multimedia services have not been regulated specifically 
by  other  Member  States.  The  existing  regulatory  categories  of  " telecoms"  and 
"broadcasting"  have  been  considered  sufficiently  flexible  (at  least  for  the  moment)  to 
include  such  services.  In  reality,  however,  continued  reliance  on  the  use  of existing 
regulatory categories will not lend itself to a harmonised view across all Member States on 
how each service should be characterised. 
In the  transition  of traditional  telecoms  and  broadcasting  regulatory  environments  to  a 
multimedia framework,  regulatory uncertainty regarding the status of potentially important 
multimedia  services  may  subject  new  operators  to  a  variety  of  different  regulatory 
requirements in different Member States.  This may deter new entry into the provision of 
such services on a pan-European basis. 
Two readily  identifiable  examples  of "multimedia"  service  providers  that  are  potentially 
subject to  inconsistent classification are Internet Service Providers and Video-on-Demand 
operations. 
•  Internet Service Provision 
Access to the Internet and a wealth of information-based services is one of the fundamental 
commercial drivers of multimedia.  By and large,  on-line  services  in general and Internet 
Service Providers  ("ISPs") in particular have  been regulated  as  VANS  in most Member 
States  (see  Table I  below).  Consequently,  they  are required to  comply with a  variety of 
notification or authorisation procedures:  e.g., Austria,  Belgium,  Ireland,  Italy,  Spain  and 
Greece- individual authorisation procedure;  United Kingdom- Class Licence. 
ISPs are exempt from any licensing requirements in Germany, France,
27  Denmark,  Sweden, 
Finland and The Netherlands. 
Of the Member States,  only  Portugal  requires  ISPs  to obtain an individual licence,  with 
Luxembourg also requiring an individual licence where the ISP provides its services over its 
own  infrastructure  or  that  of a  third  party  (otherwise,  the  ISP  is  also  subject  to  an 
authorisation procedure). 
Active debates  are taking  place  in a  number of Member States  at present regarding  the 
future regulation of ISPs. 
27  "Minitel" services are in turn subject to an agreement between France Telecom and service providers. 
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Member 
States 
Austria 
Belgiwn 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
28 
29 
Table 1:  Regulation of Internet Service Providers ("ISPs") 
No regulation  Value-Added  Individual  Broadcasting  Comments 
Service  Licence  Regime 
Provider 
~  In  theory  subject  to  an  authorisation 
procedure,  although  discussions  are 
taking  place  at  the  political  level  in 
order  to  determine  the  best  means  by 
which ISPs should be regulated. 
~  Regulated  as  a  Data  Service  Provider 
which  is  subject  to  an  individual 
declaration.  The  Internet  Service 
Providers'  Association  (''ISPA")  and 
the  BIPT are currently drafting a  Code 
of Conduct for the use of the Internet. 
~  ---
~  ---
~  ISPs  are  in  fact  treated  as  VANS 
providers,  but  are  not  subject  to  a 
licence  or  authorisation  regime.  The 
Telecommunications  Bill  of  1996 
contained  provisions  to  the  effect  that 
the  CSA 
28  would  exercise  jurisdiction 
over  content-related  issues,  but  a 
judgment  of the  Conseil  Constititionel 
held that this was unconstitutional. 
~  Under the terms of the Teleservices Act, 
effective as  of 1 August  1997, ISPs are 
not subject to licence conditions (merely 
to a notification requirement). 
~  As  of March  1997  (Law No.  2465197), 
ISPs  are  only  subject  to  an  individual 
authorisation  procedure,  with  approval 
following  automatically  after  3  months 
if no objections are raised. 
29 
~  Subject  to  the  fulfilment  of  attached 
terms of a standard licence to  which  all 
ISPs are subject. 
The regulator for broadcasting matters in France,  the Conseil superieur de 1' Audiovisuel. 
Previously,  where  an  ISP  wished  to  provide  its  services  over  leased  lines  in  excess  of 2x64  Kbit 
capacity,  an  individual  licence had  to  be  sought  (which  takes  up  to  6 months)  which  is  ultimately 
granted by the Minister after consideration by the NTC. 
_  Analy_5Y-s ________  _  ~~u;,.e, r£,1ukm ff Q~46j<f· 
LLP.  • Comparative Overview of Current Regulatory Environment in Telecommunications and Broadcasting Sector&/Licensing  Page 26 
Table 1:  Regulation of Internet Service Providers ("ISPs")  (Cont.) 
Member States  No  Value-Added  Individual  Broadcasting  Comments 
regulation  Service  Licence  Regime 
Provider 
Ita(v  ~  ISPs  are  considered  to  be  VANS  and 
subject  to  an  individual  authorisation 
requirement even where they use  leased 
lines with switched access to the PSTN. 
Lnrembottrg  ~  ~  Authorisation  available  from  the 
Ministere des Classes Moyennes insofar 
as lines are leased from the local TO. If 
being provided over self-owned or third 
party  infrastructure,  subject  to  an 
individual licence. 
The Netherlands  ~  As of  July  1997,  ISPs  are subject to  a 
general  registration  procedure  along 
with  all  other  VANS  providers; 
previously not subject to any regulation. 
Portugal  ~  Internet access  is  classified as  a  '"fixed 
complementary  service"  to  voice 
telephony  which  requires  individual 
licensing. 
Spain  ~  Subject  to  an  individual  authorisation 
procedure. 
Sweden  ~  --
United Kingdom  ~  Subject  to  a  Class  Licence  regime  for 
"enhanced services  ..  (the "TSL") where 
the  ISP  is  an  independent  entity.  Only 
where the ISP is  classified as  a ''TO" is 
it  regulated under its  individual  licence 
as  a '"supplemental service". 
_________  Analy_sy:s _ Comparative Overview of Current Regulatory Environment in Telecommunications and Broadcasting Sectors/Licem,ing  Page 27 
•  Video-On-Demand Entertainment Services 
On-demand  "entertainment"  services  have  been a major early driver of multimedia in the 
European  Union.  Although  these  services  are  not  "interactive"  in  the  strict  sense,  they 
nevertheless  incorporate consumer selection in the provision of individual  services,  which 
takes them outside the  sphere of traditional  "passive"  entertainment broadcasting services. 
The services most commonly discussed are Video-on-Demand ("VOD") services and Near-
Video-on-Demand ("NVOD") services. 
30 
To  date,  with the very limited exception of France,  there has  been no  specific legislation 
regarding new digitalised "entertainment" services in the Member States. In its White Paper 
(entitled  "Broadcasting  in the  90s:  Competition,  Choice,  Quality"),  the  United  Kingdom 
decided  against  creating  a  specific  regulatory  structure  for  such  services.  Similarly,  a 
Report  tabled  in  Finland  also  concluded  that  there  was  no  immediate  need  to  amend 
existing laws to address the expanding market of multimedia services. 
In  France,  Pay-Per-View  is  expressly  regulated  as  part  of the  offering  of cable  TV 
networks,  i.e., it  is  regulated as  a broadcasting matter by the  CSA.  Other Member States 
have not taken any specific action with respect to Pay-Per-View because they consider it to 
fall  within  the  sphere  of their  respective  broadcasting  laws  (i.e.,  only  the  transactional 
aspect constitutes a departure from traditional terrestrial broadcasting). 
31 
Similarly,  NVOD,  because  it  presumes  the  scheduled presentation  of programmes,  falls 
within  the  definition  of  "broadcasting"  contained  in  the  Television  Without  Frontiers 
Directive. 
32  Consequently,  there  is  general  unanimity  among  Member  States  as  to  the 
manner in which such services are likely to be characterised under national laws when they 
become widely available. 
The  regulatory  environment  for  VOD,  on  the  other  hand,  presents  a  more  fragmented 
regulatory picture.  The general consensus  is  that VOD,  because the customer  selects  and 
receives  a  programme  upon  his  or her  personal  request,  falls  within  the  definition  of 
"telecommunications" (reception by one consumer at a time). By way of contrast, where the 
programme  is  transmitted  at  set  intervals  to  a  large  number  of  actual  or  potential 
30 
31 
32 
The  difference  between  VOD  and  NVOD  is  that  the  former  implies  the  provision  of a  video 
programme at the precise time requested by a customer, whereas the latter implies that the  customer 
may choose to receive a video programme at a designated time in a series of scheduled times at which 
the programme is repeated. 
In Italy, enacting legislation will be required for Pay-Per-View services because they will be provided 
via separate channels.  In Ponugal, providers of subscription television require the authorisation of the 
Media Commission.  NVOD falls under the current interpretation of "subscription television". 
Refer to definition cited in Part 2 of Annex I. 
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consumers, the service falls within the definition of broadcasting (simultaneous reception by 
an undefined number of consumers, as is the case with NVOD). In these circumstances, the 
provision of audiovisual services on the individual demand of one person is  considered to 
be a point-to-point service and,  as such, regulated as any other  telecoms service. 
In  Germany,  NVOD  services  fall  within  the  new  definition  of  "teleservices"  and  are 
therefore not subject to regulation. At the other extreme, the CSA in  France takes the view 
that  even  point-to-point  messages  such  as  VOD  should  fall  within  the  domain  of 
"audiovisual"  matters  when based on the  transmission of images.  Regulation based on a 
category  as  broad as  "audiovisual",  in the  view of the  Study  Team,  goes  far  beyond the 
traditional  definitional  boundaries  between  " telecoms"  and  "broadcasting"  and  is  prima 
facie incompatible with the notion of a converged environment (discussed further in Section 
2 of Annex I). 
A number of other Member States have not yet taken a firm legal position with respect to 
the regulatory status of VOD services (refer to Table II below), with VOD services being 
provided (if at all) in a legal vacuum. 
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Table II:  Regulatory Status of Video-on-Demand 
Country  Telecoms  Broadcasting  Comments 
Regulation  Regulation 
Austria  "'  Interactive user-initiated access  to  databases  over the  public  switched 
telecommunication  network  is,  according  to  regulatory  definitions,  a 
telecoms service. 
Belgium  "'  Unregulated  at  present,  although  proposals  for  regulation  being 
considered.  Likely  to  be  considered  point-to-point  communications; 
i.e., telecoms, governed at federal level. 
Denmark  "'  Falls within definition of a telecoms service. 
Finland  "'  Defined under the I997 Telecommunications Act. 
France  "'  Video-on-Demand service provided over telephone  lines  would be  an 
"audiovisual  communication"  service  and,  as  such,  governed  by 
Section  43  of the  Audiovisual  Communications  Act of 30  September 
1986. 
Germany  NIA  NIA  Defined as an unregulated "teleservice". 
Greece 
-- --
Regulatory status unclear. 
Ireland  -- --
Regulatory  status  unclear.  The  regulatory  status  of  VOD  will  be 
conditioned  by  the  sui generis  regulation  which  applies  to  particular 
delivery platforms under specific legislation. 
Italy  "'  Defined as a telecoms service. 
Luxembourg  "'  Defined as a telecoms service. 
The  "'  Full VOD (when the consumer decides on both time and content) is not 
Netherlands  considered  to  be  broadcasting.  NVOD  is  treated  as  subscription 
television. 
Portugal  "'  According  to  Article  1  of the  Decree  Law  58/90 of 7  September, 
television shall be considered to  be  the transmission or retransmission 
of non-permanent  images  and  sounds  by  means  of electromagnetic 
waves or any other appropriate vehicle, whether through air or cables, 
that  is  intended  to  be  received  by  the  public,  with  the  exception  of 
telecoms services operating by means of individual request. 
Spain  "'  Regulatory status not addressed expressly in law. 
Sweden  "'  Regulatory status not addressed expressly in law. 
United  "'  Regulatory  characterisation  has  evolved  from  particular  individual 
Kingdom  licence conditions, rather than express legal definitions. 
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1.3  .3  Mobile Communications Services 
The Regulatory Issues 
The  outstanding  commercial  success  of mobile  communications  systems  which  use  the 
GSM
33  standard  (including  both  GSM  and  DCS-1800  networks),  and  the  political 
commitment  of the  Community  to  a  "wireless  information  society" 
34  raise  a number  of 
broad  public  policy  issues  with  ramifications  for  a  future  multimedia  regulatory 
environment: 
• 
• 
• 
33 
34 
First,  the  limitation  on  the  number  of mobile  licences  in  each  Member  State  has 
historically  been  attributable  to  the  scarcity  of valuable  public  resources  (i.e.,  radio 
frequency  spectrum).  This  raises  the  issue  whether  the  current  management  and 
valuation of those resources should act as the basis for a general regulatory framework 
in a multimedia environment. 
Second,  the licensing  of mobile  systems  in the  1990s  has  largely  taken place  in the 
context of a particular technology (e.g., GSM). In a multimedia environment, licensing 
may more appropriately be undertaken in the context of particular services rather than 
particular technologies.  Such a service-based approach, however,  may not be suitable 
in a competitive environment in which product and  service differentiation will become 
increasingly important. 
Third,  mobile  communications  today  support  high  quality  voice  service  and  data 
transmission, including Internet access, E-mail and so forth,  but at transmission speeds 
of only around 9.6 kbit/s.  However, third generation mobile systems should support a 
full  range of multimedia services.  The evolution of mobile operators which currently 
enjoy  special  rights  (for existing  systems)  into third  generation broadband  operators 
raises the issue whether regulatory safeguards should be imposed to prevent the abuse 
of a dominant position. 
GSM  operators  have  been  assigned  the  same  frequency  bands  throughout  the  European  Union, 
namely, between 890-915 MHz for reception and between 935-960 MHz for transmission.  DCS-1800 
operators, on the other hand, have been assigned between 1700-1785 MHz for reception and between 
1805-1900 MHz for transmission. 
Refer  to  Communication  to  the  European  Parliament,  the  Council,  the  Economic  and  Social 
Committee  and  the  Committee  of the  Regions  on the  further  development  of mobile  and  wireless 
communications, COM(97)217 of 29 May 1997. 
_________  Analy_sys _ Comparative Overview of Current Regulatory Environment in Teleconmmnications and Broadcasting Sectors/Licensing  Page 31 
•  Fourth,  the licensing  of new  mobile  operators has  taken place in an  environment in 
which fixed line  telecoms  operators have been allowed to have a competitive interest 
in the mobile sector.  If competition in the local loop  is  to  be a key  regulatory driver 
for  the  spread  of broadband  networks  to  the  home,  the  question  arises  whether 
regulators should permit and,  if so,  on what conditions,  the  same  entities to  operate 
competing  delivery  platforms.  An  ancillary  but  related  issue  is  whether  operators 
providing  a  fixed  or  mobile  service  today  should  be  given  access  to  additional 
spectrum in the future. 
•  Fifth,  the  separation  of the  provision  of mobile  services  from  the  ownership  and 
operation  of the  mobile  network  has  been  considered  necessary  in certain  Member 
States  to  promote  competition.  The  question  arises  whether  this  type  of separation, 
which can be found in the regulatory regimes of certain Member States, is necessary to 
promote competition in the provision of multimedia services and to  ensure the goal of 
platform independence. 
•  Sixth, the European Commission has either prohibited the imposition of licence fees  on 
new  mobile  licensees  where  an  incumbent  operator  in  fixed  telephony  has  been 
permitted  to  enter  the  mobile  sector  without  being  subjected  to  the  same  costs  or 
sought compensating benefits for the new entrant. In a competitive multimedia market, 
this  precedent  may  be  applied  by  analogy  to  equalise  competitive  conditions  in  the 
broadcasting  sector  (especially  as  digital  television  licensing  commences  throughout 
Europe).  This  might  be  achieved  by  eliminating  licence  fees  for  new  entrants, 
imposing  them  on  incumbents,  or  equalising  key  competitive  conditions  by  other 
means  (e.g.,  spectrum  re-allocation).  In  doing  so,  it  is  important  that  the  universal 
service obligations  and public  service  goals  of the  telecoms  and  broadcasting  sectors 
are not compromised. 
•  Seventh,  the  growth  of  third  generation  multimedia  mobile  systems  may  require 
additional spectrum which is currently being used inefficiently for  State purposes and, 
to  a  lesser  degree,  for  broadcasting.  In  the  case  of  broadcasting,  increased 
technological efficiency may mean that individual channels may  require less spectrum 
in the  future.  Regulations  in a multimedia environment will  no  doubt need to  resolve 
competing claims to the same spectrum bands  in a manner which promotes efficiency 
and market entry. 
•  Eighth,  the  future  licensing  of networks  using  wireless  technologies  may  require  a 
degree  of frequency  coordination  which  goes  well  beyond  the  present  regulatory 
framework.  The  issue  arises  whether  frequency  coordination in  a future  multimedia 
environment will  require the  greater  convergence of frequency  management agencies 
in the  telecoms  and broadcasting  sectors,  and  whether  such  institutional convergence 
best takes place at a Community or Member State level. 
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(i)  Community Regulatory Framework 
In contrast to  most other aspects  of telecoms  in the  European Union,  the  liberalisation of 
mobile communications services (if not necessarily infrastructure) at the Member State level 
has  in  many  cases  preceded  the  market-opening  policies  of the  European  Commission. 
Nevertheless, the Community's regulatory framework for  1998 (licensing, interconnection, 
etc.)  covers  both  fixed  and  mobile  networks.  It has  also  addressed  a number  of issues 
concerning  the  licensing  of  mobile  operators,  as  contained  in  the  following  legal 
instruments: 
(1)  General Policy: 
The Mobile Green Paper
35 
(2)  Harmonised Frequency Bands: 
Directives 871372  (GSM),  91/287 (DECT),  and 901544  (ERMES), 
36  as  supplemented by 
various ERC Decisions regarding DCS-1800,  TFTS,  DSRR and TETRA. 
37 
35 
36 
37 
38 
3() 
(2) Liberalisation Measures Under Article 90 of  the EC Treaty: 
The Mobile Directive
38 
(3)  Individual Competition Investigations into Licensing Symmetry: 
Proceedings Against Italy and Spain
39 
(4)  ETSI Standards Specifications 
Towards the Personal Communications Environment: Green Paper on a common approach in the field 
of mobile  and  personal  communications  in  the  European  Union,  COM(94)145  Final,  OJ  1994 
C290/10. 
Council  Directive  87 /372/EEC  of 25  June  1987  on  the  frequency  bands  to  be  reserved  for  the 
coordinated introduction of public pan-European cellular digital land-based mobile communications in 
the  Community,  OJ  1987  L196/85;  Council Directive 91/287/EEC of 3 June  1991  on the  frequency 
band  to  be  designated  for  the  coordinated  introduction  of  digital  European  cordless 
telecommunications (DECT) into the Community,  OJ  1991  Ll44/45; Council Directive 90/544/EEC 
of 9  October  1990  on  the  frequency  bands  designated  for  the  coordinated  introduction  of pan-
European land-based public radio paging in the Community, OJ  1990 L310/28. 
ERC  Decision on the frequency bands to be designated for the  introduction of DCS  1800,  ERC/DEC 
(95)03; ERC Decision on the frequency bands to be designated for the coordinated introduction of the 
Terrestrial  Flight  Telecommunications  System  (TFTS),  ERC/DEC  (92)01;  ERC  Decision  on  the 
frequency  bands  to  be  designated  for  the  coordinated  introduction  of Digital  Short-Range  Radio 
(DSRR),  ERC/DEC (93)01;  ERC  Decision on the frequency bands for  the introduction of the Trans 
European Trunked Radio System (TETRA), ERC/DEC (96)04. 
Commission Directive 96/2/EC of 16 January  1996 amending Directive 90/388/EEC with regard to 
mobile and personal communications, OJ  1996 L20/59. 
Commission Decision 95/489/EC of 4 October 1995 concerning the conditions imposed on the second 
operator  of GSM  radiotelephony  services  in  Italy,  OJ  1995  L280/49;  cf.  Commission  Decision 
97 1181/EC of 18 December 1996 concerning the conditions imposed on the second operator of GSM 
radiotelephony services in Spain, OJ  1997 L76/19. 
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1.  Harmonised Spectrum Allocation 
A number of Directives  have  been adopted  by  the  Community and  ERC  Decisions  have 
been  adopted  by  the  signatory  States  which  have  specified  the  radio  spectrum  available 
throughout  the  European  Union  for  various  mobile  communications  services.  These 
frequency bands are: 
•  GSM  890-915 MHz and 935-960 MHz 
•  DCS-1800  1700-1785 MHz and  1805-1900 MHz 
•  DECT  1880-1900 MHz 
•  ERMES  169.4- 169.8 MHz 
•  TFTS  1670-1675 MHz 
•  DSRR  888-890 MHz and 933-935 MHz 
•  TETRA  380-400 MHz (emergency services) and 410-430 MHz 
(public services) 
2.  The Mobile Directive 
The  Mobile  Directive  formally  liberalised  the  market  for  mobile  and  personal 
communications services as of February 1996.  In particular, the  Mobile Directive: 
•  abolishes  all  special  or  exclusive  rights  granted  to  incumbent  fixed  line 
telecoms  operators  in  the  area  of mobile  communications,  and  establishes 
open licensing procedures for new entrants in the mobile telephony market; 
•  prohibits an a priori limitation of the number of mobile licences unless  such 
limitation is based on a lack of frequency spectrum or technical standards; 
•  removes  restrictions  on the  rights  of GSM  and  DCS-1800 operators to  use 
one another's frequencies; 
•  mandates the allocation of DCS-1800 licences by 1 January 1998; 
•  prohibits  Member  States,  as  of  1  July  1996,  from  refusing  to  allocate 
DECT  /Telepoint licences; 
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•  prescribes that new  licences  or supplementary mobile  licences  for  existing 
GSM  or DCS-1800  operators  may  be  issued  only  under  conditions  which 
ensure effective competition; 
•  removes restrictions on the ability of mobile operators to use or develop their 
own infrastructure or that of other third parties such as utilities; and 
•  removes restrictions on interconnection options for mobile operators. 
National licensing and/or authorisation procedures for mobile communications may remain 
in  place,  but  only  insofar  as  they  are  intended  to  ensure  compliance  with  "essential 
requirements"  or  public  service  requirements,  and  subject  to  the  principles  of non-
discrimination  and  transparency.  Similarly,  licensing  procedures  may  not  impose 
unjustified technical restrictions. 
3.  Standards 
The  Community's  involvement  in  standards-setting  through  ETSI  has  been  an  important 
element in the commercial success of mobile services throughout the European Union.  An 
integral part of that standards-setting process has been the allocation of radio frequencies at 
the  Community  level  to  facilitate  the  pan-European  coordination  of  mobile  services. 
Moreover, because of the reluctance of the  United States to embrace the GSM  (or, for that 
matter,  any)  standard,  it  has  become  recognised  as  a  distinctively  "European"  standard 
which has (the  United States aside) received widespread acceptance. 
The success of ETSI in developing the GSM standard has led to  the further adoption since 
1993 of pan-European standards for the ERMES and DECT systems. 
The  challenge  of  developing  European  standards  for  third  general  mobile  services 
("UMTS") will also fall primarily on ETSI.  As  was true of the development of the GSM 
standard, however, there is  no consensus whether that European standard should also form 
the basis of a worldwide standard. Initially, there were attempts to work with the Japanese 
("TTC")  and  the  United  States  ("T1 ")  to  develop  one  worldwide  standard,  but  a 
regionalisation of standards now seems more likely. 
(ii)  Regulatory Aspects of Market Entry 
Mobile  services  have  very  quickly  been  transformed  from  a  specialised  market  into  a 
mainstream telecoms mass  market.  The  more mature mobile markets  such as  Scandinavia 
are  exhibiting  penetration  levels  which  far  exceed  30%  (Finland  and  Sweden  have  the 
highest penetration rates  in the world.) 
40  The spread of GSM  mobile services has  created 
economies of scale which have led to  increasingly lower prices for  handsets  and  network 
equipment. In some cases, mobile equipment is subsidised by the mobile operator or service 
provider. 
40  In the case of Finland, the penetration level has reached 40% . 
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The  increase  in  efficiency  and  quality,  and  the  decline  in  the  cost  of equipment  and 
infrastructure, have made  wireless services a viable by-pass option for  fixed  carrier (local 
loop)  telecoms  services.  Indeed,  the  regulatory  environment  in  Denmark  envisages  that 
mobile  and  fixed  line  communications  services  may  fall  within  the  same  product market 
definition  for  certain  regulatory  and  competition  law  purposes. 
41  Increasingly,  mobile 
services  are  displacing  fixed  services,  rather than being  complementary to  them.  In  fact, 
customer tariffs for mobile services have fallen so significantly in the past few  years in the 
Scandinavian countries that there is  little difference in tariff levels between fixed  line and 
mobile services. 
The  introduction  of mobile  services  in  the  European  Union  has  illustrated  the  relative 
importance of three  regulatory issues,  all of which have  some  analogous  application in a 
multimedia environment, namely: 
•  the rights and obligations of entities with a dominant position in one product 
market  that  wish  to  migrate  to  another  related,  neighbouring  or 
complementary market; 
•  the extent to which regulatory intervention should operate to prevent vertical 
integration; and 
•  whether  the  subsidisation  of consumer  equipment  by  operators  should  be 
viewed favourably by regulators as a means of stimulating the market. 
Each of these issues is assessed below in its historical context. 
•  Technological Migration 
A key regulatory issue in the future multimedia environment will be whether and on what 
terms  market  actors  in  one  product  market,  particularly  those  with  market  power,  are 
permitted to migrate into other markets. 
With few  exceptions, analogue mobile licences were first granted by Member States to  the 
existing  fixed  line  incumbent  telecoms  operators.  This  first  mover advantage  was  in turn 
extended to  second generation GSM mobile licences,  such that the leading GSM  operators 
in Austria, Belgium, Finland,  France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands,  Spain 
and  Sweden  are  subsidiaries  of the  national  fixed  line  incumbent. 
42  In  most  cases,  the 
41 
42 
Competition between local GSM tariffs and fixed wireline tariffs in Denmark suggests that it could be 
the first European national market in which the majority of voice telephony will be conducted through 
the use of wireless technology. 
Contrast  Greece,  where  independent  companies  (Panafon  and  Telestet)  were  granted  the  first  two 
GSM  mobile licences,  with a subsidiary of the  incumbent fixed  line  operator (OTE),  together with 
Telenor of Norway,  being granted a DCS-1800 licence (which is  scheduled to  commence operations 
in February 1998 (currently the subject of experimental trials in Thessaloniki).) 
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incumbent's  subsidiary  was  the  first  GSM  operator to  be  licensed  in each  Member State 
(out of a total of two and, in some Member States, three GSM operators). 
43 
In countries  such as  Sweden,  Denmark and Finland,  all  GSM  system operators were also 
allowed  to  hold  DCS-1800  licences  when those  licences  became  available  as  from  1993 
onwards,  although this was not permitted in the  United Kingdom when DCS-1800 systems 
were  launched  in  1991.  In  the  Scandinavian  countries,  the  regulatory  impetus  behind 
allowing GSM operators to hold DCS-1800 licences was the desire to make the technology 
as  accessible  as  possible  in  the  shortest  period  of time.  It was  felt  that  this  could  be 
achieved most quickly and inexpensively by the entities which already had experience in the 
sector.  The  same  logic  supported  the  view  that  fixed  line  incumbents  were  in  the  best 
position to launch GSM systems. 
The  licensing  of at  least  one  DCS-1800  system  is  due  to  take  place  in  the  rematrung 
Member States  by  1 January  1998, 
44  as  required by  Community  law. 
45  Countries  such  as 
Belgium,  Austria,  The  Netherlands,  Italy,  Ireland,  Spain  and  Portugal  are  organising 
tenders or auctions for DCS-1800 licences in the last quarter of 1997/first half of 1998. In 
some Member States,  it has been decided that a truly competitive mobile market requires 
the  introduction of new,  independent third parties  (e.g., Belgium,  Austria,  Portugal,  The 
Netherlands,  Ireland). 
46  By  way  of contrast,  countries  such  as  Italy  and  Spain  have 
expressly  decided  to  allow  existing  GSM  operators  to  obtain  a  DCS-1800  licence 
automatically once those licences become available in the near future. 
47  In any event, it will 
be  possible  under  the  terms  of the  Mobile  Directive  for  GSM  operators  to  use  DCS 
spectrum in combination with dual mode handsets to  overcome congestion (thereby further 
enhancing the competitiveness of the early entrants into mobile communications). 
As  regards  third generation mobile  systems  which will have  broadband capabilities,  tt  ts 
clear  that  the  spectrum  requirements  of UMTS  will  necessarily  limit  the  number  of 
operators providing these  systems.  Seen in this  context,  the  issue arises whether existing 
mobile operators can or should be permitted entry into UMTS. 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
In the European Union, mobile subsidiaries of fixed line incumbents are estimated to account for 64% 
of cellular users. 
Article 2(1) of the Mobile Directive. 
Member  States  are  also  obliged  to  establish  a  licensing  framework  for  DECT  services  "within  a 
reasonable timeframe" (Recital9 of the Mobile Directive). 
Recital  8  of the  Mobile  Directive  provides  that:  "Member  States  should  be  able  to  refrain  from 
granting a licence to existing operators, for example to  operators of GSM systems already present on 
their territory,  if it can be shown that this would eliminate effective competition in panicular by  the 
extension of  a dominant position.  In panicular,  where a Member State grants or has already granted 
DCS I 800 licences,  the  granting  of new or supplementary licences for existing  GSM or DCS 1800 
operators may take place on(v under conditions ensuring effective competition." 
In Italy, TIM and Omnitel-Pronto ltalia have already been permitted to provide DCS-1800 services on 
an experimental basis prior to  the DCS-1800 licensing procedure being launched (possibly as  late as 
mid-1998). 
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In the view of the Study Team, GSM and DCS-1800 licensees (actual and future)  should in 
principle  be  permitted  to  migrate  from  their  existing  systems  to  UMTS.  From  a 
technological perspective, the transition from  second generation to third generation mobile 
systems  is  comparable to  the  transition of fixed  line operators from analogue copper wire 
networks to fibre optic cable networks with ISDN and ATM capabilities. In the latter case, 
there  have  been no  regulatory  impediments  to  fixed  line  operators  making  the  transition 
from  narrowband  to  broadband  networks.  Indeed,  this  technological  migration has  been 
considered to be both inevitable and desirable.  For the same reasons,  GSM  and DCS-1800 
licensees should be permitted to migrate to the broadband capabilities of UMTS. 
In this  migration to  UMTS,  however,  a future  mature regulatory framework may  seek to 
encourage  mobile  operators  which  obtain  special  rights  in  UMTS  to  relinquish  their 
existing first and second generation mobile frequencies over an appropriate time frame.  The 
spectrum used by  those earlier systems  could then be  released  for use  by other operators 
providing  multimedia  services.  Transitional  measures  would  probably  be  required  to 
promote  such  a  migration.  The  process  of  relinquishing  spectrum  used  for  existing 
applications  should  reflect  the  extent  to  which  a  multimedia  mobile  market  supplants 
today' s mobile communications markets. Because of the increasing possibilities of fixed and 
mobile  communications  integration  in  the  context  of  UMTS,  the  future  regulatory 
environment for multimedia should also address spectrum sharing and facility sharing on a 
much greater scale than is  relevant under today's market conditions (refer to  discussion in 
Section 4 of Annex I). 
In  the  broadcasting  sector,  an analogous  situation  is  presented by the  availability of new 
digital  broadcasting  licences  in  a number  of Member  States.  If the  applicants  for  digital 
broadcasting licences  in countries  such  as  the  United Kingdom,  France  and  Germany  are 
typical  of those which are likely to  apply  in other Member States,  existing terrestrial and 
satellite  broadcasters  will  be  the  key  economic  actors  in  tomorrow's  digital  broadcast 
market.  The  Study  Team  takes  the  view,  as  in  the  case  of fixed  and  mobile  telecoms 
systems  upgrading  their  capacity  to  provide  broadband  services,  that  there  are  strong 
efficiency  and  public  policy  grounds  for  encouraging  existing  analogue  broadcasters  to 
migrate  to  digital  broadcasting.  As  a  regulatory  quid  pro  quo,  however,  traditional 
analogue  broadcasting  spectrum  should  be  relinquished  for  use  by  other  providers  of 
multimedia  services,  at  least  once  the  market  for  digital  broadcasting  has  sufficiently 
matured. 
•  Vertical Integration 
GSM operators unaffiliated with the  wireline incumbent have traditionally been required to 
use the  infrastructure of the parent of their major GSM  competitor (i.e., the incumbent or 
its  affiliate).  This means that their costs are governed by those of the  incumbent fixed  line 
operator (as,  indeed, are the costs of the incumbent's GSM  subsidiary), because more than 
half of the costs incurred by mobile operators are attributable to  interconnection and access 
charges to the public switched telephone network ("PSTN"). 
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It has  therefore  been  important  for  national  regulatory  authorities  to  ensure  that  mobile 
operators  are  not  put  at  a  cost  disadvantage  vis-a-vis  the  fixed  line  operator  and/or  its 
mobile subsidiary.  The liberalisation of mobile infrastructure following the adoption of the 
Mobile  Directive  in  1996  has  assisted  GSM  operators  in  developing  their  economic 
independence from the fixed  line operator,  even though individual implementation of that 
Directive  was  delayed  in  a  number  of  Member  States.  The  adoption  of  the  Full 
Competition Directive and the Interconnection Directive has meant that incumbent fixed line 
operators  are  not  able  to  cross-subsidise  their  mobile  operations  with  their  fixed  line 
operations,  nor  are  they  able  to  provide  their  mobile  affiliates  with  preferential 
interconnection rates  (refer to  discussion in Section 3 of Annex 1).  In  addition,  they  must 
implement  a  system  of account  separation  that  distinguishes  the  competitive  and  non-
competitive aspects of their business. 
The acknowledgement that the enduring presence of a fixed line  telecoms incumbent in the 
mobile  sector  may  lead  to  potential  anti-competitive  practices  has  been  addressed  in  a 
number of policies  implemented by the  Member States.  All of these policies  stem from  a 
recognition that the full  vertical integration of mobile  services into the business of a fixed 
line telecoms operator - at least in the early stages of telecoms liberalisation - needs to  be 
counterbalanced by certain pro-competitive safeguards. 
•  Business Separation 
Some Member States have sought to restrict the degree to  which fixed line incumbents are 
vertically integrated.  Most notably,  countries  such as  France,  Germany,  Portugal  and the 
United  Kingdom
48 have  required the  mobile  subsidiaries of the  fixed  line  incumbent to  be 
operated as separate businesses which are subject to strict accounting separation rules. 
In the majority  of Member  States,  however,  there have  been no  attempts  to  separate  the 
fixed  line  operations  of  the  incumbent  from  its  mobile  operations.  This  failure  to 
disaggregate  fixed  and  mobile  operations  has  created  opportunities  for  anti-competitive 
cross-subsidisation.  In  the  transition  to  a  multimedia  environment  characterised  by 
integrated  fixed  and  mobile  services  provided  by  the  same  supplier,  the  structural 
separation of different business units operating distinct delivery platforms such as fixed and 
mobile (as well as  the separation of their accounts) may be necessary to ensure that access 
and  interconnection  occur  on  relatively  transparent  terms  and  conditions  and  that  anti-
competitive  cross-subsidisation  does  not  occur.  In  a  multimedia  environment,  there  will 
exist strong commercial reasons why operators will wish to  bundle their service offerings 
and  tariff packages.  In  such  an  environment,  however,  the  regulatory  quid pro  quo  for 
permitting  such  economically  efficient  pricing  must  be  the  existence  of  sufficient 
transparency  in  the  economic  relations  of individual  transmission  media.  One  means  of 
doing  so  would  be  through  the  requirement  that  there  be  structural  separation  in  the 
operation of different delivery platforms. 
48  Indeed, under the terms of the licence for Cellnet, BT' s shareholding in Cellnet may not exceed 60%. 
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On the other hand, given the ultimate logic of fixed-mobile integration, it may be artificial 
in the  long  run for  infrastructure-based  multimedia providers  to  separate  their  different 
business units in the manner outlined above.  In certain competitive markets, full  structural 
separation  may  thwart  economies  of scope  across  a  range  of fixed  and  mobile  service 
offerings. 
49 In such a case, a multimedia environment might be best served by the licensing 
of multimedia  providers  across  the  full  range  of their  different  technological  routes  to 
market. Whether such an option is  feasible will depend in part on the level of competition 
in  the  local  loop  in  any  given  Member  State.  The  greater  the  level  of  local  loop 
competition, the less the regulatory imperative to strive for structural separation in the short 
term,  which  may  lead  to  inefficiencies  in  the  future.  Such  an  approach  may  also  be 
conditioned in part by the relative existence of frequencies for all market actors. Insofar as 
the European Community is able to develop policies which result in the more efficient use 
of spectrum over a broad range of market actors, the adoption of a policy of full  structural 
separation may be unnecessary. 
The  use  of wireless  technology  to  provide  fixed  local  loops  (Wireless  Local  Loop,  or 
"WLL"),  as  opposed  to  more  traditional  mobile  (e.g.,  GSM)  services,  complicates  the 
vertical  integration analysis.  Plainly,  fixed line  operators  should be permitted to  use  the 
most efficient technology in providing local loops, particularly if that technology increases 
the amount of bandwidth that can be delivered to consumers. If that technology is  wireless, 
the  question arises  whether that  technology  should be  confined  by regulation to  "fixed" 
uses.  Operators  and  consumers  may deem  it advantageous  to  use  the  same  handset  and 
telephone number for  both fixed  and mobile  services. 
50  Such dual use,  however,  raises  a 
series of pricing, licensing and universal service issues. 
•  Terminal Equipment 
Another example of the decision of certain Member States to restrict vertical integration can 
be seen in their policies with respect to terminal equipment.  In some Member States,  and 
in  compliance  with  EC  competition  rules,  equipment  suppliers  have  been  permitted  to 
provide network services only on the condition that their equipment procurement policies 
be open and transparent,  thereby preventing the absolute  foreclosure  of other equipment 
suppliers from the mobile equipment market. 
•  Network and Service Layers 
In the case of countries such as  the  United Kingdom,  The  Netherlands  and  Germany,  the 
operation of mobile  networks has  been separated from  the provision of mobile  services, 
49 
50 
In Denmark,  for  example,  Tele  Danmark announced in  September  1997  that  it  would  roll  back its 
structurally  separated  GSM  operation  into  its  fixed  line  business  and  offer  bundled  fixed-mobile 
service offerings. 
Currently available  equipment  allows  an operator to  determine  whether a wireless handset  is  being 
used in  or near the home in  connection with a wireless local  loop  or whether it  is  being  used  as  a 
mobile handset outside of the home.  Such equipment allows operators to  charge differently for  fixed 
and mobile use. 
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with mobile resellers having been authorised as  a means  of generating greater competition 
at  the  service  level.  This  restraint on vertical  integration was  subsequently  relaxed  from 
1993  onwards  in  the  United  Kingdom  with  the  introduction  of DCS-1800  (or  "PCN") 
services.  Mobile operators now merely have the option of marketing their services through 
independent resellers.  There has been an implicit acknowledgement in the  United Kingdom 
and  in  The  Netherlands  that  the  regulatory  separation  of the  network  and  service  level 
components of a mobile system does not necessarily result in competitive efficiencies (with 
the respective regulatory frameworks being accordingly modified). 
By  contrast,  the  Scandinavian  regulatory  experience  - which  witnessed  the  earliest 
development  and  marketing  of cellular mobile  systems  - is  diametrically  opposed  to  the 
position  pioneered  in  the  United  Kingdom.  In  the  Scandinavian  countries,  very  high 
penetration rates and relatively low tariff structures were achieved in what resembled near-
monopoly  situations  (without any  perceived need for  competition at  the  service provision 
level and without any attention to the level of vertical integration). 
The  relative  lack of success  in  stimulating  competition  in the  mobile  sector  through  the 
separation  of network  and  service  elements  provides  an  important  precedent  for  the 
developing  multimedia  industry.  Such  a  policy  denies  investors  in  new  networks  the 
benefits  of economies  of scale  and  scope  and  overlooks  the  fact  that the operation of the 
network is rarely seen as  a "business" in its own right, but rather as  an integral element of 
the  overall  mobile  business.  Consequently,  in  the  absence  of  clear  market  failure, 
burdening new  market entrants  with the  obligation to  split the provision of infrastructure 
from  the  provision  of services  should  be  avoided.  What  may  be  required,  however,  is 
accounting  separation  of the  two  discrete  aspects  of the  business.  As  a  general  rule, 
however,  the  Study  Team  is  of the  view  that  even  accounting  separation  requirements 
should be limited to market actors which have developed a degree of market power. 
•  Subsidisation of Consumer Equipment 
The  rapid  growth  of the  mobile  sector  has  taken  place  in  the  face  of  a  number  of 
prohibitions  against  the  subsidisation  of mobile  handsets  by  mobile  operators.  Such  a 
prohibition is justified on the grounds that the provision of ancillary or related goods ( e.g., 
handsets)  by  a  dominant  entity  at  below  cost  has  a  tendency  to  reinforce  its  market 
dominance  in the primary market (in this  case,  mobile  communications  services).  On the 
other hand, there are those who claim that,  in new technological markets, the subsidisation 
of  consumer  equipment  is  necessary  to  make  such  equipment  affordable  and  thereby 
stimulate the services market (at least in its initial stages). 
Member  States  of the  European Union have  seen merit  in both  of these  approaches.  In 
countries such as  Belgium, for example, the general prohibition on the sale of goods below 
cost prevents such a practice. In other countries such as  Finland, Denmark and Italy,  such a 
prohibition  is  mandated  expressly  for  the  mobile  sector.  In  the  United  Kingdom,  the 
subsidisation of terminal  equipment by  mobile  operators  can occur to  the  extent that the 
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subsidisation is  not considered to  be  "undue". 
51  Most other Member States  do  not prevent 
operators from providing mobile handsets below cost.  Regardless of the approach adopted, 
mobile penetration is high in all of these countries. 
Perhaps  surprisingly,  it  is  in those  countries  in which  the  provision of equipment below 
cost  is  not  permitted  that  the  penetration  of mobile  services  is  most  advanced,  both  in 
absolute  terms  (i.e.,  Italy)  and  in  pro  rata  terms  (i.e.,  Finland).  Proponents  of such 
prohibitions  assert  that,  ultimately,  it  is  the  overall  service/equipment package  which  is 
attractive to  the  consumers,  with artificially  low equipment prices  merely providing very 
short-term market stimulation.  Moreover,  it is  asserted that the provision of equipment at 
below  cost  prices  reinforces  the  dominance  of those  parties  with  a  first  mover  market 
advantage and creates the possibility of market foreclosing practices linked to the supply of 
terminal equipment.  The resolution of this  issue is  likely to  achieve new  impetus  with the 
introduction of third generation mobile  broadband  systems,  which will  inevitably  require 
new, more expensive, handsets. 
51  Competitive safeguards are introduced in the form of:  (i)  contractual links  with subscribers being no 
longer than  15  months  (previously three to  four  years);  (ii)  dominant operators such as  Cellnet and 
Vodafone being obliged to meet a cross-subsidy test (as dominant operators); and (iii) the same terms 
and conditions being offered to all service providers. 
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! In a multimedia environment, the issue of subsidisation will inevitably arise in the context of conditional access  i 
i systems or set-top  boxes,  whether used  in  the  provision of digital  interactive or digital  broadcast  services  (or  i 
i both). The regulatory arguments both in favour of and opposed to the subsidisation of  conditional access systems i 
i  are equally appealing.  Although the market for interactive services may require some form of short-term market  i 
i  stimulation because of  the expense of set-top boxes, it is also clear that those parties with first mover advantages  i 
i might reinforce their market power through the use of such conditional access systems.  These types of concerns  i 
~  stem from the fact that:  I 
•  Conditional  access  systems  may  be  the  subject  of proprietary  standards,  as  is  permitted  under  the  i 
Television  Standards  Directive.52  This  means  that,  unless  competition  law  provisions  are  actively i 
policed  to  ensure fair  and  non-discriminatory  access,  they  are  more  susceptible  than  totally  open  i 
systems to being used to exclude competitors.  I 
•  The proprietary rights in set-top boxes will often reside in a service provider/broadcaster, rather than in  j 
an independent third-party equipment manufacturer. This will create a greater incentive for  engaging i 
in abusive behaviour.  I 
•  Set-top boxes, unlike mobile handsets, are customised for a particular service provider/broadcaster. As a i 
consequence,  customers  will  ordinarily  not  be  able  to  shift  allegiances  to  another  service i 
provider/broadcaster without changing the set-top box accordingly. 
•  The potential for abuse is magnified in the broadcasting context because of the  possible links  between  i 
the  service  provider/broadcaster  and  the  creation  or  packaging  of content.  These  commercial  links  i 
within different layers of the multimedia value chain create the potential for abusive behaviour because i 
of  the natural tendency to favour the dissemination of one's own content.  ~ 
i The subsidisation of set-top boxes should therefore  be permissible only in those circumstances where there exist i 
i sufficient  regulatory  safeguards  to  ensure  that  such  subsidisation  does  not  confer  or  reinforce  a dominant  i 
j  position  on  the  service  provider/broadcaster.  In  such a situation,  the  usual  rules  should  apply  regarding  the  j 
i prohibition of predatory pricing by a dominant firm in violation of  Article 86 of the EC Treaty. 53 In this regard,  i 
i a flexible approach should be taken with respect to market definition for the purposes of determining dominance  i 
! in the relevant product market. In a multimedia environment, market dominance may need to be assessed within i 
j  the overall context of  a market actor's upstream and downstream relationships relative to the set-top box, rather i 
j  than solely with respect to the set-top box itself In other words, access to the set-top box should normally not be  j 
i seen as an end in itself, but rather as a means to obtain access to some form  of service or customer. It should be  i 
i the relationship of a service provider/broadcaster to  those services or customers - seen in light of their relations  i 
i with  parties  in  upstream,  downstream  or  neighbouring  markets  - which  are  determinative  of the  issue  of i 
: dominance in a multimedia environment.  i 
1... .............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................  1 
52 
53 
Article 4 of the Television Standards Directive, Directive 95/47/EC if the European Parliament and of 
the  Council  on the  use of standards  for  the  standards  for  the  transmission of television signals,  OJ 
1995 L281/51. 
Refer to AKZO v.  Commission, Case C-62/86, [1991] I ECR 3359, esp.  at para. 69. 
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(iii)  Current Licensing of Mobile Communications 
Notwithstanding  the  requirement  of the  Licensing  Directive  that  there  be  no  a  priori 
limitation  on  the  number  of licences  issued  as  of  1  January  1998,  mobile  operators 
throughout the European Union hold actual or  de facto  "special rights"  in connection with 
the  use  of particular frequency  bands.  Moreover,  as  long  as  spectrum constraints persist, 
mobile  licences  will  continue  to  be  limited  in  number.  Issues  will  therefore  arise  in  a 
multimedia  environment  as  to  the  appropriate  rules  by  which  additional  mobile  licences 
may be granted (assuming that there exists sufficient spectrum for additional licences). 
•  Licensing Procedures 
To  date,  a limited number of individual mobile licences have been made available to  new 
entrants upon the decision of a Member State to conduct a tender in the form of a "beauty 
parade". 
5 ~  The details of the tender, the duration of the tender procedure and the nature of 
the  submission  by  prospective  applicants  have  varied  in  both  form  and  substance  from 
Member State to Member State.  Crucial to any given tender bid are the licence fee  and the 
duration  of the  licence,  as  both  elements  are  key  to  the  development  of a  successful 
business plan. Another key element in the tender process is the relative speed with which a 
licensee  is  prepared  to  complete  the  national  roll-out  of its  network  (both  in  terms  of 
geographic  and  population coverage).  The  terms  of the tender  are  usually  available  only 
upon  payment  of a  fee  by  potential  applicants,  and  much  of the  content  of a  licence 
applicant's bid is confidential in nature. 
The  typical  selection  criteria  used  by  Member  States  which  have  conducted  "beauty 
parades"  to  select  licensees  are  often  criticised  as  being  insufficiently  transparent. 
55  For 
example,  even where specific criteria have been enumerated, licence applicants often have 
little understanding of the relative weighting to be accorded each criterion.  The procedures 
adopted  by  Germany  constitute  a  good  example  of an  open  and  relatively  transparent 
competitive  bidding  and  selection  process  for  mobile  licences.  Potential  licensees  are 
chosen according to a number of criteria, namely: 
5~ 
55 
•  competence to provide the service; 
•  previous experience; 
•  sufficiency  I  organisational resources; 
In  a number  of cases,  particular mobile  licences  have  been granted  on  a  "first-come-first-served" 
basis.  The Scandinavian countries and The Netherlands are notable examples of such a policy and, to 
a lesser degree, France. 
Refer to  the discussion of mobile licensing procedures as  at  1993,  much of which is  still current, in 
the  Study  for  the  European Commission entitled  .. Licensing and Declaration Procedures for Mobile 
Communications  in  the  Member  States  of  the  European  Community",  Study  by  KPMG  Peat 
Marwick/Stanbrook &  Hooper, August 1993. 
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•  viability of technical/business plans; and 
•  planned quality level and regional coverage. 
•  Licence fees 
There are significant differences in the licence fees  imposed upon new mobile licensees by 
different Member States.  The general trend among the  Scandinavian countries has been to 
grant both GSM and DCS-1800 licences at little or no up-front cost (e.g., Sweden,  Finland, 
Denmark) aside from annual spectrum fees. 
In most Member States, however, the fees paid for GSM licences have been very high.  For 
example, the fees  most recently paid for the second GSM licences in a number of Member 
States range from 509 million ECU in  Spain  (Airtel) to  21.8 million ECU in Ireland (Esat 
Digifone).  Between these extremes,  licence fees  were 389 million ECU in  Italy  (Omnitel 
Pronto  Italia),  356  million  ECU  in  Austria  (Max.Mobil),  270  million  ECU  in  The 
Netherlands  (Libertel),  221  million ECU in  Belgium  (Mobistar)  and  145  million ECU  in 
Greece (STET Mobile). 
In most Member States,  additional  annual  fees  are  due  for  the  use  of spectrum,  ranging 
from 2. 6 million ECU  in  Germany  to  0.14%  of the  turnover in  Sweden.  Many  Member 
States,  however,  do  not  charge  economic  rent  for  the  use  of  spectrum  (e.g.,  Austria, 
Greece,  Italy,  Spain,  and Portugal),
56  preferring instead to  extract the  economic value  of 
the licence primarily from the up-front fee.  By contrast, Member States such as  Finland and 
Denmark charge GSM licensees exclusively on the basis of spectrum usage.  The economic 
value of spectrum varies significantly from Member State to Member State. 
Licence fees for the award of DCS-1800 licences demonstrate three broad patterns, namely: 
56 
57 
•  the  first  DCS-1800  licences  in  countries  such  as  Finland,  Sweden  and 
Denmark were awarded without any fee so as to create a regulatory incentive 
to  market the  new  technology,  subject to  the  payment of annual  frequency 
fees; 
•  again,  with a view to  assisting market en try,  the next tranche of DCS-1800 
licences were awarded for  reasonable  amounts,  often consisting  only  of an 
annual administrative fee, plus annual frequency fees; 
57 and 
Portugal,  however, charges an annual fee of 200,000 ESC (approx.  1,000 ECU). 
For  example:  in France  and  Germany  respectively,  Bouygues  Telecom  and  E-Plus  were  awarded 
DCS-1800 licences with annual fees  of 154,500 ECU and  1.46m ECU  (plus  frequency  fees);  in  the 
United Kingdom,  One20ne was awarded licence for  an up-front fee  of 48,000 ECU, plus an annual 
fee of 26,000 ECU (plus frequency charges). 
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•  the  final  tranche of DCS-1800 licences,  are being awarded by a number of 
Member  States  on  the  basis  of open  tenders  (i.e.,  "beauty  parades")  or 
auctions. 
58 
It is  clear that,  as  DCS-1800  systems  have  become  more attractive,  Member  States  have 
become increasingly willing to extract commercial value for such licences. 
Many believe that auctions are the most appropriate means of determining the market value 
of mobile licences. In the  United States,  for example, auctions have been used to allocate a 
wide variety of radio licences.  Such auctions are seriously being considered throughout the 
European Union as  a means of awarding licences for mobile services (rather than the usual 
tender  procedure,  where  the  offered  price  is  merely  one  element  of the  overall  bid). 
Although auctions may  be the most appealing option from an  economist's viewpoint,  they 
are subject to a number of criticisms.  The possible failings of an auction system have been 
most  recently  illustrated  in  The  Netherlands,  where  only  two  prospective  licensees  are 
tendering for two available DCS-1800 licences. In this situation, the economic value of the 
licence is  likely to  be  artificially low. 
59  Over-reliance on auctions  may also  lead operators 
with special rights to  charge high tariffs  to  recoup their licence costs  over an  abbreviated 
period of time. 
60 
The European Commission, relying on competition rules, has  taken action on a number of 
occasions  to  prevent  Member  States  from  charging  high  licence  fees  to  new  mobile 
operators, where the mobile subsidiary of the incumbent fixed line operator has  not had to 
pay  the  same  amount. 
61  In  such  situations,  the  subsidiary  of the  fixed  line  operator  was 
charged the same amount for its GSM licence or, in the alternative, the new GSM operator 
was  accorded compensatory regulatory measures whose economic value was  equivalent to 
the licence fees it was required to pay. 
62 
Absent such relief, the incumbent operator would be at a significant competitive advantage 
during the crucial start-up phase for the new entrant.  This competition-law based approach 
may also have important implications for multimedia market entry.  For example, there are 
direct  parallels  in  the  broadcasting  sector,  where  the  first  wave  of entrants  into  digital 
broadcasting will in all  likelihood be existing analogue broadcasters.  In order to  generate 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
For example, Ireland, Belgium, Spain, Austria, and The Netherlands.  In Greece,  a DCS-1800 licence 
has  been awarded  to  a consortium made up  of the  local  fixed  line  operator,  OTE,  and  Telenor of 
Norway. 
This has also happened in the United States,  where some licenses were awarded for relatively modest 
amounts.  The auctioning procedure in The Netherlands provides some protection in that it requires a 
minimum auction price of 3 million Guilders. 
As  recognised in the  Green Paper on a common approach to mobile and personal communications in 
the European Union,  COM(94)145 Final of 27 April 1994. 
For example, in Belgium, Ireland, Spain and Italy. 
For example, in terms of preferential interconnect tariffs, the promise of being awarded a DCS-1800 
licence, and so forth. 
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market demand for such services, regulators may take the view that licence fees  should be 
negligible.  Consistent with the Commission's practice in the mobile sector, the imposition 
of higher fees on later market entrants may be unjustifiable, unless necessary to finance the 
provision of certain types of public interest services. 
•  Frequency Fees 
The  majority  of  Member  States  assess  annual  spectrum  fees  on  mobile  operators. 
Moreover, there is  an increasing trend among Member States to  adopt spectrum valuation 
policies (see discussion in Section 4 of Annex I)  which ascribe some economic value to the 
use of spectrum as a scarce resource. There are significant differences in the methods used 
by Member  States  to  value  spectrum.  Generally  speaking,  however,  there  is  a  growing 
tendency  for  spectrum charges to  be based on the  type of channels used  in light of the 
demand for such channels and the extent of anticipated congestion for such spectrum. This 
type of methodology, for example, has been adopted in  Germany and the United Kingdom. 
63 
•  Duration 
The length of mobile licences  varies  significantly  from  Member  State  to  Member State. 
Generally speaking, Member States are attempting to equalise the length of licence terms 
for both GSM and DCS-1800 licences within their respective territories. 
There continue to be  significant differences,  however,  in the  length of licence  terms  for 
mobile licences as  between Member States. For example, licences in a number of Member 
States run for an average of 15  years (e.g., Austria,  France,  Germany,  Portugal,  Ireland, 
Italy,  Luxembourg  and  The  Netherlands).  Member States such as  Austria  and  Greece  (20 
years) and the  United Kingdom  (25  years) exceed this  average,  whereas countries such as 
Denmark, Sweden and Finland (10 years) fall well below this average. 
(iv)  Third Generation Mobile Services ( "UMTS") 
The  goal  of UMTS  is  to  satisfy  the  broadband  needs  of users  of personalised  mobile 
communications  services.  UMTS is  planned to  become  operational by the  year 2002,  in 
accordance  with  the  following  timetable:  ( i)  UMTS  standards  studies  will  have  been 
completed by the end of 1997, with a view to defining its basic features by the end of 1999; 
(ii) the basic features of UMTS will be available by the years 2000-2001; (iii) the definition 
of advanced features and their implementation will be deployed by the year 2005; and (iv) a 
second phase of UMTS which will enhance its  broadband capabilities  is  estimated to  be 
available by the year 2010.
64 Acting far in advance of this timeframe, the  United Kingdom 
63  By way of comparison, an equivalent amount of 34,000 ECU per annum is charged E-Plus, the DCS-
1800 operator in Germany. Currently, the upper range of spectrum fees for the equivalent operator in 
the  United Kingdom  (One20ne) is  set at  a comparable level  (although the  Study  Team understands 
that  this  figure  is  likely  to  rise  substantially  in  the  light  of new  spectrum valuation  policies  being 
implemented in the  United Kingdom). 
Refer  to  UMTS  Task  Force  Report,  "The  Road  to  UMTS  - in  contact  anytime,  anywhere  with 
anyone",  Brussels,  1 March  1996;  cf.  Commission Communication on the  Further Development of 
Mobile and Wireless Communications, Brussels, 29 May 1997,  COM(97)217 Final; cf.  "Multimedia 
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has  already initiated a licensing procedure which is  designed to lead to  the grant of a first 
licence for UMTS by the end of 1998 under a "closed envelope" auction. 
Notwithstanding the absence of a precise working definition of UMTS, there are a number 
of functional  elements  which  define  UMTS 's  essential  character.  For  example,  UMTS 
networks  and  terminals  will  be  characterised  by  their  ability  to  deliver  broadband 
multimedia  services.  UMTS  will  also  be  delivered  independent  of location  or terminal. 
Moreover, UMTS will be delivered over all existing frequency bands for mobile services 
65 
and by a broad range of technologies. 
66  The key distinguishing characteristic of UMTS will 
be  the  gradual  integration  of fixed,  mobile  and  satellite  networks,  to  the  eventual  point 
where a customer will not differentiate between the different technologies used to  transmit 
its  communications over  individual networks. 
67  This  process of integration will inevitably 
generate a regulatory dynamic  for  the  horizontal convergence  of licensing procedures for 
applications  and  delivery  platforms  which  are  currently  subject  to  different  terms  and 
conditions. 
The  integration of fixed  and  mobile  services  raises  a  number  of fundamental  regulatory 
issues  which  will  need  to  be  addressed  in  a  future  multimedia  environment.  Industry 
interviews indicate that the future of UMTS is closely linked to the achievement of a radical 
improvement  in  spectrum  efficiency  as  compared  to  second  generation  mobile  systems. 
This may require the traditional allocation of mobile spectrum - the exclusive assignment of 
frequencies for particular applications - to be revised.  An ERO Report of 1996 posited that 
a  broader  range  of operators  utilising  different  technologies  may  be  required  to  share 
spectrum bands if UMTS is to succeed. 
Third  generation  mobile  services  should  be  allowed  to  develop  in  response  to  market 
demand, rather than in response to regulatory intervention. Industry interviews suggest that 
there is widespread consensus in the mobile industry that the current regulatory framework 
at  the  European Union  level  is  in most  respects  sufficiently  flexible  to  accommodate the 
introduction of UMTS.  By  the  same  token,  the  development of any  general policy at  the 
Community  level  for  efficient  spectrum  allocation  should  take  into  account  the  unique 
characteristics  of UMTS.  Most  potential  market  actors  envisage  an  important  role  for 
regulation in the promotion of a fair and non-discriminatory system for allocating spectrum 
between market actors and in ensuring the availability of spectrum at reasonable cost. 
65 
66 
67 
Communications on the Move", a Consultation Document from the Department of Trade and Industry 
(UK), July  1997;  cf.  Communication from the Commission on Strategy and Policy Orientations with 
Regard to  the Further Development of Mobile and Wireless Communications (UMTS),  Brussels,  15 
October 1997, COM(97)513. 
For example, over the range of 800, 900,  1800 and 2200 MHz. 
Including, GSM, DCS-1800, DECT, CDMA and AMPS. 
Thus,  UMTS will have cellular, cordless,  satellite,  Wireless Local  Loop ("WLL") and Radio Fixed 
Access ("RFA"). 
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There may  be compelling policy reasons why the European Community should develop  a 
distinctive  spectrum  allocation  policy  to  release  already-allocated  spectrum  bands  for 
UMTS in lieu of purely national solutions to  spectrum allocation.  Although the mandatory 
re-allocation  of GSM  spectrum  for  UMTS  use  would  probably  be  premature,  UMTS 
providers  should  nevertheless  be  obliged  to  demonstrate  their  spectral  efficiency.  In 
addition,  regulators  may  need  to  adopt  radically  different  methods  of promoting  the 
efficient use of spectrum in light of the increasing integration of fixed and mobile services. 
The possible auctioning of spectrum for  UMTS also needs  to  be carefully addressed,  as  it 
may lead to overpricing. 
Regulation  should  in principle facilitate  the  development  of UMTS  by  encouraging  open 
platforms  and  voluntary  technical  standards  because  of the  potentially limited  number  of 
market players for UMTS. To this end, the promotion of interoperability should be a policy 
priority for the European Union, and the  cooperation of all interested parties with ETSI in 
the  development of voluntary  technical  standards  should  be  encouraged.  In  addition,  the 
evolution towards fixed-mobile integration should lead to the conclusion that predominantly 
"mobile"  services should contribute to the cost of universal service on the  same terms and 
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j  The  evidence suggests that there are  residual  doubts  in  the  marketplace regarding  the  use  of third generation 
j  mobile  services  for  multimedia  applications.  If,  however,  the  growth  in  second  generation  mobile  j 
~  communications  is repeated for mobile multimedia applications,  regulators will face a multimedia landscape in  ! 
i which fixed communications are being replaced by a broad range of UMTS services.  i 
:  : 
~  In  these  circumstances,  the  new  and  growing  markets  made  possible  by  UMTS  would  paradoxically  be  l 
l operating under a restrictive system with a limited  number of mobile  licensees  because of a lack  of available l 
~  spectrum,  while a declining market for fixed  services  would  be operating under a system of  full  competition.  l 
j  This regulatory asymmetry between mobile and fixed services may be further skewed by the entry of  broadcasters  j 
[ with special  rights  into  multimedia  markets.  The  net  effect  of this  regulatory  imbalance  could  possibly  be  a ' 
l slowdown in the process of liberalisation in the European Union. 
j  In  the  view  of the  Study  Team,  the  regulatory  asymmetry described  above  may be  ameliorated  through  the 
i implementation of new policies which are designed to: 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
release inefficiently exploited spectrum for  use by new market entrants (thereby  diluting the 
market  power  of those  entities  previously  enjoyed  "special  rights"  in  a  multimedia 
environment) ;68 
promote  the  efficient  sharing  of  spectrum  by  all  economic  actors  in  the  multimedia  '==,,_ 
marketplace; 
promote the integration of  fixed and mobile services capable of providing broadband services; 
establish clear rules regarding the extent to which market actors can migrate from a position of j 
market  power in  one of today' s defined  product/service markets  to  the multimedia market of l 
~~~  I 
(v)  specify  the  extent  to  which  market  actors  operating  different  delivery  platforms  capable  of j 
providing  multimedia  services  should  operate  separate  business  units  for  each  delivery  j 
platform.  \ 
j  As regards  points (i),  (ii)  and  (iii)  above,  various  regulatory options for  the more efficient  use and sharing of [ 
: spectrum for multimedia services are discussed in Part 4 of Annex I.  ~ 
~  With respect to points (  iv) and (  v) above, these are the sorts of "structural" competition issues which are linked  j 
j  to  the  abuse  of market  dominance.  As  such,  they  may  be  dealt  with  on  a case-by-case  basis  through  the  j 
j  application of Articles 86 and  90 of the  EC  Treaty.  In  the alternative, a more  coherent approach  might  be  to  [ 
l  address these issues through directives adopted under the aegis of Article 90.  Such an approach  would,  in the l 
j  view of the Study Team, be consistent with the mandate given to the European Commission by the express terms  ! 
j  of Article  90.  The  use  of directives  (as  opposed  to  individual  decisions)  adopted  under Article 90,  however,  [ 
l  ....  ~~9.1:!.?.4.  ..  ~~--1!:~~4.  ..  ~~~~---~q!1f~9..'!:  ..  if.J~~--!!:~~--~ff~~~--~9.!!:?.4.  ..  ~~--~~--~-1!!:P.~1:.~  .. t.~~.P~~-~-~~-~--~f.~9.~.~~~g~~-~-~--~-~:.9..~~--~~~-~9.!.~.:  ........................... J 
68  Although  it  is  arguable that  those  rights  are  not  "special"  if they  have  been won through an  open 
auctioning procedure. 
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1.3.4  Satellite Communications Services 
The Regulatory Issues 
Satellite, broadband cable and terrestrial fibre  networks will soon be widely used to  offer 
multimedia  services.  These  different  delivery  platforms  will  often  compete  with  one 
another for the business of individual end users.  In other situations, they will complement 
one  another  and  address  separate  market  segments.  For  example,  broadcast  satellites 
cannot  currently  support  interactive  applications.  Satellite-based  services  must  use 
terrestrial lines for a return path.  By the same token, only satellite systems appear capable 
of providing truly global (i.e., beyond the European Union) broadband services.  Satellites 
are therefore likely to form a part of many global systems, especially where mobility, cost 
effectiveness,  timeliness  and  interactivity  are  considered  to  be  important  elements  in 
satisfying end user communications needs. 
69 
The  licensing  by  the  United  States  of companies  such  as  Teledesic  has  fundamentally 
changed  the  traditional  world  of one-way  broadcast  satellite.  Teledesic  will  provide 
interactive "Internet to the home"  via satellite.  A new generation of regulatory issues may 
flow  from this phenomenon, all of which have global implications. For example, the fixed 
line voice telephony bypass possibilities created by a broadband satellite system will create 
irresistible  commercial  pressure  for  the  dismantling  of  the  existing  international 
settlements  framework  currently  used  in  telecoms  (possibly  to  be  replaced  by 
interconnection charges - see Section 3 of Annex I). 
In  addition,  the  unilateral  authorisation  by  the  United  States  of a  number  of global 
broadband satellite systems using the so-called  Ka band raises important strategic concerns 
for  European regulators,  including:  ( i)  whether the granting of authorisations by the FCC 
effectively  precludes  potential  European  operators  from  using  the  Ka  band;  and  (ii) 
whether effective actions can be taken by European regulators to correct any foreclosure of 
European  satellite  operators.  The  truly  international  nature  of satellite  communications 
highlights  the  need  for  regulatory  cooperation  beyond  the  Community  level  to  other 
international fora. 
69  Satellite  systems  have  characteristics  which  are  fundamentally  different  than  other  traditional 
transmission methods, in terms of cost effectiveness, reliability, data rates, terminal installation times and 
maintenance. 
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The growth of UMTS,  of which satellite communications will form an integral part, will 
undoubtedly increase the extent to which satellite, mobile and terrestrial networks are used 
to  provide  seamless  international broadband  services.  This  double-edged phenomenon of 
network/  service integration and  competition raises  a number of regulatory  issues  for  the 
future of satellite communications in a multimedia environment: 
•  First,  the  licensing  of  satellite  services  should  take  place  under  a  sufficiently 
harmonised  set  of procedures  throughout  the  European  Union.  Those  procedures 
should  be  analogous,  even  if  not  identical,  to  those  used  for  other  forms  of 
communications  services  in  order  to  facilitate  fixed-mobile  integration.  Ideally, 
because  the  needs  of satellite  operators  transcend  national  boundaries,  this  should 
involve  the  mutual  recognition  of  national  satellite  licensing  schemes,  or  even 
European  level  action  (either  to  create  pan-European  licences  or  to  provide  an 
international coordination body for  "one-stop-shopping"). The Community has already 
taken concrete measures to further such policy goals. 
•  Second,  the  grant  of  operating  licences  under  a  harmonised  system  should  be 
complemented by harmonised spectrum allocation procedures.  In a multimedia world, 
this  may  require  the  forced  migration  of existing  services  from  currently  used 
frequency  bands  so  as  to  open  the  airwaves  for  the  next  generation  of  mobile 
communications. 
(i)  Community Regulatory Framework 
The key legal instruments which defme the liberalisation and harmonisation policies of the 
European Union in the field of satellite communications are: 
Satellite Green Paper
70 
Council Resolution on Satellite Personal Communications
71 
Council Resolution on the Provision of,  and Access to,  Space Segment Capacity 
72 
Mutual Recognition of  Satellite Earth Station Type Approval Directive
73 
Satellite Communications Directive
74 
Commission Communication on Satellite Communications in the Information Society75 
European Parliament and Council Decision on a Coordinated Authorisation Approach in 
the Field of  Satellite Personal Communications Services
76 
70  Satellite Green Paper of 20 November 1990, as approved in Council Resolution of 19 December 1992 on 
the development of the common market for satellite communications  services and equipment,  OJ  1992 
C8/l. 
71  Council  Resolution of  7  December  1993  on  the  introduction  of  satellite  personal  communication 
services in the Community, OJ  1993 C339/l. 
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From  the  perspective  of market  entry,  the  key  legislative  instrument  is  the  Satellite 
Communications  Directive,  which  liberalises  satellite  telecoms  services  and  satellite 
terminal equipment by  including  them within the  scope  of the  Services  Directive  and  the 
Terminal Equipment Directive respectively. 
77  As  a result of the Directive,  satellite network 
services for the conveyance of radio and television signals ( e.g. , the retransmission to cable 
companies of downloaded TV signals) have been liberalised as  " telecoms"  services, which 
fall  within the  scope  of the  Directive.  By  contrast,  the  content  of satellite  broadcasting 
services (whether public or private) remains the subject of national broadcasting laws.  The 
liberalisation of satellite services (i.e., the  removal of special or exclusive rights)  is  made 
subject  to  local  licensing  and  authorisation  procedures.  Those  domestic  procedures  are 
subject to a number of guiding principles, namely: 
• 
• 
73 
7.j. 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
Essential requirements.  Licensing obligations must be designed to  ensure compliance 
with  so-called  "essential  requirements",  which  are  technical  issues  which  must  be 
protected in the public interest. 
78 
Proportionality.  The Directive  introduces  the  idea  that individual licences  should not 
be necessary where a simple authorisation or declaration procedure would be sufficient 
to ensure compliance with essential requirements. 
79 
Council  Resolution  of 22  December  1994  on  further  development  of the  Community's  satellite 
communications  policy,  especially  with  regard  to  provisions  of,  and  access  to,  space  segment 
capacity, OJ  1994 C379/5. 
Proposal  for  a  European Parliament and  Council  Directive  relating  to  telecommunications terminal 
equipment and satellite earth station equipment, including the  mutual recognition of their conformity, 
COM(95)612 of 6 December 1995. 
Commission  Directive  94/46/EC  of 13  October  1994  amending  Directive  88/301/EEC  and  Directive 
90/388/EEC in particular with regard to satellite communications, OJ  1994 L268/15. 
Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  Council,  the  European  Parliament,  The  Economic  and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - EU Action Plan:  Satellite Communications in the 
Information Society, COM (97) 91  fmal of 5 March 1997. 
Decision 710/97  /EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 March 1997 on a coordinated 
authorisation approach in the tield of satellite personal-communication services  in the Community,  OJ 
1997 L105/4. 
Refer to Article 2(2)(a) of the Directive, interpreted in light of Recital 12 of the Preamble. 
For a list of relevant essential requirements in the satellite context, refer toLe Goueff,  "Satellite Service: 
The European Regulatory Framework", [1996] 5 Computer &  Telecommunications Law Review,  at pp. 
185-191.  For example:  the  efficient use  of spectrum;  the  avoidance  of harmful  interference  between 
radio-based  telecoms  systems  and  other  space-based  or  terrestrial  technical  systems;  the  security  of 
network  operations;  the  maintenance  of network  integrity;  and  (if necessary)  the  interoperability  of 
services, data protection, the protection of the environment and town and country planning objectives. 
For example,  Recital  15  of the Directive provides that the provision of satellite services only involving 
the use  of a dependent VSAT earth station  in a Member State  should only be  subject to  a declaration 
procedure in that Member State. 
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•  Objectivity, non-discrimination and transparency.  These characteristics are to be the 
hallmarks of any national licensing regime for satellites. 
The  licensing  principles  outlined  above  have  subsequently  been  subsumed  into  the 
Licensing Directive (discussed in Section 1.2 above). 
Most recently,  the  European Parliament and  the Council adopted a Decision in March 
1997 which establishes, inter alia,  a "one-stop-shopping" procedure. Once the Decision 
is  implemented,  prospective applicants for  SPCS  satellite licences  in multiple Member 
States will be able to utilise a centralised procedure under the auspices of the European 
Commission,  CEPT,  ECTRA and the  ERC,  which would  facilitate  obtaining multiple 
satellite licences throughout the European Union within specified timeframes and under 
harmonised licence conditions. 
80 
(ii)  Licensing Issues 
Communications satellites constitute one particular form of transmission media, as  do fibre 
optic  cables  and  terrestrial  microwave  links.  Today,  there  are  three  particular  types  of 
satellite systems which are seen as  stand-alone communications systems or as complements 
to fixed line and mobile services: 
•  Geostationary satellite  systems used to  augment the  transmission facilities  of fixed 
line incumbents in the provision of voice or data services. 
•  Multipoint networks of numerous  small  satellite  terminals  (" VSA Ts"  - very  small 
aperture  terminals),  which  are  widely  used  in  distribution  and  service  industries 
such as retailing and commercial banking. 
•  Satellite  systems  in Low Earth Orbit,  often referred to  as  Global  Mobile Personal 
Communications  Systems  ("GMPCS",  also  known  as  "Little  LEOs"  and  "Big 
LEOs" depending on their size). 
81  These are intended,  inter alia,  to  transmit and/or 
receive calls from users with portable mobile terminals. The fixed-mobile telephony 
and data capabilities of Big  LEOs will be tested between the years  1998 and 2000, 
when  the  four  largest  communications  systems  commence  service  (a  number  of 
Little LEOs are already in operation). 
82 
The  next  generation  of mobile  systems  will  be  so-called  Broadband  LEOs,  which  will 
provide fixed  telephony  and  broadband  multimedia  services  (scheduled  to  be operational 
between  the  years  2001-2003  (see  discussion  below)).  In  addition,  recent  developments 
80 
81 
82 
Refer especially to Article 4. 
For  example,  Little  LEOs  weigh  between  40-100  kgs,  whereas  Big  LEOs  weigh  450-700  kgs  on 
average; so-called Big MEOs weigh between 2,600-3,000 kgs per satellite. 
Namely, Iridium, Globalstar, ICO and Odyssey. 
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suggest that a further group of satellite communications mobile systems - - known as  " Mega 
GEOs"-- may commence operation by the year 2000.
83 
The  comments  immediately  below,  while  relating  specifically  to  the  licensing  of Little 
LEOs  and  Big  LEOs,  are  equally  relevant  to  these  new  generations  of  satellite 
communications systems. 
1.  Types of Licences 
Within  the  European  Union,  each  Member  State  has  specific  procedures  governing  the 
licensing  of  "Little  LEO"  and  "Big  LEO"  satellite  communications  systems  (and  their 
constituent elements) that are characterised by differences in the type of licence, its duration 
and  scope. 
84  By  way  of contrast,  the  FCC in  the  United  States  licenses  complete satellite 
systems  (including  access  to  the  space  segment). These  procedures  tend  to  treat  satellite 
systems as having four separate licensing elements, namely: 
83 
84 
85 
86 
•  Space  segment licences.  Radio  licensees have  the  right to  establish and  operate 
satellites in certain frequency  bands  on the  basis  of their satisfaction of certain 
technical criteria. 
85  Space  segment licensing is  in principle the  responsibility  of 
the country which has jurisdiction over the space segment operator.  This means 
that no other national regulators are  involved except to the extent that the  space 
segment  must  be  coordinated  under  ITU  procedures  regarding  advance 
publication,  coordination and notification, such as  Resolution 46.  The execution 
in  the  European  Union  of the  ITU  procedures  regarding  the  Inmarsat  and 
Eutelsat  systems  is  the  responsibility  of  the  Member  State  in  which  the 
organisation is located. 
According  to  the  terms  of the  Satellite  Communications  Directive,  regulatory 
restrictions on the offer of space segment capacity to an authorised earth station 
network operator have been abolished.  Space segment suppliers are authorised to 
verify  the  conformity  of  earth  stations  with  the  published  conditions  for 
utilisation  of  their  space  segment. 
86  In  addition,  the  Commission's  1994 
Communication  on  Access  to  Space  Segment  Capacity  requires  that  Member 
States  abolish  all  restrictions  on the  offer  of space  segment  capacity  on  their 
territory. 
Operators give  broad  support to  the  view that only  one space  segment licence 
should  be  required  per  satellite  system.  The  general  feeling  is  that  national 
Broadband LEOs are on average 500-1,000 kgs in weight, whereas Mega GEOs weigh over 3,000 kgs. 
Analysed in detail in Le Goueff,  "Licensing Global Mobile Personal Communications by Satellite:  The 
Quest  for  the  Holy  Grail?",  [1997]  4  Computer  &  Telecommunications  Law Review,  at  pp.l61-167. 
Refer to citations contained therein. 
For example,  the  orbital  characteristics  and  method of operation of the  satellites,  plus  the  frequency 
assignment for uplinks, downlinks and inter-satellite links (where applicable). 
Article 2. 
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87 
88 
89 
sovereignty is  not lost because of the multiple licensing  requirements  exercised 
by  the  Member  States  in  connection  with  ground  segment  licensing  ( e.g. , 
gateway earth stations,  service provision and user terminals - listed below).  On 
the other hand,  there is  a growing concern,  as  a result of the  high demand for 
and the limited spectrum allocations to  GMPCS, that any single decision of any 
single national regulator  "could amount to  a  de facto global orbit/spectrum plan 
for certain frequency bands. " 
87 
•  Gateway  earth  station  licensing.  Business  and/ or  radio  licences  are  needed  to 
operate  gateway  earth  stations  because  they  require  the  use  of spectrum  to 
transmit  and  receive  signals  from  satellites.  This  is  the  responsibility  of each 
Member State in which the satellite earth station is located. The transmitting and 
receiving  frequencies  used  by  satellite earth stations  are  coordinated  along  the 
lines  prescribed  by  the  ITU  Radio  Regulations.  Interconnection  between  the 
earth station and the PSTN is  treated as  a matter for commercial negotiation.  In 
Germany, operators are granted a network licence pursuant to which the licensee 
is authorised to operate its own network.  This gives the operator the status of a 
telecoms carrier; additional individual authorisations are required, however,  for 
the establishment and operation of earth stations. 
•  Service provision.  Typically,  satellite  operators  establish distribution  networks 
for  their services along national or regional lines,  which can best be  served by 
local  service  providers  or  distributors.  A  business  licence  clearly  defines  the 
operating  conditions  relating  to  the  different  types  of traffic  transmitted  (e.g., 
voice,  data,  video)  and  authorises  the  connection  of terminals  to  the  PSTN. 
These licences may  take a variety of forms.  For example,  a limited number of 
service  providers '  licences  may  regulate  the  use  of frequencies  or  frequency 
bands  by  means  of an  existing  satellite  system  that  is  coordinated  nationally, 
multi-nationally  or  internationally. 
88  In  the  alternative,  under  a  less  restrictive 
system,  service  providers  operating  within  the  context  of existing  satellite 
networks that are  coordinated nationally,  multinationally or internationally may 
be granted an umbrella licence  that depends  neither on the  frequencies  nor the 
satellite  system  used  (with  the  earth  segment  being  covered  by  means  of 
individual or general authorisations). 
89 
•  User terminals.  Radio licences are needed to operate each piece of mobile earth 
station  equipment  (user  terminals),  essentially  because  the  terminal  acts  as  a 
radio transmitter.  Individual licences  are required in many  countries and,  until 
The  implication  being  that  entire  frequency  bands  could  be  blocked  on  a  worldwide  basis,  thereby 
preventing their use by other satellite systems. See Le Goueff, at p.l64 and citations therein. 
For example,  VSAT  and  SNG  services.  In  this  regard,  refer also  to  VSAT and SNG  (Final  Report), 
European Radiocommunications Office (25 August 1995). 
For example,  LMSS  such  as  INMARSAT  C  or EUTELTRACS  offered  by  EUTELSAT.  There  are 
differences in the application for such licences in countries such as Germany and the United Kingdom. 
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recently,  were  even  required  for  v1s1tors  entering  a  particular  country  ( e.g., 
Portugal).  In  other  countries,  so-called  "commissioning"  on  the  part  of the 
satellite  operator  occurs, 
90  rather  than  individual  licensing  on the  part  of the 
national  administration.  The  licensing  of  terminals  is  the  sole  licensing 
instrument  used  to  regulate  satellite  communications  in  The  Netherlands.  In 
addition  to  individual  licensing  requirements,  the  lack  of  a  multilateral 
framework  for  the  mutual  recognition  of type  approvals  restricts  international 
mobility. 
Licensing on a national basis has been recognised as a potential weakness by the European 
Radiocommunications Office, which has noted in particular that:  (1) the non-uniform use of 
frequencies attributable to national licensing could lead to the inefficient use of frequency in 
Europe;  (2)  national control over a system which has  not been licensed by that country is 
practically  impossible because  the  network operator (gateway)  can be  located  elsewhere; 
and (3) the mobile terminals are equally difficult to regulate because of their size and dual-
mode features. 
91 
2.  Member State Comparisons 
There  are  currently  significant  differences  between  the  Member  States  as  regards  their 
licensing  procedures  for  satellite  communications  systems  and,  in  particular,  the  major 
characteristics  of those  licences.  For  example,  while  certain  Member  States  such  as 
Denmark require a separate class licence for  satellite networks and services, others such as 
France  incorporate  both  the  network  and  the  service  elements  within  the  same  licence. 
Other Member States such as  Sweden  do not require a licence for the provision of satellite 
services.  An  illustration  of such  differences  could  be  found  in  the  regulatory  regimes 
applicable in a number of Member States. 
In Denmark and the  United Kingdom,  a general class licence governs the provision of all 
satellite networks and  services.  There appear  to  be no  regulatory differences between the 
different types of satellite networks which might be used.  There is  no  limitation as  to  the 
duration of the  class  licence,  and  no  fee  is  required.  Satellite  terminals  are  nevertheless 
subject to type approval and to  the payment of a fee.  In  Germany,  it is  necessary to obtain 
an  individual  licence  for  the  establishment  of a  satellite  network.  By  way  of contrast, 
satellite services are only subject to  a notification procedure.  There is  no  limitation on the 
duration of the licence except in the case of a shortage of relevant frequencies.  In addition, 
the terminals are subject to type approval and to the payment of a fee.  In  Portugal, both the 
establishment of satellite networks and the  provision of satellite services  are  subject to  an 
individual licence. The licence for the network is limited to  15 years, while the licence for 
satellite services has no  limitation in time.  In addition,  it is necessary to obtain a so-called 
90 
91 
This is  intended to  ensure the  integrity of the  satellite  system by verifying that the required technical 
specifications are met and that all necessary administrative procedures have been satisfied. 
Satellite Personal Communications  Services  (S-PCS),  European Radiocommunications Office, Report of 
July  1995,  at  p.lOO.  See  also  Mobile  Satellite  Services  Applications,  European Radiocommunications 
Ot11ce, Report of August 1995 (updated November 1995). 
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"radio  licence"  which  is  limited  to  five  years.  Operators  of networks  and  providers  of 
satellite  services  are  also  subject  to  a number  of qualifications  and  operating  conditions, 
including foreign ownership restrictions and the need to provide evidence that they owe no 
debts to the State. Licences are subject to the payment of a fee. 
The duration of licences for communications satellites varies greatly from Member State to 
Member State,  and  often varies  as  between different types  of satellites.  At one  extreme, 
Sweden  does  not generally require  a licence.  In  Spain,  satellite  licences  are  of indefinite 
duration. In the  United Kingdom,  the duration of a satellite licence is 25 years. In a country 
such as  France,  the  duration of the licence is  10 years for  VSAT networks and five  years 
for  SNG  networks. 
92  In Member  States  such  as  Austria  and Belgium  there  is  no  specific 
duration period for  satellite licences,  with the  length of a licence being  determined  on  a 
case-by-case basis.  The licence may be limited in time because of the  scarcity of available 
frequencies. 
Similarly, the  scale of licence fees  payable for different types of communications satellites 
varies  greatly  between  the  Member  States.  In  Sweden,  for  example,  no  licence  fee  is 
payable  whatsoever.  In  Austria,  the  scale  of the  licence  fee  depends  on the  number  of 
transmitting units and the maximum RF-output power of the transmitting units.  In  France, 
an  annual  fee  must  be paid  ranging  from  525  ECU  to  1,500 ECU per  station,  with  the 
application fee  varying from 3,750 ECU up to 6,000 ECU. In  Spain,  there is  a fee  for the 
reservation of radio  frequency  spectrum.  In  the  United Kingdom,  no  fee  is  payable for  a 
Class  Licence, 
93  although a fee  is  payable  for  the  licence  granted under  section  1 of the 
Wireless Telegraphy Act of  1949. 
As  regards  licensing  procedures,  in  Austria  the  procedure depends  on the  services  to  be 
offered. For example: voice services to  third parties require an individual licence requiring 
prior approval;  voice  services  to  Closed User Groups are  not licensed;  and  data  services 
may  be  provided  without  a  licence  (although  notification  or  declaration  is  required).  In 
Belgium, an individual licence is necessary to establish a network, whereas only registration 
is necessary where liberalised telecoms services are to be provided. In the  United Kingdom, 
satellite systems - - not services - - are subject to  individual licensing requirements;  other 
satellite-related matters are subject to a Class Licence regime.  This is  also reflected by and 
large in the regulatory regimes of France,  Germany,  Spain  and  The  Netherlands  (refer to 
Recital 15 of the Satellite Communications Directive). 
92 
93 
Namely,  Very Small Aperature Terminals ("VSA  T") used to  describe satellite receiving dishes of less 
than 2 metres in diameter, and Satellite News Gathering ("SNG") satellites. 
The Class Licence for satellite services allows anyone within the United Kingdom to provide any form of 
satellite service,  including voice,  data and video for their own use or for the use of a third party.  The 
major restriction is that that for most services, PSTN interconnection cannot be provided at both ends of 
the  link  (i.e.,  it  is  only  available  on  a  one-way  path).  In  addition,  in  practice,  only  five  or  six 
undertakings take advantage of the service. 
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(iii)  Satellite-Based Multimedia Distribution Systems 
1.  Market Developments 
94 
Television broadcasting,  rather  than  telecoms  services,  is  the  current key  application for 
satellites  around  the  world. 
95  Digital  television  has  brought  a  revolution  in broadcasting 
with  the  introduction  of  such  new  offerings  as  thematic  channels  and  Pay-Per-View. 
Satellites offer cost effective delivery of digital television signals and outperform cable and 
terrestrial distribution in this regard.  In anticipation of the successful introduction of digital 
television, demand for transponders is dramatically increasing and new and more powerful 
satellites are expected to be launched by the year 2000. 
Satellite communications have been dominated by mobile and personal applications during 
the  1990s,  as  evidenced by the use of LEO and medium earth orbit ( "MEO") satellites to 
promote first generation Satellite Personal Communications Networks.  As mobile systems 
move  into  their  third  generation,  the  integration  of cellular  and  satellite  is  occurring  in 
UMTS/FPLMTS,  but  is  still  dominated  by  voice  communications,  with  the  promise  of 
multimedia to come. 
Although the market for Pay-TV is  widely regarded as  the  driver behind the development 
of digital television,  it is  also widely believed that the number of new market entrants will 
decline dramatically after an initial burst of subscriber interest in the  period up to  the year 
2000.  From such market developments,  it will become commercially imperative for  digital 
television operators to diversify into non-core businesses such as  the provision of data and 
on-line services. 
The recent development of the digital television standard known as DVB-MPEG will enable 
satellites  to  handle  not  only  video  but  also  data,  which  will  create  new  multimedia 
opportunities  for  satellite  systems.  The  data  dimension will  make  possible  a number  of 
"new on-line"  services, broadening the scope of digital television from mere entertainment 
to  business,  information and educational applications. 
96  The most promising application of 
the  D  VB-MPEG  standard  is  its  ability  to  transport  data  packets  over  the  Internet  and 
provide high speed Internet access. 
Despite the  many  positive  aspects  of technological  convergence,  doubts  remain as  to  the 
relative importance of satellite-based systems in the provision of multimedia services in the 
short  term,  at  least  in  the  European  Union,  where  fixed  line  and  wireless  systems  are 
95 
96 
For an excellent overview of current market developments, refer to the collected papers at the Second Ka 
Band  Utilization  Conference  and  International  Workshop  on  SCG/1,  September  24-26,  1996, 
Florence/Italy. 
Estimated to account for over 70%  of the European satellite market and expected to experience further 
growth as a result of the introduction of digital television. 
The data transmission facility within the  DVB  standard is  the key  to the  development of new  services, 
allowing them to be launched on a low cost platform such as the digital television receivers which will be 
widely available to consumers. 
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virtually  ubiquitous.  These  doubts  stem  from  a  number  of perceived  technology-based 
weaknesses of satellite services: 
•  First,  it  has  been  questioned  whether  multimedia  services  can  be  delivered  by 
existing  satellite  technology  in  the  Ku  frequency  bands,  which  are  already 
constrained  by  spectrum  capacity.  Because  of these  constraints,  only  a restricted 
class  of multimedia is  possible for  satellite-mobile  systems.  In  order to  make  full 
multimedia  services  possible,  it  will  be  necessary  to  move  out  of Ku  bands  and 
towards the new Ka band allocations which have already been licensed in the  United 
States.  Ka  band  satellite  systems  will  be  able  to  compete  directly  with  terrestrial 
broadband technologies such as cable modems and  xDSL technologies. 
97 
•  Second, multimedia applications are driven predominantly by the idea of a backbone 
"superhighway", which is  assumed to be dominated by networks built of fiber optic 
cables. 
98  As explained in Chapter II of the Study, it is increasingly likely that ATM 
will  form  the  key  transmission  standard  in  Europe  for  the  future  "information 
superhighway". This standard, however, has been developed primarily by terrestrial 
fixed network operators in the context of the  "ATM Forum"  and  the ITU,  without 
the impact of satellite operators. 
99 
•  Third, it is by no means clear that satellites can offer the quality of service provided 
by  terrestrial  ATM  or  the  degree  of  mobility  that  will  make  satellite-based 
broadband services attractive to consumers in the European Union. 
•  Fourth, fibre-based systems will always be able to deliver multimedia services more 
cheaply than satellite systems.  Where it is  economical to  deploy the  infrastructure, 
the  same  can be  said of terrestrial wireless  mobile  systems.  Whether a significant 
market  for  satellite-based  services  exists  outside  the  coverage  of the  terrestrial 
infrastructure is therefore a matter of some debate. 
100 
Despite  these  possible  impediments  to  the  emergence  of  satellite-based  multimedia 
applications  in  the  European  Union,  the  issue  remains  whether  the  European  satellite 
industry will be  able to  take advantage of the  multimedia opportunities  made possible by 
satellites  outside the  territory of the  European Union.  Given the  fact  that  the  growth of 
97 
98 
99 
100 
Refer  to  forthcoming  Report  to  the  European  Commission  on  "Prospects  for  Personal  Satellite 
Communications Using Service Links in the Ka-Band", Comsys/Hogan & Hartson. 
However,  in many parts of the world outside of Europe,  this  is  either impossible,  uneconomic  or will 
simply take too  long to develop.  In those countries,  satellites do  appear to  have a niche role  to  play in 
developing multimedia services in the short term. 
Only now is the A  TM Forum beginning to consider radio access and the problem of extending the A  TM 
standard to include radio channels. 
On the other hand, areas which do not have a high enough traffic density, or favourable terrain, to justify 
the  installation of fibre  or terrestrial mobile  receivers,  will  be  more economically  served by  satellite 
systems.  Similarly,  maritime  and  aeronautical  users  can  be  served more  easily  by  satellite  systems, 
although these may be regarded as very small niche markets for multimedia applications. 
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multimedia  applications  over  satellite  networks  is  closely  linked  to  the  use  of mobile 
systems -- an area in which European companies are particularly strong on a global basis --
the delivery of multimedia services  via  satellite is  arguably  something  which  compels  the 
European  Union  to  take  a  strong  policy  position.  To  this  end,  the  EU Action  Plan  on 
Satellite  Communications  in  the  Information  Society  promises  a  new  focus  on  the 
opportunities  arising  from  increased  political  and  technological/industrial  cooperation 
between the  European  Union  and  third  countries. 
101  Because  the  Gil is  a  global  vision, 
international cooperation is necessary and critical for its success. 
2.  Regulatory Developments 
In recent years,  an increasing number of proposals have been announced to  construct and 
launch  global  satellite  systems  for  the  provision  of broadband  multimedia  services.  A 
significant  driving  force  behind  these  projects  is  the  fact  that  the  market  for  regional 
satellite  systems  has  approached maturity and  even saturation,  particularly in Europe,  the 
United States and Asia. 
The  United  States's  FCC has  taken  an  early  lead  in  licensing  global  broadband  satellite 
systems.  The  FCC  has  issued  global  broadband  system  licences  to  such  companies  as 
Teledesic,  Lockheed  Martin  for  Astrolink,  GE  Americom  for  GE  Star,  Loral  for 
CyberStar, Orion for  the  Orion Global  Satellite  Network and  Hughes  for  Spaceways  (the 
Ka band segment).
102 
The wave of applications filed with,  and licences granted by, the FCC has led to  concerns 
that the  United  States  is  becoming the  de facto  arbiter for  global  satellite systems.  In the 
view  of the  Study  Team,  however,  attempts  to  lay  any  "blame"  on the  FCC  may  divert 
attention from the substantive regulatory concern which is at issue. Pursuant to international 
treaty,  the  designated  arbiter  for  global  satellite  systems  is  the  ITU. 
103  Through  its 
Radiocommunications Sector, the ITU is charged with adopting and implementing rules and 
policies  for  satellite  systems.  The  Radiocommunications  Sector  exercises  its  authority 
largely  through  its  World  Radiocommunications  Conferences  (" WRCs"),  which  are 
currently held ever two years. 
Unfortunately,  two  significant shortcomings  have developed  in the  ITU's management of 
global orbital resources. First, the  ITU's bureaucratic, one vote per Member Nation system 
of governance prevents  the  ITU  from  responding  quickly  to  advances  in technology  and 
proposals  for  new  satellite  systems.  Additionally,  some  have  suggested  that  developing 
101 
102 
103 
Point A12 of the Action Plan. 
The FCC has also placed on Public Notice the proposal for Alcatel's Skybridge. Also pending before the 
FCC  is  Motorolla's Celestri application and  TRW's Global  EHF Satellite  Network application,  which 
was filed on 4 September 1997. 
The ITU  is  affiliated with the  United Nations.  The ITU's mission is  the  international allocation of 
radio  frequencies  and  satellite  orbital  positions,  the  standardisation  and  interconnection  of 
international telecommunications networks and the development of telecommunications infrastructure 
in developing countries.  Voting membership in the ITU is  limited to  fully sovereign nations.  At last 
count,  185 countries were members. 
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countries 
10-+encourage  the  adoption  of cumbersome  administrative  procedures  in  order  to 
preserve orbital resources by inhibiting the prompt deployment of new satellite systems.  A 
second problem with the ITU' s method of governance is that it necessitates the development 
of coalitions,  or  "voting blocks",  in  order to  gain approval for  new  initiatives or satellite 
systems.  In  recognition  of this  fact,  the  European  Commission's  Action  Plan  urges  the 
Council  and  the  European  Parliament  to  adopt  a  far  more  active  role  in  WRC  policy 
development, commencing with the WRC-97,  which was held in Geneva in October 1997. 
At  WRC-95,  representatives  of the  US-based  Teledesic,  with  the  active  support  of the 
United  States  government,  forged  a  compromise  which  resulted  in  a  major  spectrum 
allotment in the  Ka band for  non-geosynchronous ("NGSO") satellite systems.  Teledesic's 
success was in part due to the fact that a Ka band NGSO allocation was not on the WRC-95 
agenda,  which meant that potential opponents were not in a position to  respond adequately 
to the initiative. 
There is  considerable scope for improvement in ITU processes.  During WRC-99, the ITU 
will be  asked to  consider proposals for  NGSO  satellite  systems in the Ku  band  spectrum, 
currently reserved  for  geosynchronous  systems.  The  ITU may  also  be required to  take  a 
view  on  the  licensing  of  "paper  satellites"  and  the  auctioning  of  global  system 
authorisations.  In  addition,  the  ITU  may  be  asked  to  consider  plans  for  global  direct 
satellite  systems  and  inter-satellite  links  in  increasingly  higher  spectrum  bands. 
Unfortunately, it may be extremely difficult to devise reforms for the ITU that will achieve 
the  dual  results  of lessening  bureaucracy,  while  at  the  same  time  increasing  the  pool  of 
countries that have the opportunity to propose major satellite systems. 
Even  if the  FCC  continues  to  play  a  dominant  role  in  the  licensing  of global  satellite 
systems,  it may  only  have  marginal  impact  on two,  arguably  far  more  important issues, 
namely: 
•  which global satellite systems will ultimately be constructed; and 
•  the identity of the parties which will own those systems . 
It is estimated that the market for broadband satellite services will never be able to consume 
more  than half the  broadband  satellite  system  capacity  that  has  been proposed  in  recent 
years. 
105  Industry experts believe that those who will succeed in the "race to market" will be 
the  satellite licensees  that  are  successful  in  forging  global  equity partnerships,  comprised 
predominantly of major public and private users of satellite capacity and satellite equipment 
104 
105 
Which comprise a majority of the ITU's membership. 
This means that a significant market consolidation is  likely to  occur,  and  many global satellite licences 
may never reach the launchpad stage. In a Report prepared for the European Space Agency by TelAstra, 
a  United States  satellite consultancy,  it  was  estimated that  the market for  satellite multimedia  services 
will range  from  108  gigabits per second to  285  gigabits per second,  assuming that satellites capture 6-
9.5%  market share.  In contrast,  six  of the  leading  broadband systems that  have been proposed would 
deliver  a  combined  capacity  of  438  gigabits  per  second.  See  Theresa  Foley,  "Space  Race", 
Communications Week International, August 1997, at p.  25. 
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manufacturers.  As a result,  it  is  entirely possible that  the  satellite  systems  that  are  to  be 
constructed will be truly  global in character,  and  that  the  licences issued by the  FCC may 
become little more than  "flags of convenience". 
106 
106  The  key  results  of WRC-97,  many  of which  relate  to  developing  spectrum allocations  policies  for 
broadband satellite applications, are discussed in Section 4 of Annex I. 
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i GMPCS systems do have the potential to  create an international multimedia infrastructure, going well beyond 
[ the narrow uses of today for  international travellers,  businesses, and governmental organisations.  In  terms  of 
\ creating a truly global  infrastructure, satellite communications  may  become  very important  because  of their 
: ability to supply services  to  those parts of the world otherwise unable to obtain  (or  to afford) fixed-line access. 
[ Although they  could constitute the  one  broadband network with  truly global  reach,  satellite communications 
[ systems in Europe are currently exhibiting technological weaknesses and tend to be characterised by a low take-
\ up in urban areas,  which  throws into  question their relative importance in  delivering multimedia to  the mass  :  I  market in the European Union (at least in the short term).  ' 
1 More importantly, however, the current licensing regime for international satellite communications systems in  i 
! the  European  Union  poses  significant hurdles for  the  take-off of multimedia applications  via  satellite.  Under l 
[ international law, government regulation and control of satellite systems is considered to  be a national matter,  [ 
! with  the  use of frequencies for  up linking or downlinking clearly deemed  to  be  matters falling  within national i 
~  jurisdiction.  A  recent  study concluded  that  the factor  most  likely  to  slow  the growth  of GMPCS  is  current  ~ 
regulatory policy,  because of the requirement that  operators obtain  licensing in every Member  State in  which  \ 
they wish to operate. 1D7 The adoption of the Licensing Directive into Member State laws will succeed partly in  : 
ameliorating the effects of  fragmented regulation. However, the fact that ground segment licensing requirements l 
can  be divided into  three  separate categories  under Member  State  laws  creates  the  potential for  multiple (and  \ 
different)  licensing requirements on a Member  State  level.  Repeating this experience for  every  country in  the l 
world in which an operator wishes to provide global services raises immense market entry  barriers. los  \ 
In  the  absence  of an  international satellite regulatory  body  to facilitate  the  effective  regulation  of end-to-end l 
global  satellite communications systems, efforts  should  be  made for  the  harmonisation of national approaches l 
towards licensing requirements. As recognised by the European Commission in its Action Plan, the Community i 
~  has a potentially important role to play in this process. Beyond that degree of international harmonisation, there l 
: are a number of  less ambitious regulatory goals which should be sought, namely:  l 
i:=,:  •  The  consolidation  of ground  segment  licensing  requirements  across  the  European  Union,  which  would  [ 
greatly expedite the licensing process.  The logical way in which such licensing could be consolidated would  [ 
be  along  the  lines  used  with  respect  to  other  aspects  of telecoms,  namely,  the  licensing  of networks  or l 
infrastructure (in this case,  "satellite systems"), on the one hand, and the services provided over or through  [ 
the use of those systems, on the other.  i 
~  •  The  "one-stop-shopping"  mechanism  proposed in  the  Decision  of the  European  Parliament  and  Council,  [ 
once fully implemented,  will also  be an  important step  in  the erosion  of existing regulatory  barriers.  The  i 
extension of the mandate of  the ET0109 to administer licences seems to be a logical extension of its current  [ 
role in providing one-stop-services for other forms of  telecoms services.  ; 
j  •  The  logical  next  regulatory  step  after  one-stop-shopping  is  a system  of mutual  recognition  of satellite  [ 
licences throughout the European  Union, as was proposed originally at the Community level in 1994, and  ! 
as already occurs  to a limited degree  in  the VSAT sector between  Switzerland and the Member  States of j 
l  ................  q~!!!!:'!:!!:.Y.(. .  .E.!:.~.l!:.~~~--T~.~--!::!~!..~~~!.q!!:q_~(.  ..  !..~~---Y.!!!.~~q  .. ~!.l!:g4..c:..!!!:  .. '!:!!:q  ...  ~.~-~g~1!:.'!!::  ..  T~.~--~!!!:P!.f!!!!~t!:t~.~~~!!:  .. 9f.'!:  .. ~.1!:E.~~~-~ft.!:!. .  ..! 
107 
108 
109 
The independent consultancy Ovum, cited in Mobile Satellite News of 6 February 1997, at p.5. 
At  the  ITU's  TELECOM  95  event,  a  representative  from  Iridium  claimed  that  16,000  individual 
agreements would have to  be entered by his  company if licensing agreements  were necessary for  each 
ITU  Member  Nation.  Globalstar  also  observed that  the  establishment of operational  licences  was  the 
single most burdensome task faced by it. 
The European Telecommunications Office. 
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centralised pan-European body. 110 An essential element of the harmonisation necessary for such a system of [ 
mutual recognition to succeed is a relatively high degree of harmonisation of national laws and coordination  : 
among Member States of their management of radio frequency spectrum (achieved in large part through the  ~ 
ITW.  i 
•  The  related issue of type approvals should  be addressed  on an  international  basis.  To  this  end, a series of 
mutually recognised  standards for  GMPCS  operations and  equipment could  be  agreed  upon  between  the 
European Union and other nations on the basis of bilateral arrangements. 
•  Because of its truly international nature and  because of the  relatively small number of satellite operators 
throughout the world, there exists the possibility that some form  of industry self-regulation may be feasible 
in the satellite communications sector.  ·  ..............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................  .. 
110  Analysys  canvassed  these  regulatory  possibilities  m  its  report  of February  1994  to  the  European 
Commission. 
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1.4  THE LICENSING OF "TELECOMS" INFRASTRUCTURE 
The Regulatory Issues 
The development of a competitive multimedia marketplace will  depend on the  number, 
diversity  and  availability  of  infrastructure  and  service  providers.  The  number  of 
infrastructure  providers  will  have  a  direct  and  obvious  impact  on  the  amount  of 
bandwidth  available  for  multimedia  applications.  In  the  absence  of readily  available 
bandwidth, the price of transmission capacity will remain high and the development of a 
mass market for multimedia services may be delayed. 
Until recently, many Member States did not differentiate for regulatory purposes between 
the  operation  of  telecoms  infrastructure  and  the  provision  of  services.  Such 
differentiation was unnecessary as  long  as  Community law focused  on the  liberalisation 
of services as  the principal means of encouraging competition to  the fixed line  telecoms 
incumbent (which continued to hold a monopoly over voice telephony). 
It became clear during the mid  -1990s,  however,  that the fixed  line  telecoms  incumbent 
would continue to have market power even after liberalisation of all  telecoms  services if 
service  providers  were  unable  to  use  alternative  infrastructure  or to  build  their  own 
networks.  Consequently,  infrastructure was  incrementally liberalised at  the  Community 
level in a relatively short timeframe, in the following order: (1) cable television networks 
providing  liberalised  telecoms  services  in  1995;  (2)  infrastructure  supporting  mobile 
networks in 1996; and (3) alternative infrastructure for liberalised services in 1996, and 
for the provision of any type of telecoms service after January 1998. 
This  liberalisation  programme  is  reflected  in  Member  State  law,  and  the  regulatory 
distinction between services  and  infrastructure is  now widely  drawn,  even in countries 
where  neither  telecoms  services  nor  infrastructure  require  licensing.  An  equivalent 
distinction in the broadcasting sector is  made in only a handful  of Member States  and, 
even then,  terrestrial television broadcasting networks are operated on a monopoly basis 
to support the provision of broadcast services. 
Having drawn a regulatory distinction between infrastructure and  services  for  licensing 
purposes,  regulators  must  now  decide  how  an  adapted  regulatory  framework  for 
multimedia should regulate the market behaviour of these different licensees. 
The manner in which the operators of infrastructure are licensed and regulated will have 
a major impact on whether potential investors are willing to make the huge expenditures 
necessary  to  construct  the  proverbial  "Information  Superhighway"  to  support  the 
provision of multimedia services to  the  home.  Those expenditures are being put at  risk 
by  commercial  factors  (see  Chapter  II  of  the  Study)  which  are  progressively 
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"commoditising"  the  provision  of infrastructure.  According  to  market  interviews,  the 
investment  in  networks  is  also  being  put at  risk by  regulatory  policies  which  prevent 
investors  from  deriving  the  proper  value  from  their  investments  (especially 
interconnection and "equal access" policies). 
Whether such investments can or should be promoted by a future multimedia regulatory 
framework is  the  subject of lively debate,  both among  the Member  States  and between 
regulators  within  the  European  Union  and  the  United  States.  The  debate  has  been 
couched in terms of whether society's multimedia needs are best served by  a regulatory 
model  concerned  primarily  with  infrastructure-based  competition  or  services-based 
competition. 
1.4.1  Community Regulatory Framework 
The  liberalisation  of  non-voice  services  by  the  Services  Directive  in  1990  was  not 
accompanied by any complementary liberalisation of infrastructure. The reasons for this are 
essentially  historical.  This  regulatory  imbalance  was  redressed  by  the  release  of the 
Infrastructure  Green  Paper  in  1994,
111  which  expressly  acknowledged  the  importance  of 
comprehensive infrastructure liberalisation by  1 January  1998  as  a means of ensuring the 
competitive  provision  of voice  services.  Incremental  liberalisation  occurred  through  the 
adoption  of a  series  of Article  90  Directives  which  liberalised  the  use  of infrastructure 
capable of supporting  telecoms  services  which did not fall  within the  definition of "voice 
telephony" (refer to Section 1.3.1 of Annex I), namely: 
The Satellite Communications Directive
112 
The Cable TV Directive
113 
The Mobile Directive
114 
The Full Competition Directiveu
5 
• 
111 
112 
113 
114 
115 
Satellites 
Communication to  the  Council  and  the  European Parliament,  Green  Paper on the  Liberalisation of 
Telecommunications Infrastructure and Cable Television Networks, Pt.  I (Principles and Timetable), 
Brussels, 25 October 1994, COM(94)440.  See also Green Paper, Pt.  II, 25 January 1995. 
Commission  Directive  94/46/EC  of 13  October  1994  amending  Directive  88/301/EEC  and  Directive 
90/388/EEC in particular with regard to satellite communications, OJ  1997 L268115. 
Commission Directive 95/51/EC of 18  October  1995,  amending Directive 90/388/EEC with regard to 
the  abolition  of the  restrictions  on  the  use  of cable  television  networks  for  the  provision  of already 
liberalised telecommunications services, OJ  1995 L256/49 . 
Commission  Directive  96/2/EC  of 16  January  1996  amending  Directive  90/388/EEC  with  regard  to 
mobile and personal communications, OJ  1996 L20//59 of20 January. 
Directive 96/19/EC of 13  March 1996,  amending Directive 90/388 with regard to the implementation of 
full competition in telecommunications markets, OJ  1996 L74/13 of 22 March. 
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The Satellite  Communications Directive liberalised inter alia  the provision of "satellite 
network services".  The Directive defines satellite network services as the establishment 
and  operation  of  satellite  earth  station  networks  that  allow  radio  communications 
between satellite earth stations and  space  segment (uplinks) and radio communications 
between space segments and satellite earth stations (downlinks). 
116 
•  Cable TV 
The  Cable  TV Directive liberalised the use of existing and new cable TV networks for 
the provision of liberalised telecommunications services. As from 1 January 1996, 
117  the 
following restrictions were lifted: 
•  restrictions  on  the  supply  of transmission  capacity  for  the  provision  of 
telecommunication services other than voice telephony; 
•  restrictions  on  the  use  of  cable  TV  networks 
118  for  the  provision  of 
telecommunications services other than voice telephony; and 
•  restrictions on the direct interconnection of cable TV ne tworks. 
The Cable  TV Directive does not affect the right of a Member State to  make the supply of 
telecommunications  services  by a cable  TV  operator subject to  licensing  or authorisation 
procedures. Moreover, the  Cable TV Directive does not prevent the application of national 
laws regarding the  "distribution of audiovisual programmes for the general public via cable 
TV networks, and the content of such programmes". 
119 
•  Mobile Systems 
116 
117 
118 
119 
As  discussed in Section 1.3.3 of Annex I,  the  Mobile Directive lifts all  restrictions on 
operators of mobile and personal communications systems as  regards the establishment 
of their own infrastructure,  the  use of third-party  infrastructure  or  the  shared use  of 
infrastructure in the  provision of the  services  authorised by  their licences.  Moreover, 
Article 2 (1) (iv). 
By  1 January  1998,  the  European Commission was  obliged to  carry out  an  overall  assessment  of the 
situation with regard to the remaining restrictions on the use of public  telecommunications networks for 
the provision of cable TV capacity. Refer to  Cable Review,  Commission Communication concerning the 
Review Under Competition Rules of the Joint Provision of Telecommunications and Cable TV  Networks 
by a Single  Operator and  the  Abolition  of Restrictions  on the  Provision of Cable  TV  Capacity  Over 
Telecommunications Networks,  of  17 December 1997. 
Cable TV networks are defined, within the meaning of the Cable TV Directive as "any mainly wire-based 
infrastrncture approved by a Member State for delivery or distribution of  radio or television signals to the 
public".  (Corrigendum published 29 November 1996, OJ 1996 L308/59). 
Recital 17. 
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Member  States  are  obliged  to  lift  all  restrictions  on  the  interconnection  of mobile 
communications systems with one another or with fixed networks. 
120 
•  Alternative Infrastructure 
The Full Competition Directive completed the process of infrastructure liberalisation set 
out in the  Satellite  Communications Directive,  the  Cable  TV Directive and the  Mobile 
Directive  by  requiring  the  removal  of  all  restrictions  on  the  deployment  of  any 
telecommunications networks 
121  used in the provision of liberalised telecommunications 
services. 
According to the terms of the  Full Competition Directive,  the liberalisation of all forms 
of alternative infrastructure supporting liberalised  telecoms  services was  to occur by 1 
July 1996. The only derogations from this timetable were: 
•  Portugal  until 1 July 1997 
•  Luxembourg  until 1 July 1997 
•  Ireland  until 1 July 1997 
•  Greece  until 1 October 1997 
Infrastructure supporting voice services must be liberalised by  1 January  1998 in order to 
coincide  with  the  liberalisation  of voice  telephony  in  most  Member  States.  The  only 
exceptions to this are: 
•  Luxembourg  until 1 July 1998 
•  Spain  until 1 December 1998 
•  Portugal  until 1 January 2000 
•  Ireland  until 1 January 2000 
•  Greece  until 31  December 2000 
The  obligations  contained  in the  Full  Competition  Directive  are  without prejudice  to  the 
licensing, general declaration or authorisation procedures that may exist at a national level, 
insofar  as  these  procedures:  are  aimed  at  compliance  with  II essential  requirements II;  are 
120 
121 
Article 1(3), inserting new Article 3(c) and 3(d) into the Services Directive. 
Telecommunications  networks  are  defmed  as:  "the  transmission  equipment  and,  where  applicable, 
switching equipment and other resources which permit the conveyance of  signals between defined network 
termination points by wire,  radio,  by optical or any other electromagnetic means". 
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objective,  transparent and  non-discriminatory;  require the  specification of reasons  for  any 
refusal; and include a procedure for appealing any such refusal. 
1.4.2  Member State Licensing Policy 
Although it is beyond the scope of this Study to examine the extent to which Member States 
are in compliance with the terms of the  Full  Competition Directive,  the Study Team notes 
that -- as of 1 October 1997 -- all Member States which have not received a derogation have 
either adopted legislation which implements the terms of the various Article 90 Directives 
discussed above or are in the process of introducing legislation which purports to do  so.  In 
certain  cases,  public  statements  have  been  made  that  the  provision of infrastructure  has 
been liberalised. 
Even in those cases where Member States have delayed the implementation of Community 
legislation,  there is  widespread evidence of market actors asserting the  direct effect of the 
various  Article  90  Directives  liberalising  the  provision  of infrastructure  and  providing 
capacity for liberalised services, even in the absence of an express licence to do so. 
122 
Nevertheless,  regulatory  policy  regarding  the  licensing  of infrastructure  for  liberalised 
telecoms  services  or voice  services  varies  significantly  from  Member  State  to  Member 
State: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
122 
In  countries  such as  Finland  and Denmark,  for  example,  licences are not required for 
any form of infrastructure. 
In  Sweden,  infrastructure  was  not  subject  to  licensing  until  recently  but,  with  the 
passage of the Telecommunications Law of 1997, now requires an individual licence. 
Spain,  which  is  still  in  the  process  of revising  its  telecoms  laws,  does  not  license 
infrastructure separately from services. 
In the  United Kingdom,  the introduction of the so-called International Facilities Licence 
(the  "IFL") means  that that International Simple Resale  ( "ISR") licences  are  the  only 
licences which do not include some element of infrastructure as part of the activities of 
the licensed operator. 
In  The  Netherlands,  individual  licences  for  infrastructure provision will  no  longer be 
required as from 1 January 1998. 
The ability of parties to assert their rights in this way was expressly acknowledged by the Irish Minister 
for Transport, Energy & Communications, who announced in a Press Release of 24 June  1997 that the 
liberalisation of alternative  infrastructure would occur in Ireland  through the  direct application of the 
terms of the Full Competition Directive pending the introduction of a formal licensing scheme. 
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In those Member States which require the  licensing of infrastructure used in the provision 
of liberalised  telecoms  services,  individual  licences  are often required.  The  Study Team 
questions  whether  individual  licences  are  necessary  when  the  services  themselves  are 
subject  to  a  relatively  light  licensing  regime  (i.e.,  VANS  subject  to  a  declaration  or 
notification  procedure).  The  following  are  illustrative  of  the  requirements  which  a 
particular  pan-European  provider  of  alternative  infrastructure  for  liberalised  telecoms 
services must satisfy in various Member States: 
•  The Netherlands 
•  Belgium 
•  Germany 
•  United Kingdom 
individual licence, at an annual fee of 500 NLG per 
annum (224 ECU), of unlimited duration. 
individual licence, at an up-front fee of 270,000 BEF 
(6,610 ECU) plus an annual renewal of 176,000 BEF 
(4,309 ECU). 
individual licence, at a one-off fee of 5.3 million ECU 
based on the number of lines used, of unlimited 
duration. 
IFL, at an up-front fee of 7,565 GBP (11 ,445 ECU) 
plus renewal fees of 8,000 GBP (12, 100 ECU), of 
unlimited duration. 
The licensing of infrastructure used in the provision of voice services generally involves an 
individual licence (contra:  Finland,  Denmark and, in the near future,  The Netherlands). 
In  acknowledgement  of  the  long  term  commitment  involved  in  building  network 
infrastructure,  most  Member  States  are  granting  or  proposing  to  grant  infrastructure 
licences for voice services for an indefinite duration.  Only  The Netherlands  (10-20 years), 
France and Italy (15 years) and the  United Kingdom  (25  years) prescribe shorter periods of 
time for the duration of such licences.  These countries are more or less committed to  some 
form  of infrastructure-based competitive model  for  the  telecoms  sector (see  below).  This 
suggests  that their respective  regulatory frameworks  are  premised on the  assumption that 
competition in the local loop will occur over time. 
123 
As  regards  the  fees  charged  for  infrastructure  licences,  these  vary  significantly  from 
Member  State  to  Member  State  (refer  to  Table  IV  in  Section  1. 7  of Annex  I).  At  one 
extreme, a full  national infrastructure licence will cost 5.3 million ECU in  Germany  (as  a 
one-off  fee  not  subject  to  renewals).  In  between,  an  infrastructure  licence  in  The 
Netherlands  costs  approximately  359,000 ECU per annum,  whereas  the  average  national 
infrastructure licence in  France for a non-dominant operator will consist of an up-front fee 
of 75,000  ECU  (and  annual  renewal  fees  of 150,000  ECU).  The  United  Kingdom  and 
Sweden  charge roughly similar up-front fees  of 7,565 ECU and  11,600 ECU respectively, 
coupled with annual renewal fees  set at 0. 08%  and 0. 14%  of annual turnover. 
123  Consequently,  each  regulatory  regime  envisages  possible  market  exit  and  entry  at  the  infrastructure 
provision level, rather than a model based on entrenched infrastructure monopoly or oligopoly. 
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Other  aspects  of the  licensing  process  for  infrastructure  mirror  the  licensing  regime  for 
VANS  and  voice  telephony  services  respectively  (see  discussions  in  Sections  1.3.1  and 
1.3.2 of Annex I). 
1.4.3  Internet "Infrastructure" 
The  core  "infrastructure"  which  makes  up  the  Internet  consists  principally  of three  key 
types of facilities: 
•  routers (computers designed to receive and forward packets of data); 
•  hosts (which store programmes and data); and 
•  pipes (transmission facilities which connect the hosts and routers). 
These facilities,  however,  do  not constitute  a  "network"  in  the  conventional  sense.  The 
constituent  elements  of the  Internet  are  owned  by  third  parties;  for  example,  hosts  and 
routers  are owned  by  both public  and  private entities  whose  computers  are  linked  to  the 
Internet, whereas pipes are most often owned by  telecoms companies. 
12
.+  Consequently, the 
Internet  is  a  "virtual"  network  which  is  not  regulated  per se,  although  the  underlying 
infrastructure over which it operates is subject to regulation. 
In this  environment,  network providers have both physical links  and contractual relations 
with  other networks. 
125  In the  absence  of such  direct physical  connections  or contractual 
relations  ("peering  agreements")  between networks,  Internet traffic  must  find  alternative 
routes.  It is not uncommon, therefore, for an Internet message transmitted within the same 
European  city  to  be  routed  via  the  United  States.  Responsibility  for  the  delivery  of a 
message is  not only spread among different networks,  but it is  also difficult to  determine 
which  networks  will  participate  in  the  transmission  and  termination  of  any  given 
communication  (whose  route  may  be  unpredictable).  Commercial  users  and  academic 
institutions  often  have  high  capacity  (bandwidth)  connections  to  the  Internet,  but  mass 
market users are usually confined to low capacity connections. 
Given the diffuse nature of the Internet, it is  important that infrastructure be regulated in a 
manner which is  both consistent across Member States and not onerous.  It must also give 
the right investment incentives to new network providers. 
124 
125 
These entities provide Internet-compliant routing and switching facilities themselves or lease capacity 
to  network providers who add those facilities to create sections of the Internet.  Refer to discussion in 
Internet Law & Regulation, Graham J.H. Smith (1996), p.  3. 
The  physical  connection  enables  traffic  to  flow  from  one  network  to  the  next.  The  contractual 
arrangement governs the exchange of traffic between networks. 
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1.4.4  Infrastructure vs. Services Competition Models 
There is a fundamental theoretical debate taking place in the  telecoms sector which is likely 
to  carry  over  to  the  multimedia  sector.  One  school  of thought  sees  the  future  of the 
telecommunications  sector  based  on  competition  among  a  number  of  local  access 
infrastructure providers,  e.g. , the incumbent telecoms operator, a local cable TV company, 
mobile  operators,  satellite  operators,  alternative  infrastructure  providers,  Wireless  Local 
Loop operators and an increasing number of fixed networks run by public authorities (e.g., 
city networks). The main supporters of this model at the Member State level are the  United 
Kingdom  and  The  Netherlands. 
126  These  Member  States  characterise  service  providers  as 
being simply another means of distribution to market. 
A second school of thought sees the market developing primarily on the basis of a regulated 
monopoly  model,  in  which  there  will  be  many  service  providers  which  have  cost-based 
non-discriminatory  access  to  a  very  limited  number  of  local  access  networks.  The 
proponents of this model assert that service providers will invest in (limited) infrastructure 
only after they have had an opportunity to  grow in the marketplace.  Indeed,  some market 
actors have commented that the rapid build-out of infrastructure may result in such excess 
capacity  that there may  be  little commercial  difference  between  owning  or leasing  one 's 
own infrastructure in the  future.  Most  Member  States,  however,  have  not  yet  adopted  a 
clear policy position in either direction. 
(i)  The Services-Based Competition Model 
The  services-based competition model  has  emerged  from  the  experience  of the  telecoms 
sector in the  United States.  The model is the product of three interrelated factors.  The first 
is  the  federal  constitutional  structure  of the  United  States,  in  which  regulatory power  is 
shared between the national government and the governments of the States. 
127  This federalist 
model is only relevant to a handful of European countries, and is  relevant only insofar as it 
is  the  basis  for  the  jurisdictional  division  between  the  telecoms  and  the  broadcasting 
sectors. 
128  The  second  factor  underlying  this  model  is  the  fact  that,  unlike  almost  every 
other  country,  the  United  States  telephone  system  has  always  been  owned  by  private 
investors  rather than by the government.  As  such,  the telephone industry was  subject to  a 
unique  form  of  regulation  better  known  elsewhere  in  the  world  as  "rate  of  return" 
regulation.  The third factor  was  the  assumption that the  local  access  infrastructure which 
connects  individual customers to  the network is  a natural monopoly.  The assumption of a 
natural  monopoly  is  the  cornerstone  of the  services  competition  model,  and  was  the 
126 
127 
128 
And to a growing degree, France. 
The  allocation  of costs  between  the  federal  and  state  jurisdictions  by  the  FCC  and  the  state  Public 
Utilities Commissions was guided by the federalist structure of the American constitution and not by the 
economies of telecoms.  In a series of cases in the early part of the twentieth century, the  U.S.  Supreme 
Court required this  separation of common costs between the federal and state jurisdictions based on the 
relative proportion of usage.  In other words, the  allocation of the costs of plant and equipment used to 
originate and terminate interstate calls was to be allocated between jurisdictions based on a proportion of 
the call minutes that were interstate. 
For example, Gemzany, Belgium, and, to lesser extents, Austria and Spain. 
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predicate  for  the  break  -up  of the  Bell  System  which  resulted  in  the  separation  of local 
service  from  long  distance  service.  Whatever  the  merits  of  the  natural  monopoly 
assumption at  the  time  of the  break-up,  technology has  rendered the  assumption more or 
less false. 
Because of the  United States's constitutional structure, the prices for local service were set 
at the State level, while the prices for  interstate and long distance services were set by the 
FCC.  As  a  consequence,  it  became  common  to  think  of these  two  services  as  separate 
markets  - a local market and  a long distance market.  Because of rate of return regulation 
and the existence of separate regulatory jurisdictions, it was necessary to allocate costs and 
revenue requirements between them for  rate-making purposes.  Over the course of time,  a 
widening  gap  developed  between  long  distance  prices  and  underlying  costs.  This  gap 
created an opportunity for  entry into long distance by operators such as  MCI.  Through a 
series  of policy  decisions  by  the  FCC,  interstate  long  distance  was  opened  to  new 
operators.  A  flourishing  long  distance  industry  developed.  At the  same  time,  most State 
regulators retained their legal barriers to competition in local service.  Even if they had not, 
the  widespread  view  of local  telecoms  as  a  loss-making  natural  monopoly  retarded  the 
emergence of competition in that segment. 
A number of public policy decisions were driven by this view of the  telecoms market: 
•  In response to an antitrust suit brought by the Department of Justice, AT&T agreed 
to divest its Bell Operations Companies, based on the theory that "competitive" long 
distance  services  were  being  separated  from  "monopoly"  local  services.  The  only 
variation was  that the  so-called  "Baby Bells"  were allowed to carry intrastate short 
haul long distance calls ( intraLAT  A). 
129 
•  The FCC, in its  Computer Inquiry decisions,  adopted Open Network Architecture 
("ONA")  principles  to  ensure  that  enhanced  service  providers  ( "ESPs")  and 
information  service  providers  ( "ISPs ")  had  non-discriminatory  access  to  call 
origination functions.  ONA  required  local  exchange  companies  to  make  available 
unbundled  network components.  The pricing  of unbundled  components  had  to  be 
cost-based.  No distinction was  made between originating and  terminating access. It 
was intended that ESPs and ISPs be able to attach their processors or switches to the 
local  loop  infrastructure  and,  in this  way,  their  customers  could  obtain  access  to 
their services. 
This ONA approach to pricing reflects the  "essential facilities" doctrine, derived from case-
law interpreting the prohibition on monopolisation or attempts to monopolise under Section 
2 of the Sherman Act. The  "essential facilities"  doctrine was applied in these antitrust cases 
in  the  context  of "refusals  to  deal",  where  a  firm  with  monopoly  power  controlled  a 
129  The revenues from this kind of traffic were intended to provide continued support for local service rates 
in the interest of Universal Service. State regulators retained jurisdiction over intrastate communications, 
thus preserving the constitutional separation between federal and State regulation. 
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particular asset or scarce resource,  access to  which was imperative to  the viability of new 
or potential new  competitors.  To be essential,  however,  the  resource must not be  simply 
helpful, but vital to competition in the market. Under  United States law, a plaintiff invoking 
the doctrine must prove: 
•  control of the essential facility by a monopolist; 
•  a competitor's inability to practically or reasonably duplicate the essential facility; 
•  the denial of access to the facility; 
•  the feasibility of providing the facility. 
130 
In its ONA orders, which transformed this essential facilities doctrine from an antitrust into 
a regulatory policy,  the  FCC clearly took the  view  that,  since the  local  loop  is  a natural 
monopoly and an essential facility,  ISPs are entitled to cost-based access.  To do otherwise 
would expose them to either monopoly pricing or refusals to deal, stunting the development 
of an industry which the FCC was trying to promote. In other words, the FCC concluded 
that,  given the presence of only  one  local loop  provider,  all  service providers  (including 
long  distance  operators)  should be  able to  obtain non-discriminatory  access  at cost-based 
rates to the local loop. 
Many have argued that the service provider model stunted the development of a competitive 
local access market in the  United States (with the exception of cellular services). 
(ii)  The Infrastructure-Based Competition Model 
The  United  Kingdom,  after  initially  pursuing  the  path  followed  by  the  United  States, 
changed its policy course at the time of the 1989  Duopoly Review. 
At  the  time  of privatisation  of British  Telecom  ( "BT")  in  the  early  1980s,  Mercury 
Communications was licensed as  an alternative facilities-based operator.  It was hoped that 
Mercury would develop into a full  second national network,  offering local as  well as  long 
distance services throughout Britain.  Instead,  Mercury pursued a strategy of building long 
distance facilities which were directly connected only to large users in major urban centres. 
It  never  developed  mass  market  local  loops,  preferring  to  pay  access  charges  for 
interconnection to  BT' s local loops. 
In  1990,  the  Department  of Trade  &  Industry  ( "DTI") abandoned  the  duopoly  policy, 
opening  telecoms  infrastructure  to  competition  at  all  levels.  Cable  TV  operators  were 
encouraged to apply for  telephony licences, three new wireless operators were licensed to 
provide mass market Personal Communications Networks  ( "PCNs"), and an open regime 
for  licensing  of all  operators  was  adopted.  The  independent  regulator  began to  shift  its 
emphasis  from  the  protection  of  consumers  from  abusive  practices,  to  creating  an 
environment conducive to facilities-based competition.  This shift in policy gave rise to  the 
Infrastructure Competition Model. 
130  In the telecoms context,  refer to:  MCI Communications Corp.  v.  AT&T, 708  F. 2d  1081,  1132  (7th 
Cir.),  cert  denied,  464  U.S.  891  (1983);  Bellsouth  Advertising  &  Publishing  Corp.  v.  Donnelley 
Information Publishing, 719 F. Supp.  1551  (S.D. Fla.  1988), aff'd, 933 F. 2d 952 (11th Cir. 1991). 
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Unlike the  United States,  where telecoms policy drove a "one wire"  solution (at least until 
the  passage  of  Telecommunications  Act  of 1996),  the  policies  pursued  in  the  United 
Kingdom  actively  encouraged  the  development  of multiple  local  loops.  Investment  came 
from  several  sources.  For example,  cable  TV  operators  discovered  that  they  could enjoy 
economies  of scope  by  offering  voice  telephone  service  over  their  broadband  coaxial 
networks,  at very low incremental costs.  Not coincidentally,  most of these investors  were 
telecoms  companies  of  American  parentage,  some  of  which  suddenly  realised  their 
vulnerability to cable TV competition in their home markets. Wireless investment also came 
as PCN networks were developed by various partnerships. 
The result of these policies was that local loop competition quickly began to  flourish in the 
United  Kingdom.  Although  the  Duopoly  Policy  was  abandoned  only  in  1990,  most 
residential and business customers could choose from among at least some of the following 
for  their  local  dial  tone  by  mid-1996:  BT,  Mercury  Communications,  a cable  television 
operator,  two  cellular  operators,  two  PCN  operators  (One20ne  and  Orange),  Ionica  (a 
provider of Wireless  Local  Loop  Services),  the electric utilities,  NTL,  MFS,  WorldCom 
and others.  As  one would expect in a competitive market, each operator offers a different 
package to  a different segment,  serving different needs  with a variety of price and feature 
combinations.  Each of these  operators  has  its  own local  loop  infrastructure on which  its 
customers originate calls.  These infrastructure alternatives have developed,  despite the fact 
that retail prices were dropping at more than  seven%  a year in real terms. 
With  an  infrastructure-based  competition  model  for  the  telecoms  sector,  a  number  of 
important  regulatory  policy  options  naturally  follow.  For  example,  in  an  environment 
where  there  exists  the  possibility  of multiple  local  loops,  fundamental  issues  such  as 
"interconnection",  and  the  rates  at  which  it  should  be  charged,  take  on  a  different 
dimension  (see  discussion  in Section  3  of Annex  1).  Similarly,  a  key  strategic  issue  in 
numbering policy  such  as  equal  access  (see  discussion  in Section 4 of Annex  I)  may  be 
approached from a different perspective,  depending on whether a Member State has  opted 
for a services-based or an infrastructure-based competition model. 
In  a  market  with  multiple  local  loop  operators,  the  concept  of  "interconnection"  has  a 
different  meaning  than  it  does  under  the  Services  Competition  Model.  The  existence  of 
infrastructure-based competitors makes it clear that call origination and call termination are 
not both  "essential facilities " . The  existence of multiple operators offering service to  end 
users  and  to  service  providers  means  that  call  origination  can  be  a  competitive  (or  a 
"contestable") market.  It is  no  longer a natural monopoly.  Call termination,  on the  other 
hand, remains a unique form of essential facility. 
131  Owners of local loop infrastructure need 
131  This stems from the fact that any given call must terminate on a specific designated number, which is 
a  natural  bottleneck.  Whereas  competition  may  exist  at  the  functional  level  of operators  choosing 
alternative carriers for  routing purposes,  there can by  definition be no  competition regarding which 
network  a  call  can  terminate  on;  this  is  a  decision  made  by  the  calling  party  on  the  originating 
network,  and  is  not the  subject of any  'make or buy'  decision on the  part of that  network operator. 
This  scenario  is  only  challengeable  in  the  case  of mobile  networks  in  those  markets  where mobile 
telephony  has  achieved  a  high  penetration  rate  and  where  it  is  priced  competitively  with  fixed 
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the  ability  to  terminate  calls  onto  other  networks  and  cannot  self-provide  nor  buy  the 
number  or  name-specific  termination  from  anyone  other  than  the  terminating  network 
operator.  This  critical  distinction  is  expressly  recognised  in  recent  consultations  in  The 
Netherlands regarding interconnection policy. 
132 
Seen  in  this  light,  the  focus  of public  policy  in  the  United  Kingdom  shifted  from  a 
discussion of equal  access  and  fully  allocated costs  between  service categories  to  one  of 
any-to-any  connectivity  in  a  multi-network  environment.  Although  transitional  concerns 
remain  regarding  the  dominance  of BT,  the  telecoms  incumbent,  over  prices  for  call 
origination,  the key  policy debate  shifted to  the  price to  be paid  for  call termination  and 
number portability. Even debate in 1996 about whether to extend retail price cap regulation 
focused on its relative impact on local loop investment. 
Greater clarity has  also  been gained  on the  nature  of essential facilities  as  a result of the 
United Kingdom experience.  Long  distance providers who  lack their own call origination 
facilities  are  customers  of local  infrastructure providers,  as  are  ISPs.  As  customers,  they 
can  be  victims  of  abusive  behaviour  by  a  dominant  provider.  The  introduction  of 
competition and the ability to make a reasonable  "build-or-buy" decision have the potential 
to  undermine that dominance  relatively  quickly.  In this  regard,  it  is  important to  bear in 
mind that ISPs typically do not terminate calls, while long distance operators are compelled 
to do  so.  ISPs are therefore not normally vulnerable to the denial of an essential facility as 
long  as  call  origination  is  competitively  provided  over  multiple  infrastructures.  Long 
distance carriers, however, which must terminate calls, do need this essential facility.  They 
are similar to ISPs, though, at the originating end of a call. 
An Infrastructure Competition Model should not in principle damage long distance carriers 
nor service providers, as  long as  genuine competition materialises in the local loop.  When 
no longer dependent on a monopoly offering for call origination, service providers and long 
distance carriers can use their status as large customers to obtain discounted offerings from 
infrastructure owners and combine their own value-added or long distance capabilities with 
the underlying local network to provide innovative services and create new markets. 
From  the  long  distance  and  service  provider  perspective,  the  advantages  of  the 
Infrastructure Competition Model  are outweighed by the  benefits  to  them of the  Services 
Competition Model,  because they  are more  advantaged  in the  short term  if they  can also 
obtain call origination functions at cost. 
132 
telephony services;  in this  latter situation,  the  sophisticated consumer may indeed have a theoretical 
choice on which telephone number he/she wishes to terminate. 
Refer to Annex II,  EU National Regulatory Reports, The Netherlands,  Part C. 
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. The licensing regime that is ultimately adopted for infrastructure will have a profound effect on the shape of the  ! 
i  future multimedia market:  ! 
•  The  licensing  of infrastructure  separate from  services  will facilitate  market  entry  by  a broad  array  of : 
alternative infrastructure providers  (especially  utilities)  which,  although  possibly not  wishing  to  provide  : 
multimedia services themselves, may see a business case in providing the underlying bandwidth needed to  : 
deliver  multimedia applications  to  a mass market.  Indeed,  a "carrier's  carrier"  market,  led  by  companies  ~ 
such as Hermes Railtel and Unisource Carrier Services, is already developing on a pan-European basis. 
•  The  provzswn  of infrastructure  as  a  separate  "business"  in  a  multimedia  environment  can  provide 
regulators with a clear indication of the costs involved in operating a "network" separate and apart from the 
services provided over it. This transparency will facilitate "best practices" comparisons when issues relating 
to interconnection and access arise, and can serve as a yardstick for identifying abusive practices. 
i  • 
~ . 
• 
In  order  to  adapt  existing  regulatory  structures  to  take  into  account  the  effects  of the  Internet  on 
interconnection,  access  and  end-user  pricing,  the  regulatory  policies  governing  the  operation  of the 
infrastructure upon which the Internet is based should be market-driven. 
The spread of  multimedia services will depend in large part on the relative availability of bandwidth, which  ! 
will increase exponentially relative to the amount of  infrastructure deployed.  i 
In  the view of the Study Team,  a reconciliation of the Infrastructure Competition Model and the Services  : 
Competition Model can best be achieved, in a multimedia environment which will require greater broadband  : 
capacity,  through  the  implementation  of balanced  interconnection  and  access  policies  which  can  sustain i 
both service providers and network operators in a competitively neutral manner.  ~ 
Infrastructure  competition  will  determine  to  a significant  extent  the  degree  to  which  Community  level  ! 
policies are needed to address such ancillary issues as  interconnection, equal access and unbundling.  The  : 
greater the degree of infrastructure competition, the less need there will be to  engage in regulatory micro- : 
management and ongoing ex ante regulatory governance.  I 
Although a long term  regulatory goal should  be  the promotion of infrastructure-based competition,  there  : 
should be a regulatory "safety net" for service providers in the event of market failure or an abuse of market  ! 
power.  In the transition from monopoly to full competition, concerns about market failure are not without  : 
foundation.  The  most appropriate means of ensuring the viability of service providers,  while at the same  : 
time protecting the investments of network operators, is to adopt a new model regarding "interconnection"  i 
and "access".  That model should be based on a distinction between call termination ("interconnection"), on  ! 
the one hand, and call origination ("access"), on the other (refer to discussion in Section 3 of Annex I).  i 
•  The influx of  infrastructure-based competition in the local loop, coupled with the platform independence of \ 
the Internet, should dilute the market power resulting from  control of a monopoly network.  It  is  therefore  : 
not  likely  that  a multimedia  regulatory framework  will  require  measures  as  extreme  as  the  structural i 
separation  of the  network  and  service  levels  of an  operator's  multimedia  business.  Indeed,  this  type  of ! 
regulatory  intervention  runs  counter  to  the  technological  convergence  currently  taking  place  between  i 
delivery  platforms  and  service levels,  and  would  complicate  the  regulatory status of parties  with  modest  i 
i. .............  .J~fr..~.~t:.!!.~~!!.!.~  ... g9.~!.~  ... .C~~Y.~.:.!.4~:.  ....  ~.~.~.~.~.:.~!~~:..~!.~~  ...  .P.~9!!..~.4.~:.~!.:.~~.~  ....  ...!..~  .... q.~~9  ....  ~.~.~.?.~!..  ...  ~~t~~.~~!!:  .. f~  .. f~.:!!  .....  ~~~!?.9..~~  .  ..J 
133  Various combinations of infrastructure ownership/leasing/build-out may occur as liberalisation gathers 
pace. 
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in this way. 134  ! 
On  the other hand, separation  between  the  wholesale (network)  and  retail  (services)  levels,  in  the form  of : 
accounting  separation  requirements,  may  be  necessary  to  deter  (or  at  least  to  identify)  abusive  pricing  1 
practices.  Accounting  separation  requirements  would  appear  to  be  a  more  proportionate  regulatory  : 
response  to  concerns  about  cross-subsidisation,  price  discrimination  and  bundling  by  network operators 
with market  power.  Where  market power is  enduring and abusive  behaviour flows  therefrom,  it may  be 
necessary  to  adopt  more  extreme  measures  such  as  structural  separation.  Such  an  approach,  however, 
should be accomplished only on a case-by-case basis where necessary to enforce competition rules . 
......................................................................................................................................................................................... ......................................................................................................................................  ; 
134  For example, structural separation between the network and service levels  is  much more appropriate 
in other "network" industries which are not  subject to  such competitive pressures at all  levels of the 
value chain in terms of production, transmission and service  (e.g., electricity, gas and water). 
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1.5  THE LICENSING OF "BROADCAST" NETWORKS AND SERVICES 
The Regulatory Issues 
Cable  and  over-the-air  television  broadcasting  have  traditionally  been  subject  to  a 
significantly greater degree of regulation than the publishing  sector and  other forms  of 
mass  media.  This  regulation  includes  a  very  burdensome  set  of subjective  licensing 
procedures  which  vary  dramatically  from  Member  State  to  Member  State  and  which 
confer a great deal of discretion on the regulator. 
Much  of the  subjectivity  inherent  in  licensing  lies  in  the  fact  that  issues  relating  to 
content are regulated ex ante as part of the market entry process. By way of contrast, the 
publishing sector operates throughout the European Union on the basis of virtually no  ex 
ante regulation.  Ex post regulation in the publishing sector becomes relevant when and if 
certain standards of good taste,  decency,  harmful  content,  libel  and  so  forth have been 
exceeded or violated. The publishing sector is also characterised by self-regulation in the 
form  of Press  Councils  and  other  national  equivalents,  which  bring  together  a  broad 
cross-section of societal and market interests. 
A number of technical rationales have historically been advanced to justify the extensive 
involvement  of the  State  in  the  regulation  of  broadcasting  and,  in  particular,  the 
privileged treatment accorded to public broadcasters: 
•  First, because the airwaves are a public resource, governments are entitled to license 
their use on the terms which they see fit. 
•  Second,  because  frequencies  and,  hence,  available channels  are limited,  society  has 
an  interest in requiring  licensees  to  share  their privileges  with other  representative 
members  of the  public,  and  in  compelling  them  to  present  a  balanced  range  of 
programmes in the interests of listeners and viewers. 
•  Third, because the broadcasting media (both television and radio) are more influential 
than other media, they need to be regulated more stringently than other media such as 
the press. The presence of both sound and picture in the home is  considered to  be a 
key distinguishing feature which makes broadcasting an exceptionally potent opinion-
forming medium. 
In the view of the  Study Team,  none  of the  reasons  cited above provides  a compelling 
justification for intrusive regulation of broadcasting in a future multimedia environment. 
The airwaves used by the  telecoms  sector are no  less  "public" property than those used 
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by  broadcasters.  The  public  good,  however,  is  served  by  using  those  frequencies  to 
support further competition and the spectral efficiency which such competition promotes 
(see Section 4 of Annex 1).  Similarly, digital technology permits the more efficient use of 
spectrum such that hundreds· of TV channels now exist where previously only a few were 
possible.  Hence,  as  and  when  digital  broadcasting  is  widely  deployed,  the  scarcity 
rationale for regulation will no longer be justified. 
Finally,  the  view  that broadcasting  creates  public policy concerns  which  are  absent  in 
other sectors underestimates the influence of other instantaneous transmission media such 
as  the Internet.  These new media are changing public perceptions regarding the  sources 
of available information. They are also increasingly blurring the traditional association of 
"the  public"  and  "passive"  entertainment  with  traditional  broadcasting  services. 
Digitalisation,  and  the  possibility  of  increased  interactivity,  mean  that  the  borders 
between  "public"  and  "private"  entertainment  and  communications  are  becoming 
increasingly  difficult  to  draw.  By  making  available  a  wealth  of new  programming 
choices,  digitalisation may  further weaken the  claims of public broadcasters - the  focal 
points  of the  current broadcasting  regulatory  structure  - to  be  the  unique  channel  for 
"public" broadcasting and undermine their ability to  operate wholly or partly outside the 
sphere of market economics. 
The continuing degree of regulatory involvement in broadcasting can best be  explained 
from a historical perspective by public interest considerations, given that broadcasting is 
still  a relatively  new  means  of mass  communication that  society  has  felt  compelled  to 
regulate,  just as  the  cinema  was  initially  treated  with  more  caution  than  the  theatre. 
Moreover, the  regulation of broadcasting involves critical issues  such as  social,  cultural 
and  democratic  ideals  (pluralism),  which  prompt  a  uniquely  "national"  regulatory 
response in any given case.  These elements raise distinctly non-economic issues  which 
are not readily susceptible to a simple market-based regulatory model.  Consequently, the 
history and  tradition of the respective Member States,  rather than technical reasons,  are 
more  relevant  today  in  explaining  the  divergent  treatment  of the  broadcasting  and 
publishing sectors. 
In  light  of the  above,  key  regulatory  issues  will  be:  identifying  the  elements  of the 
prevailing  national  regulatory  models  for  broadcasting  that  can  be  sustained  in  a 
multimedia environment; and identifying the elements of existing broadcasting regulation 
that  should  be  adapted  so  as  to  enable  the  broadcasting  sector  to  benefit  from  the 
opportunities and positive economic effects of the spread of multimedia applications. 
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1.5  .1  The Public/Private Broadcasting Dichtomy 
(i)  Historical Context 
Terrestrial television broadcasting 
135  in the  European Union,  much like  telecoms,  began as 
some  form  of State  or public monopoly  in  virtually every Member  State. 
136  The  scope  of 
that  monopoly  has  usually  been  defined  by  reference  to  a  series  of  "public  service" 
functions  which in theory justified the asymmetrical regulatory treatment afforded to public 
broadcasters  vis-a-vis  private  broadcasters  (see  below).  In  some  Member  States,  public 
broadcasters transmit numerous channels, 
137  with many providing both television and radio 
servtces. 
During  the  1970s  and  1980s,  private commercial  broadcasting  was  gradually  introduced 
into  all  European countries, 
138  with  the  exception  of Austria.
139  The  expansion  of private 
commercial  broadcasting  in  the  1970s  was  in  some  respects  driven  by  technical 
developments,  in particular the  spread of cable TV  networks  and  the  arrival  of direct-to-
home  ("DTH")  satellite  television.  It  is  now  commonplace  for  there  to  be  many  more 
private terrestrial broadcasters than public broadcasters. Indeed, public broadcasters are no 
longer  dominant  in  many  European  Union  countries  in  the  provision  of broadcasting 
services.  The  across-the-board  reduction  in  viewing  numbers  for  public  terrestrial 
broadcasters,  has  in  fact  jeopardised  their  ability  to  continue  to  perform  their  "public 
service" functions because of their diminished revenue base. 
As  a consequence,  there  has  been  increasing  pressure  on regulators  to  formulate  policy 
alternatives  which  would  facilitate  the  delivery  of the  services  traditionally  provided  by 
public  broadcasters  in  an  economically  efficient  manner.  Two  major  different  policy 
responses have been considered, namely: 
135 
136 
137 
138 
139 
The ensuing discussion focuses on television broadcasting, rather than radio broadcasting, because of 
the greater relative importance to multimedia of the former. 
The relationship between the private and public broadcasting sectors is,  of course,  very different in 
the  United  States.  There,  private  networks  and  local  stations  have  been  long  established  as  the 
dominant operators, with public broadcasting only being introduced in 1967. 
For example,  Germany, Italy,  The Netherlands,  Portugal,  Greece,  and Belgium broadcast over three 
channels. 
This process began earlier in the United Kingdom with the enactment of the Television Act 1954. 
The Austrian legal  regime  is  currently the  subject of a challenge under Article  10  of the  European 
Human  Rights  Convention.  Refer  also  to  the judgment of the  European Court of Human  Rights  in 
Informationverin Lentia  &  Drs  v.  Austria,  Judgment of 24  November  1993,  where the  Court ruled 
that  the  public  monopoly  rights  in  broadcasting  can  only  justify  restrictions  on  the  freedom  of 
expression in very limited circumstances.  Similar difficulties  are  being faced  in Ireland at  present, 
where there is presently only one private terrestrial broadcaster authorised to broadcast (which is  not 
as yet operational) . 
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•  as  has  occurred  with  other  industries,  some  governments  have  begun  to  call  into 
question whether the  societal  goals  achieved  until  now by public broadcasters can be 
accomplished  more  efficiently  by  the  private  sector,  without  the  need  for  public 
financing from budgets which are already stretched; and 
•  some governments have sought to  make public broadcasters more market  -oriented in a 
bid to have them enter developing multimedia markets and/  or to become more capable 
of self-financing their operations. 
140 
Commercial pressures aside, the survival of public broadcasting is  generally regarded as  a 
cultural imperative throughout the Member States. It is widely thought that only institutions 
independent of both the  State  and  private  commercial  influence  (and  thereby  not  driven 
primarily  by  the  pursuit  of  profit)  can  discharge  the  fundamental  "public  service" 
obligations  entrusted  to  broadcasters.  Constitutional  disputes  in  the  1970s  and  1980s  in 
countries such as  Germany, Italy and France regarding the exclusive or monopoly status of 
public broadcasters have confirmed their relative importance in the regulatory frameworks 
of most Member States.  In the  overwhelming  majority of these  cases,  the  courts  did not 
hold  that  the  monopoly  enjoyed  by  public  broadcasters  was  constitutionally  required, 
merely  that  it  was  permissible.  It  was  for  the  legislature  to  decide  the  structure  of the 
broadcasting  sector,  as  long  as  the  statutes  of  a  public  broadcaster  satisfied  certain 
constitutional  requirements  (in  particular,  the  principle  of freedom  of expression). 
141  In 
Germany,  for  example,  the  Constitutional  Court has  developed  a  doctrine  of the  "basic 
broadcasting service".  Under this principle, public broadcasters have the  responsibility of 
ensuring that viewers and listeners receive a wide range of programmes.  Similar doctrines 
developed in other Member State courts have  in effect guaranteed the  existence of public 
broadcasting.
142  Most recently,  the Treaty on European Union was  amended to  reflect the 
fact that "the system of public broadcasting in the Member States is  directly related to the 
democratic,  social  and cultural  needs  of each  society  and  to  the  need  to  preserve media 
pluralism" .
143 
140 
141 
142 
143 
For example, the BBC in the  United Kingdom is allowed to engage in commercial activities, subject to 
the erection of "Chinese walls" and the separation of accounts between the public broadcasting aspects 
of its operations and others.  Similarly,  in Belgium, the RTBF has been given wide powers to engage 
in commercial activities beyond pure  "broadcasting".  In addition, the so-called Intercommunales, the 
public or quasi-public authorities which run regional cable TV franchises in Belgium, were given the 
express power in 1996 to  engage in commercial activities outside the sphere of their "public service" 
requirements in running their respective cable TV franchises. 
Discussed in Broadcasting Law: a comparative study, by  E.M.  Barendt (Clarendon,  1993),  at pp 56-
60. 
In the Fourth Television Case (73  BVerfGE 118 (1986)), the German Constitutional Court formulated 
the  "Grundversorgung"  doctrine.  This  doctrine  guarantees  the  existence  and  development of public 
broadcasting,  at  least  while  private  channels  are  unable  to  fulfill  the  demands  imposed  on  public 
service broadcasters. Similarly, in Italy, the Constitutional Court adopted the same approach in 1988, 
ruling that Parliament must provide adequate frequencies and financial resources to enable the public 
channels to discharge their mission of dissemination of a wide range of opinions on political and social 
issues (Decision 826/1988 [1988] Giur. Cost. 3893). 
The Protocol to the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty concluded at the Inter-Governmental Conference goes on 
to specify that:  "The provisions of  this Treaty shall be without prejudice to the competence of  Member 
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Public broadcasters continue to enjoy the financial support provided by licence fees paid by 
individual  subscribers  or  State  funding  throughout  most  of the  Member  States  of the 
European  Union.  In  addition,  they  continue  to  have  access  to  significant  libraries  of 
content,  which  will  likely  be  of critical  importance  in  a  multimedia  environment where 
access to content will be a commercial imperative. 
Private broadcasters have a conditional statutory right to broadcast in most Member States. 
However, in order to do  so, they must satisfy the requirements prescribed by statute or by 
the relevant national regulatory  authority prior to  obtaining a licence  from  the  regulatory 
authority  itself  or  from  the  relevant  Minister.  The  broadcasting  authority  and/or  the 
Minister often have  fairly  broad discretion in the  granting of licences,  particularly when 
there is an insufficient number of broadcasting channels available to  satisfy demand.  In this 
regard,  private  broadcasters  are  in  theory  less  restricted  in  the  type  and  scope  of 
programming  which they  are  obliged  to  provide when compared to  public  broadcasters, 
which  are  obliged  to  inform and  educate,  as  well  as  entertain their  viewers.  In a  small 
number of Member States, private broadcasters enjoy constitutional rights to  conduct their 
programming  free  from  government  restrictions.  Broadcasting  freedom  in  this  respect 
confers  the  same  freedom  of speech  rights  on private  broadcasters  that  are  enjoyed  by 
public broadcasters. 
(ii)  The Elements of "Public Service" Broadcasting 
The concept of "public service"  broadcasting is  not defined in the respective legal systems 
of the  Member States,  nor is  it defmed  at  the Community level.  It thus  differs  from  the 
concept  of universal  service  in  the  telecoms  sector,  which  is  defined  clearly  at  the 
Community level  in terms  of a  minimum  set of standards.  Unlike  universal  service,  the 
public service obligations of broadcasters can usually be defined only by  reference to  the 
terms of their concessions with the State,  constitutional requirements regarding freedom of 
speech,  plurality  requirements  and  so  forth.  The practical application of these  individual 
elements  and  their  relative  importance  when  compared  to  other  relevant  elements  vary 
enormously from Member State to Member State. This diversity is due in large measure to 
the respective historical and cultural heritages of each Member State. 
States to provide for the funding of  public service in so far as such funding is granted to broadcasting 
organisations for the fulfillment  of the  public service  remit as  conferred,  defined and organised by 
each Member State,  and that such funding  does not affect trading  conditions and competition  in  the 
Community to an extent which  would be contrary to the common interest,  while the realisation of  the 
remit of  that public service shall be taken into account." 
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The public service characteristics of public broadcasters may be summarised as follows: 
•  National geographic availability of service. This obligation does not usually extend to 
all forms of programming, but to certain programmes (e.g., news and current affairs). 
144 
•  Independence from  State interests.  The  inability  of the  State  to  determine  editorial 
opinion constitutes an essential element of broadcasting freedom. 
•  Preservation  of national  cultural  identity.  This  goal  may  at  times  appear  to  be 
incompatible  with  the  principles  that  broadcasting  should  be  immune  from  State 
influence  (see  above)  and  that  a  range  of  viewpoints  should  be  expressed  in 
programming so that minority views are also aired (see below). 
•  Programming impartiality.  The provision of equal  air  time  to  all  political parties  is 
usually  associated  with  the  fulfilment  of the  impartiality  requirement.  Satisfying  this 
requirement is  often difficult given the potentially large number of political viewpoints 
and the anti-social messages of certain political parties. 
145 
•  Variety  of  programming.  One  of  the  hallmarks  of  public  broadcasters  is  their 
commitment to diverse programming and satisfying the interests of minority groups. 
•  Public financing. The clearest defining characteristic of public broadcasters is that they 
do not face the requirement of a licence fee  or a licence fee equivalent. Aside from the 
United Kingdom- which relies solely on licence fees levied on individual TV owners 
146
-
public broadcasting is  financed throughout the European Union by a mixture of licence 
fees  and advertising revenues. 
Over time,  private broadcasters have begun to  display many  of the  characteristics usually 
associated  with  public  broadcasters.  For example,  private broadcasters  are  by  nature  of 
their  licensing  conditions  independent  of State  control;  they  are  also  required  to  be 
independent of particular commercial  interests  (which  is  unique  to  private broadcasters). 
Similarly, the obligation to be impartial is usually required of private broadcasters in their 
licensing conditions.  Because the  quality of a broadcaster's programming is  a key element 
in the winning of a licence by a private operator, they often make commitments to cultural 
programming  and  current  affairs  usually  associated  with  public  broadcasters.  Finally, 
detailed  "must  carry"  rules  apply  in  each  Member  State  to  ensure  that  cable  TV 
144 
145 
146 
Universal  service  obligations  for  telecoms  services  must  also  satisfy  geographic  coverage 
requirements. 
Namely, those which promote racial hatred, violence, anti-democratic principles and so on. 
Advertising on the BBC  is prohibited under the current terms of the BBC 's Charter. In its 1988 White 
Paper entitled  "Broadcasting  in  the  1990s:  Competition,  Choice  and  Quality"  (1988),  the  United 
Kingdom  government  considered  the  replacement  of the  licence  fee  by  a  subscription  fee.  The 
government is  currently considering the  lifting of the ban on advertising by the year 2001  in order to 
allow the BBC greater options for self-financing. 
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broadcasters transmit those public channels or programmes considered to  be  in  the public 
good (see discussion in Section 3 of Annex I). 
(iii)  Satellite and Cable TV Broadcasting 
Competition  to  terrestrial  public  broadcasters  has  increasingly  come  from  cable  TV 
franchisees and from DTH satellite television stations over the course of the past decade. 
As  regards  cable TV  companies,  licences  for  television broadcasting  ("franchises"  in  the 
United Kingdom,  "concessions" in Spain) are issued only on a regional basis. w  In a country 
such  as  Finland,  cable  TV  companies  are  owned  collectively  by  the  local  inhabitants, 
whereas in Belgium the local cable TV franchises are run by public or quasi-public bodies. 
In those countries where cable TV has been/is being introduced on a commercial basis, it is 
usual  for  franchises  to  be awarded through a public tender,  where the  value of the bid is 
merely one  aspect of the  overall evaluation (e.g.,  the  United  Kingdom).  In  Spain,  rather 
than  paying  an  up-front  fee,  concessionaires  must  make  a  payment  equal  to  a  fixed 
percentage  of their proposed network build-out  costs.  Most Member  States  require  some 
form  of ongoing  annual  licence  payment  based  on  net  revenues  generated.  Cable  TV 
licensees are also subject to local "must carry" obligations. 
Satellite  broadcast  television  (known  as  direct  broadcast  satellite  ( "DBS")  or  "DTH" 
satellite)  is  increasing  in  popularity  throughout  the  European  Union.  Many  satellite 
operators  are  taking  advantage  of the  pan-European broadcasting  rights  provided  in  the 
Television  Without  Frontiers  Directive.  Under  this  Directive,  broadcasters  with  a licence 
obtained in one Member State are able to transmit their signals into another Member State 
without the need for further licensing. 
148  Although there continue to be a handful of Member 
States  with  no  licensing  regulatory  framework  for  satellite  broadcasting  services, 
149 
regulatory entry barriers are generally considered to  be  relatively low,  with the  licensing 
procedure  being  more  transparent  and  licence  fees  being  more  reasonable  than  those 
applicable to terrestrial television broadcasters. In addition, the leasing of satellite capacity 
is  charged  at  very  reasonable  rates  in  relation  to  the  overall  revenues  generated  by  the 
satellite broadcast business, which means that entry barriers are relatively low. 
The success  of DTH  services  may  undermine the  demand  for  cable TV  programming  in 
certain Member States.  In other Member States,  it might play  a more  supplementary or 
complementary role to  cable TV  networks  through the  provision of broadcasting  services 
(whether Pay-Per-View or narrowcast) which can be purchased directly or redistributed by 
cable TV networks.  In either case, the development of regulatory policies relating to access 
and  the  implementation  of competition  policy  at  both  a  national  and  European  level 
147 
148 
149 
The sole exception to this is The Netherlands, where geographic coverage can in theory be national in 
scope. 
Although this principle may not  always be adhered to strictly in practice, intervention by  a Member 
State other than where the licence was granted is relatively limited in its scope. 
For example, Belgium and Ireland. 
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concerning  access  to  content will play  a key  role in determining  the  relative  success  and 
role of both cable TV and satellite broadcasting alternatives. 
1.5.2  Comparative Licensing Requirements 
(i)  The Licensing of Infrastructure and Services 
A differentiation in the licensing of network infrastructure and the services provided over it 
can be identified most clearly in the cable TV  sector. 
150  This regulatory distinction reflects 
the  fact  that  cable  TV  networks  have,  from  their  inception,  been  seen  as  a  means  of 
transmitting many different types  of communication and  as  facilities  through which other 
programmers may wish to have their content packages broadcast.  It also  reflects the logic 
underlying the  Cable TV Directive. 
Notably,  the separate licensing of network infrastructure and services has  not as  yet taken 
root in Spain, even with the adoption of a specific cable TV regulatory regime in  1995.  In 
Spain,  the  grant of a cable  concession  incorporates  the  right to  provide programming  in 
conjunction  with  the  ownership  of the  physical  network.  This  regulatory  treatment  of 
infrastructure and services as an indivisible whole is also reflected in  Spain's telecoms law. 
The distinction between the  licensing of network infrastructure and  the  services provided 
over that  infrastructure  is  increasingly  being  reflected  in the  laws  of the  Member  States 
governing  the  satellite  sector. 
151  The  acknowledged  need  of service  providers  to  obtain 
access to both earth and space segment capacity held by other major satellite organisations 
makes  the  regulatory  distinction between network and  service provision necessary  in this 
sector. 
In the terrestrial broadcasting sector,  a distinction is  drawn between the  network provider 
and the service provider in a number of Member States (namely, the  United Kingdom,  The 
Netherlands, France,  Germany, Italy and Spain). It is no coincidence that of those countries 
which  currently  draw  this  regulatory  distinction,  both  the  United  Kingdom  and  The 
Netherlands  are  committed  to  the  model  of infrastructure-based  competition  (refer  to 
discussion in Section 1.4 and Section 3 of Annex I).  Strictly speaking, it may not be correct 
to  refer to  a "licensing"  framework for terrestrial broadcast networks because,  in some of 
the  Member  States  where  the  infrastructure/services  distinction  is  drawn,  the  network 
150 
151 
For example, Germany, France,  the United Kingdom,  The  Netherlands, Denmark, Finland,  Belgium, 
Portugal,  Luxembourg,  Austria  and  Sweden.  In  the  case  of Sweden,  such  a  regulatory  distinction 
predates the distinction between the  licensing of telecoms network infrastructure and services which 
only  came  into  effect  on  1 July  1997.  Prior  to  that  date,  Swedish  regulation  did  not  disassociate 
telecoms services from their underlying infrastructure. The regulatory split between infrastructure and 
services in the cable TV sector is likely to be ret1ected in forthcoming laws in Italy and Greece. 
Thus  far,  the  distinction  can  be  found  clearly  in  the  laws  of France,  Germany,  Greece,  Italy, 
Luxembourg and the United Kingdom. 
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provider  is  a  monopolist. 
152  In  most  Member  States,  the  network  provider  and  service 
provider are usually the same entity. 
(ii)  Licence A  ward Criteria 
Unlike  the  telecoms  sector  (refer  to  Section  1.2  of Annex  1),  there  is  no  harmonised 
Community  regulatory  framework  for  the  granting  of  broadcasting  licences.  On  the 
contrary,  licensing  requirements  vary  enormously  from  Member  State  to  Member  State. 
Although  a  broad  range  of private  broadcasters  operate  in  countries  such  as  France, 
Germany,  Spain,  Italy,  the  United  Kingdom,  Greece,  Portugal  and  Denmark,  bidding 
procedures are more or less subject to the discretion of the awarding authority. 
153  Unlike the 
telecoms  sector,  there  is  a degree  of subjectivity  and  non-transparency  inherent  in  most 
broadcasting  licensing  procedures,  without  any  clearcut  criteria  to  determine  whether  a 
licence application should be granted. 
15 -~  The degree of subjectivity and  discretion involved 
in the grant of a terrestrial broadcasting licence is illustrated in the following examples: 
• 
• 
152 
153 
154 
In  the  United  Kingdom,  licences  for  Channel  3  and  Channel  5,  local  cable  delivery 
systems, domestic satellite broadcasting, and national radio are awarded on the basis of 
the  applicant's  cash bid,  provided  it  has  passed  a  "quality  threshold"  with  regard  to 
programme standards and can establish that it is  financially able to maintain the service 
throughout the licence period. The cash bid is to be paid annually and is to be revised in 
line  with  inflation.  The procedure  is  thus  mixed  and  contains  elements  of discretion 
exercisable by the Independent Television Commission ( "lTC") or the Radio Authority, 
and  objective  criteria,  namely  the  size  of the bid.  The  lTC  can decline  to  award  the 
licence  to  the  highest bidder in exceptional circumstances.  More specifically,  the  lTC 
can award the licence to a lower bidder where the quality of the service proposed by the 
lower bidder is  "exceptionally high"  and  "substantially higher"  than  that proposed by 
the highest bidder. 
In  France,  the  Conseil  Superieur  de  1' Audiovisuel  is  required to  take  into  account  a 
number  of  factors  before  awarding  radio  and  television  licences,  namely:  the 
constitutional  requirement of pluralism;  the need  to  have  a variety  of station owners; 
and  the  need  to  avoid  the  abuse  of a  dominant  position  and  other  anti-competitive 
practices.  Subject to  these considerations,  the experience of the applicant in the media 
field may be taken into account, as may its financial resources. Applicants for television 
licences are entitled to a public hearing of their case. 
For example, France, Spain,  The Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. 
Some effort is  made to establish objective criteria under the laws of Italy, Denmark and the  German 
Liinder, which private broadcasters must be able to satisfy in order to obtain a licence. 
There are notable exceptions in the satellite broadcasting sector, where licences are often granted in a 
relatively open manner; e.g., Sweden and the  United Kingdom. 
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•  In Italy,  a number of relatively objective criteria have  been taken into account by the 
Minister  of Posts  &  Telecommunications  when  awarding  licences:  the  applicant's 
financial  resources  and  its  programming  and  technical  plans.  For existing  licensees, 
their presence in the  market,  the  quality  of their programmes,  the  proportion of self-
produced  entertainment  and  information  material  in  their  schedules,  and  levels  of 
viewership are also relevant. 
Licensing  procedures  in  the  broadcasting  sector  vary  dramatically  from  the  licensing 
procedures used in the telecoms sector in a number of other material respects: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
155 
156 
Member  States  have  not  taken  any  initiatives  to  subject  the  (incumbent)  public 
broadcaster to  licensing requirements equivalent to  those to  which private broadcasters 
are subject, as has occurred in the  telecoms sector. 
155  Public broadcasters are in fact not 
subject to licensing requirements, but have their rights conferred upon them by a variety 
of concession  contracts,  statutory  instruments,  decrees  or laws  of Parliament.  In  the 
case of the  United Kingdom and Ireland,  the respective public broadcasters are subject 
in part to  an  elaborate  system of self-regulation from  which  private  broadcasters  are 
excluded.  Access  to  rights-of-way  and  frequencies  are  also  granted  automatically  to 
public broadcasters. 
There  has  been  no  impetus  to  create  a  form  of  licensing  for  private  terrestrial 
broadcasters which is less onerous than an individual licence.  There is no concept of an 
authorisation,  declaration  or  notification  procedure  for  the  grant  of  broadcasting 
licences, as  occurs in the  telecoms sector.  The processing of licence applications is  not 
subject to any strict timeframes for review, nor is a licence application something which 
can be made to  a Minister or national regulatory authority as  a matter of right ( i.e., it 
cannot  be  made  in  the  absence  of a  government  declaration  that  there  is  available 
frequency  to  support a new  channel).  Indeed,  in Member States  such  as  Ireland,  The 
Netherlands,  Denmark  and  Austria,  private  competition  comes  only  from  cable  TV 
and/  or DTH,  as  there  is  no  private national  terrestrial  broadcaster in those  countries 
(private terrestrial broadcasting is prohibited outright only in  Austria). 
Individual  licences  in  the  broadcasting  sector  create  substantial  barriers  to  entry . 
Licence fees  are often very high and usually determined in the context of a bidding or 
auction procedure.  Telecoms  licences,  by  contrast,  unless  restricted because of scarce 
resources  (e.g. ,  GSM  or  DCS-1800  licences),  are  in  principle  only  subject  to  the 
payment  of administrative  fees  which  should  reflect  the  cost  of administering  the 
licence. 
Unlike the telecoms sector, which has witnessed the elimination of special or exclusive 
rights  over  all  services  and  infrastructure,  the  broadcasting  sector  continues  to  be 
characterised by special or exclusive rights  which inure to  the advantage of the public 
broadcaster,  whether  it  be  for  terrestrial,  cable  or  satellite  DTH  transmission. 
156 
Refer especially to discussion on mobile licensing, Section 1.3.3. of Annex I. 
For example, private operators are prohibited from using terrestrial frequencies  in The  Netherlands 
(effectively  preventing  entry).  In  the  cable  TV  sector,  Greece  and  Italy  reserve  the  use  of cable 
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Moreover,  all  private broadcasters  are  subject  to  a licence  application process  which 
varies  not  only  from  Member  State  to  Member  State,  but  also  on  the  basis  of the 
technology used to transmit signals (e.g., terrestrial, cable TV and satellite). 
157  In some 
Member States, exclusivity is granted to a single private terrestrial broadcaster. 
158 
•  The regulatory bodies involved in the administration of the  licensing regime and  other 
aspects  of regulation  in  the  broadcasting  sector  are  numerous,  with  many  of them 
having  overlapping  competences  (see  Section 5  of Annex  I).  In  the  telecoms  sector, 
jurisdictional competence  is  usually  shared  between the  responsible  Minister  and  the 
national regulatory authority. 
•  The  evaluation  of matters  relating  to  content  (such  as  the  nature  and  quality  of 
programming)  are  usually  key  elements  of  the  licence  review  process,  which  is 
irrelevant  in  the  telecoms  sector.  In  France,  for  example,  satellite  service  providers 
must  satisfy  detailed  programming  obligations  in  the  context  of a Convention  signed 
with the Conseil superieur de 1  'Audiovisuel. 
(iii)  Duration 
The duration of broadcasting licences varies not only from Member State to Member State, 
but also as between the different delivery platforms used for broadcasting (refer to Table III 
at the end of Section 1. 7). 
In addition, a licensee which has become insolvent, or whose directors have been convicted 
of a  serious  offence  relevant  to  the  acquisition  of the  licence  or  to  the  conduct  of the 
company's business,  is  likely  to  have  its  licence  withdrawn before  expiry  of the  normal 
term of the licence.  Provision for  the withdrawal of a licence is  made  in all broadcasting 
laws.  Withdrawal  of a  licence  is  also  the  most  serious  sanction  for  a  failure  to  satisfy 
programming standards. 
157 
158 
networks to  the public operator.  As regards the satellite sector, public broadcasters in countries such 
as Portugal continue to have exclusive rights with respect to satellite broadcasting networks. 
A notable exception is  Germany, where satellite service licences are dealt with in the same manner as 
are terrestrial TV licences. 
For example, this is currently true for Luxembourg, Sweden, and the two major language 
communities in Belgium. 
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1.  Terrestrial 
In the majority of Member States,  public broadcasters are expressly authorised to operate 
for  an unlimited period of time.  In the  other Member States,  it is  generally assumed that 
fixed periods of time are the subject of automatic and indefinite renewal.  It is  only in  The 
Netherlands that the period of tenure for the public broadcaster is  set at the  same level as 
for private broadcasters, namely, five years. 
Private terrestrial broadcasting licences are typically granted for  a limited period of time, 
although they are  subject to  renewal.  Towards the  end of the licence period,  the  national 
regulatory authority may review  such matters  as  the  geographic  scope  of the  regions  for 
which  licences  are  granted and  general programme requirements,  as  well  as  whether the 
licensee has satisfactorily discharged its obligations. 
The longest period for which a private broadcaster's licence has been granted is  18 years in 
the Flemish part of Belgium.  In the  United Kingdom,  the grant period is  10  years,  which 
may be renewed for further terms. This is  also the maximum period for private television 
licences  in  France,  whereas  five  years  is  the  maximum period for  radio  licences  in that 
country.  In  Germany,  the  standard  maximum  period  is  10  years,  with  frequently  a 
minimum period of four to  five years being prescribed by the laws of the  Lander. In Italy, 
the term is  20 years for the public broadcaster and six years for the other national private 
channels. The shortest licence period is four years in  Greece. 
2.  Cable TV 
The licence terms  for  cable TV franchises  reflect the  large investment required for  cable 
TV networks, the possible investment of cable TV operators in programming content, and 
the relatively long period in which franchisees anticipate recouping their investment. At one 
extreme,  cable TV franchises  are of unlimited duration in  Sweden.  The general  standard, 
however,  is  15  years (e.g.,  Portugal)  to  25  years (e.g.,  Spain  and the  United Kingdom), 
with the possibility of renewal.  In the  case of Spain,  renewal may  occur in increments of 
five  years until a maximum period of 75  years  is  reached.  At the  other end of the  scale, 
cable TV franchises  in established cabled territories  such  as  Germany  run for  periods  of 
four to  10 years (renewable). 
3.  Satellite 
The length of a satellite services licence varies from four  to  10  years  in  Germany,  to  10 
years  in  France  and  Finland,  to  10  to  15  years  in  the  United  Kingdom  (depending  on 
whether it is, respectively, a non-domestic or domestic licence), to  18 years in the Flemish 
Community  of Belgium  and  20  years  in  Italy  for  the  public  operator  RAI  (six  years 
renewable for others). In Sweden, there are no licensing requirements. 
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(iv)  Licensing of Digital Services 
Although the commercial launch of digital terrestrial broadcast services is unlikely to occur 
before  late  1998  in  the  European  Union  (especially  given  the  number  of  regulatory 
clearances which are required in advance of its launch),  a number of Member States have 
already granted licences to the first wave of digital broadcasters. 
In  the  United  Kingdom,  for  example,  four  individual  digital  terrestrial  broadcasting 
licences, in addition to the BBC and Channels 3 and 4 licences (which share a  multiplexer), 
were issued  between June and September  1997 by the lTC.  These  licences were granted 
for  12  year  terms.  With  a  view  to  stimulating  the  market  for  digital  broadcasting,  the 
licences were not subject to any up-front fees  or annual fees  payable during this initial first 
term,  as  it  was  felt  that the  attendant financial  risks  were  too  high.  The licence  review 
procedure took, on average, around 12 weeks from the time of the application to the time of 
the  grant.  Under the  terms  of the  licences,  "must-carry"  obligations  were imposed  with 
regard  to  what has  been classified as  an  "A" Licence  (i.e.,  Channel  5  and Scottish  and 
Welsh broadcasters must be carried). The joint venture made up of the Carlton and Grenada 
Groups, known as  BDB, was not subject to the same  "must-carry" obligations for its  "B", 
"C" and  "D" Licences.  The bid put forward  by BDB  was  only deemed to be acceptable 
once B-Sky-B  divested its  shareholding from the joint venture.  According to  the lTC and 
the Department of Trade & Industry, this divestiture was necessary to promote competition 
in the field of digital terrestrial broadcasting because of anti-competitive concerns regarding 
B-Sky-B 's possible leveraging of its market dominance in certain forms of content into the 
transmission market. 
Moreover, as discussed in Section 2 of Annex I, the  United Kingdom has recently proposed 
to  introduce  a  Class  Licence  regime  for  conditional  access  systems  for  interactive 
services. 
159  The  Class  Licence  would  include  four  different  types  of conditional  access 
services, namely : 
•  digital radio; 
•  digital data broadcast; 
•  non-broadcast information services; and 
•  non-broadcast interactive services. 
This licensing scheme is intended to complement the existing Class License scheme already 
in place for conditional access  systems for digital broadcasting. It is  envisaged,  consistent 
with the  approach adopted  in the  United  Kingdom  regarding  the  subsidisation of mobile 
handsets, that set-top-boxes may be heavily subsidised by their providers. This is  regarded 
as  a reasonable regulatory position in light of the fact that the conditional access regime of 
the  United Kingdom  provides  extensive powers for  the promotion of open access  for  all 
broadcasters to such set-top-boxes (refer to discussion in Section 4 of Annex 1). 
159  Refer to Oftel!DTI consultation document of July 1997. 
_  Analy...sys _________  _  ~~1-£,, c£u1&s1'a  f7  f7/~,nl/J..U:1f' 
LLP.  • Comparative Overview of Current Regulatory Environment in Telecommunications and Broadcasting Sectors/ljcensing  Page 92 
In France,  there  is  no  specific  legislation  covering  the  licensing  of digital  broadcasters. 
They are licensed, as are other broadcasters, under the terms of Article 34(1) of the  Law of 
13  September  1986.  Thus  far,  frequency  bands  have  been  allocated  to  three  digital 
broadcasters: Radio France,  Telediffusion de France, and  Sogetec. In addition, these digital 
broadcasters  can provide  auxiliary  services  such  as  data transmission.  The  licences  have 
been awarded for a period of five years. 
Digital broadcasting is not specifically regulated in  Germany.  The regulatory authorities of 
the different Lander have recently agreed that a Treaty on digital broadcasting is  required. 
The proposed Treaty would cover,  inter alia, equal access to broadcasting, open access for 
users and  uniform standards  for  digitalisation.  Thus,  DF1  has  concluded a contract with 
the  "Landesmedienanstalt" of Bavaria for the trial and development of digital broadcasting 
via the Bavarian cable TV  network and ASTRA satellites.  The contract incorporates the 
principles of the Bavarian Media Act,  including the relevant provisions on licence fees.  It 
expires on 31  July 1998,  or earlier if digital programmes are  supplied on the  basis of an 
ordinary  media  licence.  The  first  applications  for  regular  media  licences  (i.e.,  content 
provision) for digital TV programmes have recently been filed. 
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~  A  number of aspects  of existing  broadcasting  regulation  will  need  to  be  re-appraised  in  the  context  of the  i 
I emerging multimedia environment. 
~ . 
• 
~ . 
First, the legal character of the broadcasting licence fee will have to be clarified (namely, whether it is a tax, 
a special fee or duty, or a charge for services rendered by the broadcasting national regulatory authority or 
NRA).  This  legal  characterisation  is  relevant  to  the  question  whether  the  fee  should  be  assessed  and 
periodically reviewed  by the government or by the broadcasting national regulatory authority.  Opinion is 
split among the Member  States  as  to  the  particular  legal  character of such  licence fees. 160 A key  issue  is 
whether the dependence of  the broadcasting national regulatory authority on government review of the level 
of a licence fee  compromises its autonomy.  By way of contrast,  licences  in  the telecoms sector are directly 
related to the level of administrative effort required to process the licence application and the extent to which 
scarce resources are used. In a multimedia environment, it is arguable that the taxation aspect of broadcast 
licensing should be progressively lessened in order to reflect the harmonised approach currently taken in the 
telecoms sector. 
Second, market and historical developments have led to an  environment in which  the functions  performed 
by  private  broadcasters  are  becoming  increasingly  indistinguishable  from  those  performed  by  public 
broadcasters.  In  a multimedia  environment  with  the  capacity for  multiple sources  of content,  the  usual  ! 
requirements of diversity, pluralism and minority representation may be capable of being satisfied by non-
public broadcasting sources.  Were this to occur, the privileged position which public broadcasters hold vis-
a-vis private broadcasters may need to be re-examined.  For example, to the extent that pluralism and other 
public service goals may be able to be satisfied by the full range of  market participants, rather than a single 
public broadcasting entity, it may be more efficient for  the  State to  sponsor the appropriate public service  , 
programming by reference to an open and transparent bidding procedure. This would allow the provision of  ~ 
public services in a  form  which is not only comparable to the manner in which universal service is provided  ! 
in a number of  Member States, but also compatible with a competitive marketplace.  This would be without  i 
prejudice, however, to the ability of Member States  to define  "public services"  in a manner which may be 
unique  to  each  Member  State  (contra  universal  service in  the  telecoms field,  which  must satisfy certain 
minimum criteria laid down at the Community level) (refer to discussion in Chapter III of the Study). 
Similarly,  to  the  extent  that  public  broadcasters  expand  their  service  portfolios  to  provide  multimedia 
services and take advantage of their strong market  presence in broadcasting, the competition  rules  should 
apply to them with the same force they apply to other market actors,  to  the extent that Article 90(2) of the 
EC Treaty does not apply. 
Third, there is an increasing tendency on the part of  governments to expand the scope of activities in which  i 
a public  broadcaster  can  engage  consistent  with  the  terms  of its  concession  or  charter.  This  means  that  i 
many  broadcasters  will  be  able  to  participate  in  the  provision  of multimedia  services.  It is  therefore  [ 
important  that  the  licensing  system  which  applies  to  their  services  clearly  differentiate  between  the  [ 
.  provision of multimedia services - which should in principle be subject to a licensing regime similar to that  [ 
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160  There are direct rulings of the French and  Italian tribunals on the characterisation of these fees.  For 
example,  in  France,  the  Conseil  Constitutionnel  has  held  that  the  fee  ( "redevance")  should  be 
regarded  as  a parafiscal duty  (Decision 60-8  of 11  August  1960).  Accordingly,  it  is  the  executive 
which is  responsible for determining the level of the  fee.  Further to  widespread debate on the  issue, 
the  Law  of 30 September  1986  prescribed  that  the  redevance  is  a  tax  which  can  be  levied  by 
Parliament (Article 53).  In Italy,  the  Italian Constitutional Court regards broadcasting licence fees  as 
a  duty  determined  by  the  legislature  (Decision  21911989  [1989]  Giur.  Cost.  956).  In  Germany, 
academic debate has by and large favoured the view that it  is  to be treated as  a regulatory tax (see in 
particular  K.  Hiimmerich  and  K.  Beucher,  "Rundfunkfinanzierung  auf dem Priifstand''  (1989)  20 
Archiv fur Presserecht 708, 713-15). 
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licensing requirements. 
•  Fourth,  the  concept  of "broadcasting"  in  a multimedia  environment  should  more  accurately  reflect  the  ~ 
changing environment in which such services are provided.  The  presumption of scarcity traditionally has  i 
led to the conclusion that one broadcaster could most effectively satisfy the public good.  The introduction of i 
competition suggests that the public good may be capable of being served by others, often as effectively as a  ! 
public  broadcaster.  Moreover,  changing public perceptions of "information" and  "entertainment" sources  ~ 
suggest  that  the  public  may be  able  to  obtain a high  level  of quality services from  alternative sources  to  i 
traditional  broadcasters.  The  relative  importance  of such  alternative  sources  means  that  the  concept  of ! 
"broadcasting" should not be interpreted unnecessarily broadly (see discussion in Section 2 of  Annex I). 
•  Fifth, in pursuing the overarching policy goal of platform independence, public broadcasters which continue  ~ 
to maintain special or exclusive rights with respect  to  satellite networks and services  should  be  treated  in  ! 
the same manner as  would an  incumbent telecoms operator with such  interests in an alternative delivery  ! 
platform such as cable TV.  ! 
•  Sixth, consistent with the principles employed by the Commission in the telecoms sector, the technological  ! 
benefits of broadcaster migration from analogue to digital services should be treated favourably (i.e.,  as the  ! 
equivalent of telecoms fixed operators migrating from analogue to ISDN or mobile operators migrating from  i 
GSM to UMTS services). That migration, however, should reflect efficiencies, not the leveraging of market i 
power. Accordingly, this process should  be complemented by a regulatory policy which encourages the full  ! 
transition from  analogue  to  digital  over  time  (rather  than  a presence  in  both  markets for  an  indefinite i 
period), coupled with a policy of releasing analogue spectrum for use by other operators as that transition is  ! 
completed.  To this end, the management of spectrum for both telecoms and broadcasting applications should  ~ 
be monitored closely. 
•  Seventh,  careful  consideration  should  be  given  to  streamlining  licensing  procedures for  broadcasting  in 
order  to  make  them  more  reflective  of an  open  marketplace  characterised  by  competition,  rather  than  by 
scarcity. 
::::.
1=,=,=,,_  •  In particular, in the interests of market certainty, licensing procedures and conditions should be made more  ! 
transparent  and  less  subjective  in  their application.  Perhaps  the  only  way  of achieving  this  goal  in  the  ! 
context of multimedia, while at the same time doing justice to all of the public policy goals of broadcasting,  ! 
is to separate from the licensing process all matters relating to content and other public policy issues.  In so  ! 
doing, the licensing framework for broadcast networks and services could over time be governed by the same  i 
regulatory  principles  which  apply  to  the  licensing  of other  networks  and  services  in  the  provision  of i 
multimedia  services.  There  are  already  concrete  examples  of such  licensing  procedures  being  effectively i 
deployed in the context of the licensing of satellite broadcast services.  · 
i •  Under  such a scenario,  all  content-related issues  would  be  subject  to  a separate  layer of regulation.  This  ! 
would  not  diminish  the  relative  importance  of content-related  and  other  public  policy  issues.  On  the  i 
contrary, it would simply allow them to  be dealt with at the Member State level in a manner which  is  not i 
:~~=~:=  =it~~t~e~zs:~e:  =:zc~  ~~~:~~:  ~:r~ct=o~~~r:l~  :co~o=i~~:~:~~tzo:..  j 
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1.6  OWNERSHIP AND OPERATIONAL RESTRICTIONS 
The Regulatory Issues 
In a true  "converged"  or "multimedia"  environment,  many operators seeking to  benefit 
from  economies  of scope  and  scale  will  wish  to  provide  a  full  range  of multimedia 
services,  ranging  from  simple  voice-based  applications,  to  interactive  applications,  to 
traditional  broadcasting  services.  Three  types  of  regulatory  restrictions  threaten  to 
jeopardise such full-line operations, namely: 
•  So  called  "line-of-business"  restrictions,  which  limit  the  ability  of a  market  actor 
providing  a  particular  type  of  service  from  providing  another  type  or  range  of 
services because of that party 's ability to affect adversely competition in the provision 
of the  additional  services  (e.g.,  prohibiting  a  telecoms  incumbent  from  providing 
cable TV services). Although clearly designed to protect competition along  "vertical" 
lines of demarcation, these types of restrictions are inconsistent with the convergence 
of service  offerings  and  delivery  platforms.  The  challenge  is  how  to  balance  the 
countervailing  goals  of encouraging  convergence  throughout  the  European  Union 
while  at  the  same presenting a telecoms or broadcasting incumbent from  leveraging 
its market power to stifle competition in the provision of new routes to the consumer. 
•  Cross-media ownership restrictions,  which reflect the particular regulatory traditions 
of plurality and cultural diversity of individual Member States.  These restrictions run 
completely  counter to  the commercial  drive towards  convergence.  Although clearly 
designed  to  promote  democratic  ideals  and  diversity  of choice,  these  rules  were 
formulated at a time when industrial  sectors were defined solely along clear vertical 
lines, without taking into account the dynamics of convergence.  The phenomenon of 
convergence,  and  the  proliferation  of new  distribution  channels  brought  about  by 
digitalisation,  should  increase  consumer  choice.  Accordingly,  the  historically 
perceived  regulatory  need  to  set  limits  on  the  ownership  of media-related  services 
should  no  longer assume  the  same  level  of significance  as  it  has  in  the  past.  The 
regulatory  challenge  lies  in  preserving  plurality,  while  achieving  some  degree  of 
harmonisation  which  would  facilitate  the  provision  of pan-European  multimedia 
services. 
•  Non-uniform foreign ownership restrictions  across  sectors,  which have  existed both 
within  and  between  Member  States  of  the  European  Union.  Although  such 
restrictions are being dismantled in the  telecoms  sector because of the  Community's 
WTO commitments, they are still pervasive in the broadcasting sector. 
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1.6.1  Line-of-Business Restrictions 
In addition to  the existing  restrictions  on the  provision of voice  services  until  1 January 
1998 (or later, in the case of those countries which have obtained  derogations- (see Section 
1. 3  .1  of Annex I)  and the infrastructure used to  support liberalised and voice services (see 
Section 1.4 of Annex 1),  there are a number of restrictions which limit the ability of market 
players to  compete across  the full  range of services  in a multimedia environment.  These 
restrictions  are justified by  regulators  that  wish  to  preserve the  value  of certain types  of 
special or exclusive rights, or that wish to promote nascent investment in new networks and 
services by excluding incumbent operators. 
(i)  Telecoms Incumbents Providing GSM Mobile Services 
With the sole exception of Greece,  incumbent telecoms operators throughout the European 
Union have been permitted to operate GSM networks (see Section 1.3.3 of Annex I).  This 
has usually been accomplished through a separate licence,  which  requires the  operator to 
maintain accounts  that  are  separate  from the fixed  line  telecoms  business.  Full  structural 
separation between fixed  line and  GSM businesses, however,  is  rare ( i.e. , Germany).  It is 
most  recently  reported  that  the  application of Community competition rules  will  require 
structural separation between the GSM mobile operations and the fixed network operations 
of Telecom ltalia. 
161 
GSM  licences  were  often  first  issued  to  incumbent  telecoms  operators  and  usually  at 
significantly  reduced  fees,  as  compared  to  later  entrants.  Community  competition  rules 
have been used to  redress the competitive imbalance created by such a policy in  Italy  and 
Spain (and also in Ireland and Belgium prior to any discrimination occurring). 
162  The policy 
of  Greece  was  changed  in  1997,  when  it  was  announced  that  the  national  telecoms 
incumbent,  OTE,  previously  prohibited  from  operating  a  GSM  network,  would  be 
permitted to  operate one of the two  DCS-1800 licences that will be made available by  the 
start of 1998 (as part of a joint venture with Telenor). 
(ii)  GSM Mobile Operators Providing DCS-1800 Services 
Although the Scandinavian countries did not prevent GSM operators from obtaining DCS-
1800 licences, the general pattern among many Member States of recent years has been to 
prohibit GSM operators from bidding for DCS-1800 systems (see Section 1.3.3 of Annex 
1).  Spain,  Italy  and the Scandinavian countries are notable exceptions to  this general trend. 
Measures have been implemented widely at the Member State level, however, which allow 
GSM operators access to a greater degree of spectrum than originally allocated. 
161 
162 
Refer to discussion in Section 1. 3. 3 of Annex I. 
Refer to discussion in Section 1. 3. 3 of Annex I. 
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(iii)  GSM Mobile Operators Providing Fixed Voice Services 
As part of their initial licence grants, most GSM operators were prevented from providing 
voice telephony services from fixed terminals (contra:  Sweden, Denmark and Sweden). The 
logic of fixed-mobile  integration and  the  liberalisation of voice  services in most Member 
States  from  1 January  1998  means  that  these  types  of restrictions  will  have  to  be  re-
considered. 
(iv)  Cable TV Operators Providing Telephony 
Prior to  1 January 1998, cable TV operators in most Member States -- with the exception of 
the  United Kingdom, Denmark, Sweden and Finland-- were not permitted to provide voice 
telephony services over their networks.  Their inability to  do  so  will provide a significant 
degree  of regulatory  momentum  to  the  process  of convergence.  Cable  TV  operators, 
however, have been expressly permitted to  transmit liberalised  telecoms services  since the 
adoption of the  Cable  TV Directive (see Section 1.4 of Annex I),  which has  by  and large 
been transposed into the laws of most Member States. 
(v)  Geographical Limits on Cable TV Franchises 
Cable TV franchises or concessions in the European Union are generally granted on a local 
or regional basis.  Geographic limits on operation are usually complemented by restrictions 
on  the  number  of homes  which  can  be  served  by  any  given  cable  TV  operator.  For 
example: 
•  In Spain: 
•  In Belgium: 
•  In The 
Netherlands: 
Concessions are defined in terms of the  relevant municipalities with 
local  administrative  authority.  The  number  of licences  which  any 
given  operator  can  hold  is  unlimited,  although  each  cable  TV 
operator is currently limited to serving 1.5 million customers. 
163 
Concessions  are  granted  to  public  or  quasi-public  authorities 
("Communales ")  to  run cable TV operations  within the geographical 
confmes of a given commune. 
Cable TV licences are restricted to the municipality granting the 
licence.  Operators, however, can accumulate an unlimited number of 
licences. 
163  Query whether Telef6nica,  if operating through separate subsidiaries,  can overcome  this  restriction 
under existing Spanish Law. 
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•  In the  United 
Kingdom:  Franchise  areas  are  defined  in  terms  of local  communities  with  a 
sense  of common  identity.  The  size  of various  franchises  can  vary 
enormously.  As  the  C& W  Communications  merger  illustrates, 
however,  it  is  possible  to  forge  more  substantial  alliances  among 
cable TV franchisees. 
•  In France:  Communes  or  groups  of communes  delimit  the  relevant  franchise 
area. 
•  In Finland:  Cable  franchises  are  granted  on  the  basis  of  the  local 
municipality /municipalities covered. 
It  is  only  in  countries  such  as  Germany,  Sweden,  Ireland  and  (more  recently)  The 
Netherlands that a single cable TV network can provide nation-wide multimedia services. 
164 
It is  no  coincidence, however, that cable TV networks  in most of these countries are  also 
owned and operated by the incumbent  telecoms operator. This means that, in most Member 
States,  individual  cable  TV  network operations  cannot  provide  multimedia  services  on a 
truly national or regional basis unless they interconnect with other networks in the context 
of a strategic  alliance  (as  has  occurred  in the  case  of  Telenet  in  the  Flanders  region  of 
Belgium).
165 
(vi)  Telecoms Incumbents Providing Multimedia Services 
By and large, there are few  explicit restrictions that prevent incumbent  telecoms operators 
from  providing  "multimedia"  services.  The  licences  of  certain  telecoms  incumbents, 
however,  do  mostly refer to  the  provision of telecommunications  services  as  the business 
purpose  of  such  operators.  Insofar  as  multimedia  services  might  be  characterised  as 
"broadcasting",  the  mandates  of the  national  incumbent  telecoms  operators  in  Greece, 
Italy,  Belgium  and  Spain  arguably  extend  to  the  provision  of such  services.  However, 
insofar as  these multimedia services  are provided on an  "on demand"  basis,  there do  not 
appear to be any explicit regulatory restrictions on their provision. 
By  way  of contrast,  the  United  Kingdom  expressly  prohibits  BT  and  other  domestic 
telecoms  operators  from:  (i)  transmitting  or  conveying  "entertainment  " or  "broadcast" 
services  over  their  own  telecommunications  networks,  except  in  response  to  individual 
requests;  and  (ii)  engaging  in  the  "provision"  or  "production"  of content,  except  at  a 
regional  level under certain specified circumstances  (to  be  reviewed  in the  year 2001). 
166 
16-+ 
165 
166 
Although,  in the  case of Germany,  for  example,  Deutsche Telekom has sought to  run its  cable TV 
businesses along regional lines. 
Whereas they may invest or build their own cable TV networks. 
Changes  in the  regulatory  regime  in Denmark drew  the  distinction between the  transmission  and the 
production of content, thereby preventing Tele Danmark from producing content. The regulatory regime, 
however. was amended again in 1996 and removed the restrictions on Tele Danmark's ability to engage 
in the production of content or the transmission of multimedia services. 
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This distinction between production and transmission, which was borrowed from the  United 
States  regulatory  model,  has  since  been  overhauled  in  the  United  States  by  the  1996 
Telecommunications Act. The distinction between transmission and content provision is also 
relevant in Germany where, for constitutional reasons (i.e., the competence of the  Lander) 
the  question has  arisen whether the  telecoms  incumbent (Deutsche  Telekom)  can become 
involved in the production of content. 
The  policy  behind  these  restrictions  in  the  United  Kingdom,  as  was  true  in  the  United 
States,  is  to  protect  new  investment  in  cable  TV  infrastructure  until  the  market  is 
sufficiently mature to ensure competition across all sectors. In the absence of such a policy, 
it  is  argued,  the  advantages  enjoyed  by  an  incumbent  telecoms  operator  (e.g.,  its  sunk 
costs,  its  economies  of scale  and  scope,  its  cash resources)  will  enable  it to  leverage  its 
market  power  in  the  cable  TV  sector,  thereby  retarding  growth  and  limiting  consumer 
choice.  This  type  of leverage could  manifest  itself in anti-competitive cross-subsidisation 
and price discrimination. 
In Spain,  after a moratorium of between 16 to 24 months,  Telef6nica will be permitted to 
build cable TV  networks  on the  same terms  and  conditions  as  other cable  TV operators. 
The rationale for  this  moratorium is  that  Telefonica will be allowed to construct cable TV 
networks  without  going  through  the  same  bidding  procedures  as  other  cable  TV 
concessionaires. 
167  It is  open to  conjecture whether this  type  of exemption  for  Telefonica 
from competitive bidding is compatible with Community competition rules. 
(vii)  Telecoms Incumbents Operating Cable TV Networks 
Until recently, the only restrictions imposed on the provision of cable TV infrastructure and 
services  by  incumbent  telecoms  operators  could  be  found  in  Austria,  Belgium,  Italy  and 
Lzaembourg.  More  recently,  however,  prompted by  concerns  that the  dual  ownership  of 
telecoms  and  cable  TV  infrastructure  raises  significant  bottleneck  issues  and  threatens 
competition in the  local  loop,  regulators  at  both the  Community and  Member State  level 
have  sought to  address  the  extent to  which  the  dual  ownership  and/or operation of both 
major  terrestrial  delivery  platforms  for  multimedia  is  acceptable. 
168  Most  recently,  the 
regulatory authorities  in  The  Netherlands  determined that competition was  best served by 
requiring the incumbent  telecoms operator to  divest its  interest in the  CASEMA cable TV 
167 
168 
That period may be further extended if deemed to be appropriate by the Spanish authorities in light of 
competitive developments in the Spanish marketplace. A Spanish court has also ruled that,  during the 
moratorium period,  Telefonica may  not build  out  a cable TV  network,  even if it  does  not  provide 
services over the  network until  the  moratorium period elapses  (i.e.,  such  a network roll-out  would 
stifle investment in the independent cable TV operators because of the competitive "overhang" which 
Telefonica would create in the market). 
See, for example, the Study performed by Arthur D.  Little International,  1997, entitled "Cable Review-
Study  on  the  competition  implications  in  telecommunications  and  multimedia  markets  of :  (a)  joint 
provision of cable and telecoms networks by a single dominant operator~ and (b) restrictions on the use of 
telecoms networks for the provision of cable television services''. See also Veljanovski, Promoting Local 
Network  Competition,  1996;  cf.  OECD,  Current  Status  of Communication  Infrastructure  Regulation: 
Cable Television, OECD/GD(96) 101. 
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network  as  a  condition  for  CASEMA 's  participation  in  the  second  national 
telecommunications operator,  Enertel. 
The  commercial  development of European cable  TV  infrastructure  generally  reflects  the 
following: 
•  II Greenfield countries  II ,  where  there  is  little  or  no  broadband  infrastructure  to  the 
home (i.e., Greece,  Italy,  Portugal and Spain). 
•  Fast developing  markets,  where  there  is  significant  scope for  the  development of 
broadband  to  the  home,  but  where  still  there  is  significant  investment  and 
installation  of advanced  modern  systems  ( i.e. ,  the  United  Kingdom  and  perhaps 
France (at least in the Paris metropolitan area)). 
•  Widespread  mature  systems,  where  installation  of  broadband  to  the  home  is 
extensive,  but  requires  upgrading  (i.e.,  Belgium,  The  Netherlands,  Denmark  and 
Germany). 
These patterns  of commercial  development,  however,  are  not  reflected  in  the  regulatory 
frameworks of the Member States. For example: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
169 
170 
In certain countries such as  Germany and Portugal, the telecoms incumbent enjoys a 
monopoly  or  near-monopoly  with  respect  to  cable  TV  infrastructure.  In  other 
countries, such as Austria and Finland,  the telecoms incumbent has only a relatively 
small stake in cable TV infrastructure. 
In certain jurisdictions, the  telecoms incumbent's cable TV network may be wholly 
separate from the infrastructure used to provide telephony services (as occurs in  The 
Netherlands
169  or in  Ireland)  or  it  may  share  the  national  telecoms  network  to  a 
significant degree (as occurs in Germany).
170 
In the United Kingdom,  the incumbent telecoms operator may not convey or provide 
broadcast entertainment services  over its  telecoms  network  (at least until  the year 
2001). 
Cable TV companies have in general been subject to territorial restrictions on their 
operations that are  based on various  criteria (e.g.,  population coverage,  estimated 
viewing  audience,  geographical  area  or regional  limits).  In  certain jurisdictions, 
this  may  result  in  exclusivity  for  cable  TV  licences  for  each  geographic  (or 
franchise) area, although the trend is for cable TV franchisees or concessionaires not 
During the course of 1997,  however,  the Dutch telecoms  incumbent was  required to withdraw from 
its cable TV interests (see earlier discussion). 
Similarly, the individual members of the Finnet group in Finland have both a cable TV network and a 
telecoms  network going  to  the  homes  of local  subscribers.  In  December  1997,  however,  Deutsche 
Telekom  announced  its  intention  to  operate  its  respective  telecoms  cable  TV  networks  through 
structurally separate undertakings. 
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to be awarded absolute exclusive rights for the provision of cable TV services in any 
given region. 
171 
•  In  certain Member States,  cable  TV  companies  are owned  in whole  or in part by 
public municipalities and are subject to non-commercial  "public service" obligations 
(e.g., Belgium, Finland). 
The combined effect of these various approaches makes it exceedingly difficult to formulate 
a  single  strategy  at  the  Community  level  for  separating  the  cable  TV  and  telecoms 
businesses  of an  incumbent  telecoms  operator.  In  late  December  1997,  the  European 
Commission  released  for  comment a draft directive under  Article  90  which  proposed  to 
amend the Services Directive by inter alia prescribing that: 
"Member States shall ensure that any telecommunications organisation to which they grant 
special or exclusive rights in the areas of relevant radiofrequencies or which they control, 
which,  in  a substantial part of the common market,  is dominant and operates a cable TV 
network under special or exclusive rights does not do  so using the same legal entity as it 
uses for its public telecommunciations network". 
172 
In  addition  to  this  structural  separation,  the  proposed  directive  envisages  that  the 
Commission will examine on a case-by-case basis whether it would be compatible with the 
principle of proportionality to require individual Member States to take further measures. 
173 
(viii)  Cable TV Operators Involved in Content Production 
Until  recently,  there  were  a  significant  number  of Member  States  in  which  cable  TV 
operators were not permitted by law to engage in the production of content for distribution 
over their networks.  However,  legislative amendments  enacted during  the  course of 1997 
have  removed  this  restriction  from  cable  TV operators  in  Austria,  The  Netherlands  and 
Portugal. 
By way of contrast, the regulatory approach in the  United Kingdom has been to encourage 
cable TV  operators  to  produce  their  own,  or to  commission independent,  programming. 
!71 
172 
173 
For example, territorial exclusivity for cable TV franchisees  is  no  longer upheld in The Netherlands, 
nor will it be permissible under the terms of a proposed new legal regime which will be introduced in 
Spain  during  the  course  of  1998  (there  is  also  no  formal  territorial  exclusivity  in  Belgium). 
Realistically,  however,  it will be rare for a heavily cabled region to  be able to sustain more than one 
cable TV network. 
Draft Commission Directive amending Directive 90/388/EEC with regard to  its  effective application 
in a multimedia environment, by legally separating the provision of telecommunications and cable TV 
networks owned by a single operator, of 17 December 1997. 
"The  decisions  to  be  taken  in  respect  of specific  cases  could provide for measures  including  the 
opening of  a cable operator to a participation of  third parties,  or the requirement to fully sell-off this 
entity". (Recital 2) 
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Indeed,  an  ongoing  dispute  in  the  United  Kingdom  is  the  extent  to  which  cable  TV 
operators  are  said  to  be  "dependent"  on  content  packaged  by  the  satellite  broadcaster 
BSkyB. 
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. The varied line-of-business restrictions which one finds throughout the European Union constitute a potentially  1 
~  serious impediment to the growth of  multimedia services on a pan-European basis:  · 
• 
!  • 
I  • 
Line-of-business  restrictions  in  a converged  environment are  prima facie  distortive  of competition.  Such 
restrictions should therefore only be imposed where they are needed  to  promote independent investment in 
new  services  (e.g.,  greenfield  cable  TV investments  or  new  DCS-1800  mobile  licences)  which  would 
otherwise be threatened by a telecoms or broadcasting operator capable of leveraging its market power into 
an adjacent or neighbouring market which has not yet matured. 
Restrictions on  the ability of market  players  to  engage  in the  production  of content,  unless  prompted  by 
serious  competition  law  concerns  resulting from  vertical  integration,  do  not  appear  to  be  justified  in  a 
multimedia world dependent on  the production of content for its continuing growth.  Moreover, depriving 
telecoms  and  cable TV operators of the  right  to  engage in the production of content may jeopardise  their 
commercial future by excluding them from  the most lucrative parts of the multimedia value chain.  In  the 
case of telecoms  companies,  the downward pressure on  telephony prices  will probably need  to  be offset  by 
high value content-rich transmissions.  In  the case of cable  TV companies,  consigning them  to  the  role of 
carriers  would  deny  them  the  right  to  develop  strong  multimedia  product  packages  to  match  the 
entertainment services of  broadcasters and the enhanced information services of  telecoms companies. 
The  desire  to foster competition between delivery platforms may require  the adoption of one of a range of 
regulatory options, namely: 
In  extreme cases, an incumbent telecoms operator might be required  to divest its interest in an alternative  1 
delivery platform such as  cable  TV.  Such  a policy option  is  probably best taken  in individual cases at  the l 
national  level,  whether at  the  behest  of the  National  Regulatory Authority or  the  National  Competition  ~ 
Authority. At the Community level, ex ante legislation to this effect would be difficult to reconcile with the  1 
terms of  Article 222 of  the EC Treaty, 174 especially where vested rights are likely to  be affected by any such  j 
divestiture.  I 
•  The European Commission, using to its powers to review strategic alliances under Article 85(3) of the EC  l 
Treaty or its powers under the Merger Control Regulation, may require divestiture as a condition precedent  \ 
to  the  regulatory  clearance of "multimedia" mergers, joint ventures or other looser forms  of cooperation.  l 
Given that few firms  in  the industry will have the full range of skills necessary to  provide all manner of 1 
multimedia services and platforms, it is inevitable that network operators will pursue acquisitions or joint l 
ventures which have  the  potential to  generate a full set  of multimedia skills.  Accordingly, the  European  l 
Commission  will  have ample  opportunity to  review  the  potential anti-competitive consequences flowing  ~ 
from the common ownership of  multiple delivery platforms.  , 
:,_i'=,,  •  Another  regulatory  option  to  promote  platform  independence  and  to  prevent  anticompetitive  cross- ~ 
subsidisation  is  to  require  the  structural separation  of different  businesses  run  over  different  platforms, l 
whether those services constitute full substitutes for one another (e.g.,  telephony provided over telecoms or  j 
cable  TV networks)  or  partial substitutes (fixed  telecoms  and  wireless  communications).  Such an  option  \ 
would  be accompanied by the requirement  that there  be full accounting separation  between  the separately ! 
run businesses.  This regulatory option is best implemented on a case-by-case basis, rather than through ex  ~ 
ante regulation, given the very different levels of  cable penetration in Europe.  The fundamental purpose of\ 
structural separation is to prevent the leverage of  market power from one sector into another. In a converged  \ 
1. ...............  ~'!.~!.~~'!?!!:~'!.~~---~~~~!!~!.!  ...  ~~'!:~l!:.~.~~~!.~~-4.  .. ~Y.t!!:.~~~4.  ..  ?..~.r:?.~.~~--~fi~T~!.!:g~~-fi.!:~4.~.!!!:~.~-~-~~--!.!!.~~g:.f!:~.~-~-'!:J!t!:4.J~~---~-~.1!!:~!.!!.~4.  ... J 
17..(  Article 222 prescribes that "This Treaty shall in no way prejudice the rules in Member States goveming 
the system of  property ownership." 
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~  level of platform and  service competition in a given situation, may retard  convergence and deny full-line  i 
operators economies of scope. Consequently, structural separation would be a viable policy option under the  1 
terms of Articles 86 and/or 90 in those individual cases where markets are not fully competitive and where  t 
anti-competitive cross-subsidisation or discrimination has occurred.  : 
Some  of the  anti-competitive  concerns  resulting from  the  interests  of an  operator  in  multiple  delivery  l 
platforms  might be addressed  by  other regulatory  policies  which  promote greater  access  to  networks.  For  j 
example, unbundling down  to  the level of the local  loop  is mandated in Finland,  where each  regional  cable  j 
TV company also operates a separate telecoms network to each household in its region.  Although the same  l 
unbundling requirement  is  mandated  in  Germany,  it is  questionable whether this  regulatory option  is  as  · 
effective in a situation where a single national telecoms incumbent operating in a such a large geographic 
market also operates the national cable TV network. 
Existing geographic  restrictions  on  the  operations  of cable  TV operators  should  be  counterbalanced  by  a 
willingness  to  permit  them  to  forge  alliances  with  other  cable  TV operators,  thereby  allowing  them  to 
develop economies of scale by providing national broadband services. 
:  ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................  : 
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1.6.2  Cross-media Ownership 
(i)  The European Regulatory Framework 
Community legislation in the mass  media sector is  limited to the harmonisation provisions 
of the Television  Without Frontiers Directive of 1989 (revised in 1997). 
175  With respect to 
issues such as  media ownership and pluralism, the EC  Treaty expressly acknowledges that 
these are matters which fall primarily within the jurisdiction of the Member States. 
176 
In late 1992, however, the European Commission adopted its  Pluralism Green  Paper ("the 
Green  Paper"),
177  which was  followed  in  1994 by its  Pluralism  and Media  Concentration 
Communication  ("the  Communication ").
178  In  its  Communication,  the  Commission 
concluded that there were significant disparities in the media concentration rules throughout 
the European Union, the net result of which was to: 
•  discourage  direct  investment  in  media  enterprises  and  the  exercise  of the 
right of establishment guaranteed by Articles 52 and 58 of the EC Treaty; 
•  create legal uncertainty about the free provision of broadcasts throughout the 
European Union; and 
•  expose operators to distortions of competition. 
The net result of these disparities was  to jeopardise the creation of a true Internal Market 
(as required under Article 7a of the EC Treaty). 
179  Moreover, in the absence of some degree 
of harmonisation,  national  media  ownership  restrictions  were  often  capable  of being 
circumvented. 
180 
175 
176 
177 
178 
179 
180 
Directive 97 /36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 1997 amending Council 
Directive  89/552/EEC on the  coordination of certain provisions hand  drawn by  law,  regulation  or 
administrative action in Member States concerning the pursuit of television broadcasting activities, OJ 
197 L202/60. 
Refer to Protocol on the System of Public Undertakings in the Member States in the Amsterdam Treaty, 
and Article 222 of the EC Treaty. 
"Pluralism  and  Media  Concentration"  in  the  Internal  Market:  An  Assessment  of  the  Need  for 
Community Action", COM(92)480 Final of 23 December 1992. 
COM(94)353 of 5 October 1994. 
This result would also run counter to the goals of the 1994 White Paper on Growth,  Competitiveness and 
Employment, COM(93)700 Final. 
Refer to  the judgment of the  European Court of Justice in  TV 105A  v.  Commissariaat Voor de Media, 
Case C-23/93, [1994]  I ECR 4795; cf.  Paul Denuit, Case C-14/96, [1997] I ECR 2785. 
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The  Communication  also  recognised  that  new  technologies  (digital  transmission, 
compression and  convergence)  have  made  it  essential  to  provide  services  across  national 
frontiers.  The large  amounts  of investment  needed  to  implement  these  new  technologies 
require a pan-European market.  The  consultation process undertaken in the  Green  Paper 
tended  to  confirm  the  desirability  of harmonising  national  restrictions  on  cross-media 
ownership. 
To this end, the European Commission decided to take further action and is widely reported 
to  be considering the  adoption of a directive harmonising national  cross-media ownership 
rules  by  setting  "audience  share"  and  "consumption"  thresholds,  instead  of restrictions 
based on  ownership.  These proposed thresholds  were reported to  be  set  at  relatively  low 
levels, namely: 
•  30%  for  "monomedia"  concentrations for television and radio,  respectively;  under this 
standard, a single undertaking could not control another (new or existing) undertaking if 
the total audience share of the services offered by the combined undertaking equalled or 
exceeded 30% in the relevant geographic area concerned; and 
•  10%  for "multimedia" concentrations for a combination of different media; accordingly, 
an  undertaking  already  active  in  one  media  could  not  control  an  undertaking  in  a 
different  media  (new  or existing)  if the  total  audience  share  of its  combined  media 
equalled 10%  or more in the relevant geographic area concerned. 
Public service broadcasters were said to be exempt from these proposals.  Opposition from 
the broadcasting industry and the press resulted in the Commission giving consideration to 
the  adoption  of a  "flexibility"  clause  which  would  allow  Member  States  to  authorise 
domestic media companies to exceed the proposed thresholds where considered appropriate. 
Such flexibility  was  claimed to  be necessary because the proposed thresholds  are  already 
exceeded  in  a  number  of Member  States  and  because  regional  broadcasters  would  be 
adversely affected by the proposal, even though their relevant geographic areas of operation 
constitute only a small fraction of the overall national territory. 
181 
Effect of  European Competition Rules 
A de facto  degree of cross-media ownership restructuring is  occurring at a European level 
as a result of the application of European competition rules to an ever-increasing number of 
mergers and strategic alliances: 
• 
181 
As regards mergers or concentrative joint ventures, the European Commission's Merger 
Task Force has had the opportunity to examine a large number of notified transactions 
For  example,  under  current estimated  market  shares  based  on  audience  coverage,  France's  TFI  has 
approximately 39%, Belgium's VTM has  43%,  Italy's three networks  run by  the  Berlusconi  Fininvest 
group have  over 40%,  while  the  United Kingdom's  lTV  Association would hold  in excess  of 30%  in 
small regions. 
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in the media sector using its powers of review under the  Merger Control Regulation.
182 
The  theoretical possibility that the  Commission would  be  restricted  in its  attempts  to 
develop  a coherent pan-European merger policy across  the  various multimedia sectors 
because of the  potential application of Article 21(3) of the  Merger  Control Regulation 
has  not  materialised.  Under  the  terms  of  that  provision,  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
Commission  may  be  overridden  by  Member  States  to  protect  the  "plurality  of the 
media"  insofar as  such measures are compatible with Community law.  Member States 
have not only been reluctant to  exercise their rights under Article 21(3),  but they  have 
also  referred mergers  to  the  Merger Task Force where domestic  merger control  laws 
were deemed inadequate to address such combinations. 
183 
•  As  regards  cooperative joint ventures 
18+ or exclusive relationships 
185  involving content, 
the Commission has had ample opportunity to apply the competition rules in the context 
of notifications under Article 85(1) seeking Article 85(3) exemptions. 
(ii)  Cross-media Ownership Restrictions at Member State Level 
In order to promote cultural diversity and  safeguard pluralism,  most Member States  have 
adopted specific cross-media ownership and participation rules.  These rules span all forms 
of media,  including broadcast television,  cable TV,  radio,  and the press.  In countries such 
as  Spain  and  Portugal,  the  obligation  to  ensure  media  pluralism  is  constitutionally 
enshrined.  In  countries  such  as  Germany,  Italy  and  France,  the  court  systems  have 
compelled governments to respect pluralism. 
There is  great variation in the  measures  taken by  the  Member  States  to  implement these 
policy goals, ranging from a complex set of media ownership rules (e.g., France)  to  more 
182 
183 
184 
185 
For example, Nordic Satellite Distribution (Case IV /M.490 of 19 July 1995); n-tv (Case IV /M.810 of 16 
September 1996): Benelsmann/CLT (Case IV/M.779 of 7 October 1996); IP!Reuters (Case IV/M.730 of 
5 July  1996);  CEP!Groupe  de  Ia  Cite  (Case  IV/M.665  of 29  November  1995):  MSG Media  Service 
(Case IV/M.423 of 14 March  1994); ABC/Generate des Eaux!Canal+  W.H.  Smith  (Case IV/M.423 of 
10 September 1991); Sunrise (Case IV /M.176 of 13 January 1992); Benelsmann!News Intemational/Vox 
(Case  IV/M.489  of 6  September  1994);  Kirch/Richemont  (Case  IV/M.410  of  2  August  1994): 
CLT!Disney/Super RTL (Case IV/M.566 of 17  May 1995):  Canal+IUFAIMDO (Case IV/M.655 of 13 
November  1995);  Channel  Five  (Case  IV /M.673  of 22  December  1995);  Viacom/Bear  Stems  (Case 
IV/M.717 of 25  March 1996); N-TV (Case IV/M.810 of 16 September 1996): Benelsmannl CLT (Case 
IV /M. 779  of 7  October  1996);  Cable  &  Wireless/Nynex!Bell  Canada  (Case  IV /M.M.865  of  11 
December 1996); Bell Cablemedia!Cable &  Wireless!Videotron (Case IV /M.853 of 11  December 1996); 
RTL 7 (Case IV /M.878 of 14 February 1997). 
For example, refer to the Holland Media Group (HMG) Case, OJ  1996 L294/14. 
For  example,  Screensport/EBU  (joint  venture),  OJ  1991  L63/32;  VIP  (joint  venture),  OJ  1989 
L226/25; EBU/Eurovision System (joint buying), OJ  1993 L179/23. 
For example,  Auditel (exclusive purchasing),  OJ  1993  L306/50:  ARD (Purchasing  Agreement),  OJ 
1989 L284/36; Magill (IPR), OJ 1989 L78/43. 
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light-handed  regulation  (e.g.,  Germany).
186  Aside  from  the  application  of  general 
competition rules,  there are  no  explicit rules  in  Finland and  Luxembourg on cross-media 
ownership  and  participation. 
187  Most  Member  States,  however,  take  the  view  that 
competition rules alone are insufficient to promote the non-economic goals of pluralism and 
cultural diversity. 
Generally speaking, the cross-media ownership restrictions imposed by Member States vary 
according  to  the  media  of  transmission  or  distribution.  For  example,  the  terrestrial 
television  sector  is  the  most  heavily  regulated.  Cable  TV  is  less  heavily  regulated,  and 
satellite television is characterised by the least amount of regulatory interference. 
188 
A review of Member State laws  suggests that national media cross-ownership laws can be 
divided  into  four  broad  regulatory  categories.  Many  Member  States  implement  a 
combination of these restrictions: 
(1)  Horizontal Integration 
In addition to  relying on national competition rules to prevent the abuse of market power, 
Member States such as  Belgium, France,  Germany, Italy, Ireland,  Portugal, Spain and the 
United  Kingdom  have  adopted  specific  "mono  media"  restrictions  to  address  horizontal 
integration, (i.e. , where an entity or group of entities controls different production units in 
the same economic activity). 
In  particular,  national  laws  restrict  the  ability  of  parties  to  achieve  high  market 
concentrations  through newspaper  and  magazine  mergers.  In  addition,  purchases  of local 
television and radio  stations are restricted in order to  ensure that programming focuses  on 
the needs of local audiences. 
186 
187 
188 
In  Gennany,  there  are  no  provisions  concerning  cross-media  ownership  in  either  the  Lander 
Broadcasting Treaty or in the  press  laws  of the  respective  States.  Most  of the  Lander's broadcasting 
statutes, however, do contain restrictions which vary in their application. 
In Finland,  however,  the  Council nevertheless has  the  power to  limit participation in the  broadcasting 
companies  to  ensure pluralism and diversity.  Moreover,  ownership  restrictions  might be imposed  on 
operators  at  the  time  a licence  is  granted.  In  Luxembourg,  the  government  considers  as  essential  the 
inclusion of a licence condition requiring the establishment of the service to be of tinancial and economic 
interest to Luxembourg.  In Finland,  if the ownership of a broadcaster changes, the Council of State may 
reassess  the  licence.  In  Sweden,  the  licence  of the  commercial  operator  contains  restrictions  which 
assume  a  continued  holding  of ownership,  with  no  majority  owner  being  able  to  increase  its  stake 
signiticantly.  By way of comparison,  in the  United Kingdom,  after the  grant of the so-called Channel 3 
and Channel 5 broadcasting licences,  there was  a one year moratorium during which ownership of the 
licensee could not change. 
Only France,  Portugal  and  the  United  Kingdom  have  sector-specific  ownership  restrictions  regarding 
satellite television. 
~«<!~.  t£,~~  ff Yknr..u:.y-
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(2)  Multimedia Integration 
Multimedia integration,  whereby an  entity controls different media,  has  been common for 
some time in the print sector (e.g., newspapers, books, periodicals/magazines). The effects 
of convergence on the electronic and print media are raising the competitive importance of 
cross-ownership in these sectors, especially because they compete for the  same advertising 
revenues.  Restrictions  on  this  type  of cross-ownership  are  commonly  found  throughout 
most  Member  States.  They  exist  in the  laws  of Austria,  France,  Italy,  The  Netherlands, 
Spain,  the  United  Kingdom,  and  several  Lander  in  Germany  (e.g.,  Baden-Wurttemberg, 
Bavaria, Hamburg, Hessen, Lower Saxony). 
Restrictions  are  expressed  in  a number  of different  ways.  For example,  limits  are  often 
expressed in terms  of the potential audience  share which a licensee can obtain within the 
area of authorisation.  In France,  it is  forbidden to  acquire a television,  radio  or cable TV 
licence if, as  a the  result, the licensee accumulates more than two of the following:  one or 
more television licences covering in total a population of four  million,  one or more radio 
licences  covering  a total  of 30  million people;  one  or more  cable  licences  covering  six 
million inhabitants;  or the control of one or more newspapers with more than 20%  of the 
total  national  circulation  of comparable  daily  papers.  There  are  similar  provisions  with 
regard to local and regional concentrations. 
In Italy,  a restriction has been adopted which attempts to limit the acquisition of resources 
for  the  "mass  communication"  sectors  based  on  individual  undertakings  controlled.  All 
transactions  which  lead  to  a  media  undertaking  acquiring  more  than  20%  of all  media 
resources,  or  to  a  multi-sector  conglomerate  (a  body  with  two-thirds  of its  resources 
derived  from  mass  media  operations)  acquiring  more  than  25%  of such  resources  are 
automatically null  and  void.  The  definition of "media resources",  however,  is  unclear;  it 
omits  references  to  the  resources  which  might  be  obtained  from  book  publishing,  the 
production and distribution of films and television programmes, and the sale of music. 
In Belgium, internal divisions within the country create a severe impediment to cross-media 
ownership.  For example,  whereas the French community expressly restricts concentration 
in multiple media, the Flemish community requires that at least 51 % of the capital of non-
public television corporations be held by publishers of Dutch language newspapers. 
Media cross-ownership limitations are often applied in combination with licensing policies 
in  the  television  and  radio  sectors.  For  example,  licences  may  be  combined  with 
programme guarantees  from the  licensee,  usually relating  to  objectivity requirements,  the 
right  of  reply,  type  of programmes,  minority  programming,  and  the  availability  of 
broadcast time for political campaigns. 
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(3)  Restrictions on Holdings 
Legislation in countries  such as  France,  Germany,  Denmark,  Portugal,  Spain  and  Greece 
place  limits  on  shareholdings  in  media  undertakings  (ranging  from  20%  to  50%).  The 
object  of such  rules  is  to  promote pluralism by  ensuring  that  no  single  shareholder  can 
exercise  "decisive  influence"  over  such undertakings  (e.g.,  Denmark).  For example,  in 
France,  a  company  may  not  hold  an  interest  in  more  than  three  analogue  private 
broadcasters.  In addition,  participation in the  first  channel  may  not  exceed  49%  of the 
common shares or of the voting rights of the company, while participation held in a second 
and third channel may not exceed 15%  and 5% , respectively, of the shares/voting rights. 
(4)  Restrictions Based on the Nature of Applicant's Activities 
Specific provisions have been adopted in  Portugal,  Germany,  the  United Kingdom  and by 
the  French  community  in  Belgium  that  restrict  political  parties,  trade  unions  and  other 
associations  which  have  clear  links  to  political  or  opinion-making  entities,  from  having 
shareholding  interests  in  broadcasting  entities.  For  example,  the  Media  Act  of North 
Rhine-Westphalia in Germany provides that political parties, voter associations, and entities 
dependent on a political party or voter association cannot be granted a service licence. 
Each  of these  restrictions  is  designed  to  ensure transparency  so  that  regulators  are  in a 
position to identify operators and service providers alike. 
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[ The  continued  existence  of a patchwork  quilt  of national  cross-media  ownership  rules  requires  reform  in  a 
i multimedia environment: 
• 
• 
• 
Existing cross-media  ownership  restrictions  were  premised  on  the  belief that  the  various forms  of media 
constituted discrete and separate product markets with little or no overlap.  That premise is no longer true. 
The  ability of newspapers,  or portions  thereof,  to  be  downloaded from  computers,  the ability of scheduled 
programming to  be received on the Internet, and the capability of telecoms networks to deliver a variety of 
multimedia services, mean that existing notions of distinct media are becoming blurred.  Moreover,  the use 
of such  media  on  an  interactive  basis  (also  not envisaged under existing cross-media  ownership  rules)  is 
fundamentally altering the character of such media. 
Technical,  complex and widely differing media concentration rules act as an impediment to  the growth of 
truly pan-European  (as  opposed  to  regional or national)  media operations which can  compete on a global  j 
scale.  The  absence  of a truly  European  media  industry is  no  doubt  due  to  the  significant  cultural  and  j 
linguistic  differences  which  characterise  the  European  Union.  Nevertheless,  the  relatively  successful  ~ 
involvement  of Canal+  in  American  cinema  releases  suggests  that  a greater  degree  of cross-cultural  \ 
involvement within the European Union itself is feasible if  regulatory barriers are lowered.  I 
The traditional goal of promoting pluralism should  be  re-appraised in  light of shifting notions of relevant  j 
"markets"  in  a multimedia  environment  and  also  in  light  of the  need  to  encourage  investment  in  a  i 
multimedia environment.  Minimal thresholds should  be used  to protect against distortions of competition i 
whilst encouraging convergence of the different media sectors.  Because the notion of "relevant markets" is  \ 
in a state of  flux, harmonisation should not proceed on the basis of simple numerical limits on the numbers  \ 
of  channels, stations, newspapers and so on.  · 
It will also  be important  to  develop  a common  understanding of how  "market  power"  is  to  be  measured  i 
across different media. The United Kingdom, for example, introduced the criterion of "audience share" in its i 
1996 Broadcasting Act, which certain other Member States may also  be willing to adopt (e.g.,  Germany).  \ 
The  introduction of a concept of "audience share", however,  presupposes  the existence of well  established  \ 
markets, which will be difficult to define with precision in a multimedia world. At the very least, a common  ! 
understanding  of the  elements  which  enable  an  undertaking  to  "influence"  the  management  (whether  i 
through  ownership  or  some  other form  of control)  of other  media  undertakings  would facilitate  more  ! 
consistency in the approach to such concepts.  l 
In addition to the definition of common criteria to address cross-media ownership issues, there is a need for  i 
increased  cooperation  among  the  regulatory authorities  responsible for  the  various  media  involved.  Such  ! 
coordination  would  no doubt  be facilitated  if there  were a greater degree of convergence of the regulatory  \ 
functions currently performed by telecoms and broadcasting authorities.  ' 
\'',,,=  •  The  Study  Team  has  not  identified  any  compelling  policy  reasons  to  treat  cross-media  ownership  j 
restrictions differently when applied to public broadcasters, except insofar as such restrictions would affect  \ 
their ability to perform public service Junctions more efficiently.  ' 
L  ...............................................................................................................................................•.............................................................•.•......•...•••.............................•......................•...••••...................••.................  : 
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1.6.3  Foreign Ownership Restrictions 
Despite their prima facie  incompatibility with Articles 52,  58  and  59 of the EC  Treaty, 
189 
there  also  exist  restrictions  on  the  ownership  of  local  telecoms  undertakings  and 
broadcasters by non-Community nationals. Until the signature of the  M"'O Agreement, 
190  the 
telecoms  sector  was  characterised  by  the  following  ownership  restrictions  on  non-
Community nationals: 
•  In  Belgium,  ownership  of  Belgacom  by  a  non-Community  national  was 
limited to 49%  (either capital share or voting rights). 
•  In Greece,  there was  a  "local establishment"  requirement  for  undertakings 
that provided telecoms services. 
•  In Finland,  half of the founders  of the undertaking and the members of the 
Board  of  Directors,  plus  the  Managing  Director,  must  be  permanent 
residents of the European Economic Area. 
•  In France,  non-Community  nationals  could  not  hold  more  than  25%  of a 
national mobile licensee (directly or indirectly) or more than 20%  in  France 
Telecom. 
•  In Portugal,  non-Community nationals could not hold more than 25 % in the 
capital of companies providing  "basic services" (including a national mobile 
licensee),  and international services could only be provided by undertakings 
incorporated in the country. 
•  In  Spain,  in  the  absence  of Cabinet  approval,  non-Community  nationals 
could not own more than 25%  of any facilities-based,  radio-based or satellite 
network  services  telecoms  licensee  (providers  of VANS  and  Closed  User 
Groups services were exempted). 
Following the adoption of the  WTO Agreement, the Member States of the European Union-
with the exception of Belgium, France and Portugal -- have removed restrictions on foreign 
ownership. 
191 
189 
190 
191 
Articles  52  and  58  relate  to  the  right  of establishment,  whereas  Article  59  relates  to  the  freedom  to 
provide services. 
Council  Decision  of 28  November  1997  concerning  the  conclusion  of  behalf  of the  European 
Community, as regards matters within its competence, of the results of the WTO negotiations on basic 
telecommunications services, OJ  1997 L347/45. 
Portugal  and  France  have  made  a  commitment  under  the  "Additional  Commitments"  section  of the 
GATS  Schedule  to  draft  legislation  aimed  at  partially  removing  the  present  limitations  on  foreign 
ownership (promising to  introduce legislation to  this effect no  later than  1998,  to  become  binding as  a 
GATS commitment no later than 1999). 
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In  the  broadcasting  sector,  foreign  ownership  limitations  are  more  widespread,  and  not 
subject to  any  agreement at  the WTO level.  For example,  there is  a broad prohibition on 
ownership interests in terrestrial television licensees in a majority of Member States  ( e.g., 
Belgium, Finland, France,  Greece, Italy,  Portugal, Spain and the  United Kingdom).  These 
ownership restrictions extend in the  United Kingdom to  the  provision of domestic  satellite 
services, and also to the cable TV sector in countries such as  Finland, Italy and Spain (e.g., 
25%  in Spain).  These restrictions on foreign ownership are unlikely to  be  removed in the 
short term, especially in light of the relative importance attached by Member State laws to 
the preservation of cultural identity. 
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1.7  MARKET ENTRY REQUIREMENTS: A COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW 
The Regulatory Issues 
A key policy goal in adapting the current telecoms regulatory framework to tomorrow's 
multimedia  market  should  be  the  establishment  of  clear,  transparent  and  non-
discriminatory rules  governing  market entry.  The  procedures for  granting  licences,  the 
criteria used to  select prospective licensees and the timeframes within which licences are 
granted are all important elements of a coherent licensing  policy.  Although much of the 
groundwork  for  such  a  sound  licensing  framework  will  be  achieved  in  the  telecoms 
sector  through  the  effective  implementation  of the  Licensing Directive,  the  licensing 
traditions of the broadcasting sector do  not display a comparable degree of transparency 
and  objectivity.  Moreover,  even in the  telecoms  world,  differences  in the  treatment of 
licences  are  widespread,  both between  Member States  and  between  individual  service 
categories within Member States.  As  discussed throughout Section  1  of Annex I,  these 
differences create a patchwork  quilt of market entry conditions throughout the European 
Union.  To the  extent that  licensing  conditions  and  procedures  tend  to  give  the  wrong 
market signals  to  new entrants,  existing  licensing  requirements  may  have  the  effect  of 
discouraging investment in new networks and services and impeding the creation of pan-
European multimedia service offerings.  Restrictions  on the  transferability of licences in 
several Member States also restrict potential exit strategies for new market players. 
Two  important dimensions  of licensing policy  in  the  telecoms  sector  which may  affect 
investment  decisions  -- the  duration  and  the  cost  of licences  -- are  discussed  below. 
Under the Licensing Directive, licence duration is not regulated, but is a matter left to the 
individual  Member States.  The  Licensing Directive,  however,  does  require licence fees 
for general authorisations  to be limited to the  "administrative costs incurred in the issue, 
management,  control and enforcement of the applicable authorisation scheme"  (Article 
6).  "Administrative  costs"  is  unfortunately  a  concept  prone  to  a  broad  range  of 
interpretations (e.g. , to  satisfy the overall costs of the national regulatory authority, the 
cost  of the  overall  licensing  regime ,  or  simply  the  administrative  costs  incurred  in 
processing a single licence application).  In the case  of individual licences,  licence fees 
should cover only  "the administrative costs  incurred in the  issue,  management,  control 
and  enforcement  of  the  applicable  individual  licences ",  and  the  fees  "should  be 
proportionate  to  the  work  involved".  Notwithstanding  these  general  requirements, 
Member  States  may,  where  scarce  resources  are  to  be  used,  "allow  their  national 
regulatory authorities to impose charges which reflect the need to ensure the optimal use 
of these resources"  (which  "shall be non-discriminatory and take into particular account 
the need to foster the development of innovative services and competition ") (Article 11). 
There  is  no  comparable  regulatory  regime  established  at  the  European  level  for  the 
licensing  of  broadcasting  networks  and  services,  even  with  respect  to  the  most 
fundamental aspects of licensing policies. 
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1. 7.1  Duration of Licences 
The duration of licences  is  an important factor  in the  decision of new  actors  to  enter the 
multimedia  market.  Among  other  things,  licence  duration  provides  new  market  entrants 
with  a  relevant  reference  point  against  which  to  sink  costs,  amortize  investments  and 
develop profitable services. 
Significant variations  in licence periods  can act  as  a serious  impediment to  those  entities 
wishing to provide pan-European multimedia services. Excessively lengthy licences can act 
as a deterrent to new entrants who feel that  "first mover" advantages may be entrenched. In 
turn,  licences  which are  not  of indefinite  duration  allow  individual  investors  to  envisage 
market exit  strategies where appropriate,  and  can  also  encourage new  entrants  in a more 
mature  commercial  environment  to  seek  to  replace  established  operators.  By  contrast, 
excessively  short  licence  periods  discourage  new  entrants  from  developing  long  term 
business plans and investing in new services which are not assured of immediate consumer 
acceptance. 
There are  significant differences  among  Member States  regarding the  duration of licences 
across  different  service  categories.  In  the  European  Union,  the  following  trends  are 
apparent: 
•  The  duration  of  voice  telephony  licences  varies  from  Member  State  to 
Member State.  They may be of indefinite duration ( e.g. , Germany,  Sweden) 
or may range from  15  years in countries such as  Belgium, Italy and France, 
to 30 years in countries such as  Spain. 
•  The duration of cable TV licences varies from five years ( e.g. , Finland,  the 
Netherlands)  up  to  25  years  (e.g.,  Spain  and  the  United  Kingdom).  In 
Germany, the duration of a cable network licence across the various  Lander 
is  comparable to  the duration of a private broadcasting licence ( i.e. , two to 
10  years).  In Austria, Denmark,  Ireland and  Sweden,  these licences  are of 
indefinite duration. 
•  Mobile  licences  in a number  of Member  States  run for  an  average  of 15 
years  (e.g.,  France,  Germany,  Italy,  Spain,  The  Netherlands).  Member 
States  such as  Finland (20 years),  Greece  (20 years),  Spain  (25  years)  and 
the  United Kingdom  (25  years)  exceed this  average,  whereas  countries  like 
Denmark,  Finland  and  Sweden  (five  to  10  years)  fall  well  below  this 
average. 
•  VANS licences are usually of indefinite duration, with the exception of Italy 
and  Portugal,  where  the  validity  of the  licence  is  for  nine  and  15  years 
respectively.  In both of these countries, however,  the licences are subject to 
renewal. 
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•  Whereas  public  broadcasting  licences  are  generally  of indefinite  duration 
(with the exception of The Netherlands- five years, the United Kingdom- 10 
years and Portugal - 15  years), the duration of private broadcasting licences 
varies significantly from Member State to Member State. The longest licence 
period is  granted to private broadcasters  operating  in  Flanders  in Belgium 
(18  years).  In  France,  Germany,  Spain  and  the  United  Kingdom,  the 
maximum  licence  period  is  10  years.  The  shortest  licence  period  is  four 
years in Greece (cf. one year licence for satellite TV in  The Netherlands).  In 
most Member States, private broadcasting licences are subject to  renewal. It 
is  only in countries such as  the  United Kingdom and The Netherlands where 
there  is  equality  of  regulatory  treatment  between  public  and  private 
broadcasters as regards licence duration. 
Table  III  overleaf summarises  the  various  licence  periods  for  services  across  the 
multimedia spectrum. 
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1.  7.2  Value of Licences 
The most obvious and distinctive barriers to entry in the multimedia marketplace  are high 
licence fees  which do  not reflect the fair market value of public resources (such as  rights-
of-way,  spectrum and  access  to  numbers)  or which are  so  prohibitive as  to  deter  market 
entry.  Excessively  high  licence  fees  can  discourage  entry  by  efficient,  but  cash  poor, 
market players (an observation which is consistently made with respect to the high up-front 
charges for national voice telephony and infrastructure licences in Germany). 
Licence fees often include an up-front fee and/or an annual fee,  plus fees for the use 
of frequencies and numbers. 
•  Up-front  fees  for  voice  telephony  licences  start  from:  in  Austria  (1,221 
ECU),  Sweden  (11,600  ECU)  and  France  (30,000  ECU).  In France,  the 
annual  fee  is  60,000 ECU, whereas in Sweden  it is  equivalent to  0.14%  of 
turnover.  In  the  United  Kingdom,  ISR  licences  (which  involve  no 
infrastructure provision) are issued for  113  ECU each.  No  fees  are charged 
in Denmark and in Sweden.  In Germany,  by contrast, up-front licence fees 
(with no  renewal charges) can be as  high as  1. 5 million ECU for a national 
licence. 
•  Belgium,  Denmark,  Finland and France do not charge for the grant of cable 
TV  licences.  In  Germany,  fees  are  individually  negotiated  with  Deutsche 
Telecom and  are  based on the  level  of investment involved.  In  the  United 
Kingdom,  the  value  of  franchises  varies  significantly,  with  a  sliding 
percentage of qualifying revenues being paid in addition to up-front fees.  In 
Ireland,  an annual fee of 5%  of turnover is charged. 
•  There are  significant differences  in the  fees  paid to  obtain mobile  licences 
throughout the European Union.  Significant up-front fees  have been paid for 
second  GSM  licences  pursuant  to  an  auction/"beauty  parade"  procedure; 
e.g.,  in  Greece  (145  million ECU),  in Austria  (356  million ECU),  and  in 
Italy  (389  million ECU).  The Scandinavian countries charge little (Sweden, 
Denmark) or no up-front fees (Finland),  aside from annual spectrum charges. 
Finland  and  Denmark  charge  exclusively  on the  basis  of spectrum usage. 
Annual fees  vary widely, ranging from 7,000 ECU in Austria  (in addition to 
a high up-front fee  of 356 million ECU), to 4 million ECU in Germany.  In 
some  Member  States,  the  fee  is  calculated  in  relation  to  the  turnover 
generated (e.g.,  in Italy,  where the fee  is 3.5% of gross profit). In addition, 
annual  fees  are  payable  in most  Member  States  for  the  use  of spectrum, 
which  are  calculated  in a variety  of ways  (there  is  a general  tendency  for 
spectrum fees to rise). 
•  VANS  licences are free  in Austria,  Belgium,  Denmark,  Finland,  Germany, 
The Netherlands,  Sweden and the United Kingdom.  In Ireland,  it is necessary 
to pay an up-front fee  of 1,354 ECU. In Italy,  the up-front fee  is  519 ECU 
_________  Analy_sys _ Comparative Overv1ew of Current Regulatory Environment in Telecommunications and Broadcasting Sectors/Licensing  Page  123 
and an additional 519 ECU annually for each piece of switching equipment. 
Portugal  charges  the  highest fees  for  VANS  in the  European Union,  with 
2,500 ECU due at the time of submitting the  application, plus an additional 
fee of 10,000 ECU annually. 
•  No Member State charges fees  for the grant of public broadcasting licences. 
On  the  contrary,  public  broadcasters  are  in  general  financed  by  a 
combination of licence fees  levied on the public and advertising revenues. 
208 
Finland,  however,  requires  the  payment  of frequency  fees.  As  regards 
private broadcasting licences,  there  are  no  fees  in Belgium  and  France.  In 
Denmark,  there  is  an  annual  fee  of 2,017  ECU  for  each  TV  licence.  In 
Germany,  the  Lander  impose a variety of up-front fees;  they  are  currently 
considering raising the level of up-front fees  to  approximately 10,000 ECU. 
In many other countries, private broadcasting fees  can be substantial (in the 
United Kingdom,  for  example, the Channel 5 licence was  auctioned for  310 
million ECU). More recently, however, the new digital broadcasting licences 
granted  in the  United  Kingdom,  France  and  Germany  have  been issued  at 
little or no cost in order to stimulate market entry. 
Table IV overleaf summarises the range of licence fees payable for different types of 
services provided across the telecoms and broadcasting sectors. 
208  As  has been indicated elsewhere (refer to Public Policy Issues Arising from Telecommunications and 
Audiovisual  Convergence,  KPMG,  September  1996),  licence  fees  have  in  fact  declined  in  relative 
importance as  a source of revenue for  European television broadcasters from approximately 80%  in 
1985 to  50%  in 1994.  This is due principally to increases in advertising expenditures and the growth 
of revenue from subscription services (a relatively new form of revenue). 
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The  process  of convergence  will  be facilitated  by  the  development  and  implementation  of a common  set  of 
licensing conditions. A review of comparative licence terms and licensing fees, however, illustrates that, at least 
\ as regards two key criteria for market entry, there is a broad divergence of views among the Member States as to 
j  the appropriate regulatory regimes which should  be employed.  Policies should  be directed  towards the gradual 
1 harmonisation of the key  aspects of licensing policy which,  absent harmonisation, may distort  the  investment 
j  signals given to new market entrants. 
j  Harmonised  licensing  conditions  are  particularly important if market  players  are  to  be  able  to  develop  pan- 1 
1  European  networks.  As  the  process  of fixed-mobile  convergence  develops  further,  the  need  for  greater  ~ 
!  equalisation  of these  key  licensing requirements  will intensify.  Harmonisation  may occur in  part  as  Member  : 
l States  achieve  a relatively  similar  level  of liberalisation  in  the  period  immediately after  1 January  1998;  at 
1 present,  fragmented  regulation  may  be  explained  by  the  different  rates  at  which  market  liberalisation  was 
[ pursued in the past. 
.  . 
\ It will  also  be  important  to  introduce  more  market-sensitive  mechanisms  to  the  licensing  system  to  assist  \ 
1 regulators in valuing licences. The valuation of  scarce resources would constitute an important aspect of such an 
1  exercise (see  Section 4 of Annex I).  Access to  such  resources,  when measured in  terms of both  time (duration) 
i and expense (jees), will establish clear market entry signals. 
1  There does not appear to  be any clear policy imperative that would prevent licences and authorisations issued at 
1 national level for a broad range of multimedia services from  benefiting from  the principle of mutual recognition 
1  across  all  Member  States  - as  occurs  with  most  other  services.  This  principle  of mutual  recognition  would 
l probably not be extendable to licences which are dependent upon access to scarce resources such as rights-of-way 
1  or spectrum.  Insofar  as  such  licences  are valued using comparable economic  criteria, however,  the  dangers  of  ~ 
I  fragmented regulatWn are less likely to assume major policy significance.  : 
1 At a political  level,  the mutual recognition  of licences  and authorisations  may  be  deemed  to  deprive  Member  1 
1 States of the revenues that might be gained by imposing high licensing fees.  However, because licence fees should  1 
1 only reflect the necessary costs incurred in their administration and the efficient use of scarce resources, such a 1  _  =~t~~:t::~  =~~1~  ::~:~~~o  ~:  ~~'::l~:~:s  ~~:~:~s~o~~~~::~~~=:~:lr:~~~llio~.  j 
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2.  The  Definitional  Boundaries  Between  "Telecommunications" 
and "Broadcasting" Services 
The Regulatory Issues 
The  starting point in  adapting  the current  telecoms  regulatory  framework  to  accommodate 
multimedia  is  a  fundamental  reappraisal  of  the  defmitional  boundaries  between  the 
"telecommunications"  and  "broadcasting"  sectors.  The  reasons  for  this  reappraisal  stem 
largely from the following technological and commercial factors: 
•  Individual delivery platforms, once associated with the transmission of a particular type 
of message  or  signal,  are  now  capable  of carrying  all  manner  of messages.  As  a 
consequence,  the  conceptual  dividing  line  between  "telecommunications"  and 
"broadcasting",  which  has  often been based on the  delivery platform used to  carry the 
message,  will  no  longer  be  valid  in  a  multimedia  environment.  Similarly,  terminal 
equipment  will  become  increasingly  multi-purpose.  Consequently,  the  ability  to  watch 
programming or listen to music on a computer (or even to conduct a voice conversation 
over  it)  will  be  matched  by  the  ability  of  a  television  set  to  satisfy  interactive 
entertainment and business needs. 
•  Definitional boundaries  predicated on the  distinction between  "private"  ( telecoms)  and 
"public"  (broadcasting) messages can no  longer be  regarded as  foolproof.  The Internet 
has  blurred  the  distinction  between  private  and  public  communications,  with  the 
dissemination of communications over the Internet often being at the cross-roads of these 
two  forms  of communication;  "multicasting"  and  "Webcasting"  services  are particular 
instances of the  Internet being used  in  ways  which do  not fall  within either traditional 
definitional category. 
•  Distinctions  based  on  the  essential  character  of the  messages  transmitted  ( e.g.,  voice 
telephony, video text, data) may also become irrelevant because, in a digital multimedia 
environment,  it may  be  impractical,  if not impossible,  to  separate individual streams of 
data, voice and images and to regulate them differently. 
Both Community legal instruments and the regulatory traditions of the Member States have 
distinguished  between  broadcasting  and  telecoms  by  reference  to  one  or  more  of the 
foregoing concepts,  which are being rendered largely obsolete by  convergence.  In a digital 
environment,  regulatory  definitions  may  need  to  be  more  sensitive  to  technological 
convergence,  by according  greater importance to  the  commercial  relationship between the 
consumer of communications and the party responsible for their transmission. 
_  Analy_s:ys _________  _  e£!-«h-_,,  o£,/nd'~- F fb~r~:r 
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2.1  EXISTING DEFINITIONAL BOUNDARIES UNDER COMMUNITY LAW 
The  definitional  divide  between  " telecoms"  and  "broadcasting",  and  the  important 
jurisdictional  consequences  which  flow  from  that  distinction,  have  not  always  been 
consistently  drawn  at  the  Community  level.  This  lack  of consistency  has  thus  far  been 
acceptable from a regulatory point of view because the defmitions have often been used for 
different  regulatory  purposes  (i.e.,  as  a basis  for  taxation,  to  determine  which  areas  of 
telecoms are open to competition, the creation of harmonised transmission standards in the 
television industry,  the determination of intellectual property rights,  and  so  forth).  To the 
extent that the respective  telecoms,  broadcasting and publishing markets were  satisfied by 
differentiated  services  and  market actors,  these definitional  inconsistencies  were  arguably 
not  critical.  In  a  future  multimedia  environment,  however,  the  Study  Team  questions 
whether such definitional inconsistencies can be maintained. 
As outlined in Section 1 of Annex I, the fundamentally different regulatory traditions of the 
telecoms,  broadcasting  and  publishing  sectors  are  reflected  in  the  barriers raised  to  new 
market entrants and the  extent to  which activities in each sector are regulated.  The initial 
regulatory characterisation of a service is  therefore important because it triggers a chain of 
regulatory  rights  and  obligations  which  vary  significantly  from  sector to  sector.  The fact 
that multimedia services contain elements of both the  telecoms and the broadcasting world 
raises uncertainty as  to  their regulatory status,  and  that uncertainty may result in multiple 
sets of rules applying to  the  same  service or the extension of onerous regulation designed 
for  telecoms  networks  or broadcast programming to  the  majority  of multimedia  services. 
Neither of these  alternatives  is  likely  to  be  economically  efficient,  nor  is  either likely to 
reflect the  intrinsic nature  of the  vast majority  of multimedia  services;  nor,  indeed,  will 
they necessarily achieve the objectives underpinning such rules in a proportionate way. 
Table V below provides a cross-section of the  ways  in which the  Community has  defined 
the concepts of "telecoms" and "broadcasting": 
,~'  .. u-n.,  ok~ukJ<a- # il?~r..u7 
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Table V:  Definitional Boundaries at Community Level 
LEGAL 
INSTRUMENT 
Television Without 
Frontiers 
Directive 
(Directive 
89/552/EEC) 
Full  Competition 
Directive 
(Directive 
90/388/EEC) 
Licensing 
Directive 
(Directive 
97/13/EC) 
Interconnection 
Directive 
(Directive 
97/33/EC) 
VAT to Telecoms 
Decisions 
(Decisions 
97  /200/EC to 
97/214/EC) 
DEFINITION OF "TELECOMMUNICATIONS" AND 
"BROADCASTING" 
Television broadcasting means the initial transmission by wire or over the 
air,  including  that  by  satellite,  in  unencoded  or  encoded  form,  of 
television programmes intended for  reception by the  public.  It includes 
the communication of programmes between undertakings with a view to 
their  being  relayed  to  the  public.  It does  not  include  communication 
services providing items of information or other messages on individual 
demand  such  as  telecopying,  electronic  data  banks  and  other  similar 
services . 
235 
Telecommunications  services  means  services  whose  provision  consists 
wholly or partly in the transmission and routing of signals on the public 
telecommunications network by means of telecommunications processes, 
with the exception of radio -broadcasting and television. 
236 
The telecommunications market  "does not concern mobile telephony nor 
paging  services,  nor  mass  communications  services  such  as  radio  or 
television" . 
237 
Telecommunications  services  means  services  whose  provision  consists 
wholly  or  partly  in  the  transmission  and  routing  of  signals  on 
telecommunications networks by means of telecommunications processes, 
with the exception of radio broadcasting and television. 
This  Directive is  without prejudice to  the  specific rules  adopted by the 
Member  States  in  accordance  with  Community  law,  governing  the 
distribution of audiovisual programmes intended for  the general public, 
and the content of such programmes. 
Telecommunications  services  means  services  whose  provision  consists 
wholly  or  partly  in  the  transmission  and  routing  of  signals  on 
telecommunications networks,  with the exception of radio and television 
broadcasting. 
238 
Telecommunications  services  shall  be deemed  to  be  services  relating  to 
the  transmission,  emission or reception of signals,  writing,  images  and 
sounds  or information  of any  nature  by  wire,  radio,  optical  or  other 
electromagnetic systems, including the transfer or assignment of the right 
to use capacity for such transmission, emission or reception. 
239 
235 
236 
Article l(a) of Directive 89/552/EEC. 
Article 1.1(4) of Directive 90/388/EEC. 
237 
238 
239 
In first preamble of Directive 90/388/EEC. 
Article 2(d) of Directive 97 /33/EC. 
Article 1 §2 of Directive 97 /200/EC. 
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LEGAL 
INSTRUMENT 
Television 
Standards 
Directive 
(Directive 
95/47/EC) 
Copyright-
Satellite 
Broadcasting and 
Retransmission 
Directive 
(Directive 
93/83/EC) 
Copyright  & 
Related  Rights  in 
the  Information 
Society 
II Questionnaire II 
DEFINITION OF "TELECOMMUNICATIONS" AND 
"BROADCASTING" 
Reference is made to  "all television services transmitted to viewers in the 
Community  whether  by  cable,  satellite  or terrestrial  means"  having  to 
satisfy  certain  standards.  In  addition,  "[fully]  digital  transmission 
networks  open to  the  public  for  the  distribution  of television  services 
must be capable of distributing wide-format services" . 
2.to 
Communication to the public by satellite means: 
"(a)  the  act  of introducing,  under  the  control  and  responsibility  of the 
broadcasting organisation,  the programme -carrying  signals  intended for 
reception  by  the  public  into  an  uninterrupted  chain  of communication 
leading to the satellite and down towards the earth. 
... (b) The act of communication to the public by satellite occurs solely in 
the  Member  State  where,  under  the  control  and  responsibility  of the 
broadcasting organisation, the programme -carrying signals are introduced 
into an uninterrupted chain of communication leading to  the  satellite and 
down towards the earth. 
Cable  retransmission  means  the  simultaneous,  unaltered and unabridged 
retransmission  by  a  cable  or  microwave  system  for  reception  by  the 
public of an initial transmission from another Member State, by wire or 
over the air, including that by satellite, of television or radio programmes 
intended for reception by the public. ='+I 
Community law does not defme "communication to the public". 
Community law refers to broadcasting in several places.  Broadcasting in 
the  Directives  means  "the  initial  transmission by  wire  or over the  air, 
including  that  by  satellite,  in  unencoded  or  encoded  form,  of  ... 
programmes  intended  for  reception  by  the  public".  Communication 
services providing pieces  of information or other services point-to-point 
and  on  demand  such  as  photocopying,  electronic  databases  and  other 
similar services are not covered." 
The concept of broadcasting in the  Satellite and Cable Directive matches 
the  above  defmition;  it  refers  to  "an  initial  transmission  from  another 
Member State, by wire or over the air, including by satellite, of television 
or radio programmes intended for reception by the public".  It also states 
that  "If the  programme-carrying  signals  are  encrypted,  then  there  is 
communication to  the  pubic by  satellite  on condition that  the  means  of 
decrypting  the broadcast are provided to  the public by the broadcasting 
organisation or with its consent. " 
2.f0 
241 
Article 2 of Directive 95/47/EC. 
Article 2 of Directive 93/83/EEC. 
(~~~.  ubnd'e?<j  ff  DJ~p.46y 
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LEGAL 
INSTRUMENT 
DEFINITION OF "TELECOMMUNICATIONS" AND 
"BROADCASTING" 
Green  Paper  on 
Encrypted 
ServiceS
242 
Encrypted  services  include  traditional  encrypted  broadcast  (via  cable, 
hertzian  waves  or  by  satellite),  new  broadcasting  services  (digital 
television,  Pay-Per-View,  near  Video-on-Demand)  and  Information 
Society  services,  namely  electronic  distance  services  provided  on 
individual  request  or the  user  of the  services  (in  particular  Video-on-
Demand,  games  supplied  on  request,  teleshopping  and  multimedia 
information services). 
244 
Revised  Directive 
on Regulatory 
Transparency
243 
Information  Society  services  are  defined  as  "any  service  provided  at  a 
distance,  by  electronic means  and on the  individual request of a service 
receiver". This definition covers a whole range of services, examples of 
which can be  found  in the  Communication accompanying  the  proposed 
Directive. 
245 
Proposed 
Conditional 
Access Directive
46 
- Adopts  definition of television  broadcasting  in the  Television  Without 
Frontiers Directive (Directive 89/552/EEC). 
- Radio  broadcasting  means  any  transmission  by  wire  or over  the  air, 
including that by satellite, of radio programmes intended for reception by 
the public. 
242 
243 
244 
245 
246 
- Adopts  definition  of  Information  Society  Services  in  the  proposed 
revisions of the Transparency Directive, Directive 83/189/EEC (above). 
Green Paper on the Legal Protection of Encrypted Services, COM (96)76 Final of 6 March 1996;  cf. 
Commission Press Release, IP /96/204 of 6 March 1996. 
Proposal  for  a  European  Parliament  and  Council  Directive  amending  for  a  third  time  Directive 
83/189/EEC  laying  down  a  procedure  for  the  provision  of information  in  the  field  of technical 
standards and  regulations,  COM/96/392 of 30  August  1996,  OJ  1996  C307 Ill (with accompanying 
Notice, OJ  1996 C307110). 
Paragraph III of the Green Paper. 
"Information  Society  services  will  be  (or  already  are)  highly  diverse  and  include  electronic 
newspapers, distance education and healthcare services, distance tourism services, the distance selling 
of goods  and  services  by  electronic  means,  distance  betting  services  interactive  games  and  leisure 
activities,  etc.  The  feature  they  all  have  in  common  is  that  they  are  provided  electronically  at  a 
distance  and  are  intended to  meet  one  or more  specific  requests  by  an  individual  service  receiver. 
Owing to this latter characteristic, the services are ""interactive"  inasmuch as the provider responds to 
specific requests from a receiver and vice versa" . 
Draft Proposal for  a European Parliament and Council Directive on the  Legal Protection of Services 
based on, or consisting of, Conditional Access, OJ  1997 C31417. 
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LEGAL 
INSTRUMENT 
DEFINITION OF "TELECOMMUNICATIONS" AND 
"BROADCASTING 
lVTO Agreement  Telecommunications  means  the  transmission and  reception of signals  by 
any  electromagnetic  means. 
2
-t
7  Public  telecommunications  transport 
service  means  any  telecommunications  transport  service  required, 
explicitly or in effect, by a Member to be offered to the public generally. 
Such  services  may  include,  inter alia,  telegraph,  telephone,  telex,  and 
data  transmission  typically  involving  the  real-time  transmission  of 
customer-supplied information between two  or more points  without any 
end-to-end change in the  form or content of the  customer's information. 
Public  telecommunications  transport  network  means  the  public 
telecommunications  infrastructure  which  permits  telecommunications 
between and among defined network termination points. 
WTO commitments do not extend to  broadcasting matters. 
2-t
8 
As  should  be  clear  from  Table  V  above,  there  is  no  uniform  approach  towards  the 
definition  of  "telecoms"  and  "broadcasting"  at  the  Community  level.  Moreover,  the 
definitions currently used are subject to a number of criticisms: 
• 
• 
247 
248 
One of the defining elements of broadcasting is  its broad dissemination.  Therefore, 
broadcasting  has  often been  characterised  as  a  "point  to  multi-point"  service.  In 
terms  of legal  definitions,  the  notion  of "multi-point"  has  been  treated  as  being 
synonymous with the idea of "the public" in most Community legal instruments (see 
above). Unfortunately, the  Licensing Directive refers to the  "general public". In the 
view of the Study Team, the qualification "general" adds little additional meaning to 
the  word  "public".  Similarly,  the  Full  Competition  Directive  excludes  "mass 
communications  services  such  as  radio  or  television"  from  the  scope  of  the 
definition of "telecoms". Again,  the  Study Team is  of the view that the use of yet 
another  term  to  convey  the  same  distinction  between  public  and  private 
communications is unhelpful. 
"Telecoms"  services  are  defined primarily  in all  Community  legal  instruments  by 
reference  to  the  transmission  of such  services  either  wholly  or  partly  over  the 
"telecoms  network".  This  means  that  the  fundamental  notion  of  platform 
independence,  a  key  element  in  the  future  provision  of multimedia  services,  is 
absent from all  existing definitions  of telecoms.  Consequently,  this  opens  up  the 
GATS Agreement of 1994 (Marakesh), Annex on Telecommunications. 
Refer  to  Resolution  of the  European  Parliament  on  the  Cultural  Aspects  of GATT,  OJ  1993  C 
2551182  (used to  support  the  exclusion of audiovisual  and  content-related matters  in  the  context of 
Uruguay Round negotiations). 
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• 
• 
• 
• 
249 
possibility of different regulatory treatment of the Internet if delivery occurs over a 
broadcasting, as opposed to a telecoms, network. 
There appear  to  be  no  strong  public  policy  grounds  for  certain Community  legal 
instruments to  refer to  the  distribution of " audiovisual programmes".  References to 
"audiovisual"  matters,  which  focus  principally  on  content-related  issues,  are  not 
identical in regulatory  significance to  the  much broader concept of "broadcasting". 
Moreover, the concept of "distribution" is  prima facie  inconsistent with the concept 
of "transmission",  which  is  widely  used  in  both  the  telecoms  and  broadcasting 
worlds.  Finally,  the use of the word  "programmes"  is  inconsistent with the use  of 
the word "services" in the telecoms sector. 
The expression  "television broadcasting"  is  used on a number of occasions without 
any definition of key terms such as  "television",  "television services"  or "television 
transmitters". Restricting the concept of "broadcasting" to transmission by means of 
a television does not take into account the  multi-functional aspects of both television 
sets and computers, either now or in the future. 
The  WTO  Agreement  on  telecoms  sheds  no  light  on  definitional  issues  at  the 
Community  level,  because  it  was  concluded  with  the  relatively  narrow  aim  of 
liberalising  voice  telephony  services  and  networks  (it  being  assumed  that  VANS 
were  more  or  less  already  liberalised).  Consequently,  " telecoms"  is  defined  very 
narrowly in terms of voice services and the exceptions to the Agreement are defmed 
in terms of a list of transmission options. 
249 
The  latest  definition  of "telecoms  services",  which  is  found  in  a  series  of  VAT 
Decisions, contains an all-embracing definition of the types of services which can be 
provided over all manner of delivery platforms via all possible technologies.  Under 
this definition,  the nature of the signals transmitted (audio,  visual,  data,  voice,  and 
so  on)  are irrelevant to  the  issue whether a service is  defined  as  telecoms.  At  the 
same time,  however,  there is  no clear differentiation between the types of services 
considered  to  be  "telecoms"  services,  on  the  one  hand,  and  traditional 
"broadcasting"  services, on the other.  Consequently, the definition used in the  VAT 
Decisions  makes  one  aware  of the  potential breadth of telecoms  services,  but  not 
their  outer limits.  Given  the  competing jurisdictional  claims  on the  telecoms  and 
broadcasting  sectors  in a multimedia  environment,  such  a  definition  is  too  open-
ended to provide a workable definition of " telecoms". 
"Broadcasting''  is  understood  by  the  Community  to  be  "the  uninterrupted  chain  of transmission 
required for the distribution of television and radio programme signals to the general public, but does 
not  cover  contribution  links  between  operators."  The  exclusion  of satellite  broadcasting  from  the 
WTO Agreement stems from the fact that the  United States commitment explicitly excluded "one-way 
satellite  transmission  of Direct  to  Home  (DTH)  and  Direct  Broadcast  Satellite  (DBS)  television 
services  and  of digital  audio  services".  This  was  justified by  the  United  States  on  the  basis  that, 
although  these  services  are  treated  as  "telecoms"  services  in  the  United  States,  they  are 
overwhelmingly viewed as  "broadcast" services in other countries. 
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•  New  Community  legal  instruments  are  using  the  concept of  "Information Society 
Services"  as  the  basis  upon  which  to  introduce  harmonisation  and  mutual 
recognition legislation.  The definition of  "Information Society  Services"  relies  on 
the fact that the service in question is being provided  at the request of an individual, 
regardless  of the  technology  or  the  platform  used  to  transmit  the  service  and 
regardless of the number of receivers of the service at the time of its transmission. 
Given these differences,  a fundamental  review  of regulatory defmitions at the Community 
level  is  probably  required  to  ensure  that  Community  legislation  better  reflects  the 
regulatory  and  technical  realities  of multimedia.  The  lines  along  which  such  a  review 
should take place are outlined in Section 2.4 below. 
2.2  DEFINITIONAL WEAKNESSES UNDER EXISTING MEMBER STATE LAWS 
In general  terms,  the  regulatory  definitions  of telecoms  and  broadcasting  at  the  Member 
State  level  suffer  from  a  number  of  common  weaknesses,  as  is  illustrated  by  the 
representative sample of definitions set forth overleaf in Table VI: 
elf-~---. c£,~~  H 0-&rn.pb-:y· 
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Table VI: Definitions at the Member State Level 
COUNTRY  TELECO~CATIONS  BROADCASTING 
Austria  Telecommunication is defined as the 
technical process of transmitting, 
transferring and receiving messages of 
any nature in the form of text, speech, 
images or tones by means of appropriate 
technical equipment.  :!so 
Broadcasting  is  defined  as  any  transmissions  of all 
kinds  of presentations in text or sound  or picture by 
electric oscillation through wire or non-wire intended 
for reception by the public as well as  the operation of 
technical facilities which serve this purpose.:!
51 
Belgium  Telecommunications  means  any 
transfer,  transmission  or  reception  of 
signs,  signals,  texts,  pictures sounds  or 
data  of  any  nature,  by  wire,  radio-
electricity,  optical  signals  or any  other 
electromagnetic system.  ::!5 ::! 
Broadcasting  service  means  the  service  for  radio-
connection which broadcasts with a view of reaching 
the general public  directly.  The service may consist 
of  sound-television- or  other  means  of 
broadcasting.  :!
53 
17ze 
Netherlands 
Telecommunications  is  defined  in  the 
draft Telecommunications Act
254  as  "any 
transmission,  emission  or  reception  of 
signals in any form, by means of cables, 
radio  waves,  optical  means  or  other 
electromagnetic  means"; 
telecommunications service 
Broadcasting  is  defmed  in  the  draft 
Telecommunications  Act  as  an  electronic  media 
service concerned with the provision and broadcasting 
of programmes. 
France 
250 
251 
252 
253 
254 
255 
256 
means  a  service  which  consists  wholly 
or partly of the trans-mission or routing 
of signals on a telecommunications net-
work.255 
Telecommunications  means any form of 
transmission  or  reception  of  signs, 
signals,  text,  image,  sound  or  other 
information,  by  wire,  optical  fibre, 
Audiovisual  services  are  defined  as  any  work 
consisting  of sequences  of moving  images,  with  or 
without sound. 
257 
Federal  Law  to  enact  a  Telecommunications  Law  that  amends  the  Telegraph  Route  Law 
(Telegraphenwegegesetz), the Telecommunications Charges Law (Fernmelde-gebuhrengesetz) and the 
Cable  and  Satellite  Broadcast  Radio  Law  (Kabel- und  Satelliten-Rundfunkgesetz),  and  makes 
supplementary provisions to the Broadcast Radio Law (Rundfunkgesetz) and Broadcast Radio Decree 
(Rundfunkverordnung). 
Federal Constitutional Act to Secure the Independence of  Broadcasting. 
Article 68, 4  o  of the Law of  21 March  1991. 
Article 1,  9  o  of the Law of  6 February 1987. 
Draft submitted to Parliament on 15 September 1997. 
Telecommunications Market Act 39611997. 
Chapter 1(1) of the Telecommunications Act. 
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COUNTRY  TELECO~~CATIONS  BROADCASTING 
France 
(Cont.) 
radio or other electromagnetic means. 
256  Audiovisual  communication  is  defined  as  the 
transmission  for  the  public  or for  certain categories 
within the public, by telecommunications transmission 
means,  of any  signs,  signals,  text,  images,  sounds or 
information  of any  nature  which  do  not  constitute 
private correspondence. 
258 
Private  correspondence  is  defined  as  the  message 
which  is  expressly designed  for  reception by  one  or 
several determined and identifiable, either physical or 
legal, persons. 
259 
Gennany  Telecommunications  shall  mean  the 
technical  process  of  sending, 
transmitting  and  receiving  any  kind  of 
message  in  the  form  of signs,  voice, 
images  or  sounds  by  means  of 
telecommunications systems. 
260 
Broadcasting is the provision and transmission for the 
general public of presentations of all  kinds of speech, 
sound and picture, using electrical oscillations without 
junction  lines  or  by  means  of a  conductor.  The 
definition  includes  presentations  transmitted  in 
encoded form of receivable for a special payment,  as 
well as broadcast videotext. 
261 
United 
Kingdom 
Telecommunication  system  is  a  system 
for the  conveyance,  through the  agency 
of electric,  magnetic,  electro-magnetic, 
electro-chemical  or  electro-mechanical 
energy,  of -- (a)  speech,  music  and 
other sounds; (b) visual images; 
Television  broadcasting  service  means  a  service 
consisting  in  the  broadcasting  of  television 
programmes  for  general  reception in,  or in  any  area 
in, the  United Kingdom,  including a domestic satellite 
service  [but  not  including  a  restricted  service  or  a 
multiplex  service].  This  definition  does  not  apply  to 
any teletext service or any other service in the case of 
which  the  visual  images  broadcast  in  the  service 
consist  wholly  or  mainly  of  non-representational 
images:  i.e.,  visual  images  which  are  neither  still 
pictures  nor  comprised  within  sequences  of visual 
images capable of being seen as moving pictures. 
263 
Multiplex  service  means  a  service  provided  by  any 
person which consists in the broadcasting for  general 
reception  of two  or  more  services  specified  . . .  by 
combining  the  relevant  information  in  digital  form, 
together  with  any  broadcasting  in  digital  form  of 
digital additional services. 
264 
257 
258 
259 
260 
261 
262 
263 
264 
(c)  signals  serving  for  the  importation 
(whether  as  between  persons  and 
persons,  things  and  things  or  persons 
and things) of any matter otherwise than 
in the  form of sounds or visual images; 
or 
(d)  signals  serving  for  the  actuation or 
control of machinery or apparatus. 
262 
Article L.ll2.2 of the French Law on Intellectual Property. 
The Law of  30 September 1986 (Freedom of  Communications Act, or "FCA"). 
Order of 18 February 1988 of The Prime Minister. 
§2(16) of the Telecommunications Act. 
Chapter I, Section 2(1) of the Agreement on Broadcasting between Federal States in  United Germany. 
Part I, Section 4 of the Telecommunications Act 1984. 
Part I, Section II (5) of the Broadcasting Act 1990. 
Part I, Section 1 of the Broadcasting Act 1996. 
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The key ways in which the regulatory regimes of the Member States are not sensitive to the 
dynamics of convergence relate to: 
•  The nature of the  delivery platform.  The key  defining element of many definitions 
of telecoms and broadcasting at  the Member State level (as  occurs at the  European 
Union level) is the delivery platform used to transmit the messages in question.  In a 
multimedia  environment,  operators  will  no  longer  be  constrained  in  providing 
telephony  over  telephone  networks,  television  and  radio  programming  over 
broadcasting  or  cable  TV  networks,  nor  data  over  networks  based  on  the 
internetworking of computers. In such an environment, talk of a " telecoms network" 
or a "broadcasting network" will become increasingly meaningless. 
265 
265 
266 
267 
The  current  regulatory  notion  of  "voice  telephony"  is  dictated  by  the  public 
switched platform over which it is delivered. However, voice transmissions are now 
being routed over packet networks and delivered via the Internet.  Additionally, they 
may  consist of much  more than  simple voice  communications  traffic  between two 
users;  voice  may  be  carried  as  an  adjunct  to  other  data-based  services. 
266  Most 
importantly,  in  an  environment  in  which  voice  communications  can  be  made  as 
effectively over a traditional telephone link as they can by computers linked over the 
Internet, the existing concept of  "voice telephony"  would  appear to  be  outmoded. 
Even  today,  voice  applications  are  often  merely  one  element  of multifunction 
applications  that combine  voice,  data,  and  graphics  (such  as  telemedicine  or data 
conferencing  applications),  rather  than  discrete  service  offerings.  This  trend  will 
only  increase  as  multimedia  applications  become  more  commonplace  in  both  the 
home and the office. 
By  failing  to  acknowledge  that  voice  and  broadcast  services  can  be  delivered  by 
means other than their traditional networks, existing regulatory definitions also run 
the risk of jeopardising the respective goals of universal service and public service 
for  the  telecoms  and  broadcasting  sectors.  In  a  multimedia  environment,  for 
example, there is no compelling policy reason why the delivery of a minimum level 
of voice service at an affordable price as part of universal service obligations cannot 
be  satisfied  by  means  other  than  a  telecoms  network  (e.g. ,  voice  over  the 
Internet). 
267  As  has  been  explained  in  our  interviews  with  a  number  of Internet 
Similarly, the idea of regulating broadcasting based on the type of screen to be used (e.g., television) 
would run counter to the trend of independent delivery platforms. 
In the  United States,  the FCC has distinguished between the provision of a telecoms conduit and the 
provision of services which add value to  that conduit (i.e., which  "enhance"  that conduit).  Applying 
the  1996  Telecommunications  Act and  the  distinction  between  information/enhanced  services  and 
telecoms  services,  the  FCC has  issued  orders  exempting  ISPs  from  regulatory  obligations  imposed 
upon providers of such conventional telecoms services as voice telephony. 
The digital era opens up the possibility of a highly deregulated and competitive environment in which 
all  modes  of communication -- data,  fax,  voice,  broadband  video  and  multimedia  -- are subject  to 
essentially the  same  digital  encoding,  transmitting  and  de-coding  solutions.  In  a  similar  vein,  the 
dividing line between telecoms and broadcasting for  certain regulatory purposes is  sometimes drawn 
on the basis of the particular technology being used to  convey a given signal.  As  has  been explained 
earlier  in  this  Study,  this  technological  divide  is  also  no  longer  viable.  For  example,  there  is  an 
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Service Providers,  the  classification of voice telephony  as  something  distinct from 
data  transmission  or television  broadcasting  is  a  remnant  of the  analogue  era  of 
communications.  The separate regulatory classification of voice telephony  is  also  a 
vestige  of the  era  of a  highly  regulated  telecoms  services.  The  convergence  of 
communications technologies makes distinctions between voice and data increasingly 
arbitrary and irrelevant.  Clearly,  the  technological trend is  towards  the unification 
of  communications  infrastructures  via  digitalisation,  and  away  from  the  old 
paradigm of distinct carrier platforms. 
Similarly,  to  the  extent that Member States  have  required the  fulfilment  of certain 
public  service goals  (usually  associated  with  certain types  of content)  through the 
traditional  medium  of television  broadcasting,  there  appear  to  be  no  compelling 
public policy reasons why new media may not also be given a role in meeting these 
objectives. 
•  The  distinction  between  public  and  private  communications.  Another  traditional 
means  of differentiating between  telecoms  and broadcasting  regulation has  been to 
focus  on whether an individual or the public at  large is  the  intended recipient of a 
particular transmission.  More or less all Member State laws define broadcasting in 
terms  of the  public  being  addressed.  As  a  result  of the  Internet,  however,  the 
distinction  between  public  and  private  is  becoming  increasingly  blurred;  video 
servers  have  effectively  become  point-to-point  delivery  systems  which  can 
simultaneously  deliver  hundreds  of thousands  of video  streams  to  thousands  of 
homes.  Because the Internet facilitates one-to-one communications, as  well as  other 
communications  which  may  or  may  not  be  considered  public  or  semi-public  in 
nature  (i.e.,  going  beyond  the  usual  confines  of  a  Closed  User  Group),  the 
traditional  association of broadcasting  with communications  to  the  public  may  no 
longer be sustainable as the overarching defining criterion. 
268 
In addition to the common patterns of regulation identified above, the regulatory regimes of 
certain Member States  raise  a number of further definitional issues  which  are  relevant to 
multimedia, namely: 
• 
268 
In  Germany,  a  separate  regulatory  category  for  "multimedia"  services  (see  Section 
1.3.2. of Annex I),  which falls  expressly outside the existing defmitional categories of 
telecoms  and  broadcasting,  was  created  as  of 1 August  1997.  The  classification  of 
increasing tendency towards the integration of fixed  and mobile infrastructure and  services~ wireless 
local loops are proving to be both a delivery platform in their own right and a means of supplementing 
an existing network; A  TM and XDSL technologies are being deployed across various Member States 
to  achieve the  same  results;  and messages  are being transmitted across  a broad range of frequencies 
through the use of electromagnetic means and otherwise. In this evolving environment, it will become 
fruitless  to  associate  mobile  communications  systems  solely  with  the  telecoms  regulatory  structure 
simply on the basis of the particular technology deployed to transmit signals. 
The French law also qualities the notion of "the public" by referring also to  "sections of the public". 
This  type  of qualification,  which  may  overlap  with  the  notion  of a  Closed  User  Group  in  many 
circumstances,  adds  a  further  layer  of complication  to  the  distinction  between public  and  private 
communications. 
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services as  "multimedia" (or "teleservices ")  means that they are not subject to  licensing 
requirements.  The  approach  avoids  the  traditional  pitfalls  of associating  a  particular 
range of services with the delivery platform over which they are delivered, and instead 
focuses on the essential nature of the services being transmitted.  However, the creation 
of an  additional  regulatory  category  will,  in  the  view  of the  Study  Team,  inevitably 
create  further  definitional  disputes  between  the  Federal  government  (responsible  for 
telecoms) and the  Lander (responsible for broadcasting) as  they assert jurisdiction over 
certain types of services. 
The Lander, for example,  have argued that the regulation of content associated usually 
with broadcasting  should  apply  with equal  force  to  services  which are  effectively  the 
same as broadcasting. 
Moreover,  the  catalogue of services described as  "multimedia"  does  not appear to  be 
sufficiently  future-proof  to  survive  in  an  environment  in  which  new,  previously 
unknown,  applications  may  be  introduced.  In  the  absence  of  a  clear  theoretical 
distinction  between  existing  definitional  categories  and  multimedia  services,  such  an 
approach may  not be sustainable in the  long term  (or,  in the  alternative,  may  require 
regular revision). 
•  In  France,  "audiovisual  communications"  (rather  than  "broadcasting")  have  been 
differentiated from telecoms services since 1986. The French law is unique insofar as  it 
draws a definitional divide on the basis of the nature of the content being transmitted. In 
a  converged  environment,  the  use  of content-based  criteria  appears  to  be  counter-
intuitive, especially in the context of Internet communications. The differentiation of the 
constituent  elements  of a  message  transmitted  over  the  Internet  into  voice,  data,  or 
video components is only relevant to the  sender and the receiver.  During the course of 
transmission,  the message  simply  consists  of "bits".  Internet service providers cannot 
distinguish between packets that contain voice and packets that carry text,  graphics, or 
other forms of information. They are therefore not in a position to prevent these packets 
from  reaching  their  final  destination,  nor  are  they  in  a  position  to  meter  such 
transmissions in order to facilitate regulation. 
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The definition of "audiovisual communications" used in French law threatens to engulf 
a  vast  range  of multimedia  services,  thereby  subjecting  them  to  the  more  onerous 
regulatory  regime  associated  with  the  broadcasting  sector.  Such  a  regulatory 
classification is  not consistent with the open market conditions in which such services 
are being  provided  at  present,  nor is  it  consistent  with the regulatory  regime  which 
applies to  VANS throughout the  Member States (which is  the regulatory classification 
currently most closely linked to multimedia services). Such a classification has not been 
adopted  by  any  other  Member  State,  nor  is  it  reflected  in  Community  law  or 
international law.  Community law only refers to  " audiovisual programmes"  as  falling 
outside telecoms regulation because of the importance of content regulation over such 
programmes.  In  all  other  respects,  Community  law  establishes  harmonised  legal 
principles  with respect to  "broadcasting"  in general  and  "television broadcasters"  in 
particular. 
269  To the  extent that  content  controls  should  be enforced,  the  quality  and 
nature of audiovisual signals will undoubtedly always be highly relevant. However, the 
logic of a multimedia marketplace runs counter to the idea that the physical character of 
a given signal determines all aspects of its regulation. 
•  In the  United Kingdom,  the unification of the regulatory regime for conditional access 
services for all digital services was proposed in July 1997. no Under the proposal, a new 
Access  Control  Class  Licence  will  be  created  which  not  only  embraces  conditional 
access  for  digital  television  broadcasts  (which  are  already  regulated), 
271  but  also 
conditional access systems for: 
269 
270 
271 
•  digital radio broadcasts; 
•  digital data broadcasts (e.g., software download services); 
•  non-broadcast information services (e.g., on-line information services); and 
•  non-broadcast interactive services (e.g., games and home shopping). 
The underlying  rationale  for this  initiative  is  that,  in  a  multimedia  world,  there  are 
certain issues which regulation should address horizontally across the broadcasting and 
telecoms sectors.  The fact that a service is  ancillary to a particular service ( e.g. , in a 
given instance,  broadcasting)  does  not mean that it must in tum be regulated by the 
same  regulatory  regime  as  applies  to  the  main  service  itself.  The  logic  of such  an 
approach,  however,  does  suggest that a degree of convergence in regulatory functions 
must also occur in order to facilitate the implementation of such a policy. Although 
Similarly. the WTO Agreement does not serve as a relevant precedent for the regulatory relevance of 
"audiovisual" issues other than to confirm their affinity to content controls, which clearly fall  outside 
the  scope of international  trade  agreements relating to  economic regulation (and which  confer clear 
jurisdiction  on  individual  nations  to  regulate  non-economic  issues  according  to  their  own  legal 
traditions). 
Refer to Joint OFTEL and DTI Notice and Consultation entitled "Extending the regulatory regime for 
conditional access services", July 1997. 
Refer  to  the  Advanced  Television  Services  Regulations  (SI  1996  No.  3151)  and  the  Advanced 
Television Services  (Amendment) Regulations (SI  1996 No.  3197), along with the Telecommunications 
Act Class Licence issued on 7 January 1997. 
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there  have  been  strong  suggestions  in  the  United  Kingdom  that  such  regulatory 
convergence is  desirable (see Section 5 of Annex I),  the current regulatory structure in 
that Member State for the oversight of broadcasting matters is particularly fragmented. 
The regulatory approach proposed in the  United Kingdom,  while being sensitive to  the 
"horizontal" aspects of convergence, is nevertheless subject to the criticism that it tends 
to over-regulate services which are today essentially unregulated. 
•  A  number  of Member  States  such  as  Finland,  while  clearly  defining  the  scope  of 
"telecoms"  services  in  their  legislation,  have  not  clearly  defined  the  scope  of 
"broadcasting  services".  This  is  largely  a reflection  of the  fact  that  the  broadcasting 
sector in individual Member States has been considered synonymous with the  scope of 
the  authority  granted to  its  national  broadcaster(s).  Consequently,  "broadcasting"  has 
often developed in a haphazard manner which reflects  the  different types  of networks 
over which audiovisual signals might be transmitted ( e.g. , Ireland). 
2.3  OPTIONS FOR ADAPTING CURRENT APPROACHES TO MULTIMEDIA 
The essence of multimedia is not merely the crossing over by providers of information and 
entertainment  services  into  the  provision of one  another's  content  or the  deployment  of 
different delivery platforms for the transmission of such content.  More fundamentally,  the 
technical significance of convergence is that, because of digitalisation, former differences in 
content disappear as  information is  reduced to  a common  stream of binary bits  and  bytes 
which  can  be  transmitted  through  common  delivery  platforms.  In  practical  terms,  this 
means  that  the  definitional  boundaries  between  a  telephone  network,  a  cable  television 
system  and  a terrestrial  television  broadcast  network  which  historically  carried  different 
types of content should be fundamentally reconsidered. 
Regulatory  definitions  should  not only  reflect the  technical  realities  of digitalisation,  but 
also the  specific characteristics of the  service being delivered.  For example,  the pervasive 
nature  of free  over-the-air  television,  and  its  acknowledged  impact  on  society,  justify 
stronger rules relating to content than does the provision of content over the Internet. 
In determining the manner in which the current  telecoms regulatory framework ought to be 
adapted for multimedia, the conceptual starting point should be a clear vision of the types of 
services  which  fall  within  the  respective  spheres of telecoms  and  broadcasting.  This  key 
definitional issue can be distilled into the following five policy options: 
Option 1: 
Option 2: 
Maintain the current regulatory structure and decide on a case-by-case basis 
in which regulatory category new digital services should be placed. 
Treat  multimedia  services  as  falling  within  the  traditional  sphere  of 
"telecoms". 
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Option 3: 
Option 4: 
Option 5: 
Treat  multimedia  services  as  falling  within  the  traditional  sphere  of 
"broadcasting". 
Treat multimedia services  in a sui generis manner under future  Community 
legislation. 
Classify  multimedia  services  pursuant  to  a  new  converged  vision  of the 
future multimedia environment, that reflects  a fundamental re-evaluation of 
existing  definitions  of  broadcasting  and  telecoms,  but  pursue  the  core 
element of infrastructure regulation. 
For the reasons cited above in Sections 2.1 and 2.2, Options 1, 2 and 3 are unlikely to be 
sustainable in the long term.  Continued  reliance  on the existing  regulatory definitions of 
telecoms and broadcasting at both the Community and Member State level is likely to create 
major distortions to  investment.  In  tum, Option 4  is  likely to  result in greater regulatory 
tension because jurisdictional conflict will exist across three, rather than two,  competitive 
sectors.  Although  Option  4  is  theoretically  capable  of  a  light  regulatory  regime  for 
multimedia  services,  the  overall  effect of a  new  regulatory  category would  be to  create 
greater  regulatory  divergence  in  response  to  technological  convergence,  and  subject 
currently unregulated activities to regulation.  In light of the existing  controversies which 
have  taken place between  telecoms  and  broadcasting  regulators  in a  number of Member 
States regarding their respective jurisdictional powers, 
272  the addition of a further regulatory 
category can only increase the possibilities of such discord. 
In the view of the Study Team, the adoption of Option 5 is  the most appropriate regulatory 
response for two fundamental reasons.  First, it is the regulatory option most consistent with 
the phenomenon of convergence (i.e. , the gradual bringing together of sectors rather than 
their further separation).  Second, it is the option which is likely to be the most workable, to 
regulators  and  market  actors  throughout  the  European  Union,  given the  existence  of a 
regulatory  distinction  between  telecoms  and  broadcasting  in  the  legal  regimes  of every 
Member State.  The conceptual lines  upon which a  defmitional  divide can be erected are 
considered below. 
272  Especially  in France  (the  ART  and  the  CSA),  the  United  Kingdom  (OFTEL and  the  lTC)  and  in 
Germany (the Federal State and the Lander). 
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!Implications for Multimedia 
In  the  view  of the  Study Team,  the  phenomenon  of convergence  brings  with  it  the  need for  an  overhaul  of  j 
existing regulatory  definitions.  To  this  end,  it  is  proposed  that  an  alternative  regulatory  model  be  adopted  i 
which provides a partial horizontal, cross-sectoral response to the phenomenon of  convergence.  I 
The  regulatory  definitional  model  proposed  by  the  Study  Team  would  seek  to  differentiate  communications  \ 
services from broadcasting services. Rather than relying on technical or technology-based definitions, which will  i 
always run the risk of being superseded as soon as technology moves on to the next generation of  sophistication,  i 
the  Study  Team  proposes  to  adopt  a functional  approach  in  drawing  the  definitional  boundaries for  these  j 
concepts  · 
The proposed future regulatory model consists of the following working assumptions: 
•  In the short-to medium-term, the regulatory environment for multimedia services will not be  j 
monolithic.  I 
In the view of the Study Team,  the regulatory traditions of telecoms and broadcasting will continue to  i 
be fundamentally different  in  certain  key  respects for  the foreseeable future,  which  means  that  in the  i 
short-to  medium-term  they  are  not  susceptible  to  being  regulated  in  their  entirety  under  a single  ~ 
integrated  regulatory  regime.  Moreover,  it  would  be  premature  to  create  a  single  "converged"  i 
regulatory  regime  when  the  marketplace  is  just  as  likely  to  be  characterised  by  divergence  (i.e.,  a i 
continuing  role  for  analogue  television  alongside  an  explosion  of  digital  niche  services  and  i 
programming)  as  it will  be  by market  convergence (i.e.,  most market actors providing a full  range of i 
multimedia services).  I 
The  challenge for  regulators,  however,  is  to  determine  those  elements  which  lend  themselves  to  a 
common "horizontal" or "converged" regulatory approach.  The licensing of  services and infrastructure i 
in a competitive multimedia environment, it has been suggested (see  Section 5 of Annex I), provides a i 
core group of issues which are capable of  being addressed by a single regulator.  I 
•  Telecoms  services  should  be  subsumed  into  a  new  regulatory  category,  entitled i 
"communications" services, while traditional broadcasting services would constitute the other i 
relevant regulatory category.  I 
The  regulatory impetus created  by the full liberalisation of voice services and  the integration of  fixed 
and  mobile  services,  coupled  with  the  technological  ability  to  provide  multimedia  services  over 
broadband  networks,  have  created  an  irresistible  commercial  momentum for  the  delivery  of a broad 
range  of "communications"  services.  The  form  of these  services  may  be  audio,  visual,  data  or 
combinations thereof.  Over time, the economic premium currently attached in the marketplace to voice 
services  is likely  to  decrease,  which  will mean  that  communications  will  be  treated more or  less  as a  ~ 
basket of services offered on market conditions.  (Some important market actors have gone so far as  to  i 
predict that simple voice traffic may amount to a very small percentage of the total traffic carried  by i 
major market players in the not-too-distant future).  · 
Communications services should be distinguishable from broadcasting services by virtue of 
the contractual ("on demand") and/  or interactive nature of the former, and the scheduled 
programming nature of the latter. 
In  a multimedia  marketplace  characterised  by  competition,  the  simplest  and  most  effective  way of , 
defining  that  market  is  to  configure  it  around  the  perceptions  of the  consumer.  This  approach  is  ! 
~  consistent with  the  classic  competition  law  perspective  of defining  relevant  markets.  In  competition  \ 
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analysis).  From  the  vantage  point  of the  consumer,  the  defining feature  of both  voice  services  and  ! 
multimedia services rests in the fact that the consumer can select precisely the time and the form  of the  j 
communication  he/she  wishes  to  make  or  receive,  as  the  case  may  be  (i.e.,  "on  demand").  The  [ 
informational  or  entertainment  nature  of that  communication  is  irrelevant from  the  viewpoint  of i 
economic regulation.  ' 
This contractual or "on demand" element may or may not involve an interactive aspect, although it is 
envisaged that a definition of "interactive" may include the element of personal selection of a particular 
service.  In  the  alternative,  a narrower  version  of a communications service  may  incorporate  the 
broader notion of interactivity, insofar as  the  linear nature273  of a particular service is  susceptible  to 
change. A hybrid definition of communications services, combining the elements of its on-demand and  : 
interactive nature, might also  be a workable regulatory option. By definition, communications services 
would be unscheduled in nature. 
On  the  other side of the  definitional  divide  is  broadcasting, which  should  be  identified  in  terms  of ~ 
whether messages or broadcasts are scheduled or unscheduled. The Study Team  takes the view that the  i 
relevance  of a scheduled,  as  opposed  to  a non-scheduled  service,  is  critical from  both  a demand  side  · 
analysis  and  a supply  side  analysis.  From  the  demand  side,  the  consumer  clearly  adopts  a more 
"passive"  posture  with  respect  to  a scheduled  service.  The  scheduling  element  would,  in  our  view, 
override the  contractual element  in a situation such as  Pay-Per-View.  From  the supply side,  private 
broadcasters  clearly  perceive  scheduling  as  a  key  defining  element  of  their  business.  Because 
broadcasting  revenues  are  derived  primarily  from  advertising  expenditures,  which  in  turn  vary  . 
significantly in  relation  to  the  scheduled timing and  quality of certain  broadcasts,  the  scheduling of i 
other types  of entertainment (e.g.,  video-enriched)  or  information  (e.g.,  computer enhanced)  services  j 
would  be  seen  to  be  competing  directly  or  indirectly for  advertising  revenues  in  the  broadcasting I 
sector. 274 
The  distinction  between  "scheduled"  and  "unscheduled", at  least from  certain  viewers'  perspectives,  i 
may,  become  academic  in  a  mature  multimedia  environment.  For  example,  the  ever-increasing  i 
intelligence which will be embedded in set-top boxes and navigation systems will allow consumers with  j 
specialised interests  to  be  served with tailor-made  programming and information  packages  which  are  j 
largely  independent  of scheduling.  A  particular  example  of new  services  which  would  straddle  the  ! 
scheduled/non-scheduled divide are "push" technology services over the World Wide Web. 275  1 
In  the view of the Study Team,  the transmission of tailor-made information, even if it transmitted at  j 
regular predetermined intervals, should qualify such transmissions as  "communications".  Sustaining ! 
this  regulatory  classification,  however,  does  become  more  difficult  where  the  same  type  of tailored  i 
information  is  disseminated  to  a  very  broad  section  of the  public  on  a  pre-scheduled  basis.276  j 
Ultimately,  the dividing line may need  to  be drawn  in  marginal  cases  by reference  to  the doctrine  of i 
proportionality.  I 
The  growth  of Internet  communications  means  that  the  above  nomenclature  may  bring  within  the  j 
scope  of "broadcasting"  certain  types  of fledgling  on-line  information  services  which  should  not in  j 
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Namely, a communication whose essential qualities cannot be modified or transformed. 
The relative importance of advertising in the commercial television context has been identified by the 
European Commission's Merger Task Force in its  finding that there exists a  "Dutch market for  TV 
advertising": Holland Media Group Case, OJ (1996) L134/32. 
"Push  technology"  has  the  ability  to  deliver  tailored  information  to  desktops,  based  on  a  user's 
requirements profile. rather than requiring a user to pull the information down from the Web. 
Such a group, although having a common set of requirements, would arguably not be tantamount to a 
"Close  User  Group",  as  that  expression  is  understood  under  Community  telecommunications 
legislation. 
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'  their  overall  economic  impact  on  the  marketplace. 277  In  addition,  or  perhaps  in  the  alternative,  the  i 
concept of broadcasting ought to exclude those scheduled communications which consist solely of the  i 
transfer of  data (i.e., without voice, audio or visual signals).  i 
• 
The distinction between communications services and broadcasting services should facilitate i 
::::i:~Watory evolution of the respective concepts of universal service and "public service"  ~ 
The  proposed  regulatory  model  outlined  above  would  allow  the  distinctive  traditions  of universal  \ 
service and  public  service,  drawn from  the  respective  telecoms  and  broadcasting sectors  of today,  to  i 
develop  independently in  response  to  the  demands  of the  multimedia  marketplace.  Universal  service i 
would continue to  be treated, at least for in the foreseeable future, as relating to a basic range of  voice- i 
related services.  As the Information Society gathers momentum, however, the core issues addressed by  [ 
today' s concept of  universal service may be expanded over time to include the provision of certain types  i 
of multimedia  services falling  within  the  rubric  of "communications"  services  a  long  equivalent i 
conditions.  Similarly,  the  traditions  of public  service  missions  in  the  broadcasting  sector  - which  i 
include obligations  linked  to  the content of the services  provided -- can  continue, albeit possibly in a i 
form  which  is  more  consistent  with  the  goals  of an  evolving  competitive  market  (see  discussion  in  ~ 
Chapter III of  the Study) and with individual Member State policy goals. 
The regulation of broadcasting should focus increasingly on the range of public policy issues i 
(especially content-related) which are of ongoing importance to the sector.  ' 
The  adoption  of  regulatory  definitions  which  distinguish  between  "communications"  and  1 
"broadcasting"  would  treat  the  regulation  of broadcasting  as  a distinct  sector  characterised  by  the  i 
presence of  a broad range of public policy goals, most of which relate to the preservation of  certain levels  i 
of quality and diversity of content, convergence at the technological level is driving the convergence of i 
regulatory functions  at  the  transmission  and  service  provision  levels  (in  terms  of the  regulatory  ' 
requirements which need to  be satisfied by all market actors across both the telecoms and broadcasting 
sectors).  Technological  convergence,  however,  does  not  require  the  same  level  of convergence  of 
regulatory  functions  in  matters  relating  to  content  controls.  Consequently,  the 
communications/broadcasting  distinction  would  be  primarily  directed  towards  the  identification  of 
those areas of  regulation which do not lend themselves to a horizontal regulatory approach. 
The framework  set fourth  above  is  given greater  weight  by  the  recent amendments  to  the  Television 
Without Frontiers Directive, which added a definition of "broadcaster" to Article 1  (b) of  the Directive: 
the  natural  or  legal  person  who  has  editorial  responsibility for  the  composition  of schedules  of 
television programmes and who transmits them or has them transmitted by third parties." 
The  imputation  of "editorial  responsibility"  to  broadcasters,  as  an  integral  part  of their  nature, 
highlights the relative importance of content-related issues in the broadcasting world.  In  the world of 
communications,  by contrast,  an  infrastructure provider or service provider may do  little more than 
facilitate communications between parties, with little or no access to the production or dissemination of ! 
content.  Of course,  the  regulatory model proposed  does  not imply that  the regulation of content will i 
never be  relevant outside the sphere of broadcasting.  It will continue to  have relevance,  to  the extent i 
determined to be appropriate by individual Member States. However, the extent of State involvement in  I 
content-related  issues  outside  the  broadcasting  sector  is  likely  to  be  -- and  should  be  -- of a totally  ! 
different  magnitude.  The  proper  application  of the  doctrine  of proportionality  will  be  of major  j 
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277  For  example,  new  Webcast  services  which  may,  stricto  sensu,  be  considered  to  be  broadcasting 
services. 
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j  from  the purchase of a newspaper or a book,  there appears  to  be no compelling policy ground why the  : 
system of self-regulation and  the  primacy accorded  to  the freedom  of speech  in  the  publishing sector  : 
should not be progressively assimilated into the regulatory framework for communications services.  · 
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3.  Conditions of Market Operation:  Interconnection and Access  In 
the Telecoms and Broadcasting Sectors 
The Regulatory Issues 
In a competitive multimedia environment, the key operational issue for all market players 
will  be  the  terms  and  conditions  pursuant to  which  they  can obtain interconnection and 
access to one another's networks and/or to one another's customers. 
Extensive  competitive  entry,  especially  when  characterised  by  niche  market  players 
performing diverse network roles, will create the potential for a "network of networks". In 
such  an  environment,  a wide  variety  of operators  will  provide  different  components  of 
what is effectively a single network (whether switched or packet-switched). The Internet is 
the prototype of how this network of networks may operate. 
The  adoption  of a  coherent  policy  on interconnection  and  access  for  this  "network  of 
networks"  in a multimedia  environment  is  complicated  by the  fact  that  the  concepts  of 
interconnection and  access  in the  respective  fields  of  telecoms  and  broadcasting  are  the 
product of many different policies: 
(1)  In the telecoms field,  "interconnection" has come to mean the physical connection 
of networks needed to ensure "any-to-any" communications. Regulatory policy has 
been directed towards achieving interconnection with incumbent  telecoms operators 
at cost-based charges. The concept of interconnection has recently been extended in 
certain  Member  States  to  embrace  looser  configurations  of networks.  The  term 
"access"  is  generally used to  refer to the  relations between service providers and 
network operators, usually in the context of a service provider obtaining access to a 
customer of the  network operator.  In certain Member States  and,  indeed,  under 
certain instruments of Community law, the dividing line between the two concepts 
has become blurred. 
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(2)  In the  broadcasting  field,  interconnection has  been  by  and  large  irrelevant  from  a 
regulatory  perspective because  of the  fact  that broadcasting  has  traditionally  been a 
one-to-many  service  which has  not  exhibited  any  signs  of interactivity.  By  way  of 
contrast,  "access" has had a number of important social and cultural connotations in 
broadcasting, most of which relate to the preservation of pluralism. The most tangible 
manifestation of the access concept is the range of "must carry"  rules which apply to 
cable TV companies throughout the Member States of the  European Union.  Access, 
however, will achieve economic dimensions in a multimedia environment (i.e., similar 
to  its  role  in telecoms)  as  broadcasters become vertically  integrated  and  assume the 
position  of gatekeepers  through  their  control  of conditional  access  systems.  In  a 
limited  number  of Member  States,  the  issue  has  arisen  whether  a  more  economic 
concept of access should apply to the networks of cable TV operators, similar in terms 
to the Open Network Provision concept in the  telecoms sector (which has to date been 
characterised by a network monopoly). 
In a multimedia environment, the regulatory challenges are twofold: 
=>  First,  regulation should preserve and extend the  notion of cost  -based interconnection 
for  any-to-any  communications.  In  doing  so,  however,  a  theoretical  model  which 
addresses the real sources of concern in interconnection -- the existence of bottlenecks 
-- should be developed. 
Second,  regulation, in providing service providers with access to networks, should not 
deprive network owners of all the  "value " of their networks.  To do otherwise would 
be to  restrict network owners  to  the  role  of common carriers  and  would jeopardise 
their willingness to invest in the roll-out of broadband networks. 
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3.1  COMMUNITY  LEGAL  FRAMEWORK  FOR  INTERCONNECTION  AND  ACCESS  IN 
TELECOMS SECTOR 
The concepts  of "interconnection"  and  "access"  are  the  subject of detailed regulation at  the 
Community level, based on a number of legal instruments: 
Interconnection Directive
278 
Draft Access Notice
279 
Full Competition Directive
280 
ONP Voice Telephony Directive (as amended)
281 
Interconnection Pricing Recommendation
282 
(i)  Interconnection Directive 
The  Interconnection  Directive
183  provides  a harmonised  approach  to  interconnection  in  the 
European  Union.  It  complements  the  general  interconnection  obligations  imposed  on 
incumbent  telecoms  operators  by  the  Full  Competition  Directive.  The  Interconnection 
Directive  establishes  a  minimum  set  of harmonised  rights  and  obligations  in  the  field  of 
interconnection  of public  telecoms  networks.  Because  it  is  based  on  the  harmonisation 
provisions  of the  EC  Treaty,  the  Directive 's interconnection  requirements  are  broader  in 
scope than the obligations normally imposed under competition rules  (Articles 85  and 86 of 
the EC Treaty). 
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Directive 97 /33/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 1997 on interconnection in 
telecommunications with regard to ensuring universal service and interoperability through application of 
the principles of the open network provision (ONP), OJ 1997 L199 /32. 
Communication from the Commission on the application of the competition rules to access agreements in 
the telecommunications sector- framework, relevant markets and principle, OJ  1997 C76/9. 
Commission  Directive  96/19/EC  of  13  March  1996  amending  Commission  Directive  90/388/EEC 
regarding the implementation of full competition in telecommunications markets, OJ  1996 L74/13. 
Amended proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on the application of open network 
provision (ONP) to  voice telephony  and on universal  service for  telecommunications  in a competitive 
environment replacing  European Parliament and  Council  Directive 95/62/EC,  OJ  1997  C248/13  (text 
agreed in December 1997, awaiting signature). 
C(97)3148 of 15 October 1997. 
Open Network Provision ("ONP"), a concept used in the Interconnection Directive,  denotes the system 
of open and  efficient  access  to  public  telecommunications  networks  and,  where applicable,  to  public 
telecommunications services and the efficient use of those networks and services. 
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The Interconnection Directive  is  based on three  key policies:  namely,  cost  -orientation,  non-
discrimination,  and  transparency.  The  basic  terms  and  conditions  pursuant  to  which 
interconnection will be provided are as follows: 
•  Interconnection  is  a  matter  for  the  commercial  negotiatiOn  of the  parties. 
However,  organisations with "significant market power" in a relevant market 
are subject to  additional  interconnection obligations.  An organisation with a 
market share in excess of 25%  is presumed to enjoy significant market power, 
unless the National Regulatory Authority ( "NRA") determines otherwise. 
•  The  right  of service  providers  to  obtain  access  to  an  incumbent  telecom 
operator's  facilities  is  also  guaranteed.  However,  based  on  the  United 
Kingdom's  regulatory model, network operators will be able to offer different 
interconnection  tariffs,  terms  and  conditions  to  different  categories  of 
organisation (e.g.,  fixed network operators as compared to  service providers), 
where such differences can be objectively justified on the basis of the type of 
interconnection  provided  and/  or  the  relevant  national  licensing  conditions 
(assuming that the conditions applied are not discriminatory). 
•  The  Interconnection  Directive  does  not  require  the  use  of a  specific  costing 
model for interconnection tariffs, although they must be oriented towards costs 
and  forward  looking.  The  Long  Run  Incremental  Cost  ( "LRIC")  model  is 
preferred by the European Commission and by Member States (at least insofar 
as  call  termination  is  concerned),  but  other  approaches  are  not  excluded. 
Although contributions to  the net cost of providing universal  service may  be 
added  to  interconnection  charges,  they  must  be  unbundled  from 
interconnection charges.  Accounting separation requirements must also be in 
place to ensure that these pricing obligations are observed. 
•  Interconnection disputes will be subject to  the supervision and intervention of 
NRAs.  NRAs  have the  discretion to  require the  retrospective  adjustment of 
interconnection  tariffs.  They  can  also  be  empowered  to  hear  and  resolve 
(within a defmed time  frame)  interconnection disputes  if the parties are unable 
to  resolve  their differences.  It is  only  where  interconnection disputes  have  a 
cross-border  dimension  that  a  special  dispute  resolution  procedure  at  the 
Community  level  is  triggered,  which  is  overseen  by  the  European 
Commission. 
•  NRAs  can  require  the  submission  of  standard  interconnection  offers  by 
incumbent  operators  pursuant  to  which  they  provide  interconnection  to 
interested  third  parties  (subject  to  the  confidentiality  of sensitive  business 
information). 
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•  Incumbent  telecoms  operators  may  not  discriminate  in  the  interconnection 
provided  to  affiliated  entities  (e.g.,  a  mobile  subsidiary)  as  compared  to 
unaffiliated competitors. 
•  Essential requirements which constitute justified restrictions on access to,  and 
use of, public telecoms networks and services, are limited to: 
(i)  the security of network operations; 
(ii)  the maintenance of network integrity; 
(iii)  the interoperability of services in justified cases; and 
(iv)  the protection of data wherever appropriate. 
•  There  is  a  policy  in  favour  of  European  standards  in  the  field  of 
interconnection. The harmonisation of technical interfaces and standards, based 
on international standardisation initiatives, is also promoted. 
(ii)  Revised ONP Voice Telephony Directive 
The stated object of the  ONP Voice Telephony Directive (as amended) is the harmonisation of 
conditions  for  the  efficient access  to  and use  of fixed  public telephone  networks  and  fixed 
public telephone services in a competitive environment (in accordance with the ONP rules). 
Public network operators are required to make information regarding network access available 
to  NRAs,  and  to  publish other information prescribed by  the  Directive,  at  least  insofar  as 
special or exclusive rights continue to exist in the provision of fixed public  telecoms networks 
and voice telephony services. In addition, organisations enjoying significant market power (as 
defined by the  ONP rules)  and  operating  fixed  public  telecoms  networks  and/or providing 
fixed  public  telecoms  services  may  not  unjustifiably  terminate,  interrupt,  or  vary  in  any 
material respect, the services which they provide to other organisations. 
Access  to,  and  use  of,  the  fixed  public  telephone  network  and/or  public  fixed  telephone 
service may be  restricted by the Member States only on the basis  of essential requirements, 
namely:  (i) the security of network operations;  (ii) the maintenance of network integrity;  (iii) 
the  interoperability  of services;  (iv)  the  protection  of data;  and  (v)  the  effective  use  of 
frequency spectrum. 
The  ONP  Voice  Telephony  Directive  also  includes  a  requirement  that  organisations  with 
significant  market  power  in  the  provision  of fixed  public  telecoms  networks  respond  to 
reasonable  requests  for  access  at  network  termination  points  other  than  the  commonly 
provided network termination points listed in an Annex to the  Directive (referred to as Special 
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Network Access,  "SNA").  Although SNA arrangements are to  be negotiated by the parties, 
they must nevertheless reflect a number of criteria, in particular: 
•  all charges must be cost-oriented; 
•  conditions must be non-discriminatory, fair and reasonable for both parties; 
•  conditions must ensure the greatest possible benefit for all users; 
•  agreements  must  be  implemented  in  an  efficient  and  timely  manner,  in 
compliance with recognised  standards,  essential  requirements  and  end-to-end 
quality of service; and 
•  details  of these  agreements  must  be  made  available  to  NRAs  on  request, 
subject to the protection of confidential information. 
(iii)  Draft Access Notice 
In March  1997,  a  Draft  Notice  on  the  Application  of the  Competition  Rules  to  Access 
Agreements  in  the  Telecommunications  Sector  was  released  for  public  comment  ("Draft 
Access Notice "). 
284 In its Draft Notice,  the Commission explained  how it intends to apply EC 
competition rules to interconnection and access issues.  The  Draft Notice is,  strictly speaking, 
not binding on national  courts;  nonetheless,  it remains  the  basic  "operator's guide to  legal 
market behaviour" in the field of interconnection. 
According  to  the  Draft  Notice,  the  existence  of a  harmonised  regulatory  framework  for 
interconnection  does  not  override  the  application  of competition  rules  to  these  types  of 
agreements.  Until such time as the Member States adopt a harmonised regulatory framework 
for  interconnection,  the prevention of anti-competitive  behaviour through the  application of 
such rules is essential. 
The Draft Notice  is premised on the  general principle that new entrants,  at least at the early 
stages  of liberalisation,  must  be  ensured  access  to  the  networks  of  incumbent  telecoms 
operators.  The  concept  of "access"  remains  undefined  in  the  Draft  Notice,  and  appears  to 
encompass  a  number  of different  scenarios.  Although  access  is  not  restricted  to  physical 
network facilities, the Draft Notice focuses principally on the restrictions which may appear at 
this  level.  This  focus  reflects  the  fact  that  incumbent  operators  will  retain  de  facto 
monopolies, even after formalliberalisation takes place. 
284  OJ 1997 C76/9. Scheduled to be released in final form in February 1998. 
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"Relevant Markets" 
The Commission has  taken the  view that two  product markets  are relevant when analysing 
access issues under Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty, namely: 
(i)  the  market  for  services  (defined  mainly  from  the  viewpoint  of  demand 
substitutability); and 
(ii)  the  market for  access  (defmed  as  access  to  the  facilities  needed  in order to 
provide the services in question). 
Beyond this distinction, the Commission does not define any specific product markets; market 
definition  is  to  be  resolved  on  a  case-by-case  basis.  The  Draft  Notice  also  does  not 
differentiate between the various kinds of access that are made available for different network 
functions or facilities. 
Infringements of  Article 86 
According to the Draft Notice,  the main potential for abuse in the access and service markets 
is  likely  to  arise  from  the  control  of  "essential  facilities ".  Although  dominance  does  not 
always necessarily arise from the control of an essential facility,  the  Draft Notice  focuses  on 
those cases where it does. 
The Draft Notice adopts a broad concept of facilities which are considered to be  "essential". 
Amongst these facilities  are  the public  telecoms  network for  the provision of voice  and/  or 
data,  leased  circuits  and  related  network  terminating  equipment,  basic  data  regarding 
subscribers to public voice telephony  service,  numbering  schemes,  and other customer  and 
technical information.  Not all of these facilities,  however, are incapable of being reproduced 
at a reasonable cost by competitors.  As  a consequence,  not all  of these facilities  would  be 
considered  "essential"  under  existing  EC  jurisprudence  and  Commission  administrative 
practice. 
Also  addressed by the  Draft Notice  is  joint dominance  by  two  companies  operating in the 
same geographic area (in particular,  operators of telecoms infrastructure).  In order for joint 
dominance to exist, there must be no competition between the jointly dominant undertakings. 
The Commission appears to be prepared to make such a finding not only when the operators 
in  question  have  established  interconnection  or  other  cooperation  agreements,  but  also  in 
cases where only more tenuous economic links exist amongst the jointly dominant companies. 
The Commission sets forth as examples of joint dominance the cases where access to the local 
loop is controlled by the incumbent telecoms operator and an exclusively franchised cable TV 
operator;  whether joint dominance  exists  in such  cases  will  depend  on  an  analysis  of the 
competitive situation in the relevant market, defmed on a case-by-case basis. 
Abuse of dominance (or joint dominance), which is  contrary to Article 86 of the EC Treaty, 
includes the refusal to provide access to  an existing or a new downstream market actor,  the 
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termination of existing access relations, and/or making such access economically unprofitable 
by charging excessively high or predatory prices, or by establishing conditions which make it 
more  difficult or burdensome  for  other  (actual  or potential)  suppliers,  provided there  is  no 
objective justification for such a course of action. 
Discrimination is  considered to  constitute an  abuse if undertaken by  a dominant (or jointly 
dominant)  operator,  unless  objectively  justified.  The  requirement  of  non-discrimination 
applies  to  the  treatment  accorded  to  different  customers  and  the  treatment  accorded  to 
customers  as  compared  to  the  treatment  granted  to  the  operator's  own  subsidiary  or 
downstream service arm. Among the allegations of discrimination which the Commission will 
examine most closely are those related to network configuration, the number and/or location 
of interconnection points, and the number of dialled digits. 
Infringements of  Article 85 
The Draft Notice  recognises  that access  agreements  are  essentially pro-competitive,  in that 
they  are  essential  to  competition in downstream markets.  The  Commission,  however,  also 
identifies  potentially  restrictive  aspects  of such  agreements,  particularly  arrangements  to 
exchange  customer  and  traffic  information,  as  well  as  interconnection  agreements  under 
certain circumstances. 
(iv)  Interconnection Pricing Recommendation 
Interconnection charges  constitute  a potential  entry barrier  for  new  market  entrants,  often 
representing 40%  of their total expenditures. The most basic interconnection service provided 
is that of call termination, and the  Recommendation concentrates on pricing principles for that 
service. 
In  its  Recommendation,  the  Commission  has  compiled  a  list  of  "best  current  practice" 
interconnection charges  that  should  apply  until  such  time  as  interconnection prices  can be 
properly  calculated  on  the  basis  of forward-looking  long  run  average  incremental  costs 
(''~~IC''). 
The recommended prices include the price of terminating a call,  at peak time, on established 
fixed networks, at three different levels : 
(i)  "~ocal" level interconnection (i.e., at a local exchange or as  near a local exchange 
as  possible);  with a "best current practice" interconnection charge between 0.6 and 
1.0/100 ECU per minute. 
(ii)  "Single  transit"  interconnection  (i.e.,  providing  access  to  0.5-1M  customers  in  a 
metropolitan  area);  with  a  "best current practice"  interconnection charge  between 
0.9 and 1.8/100 ECU per minute. 
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(iii)  "Double transit"  interconnection (i.e.,  providing access  to  customers  on a national 
network); with a "best current practice" interconnection charge  between 1.5 and 2.6 
/100 ECU per minute. 
The Commission's purpose in identifying these prices, which apply from  1 January 1998,  is 
to alert NRAs to  investigate further if a network operator proposes prices falling  outside the 
recommended ranges. 
The biggest impact of the  Recommendation  is  likely to  be felt  in two areas where prices are 
currently out of line with costs.  The first is  the price paid by  mobile operators to  terminate 
calls  on fixed  networks;  these prices are  still much higher than the prices  for  fixed-to-fixed 
network interconnection.  The second area concerns calls  between Member States,  where the 
prices  charged  have  been much  higher than  prices  for  national  calls  of the  same  distance. 
With  the  adoption  of  this  Recommendation,  these  two  anomalies  should  progressively 
disappear after 1 January 1998. 
3.2  TELECOMS INTERCONNECTION AND ACCESS RULES AT MEMBER STATE LEVEL 
Most Member States  of the  European Union have  enacted  rules  with  a view  to  regulating 
interconnection in a liberalised environment.  These rules generally follow those contained in 
the Interconnection Directive,  although their level of detail  and  sophistication greatly varies 
according to each Member State. 
The following trends, however, can be gleaned from a comparative study of these rules: 
(i)  Interconnection is  considered to  be a matter  for  commercial  negotiations,  subject to 
special regulation in the case of operators with significant market power 
The new  telecoms legislation approved in  Germany  (the German Telecommunications Act of 
August  1 1996) and France  (the French Telecommunications Law of July 28  1996) make it 
clear that  the  details  of interconnection negotiations  are  matters  which  are  best left to  the 
parties,  with  the  caveat  that  operators  with  "significant  market  power",  are  subject  to  a 
special range of mandated obligations. 
Also, according to the proposed new  Italian telecoms law which was adopted during the last 
quarter of 1997,  operators declared  to  be  in  a position  of significant market power by the 
NRA  and  which  provide  switched  and  unswitched  bearer  capabilities  upon  which  other 
telecoms  services depend,  are subject to  special interconnection obligations,  they  also enjoy 
special rights to interconnect with other operators. 
Similarly, under the proposed new  telecoms law in Spain,  operators with "significant market 
power"  in the  relevant geographic market (whether municipal,  regional  or national),  which 
are authorised to provide public telecoms networks and/  or publicly available  telecoms services 
are subject to additional interconnection obligations. Significant market power is presumed to 
exist where an entity has  a market share in excess of 25%  of a relevant market,  unless the 
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Spanish  NRA  determines  otherwise.  The  Council  of Ministers  (with  the  previous  binding 
opinion of the NRA) may modify this 25%  market share threshold. 
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(ii)  Special  Network Access  (" SNA ")  is  generally available,  at  least when establishing 
interconnection to the PSTN or to a dominant operator's network. 
National rules on SNA have not been developed in any detail.  The general requirements for 
SNA are contained in the  Interconnection Directive and in the revised  ONP Voice  Telephony 
Directive. 
(iii)  Operators  with  significant  market  power  are  under  an  obligation  to  publish  a 
standard offer, subject to regulatory approval . 
The contents of standard offers are largely left undefined in the laws of Member States such 
as  Germany,  Spain and Italy.  By way of contrast, in France,  the Interconnection Decree of  3 
March 1997 sets forth in great detail the minimum set of issues that must be addressed by the 
standard interconnection offers of dominant operators. 
National  legislation generally permits the  application of different interconnection terms  and 
conditions  to  different  categories  of operators,  as  long  as  these  differences  are  objectively 
justified.  As  a  result  of an  amendment  to  the  Interconnection  Decree  in  France,  France 
Telecom is now required to state these differences clearly in its standard offer. 
The  scope  of the  obligation to  publish  information  regarding  the  terms  and  conditions  of 
interconnection  ("Reference  Interconnection  Offers")  is  the  subject  of a  joint  document 
prepared by Directorates-General IV and XIII of the European Commission. 
286  Germany  and 
Denmark were notified by the European Commission in November 1997 that their failure to 
mandate  the  provision  of a  Reference  Interconnection  Offer  by  their  respective  national 
telecoms incumbents would result in formal infringement procedures. 
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(iv)  Some level of "unbundling" is required 
In  Finland  and  Germany,  unbundling  is  mandated  down  to  the  level  of the  local  loop. 
288 
Generally speaking, however, national interconnection regulations do not specifically mandate 
the  unbundling  of intelligent  network  functionalities  (even  for  dominant  operators).  The 
precise level of unbundling necessary in any  given case is  likely to be determined on a case-
by -case basis in most Member States. 
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The concept of "significant market power", as used in the Interconnection Directive, is the subject of 
clarification before the ONP Committee (Working document for discussion dated 7 November 1997, 
ONP, COM(97)41). 
Refer to  discussion document on "Reference Interconnection Offers:  Terms  and Conditions",  (ONP 
COM(97)45, Brussels, 14 November 1997). 
Commission Press Release, IP/97/954 of 5 November 1997. 
Not  coincidentally,  both  of these  countries  are  characterised  by  a  situation  where  the  local  loop 
telecoms operator is also the local cable TV operator. 
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(v)  Interconnection pricing varies widely among the Member States 
The greatest divergences  among Member States  exists with respect to  pricing  standards  and 
the way interconnection charges are determined. 
In  Denmark,  France,  Germany,  Italy,  and  Sweden,  the  determination  of interconnection 
charges  is  left  to  commercial  negotiations,  subject  to  regulatory  intervention  by  the  NRA 
which is  empowered to  resolve disputes  and  approve the  standard interconnection offers  of 
dominant  operators.  In  Spain,  the  maximum  tariffs  for  interconnection  with  the  PSTN  of 
facilities-based  providers  of basic  telephony  are  mandated  by  the  current  interconnection 
rules. 
In the  United Kingdom,  charges for  interconnection with British Telecom ("BT") have been 
traditionally  established by  OFTEL.  This  system,  however,  is  in  the  process  of changing. 
OFTEL proposed, for the period beginning August 1997, to eliminate the criteria that actually 
determine  the  level  of interconnection  charges;  instead,  OFTEL  will  establish  a  broad 
framework within which BT will be allowed to set its own charges. The degree of control by 
OFTEL would vary according to the competitiveness of the particular interconnection service 
in question. 
A difference is drawn by OFTEL between: 
1.  Competitive interconnection services and prospectively competitive interconnection 
services  (all  of which  are  "call  origination"  services),  which  will  be  unregulated 
(prospectively competitive services, however, will be subject to a cap of Retail Price 
Index (RPI) + 0% , to prevent charges from increasing in real terms); and 
2.  Bottleneck and  non-competitive interconnection services,  which  will  be  regulated, 
subject to price caps, and divided into two separate baskets (one for call termination 
services and one for general network services), with the weighted average charge for 
services in the baskets not being allowed to increase by more than RPI-X each year. 
In  terms  of the  actual  prices  charged,  dominant  operators  are  generally  subject  to  the 
obligation to  follow certain standards when fixing their interconnection prices.  In the  United 
Kingdom,  as  of August  1997,  interconnection charges for  call termination will be based on 
forward-looking incremental costs. 
289 
According  to  the  new  Telecommunications  Law  in Italy,  interconnection costs  must  follow 
"effective  costs ",  plus  a  reasonable  return  on  investment.  The  economic  conditions  for 
interconnection must be  "sufficiently  unbundled"  to  allow  the  NRA  to  monitor compliance 
with this general principle and to allow the party requesting interconnection to ensure that it is 
only paying for the interconnection services requested.  The LRAIC formula,  however, is not 
clearly required as the basis for calculating interconnection charges. 
289  See Oftel's Consultative Document published in December 1996,  "Network Charges from 1997". 
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Under the  Telecommunications  Law in Spain,  rates  for  interconnection must  reflect  "actual 
costs"  and be "sufficiently unbundled".  The new Spanish law,  however,  allows  a system of 
Access  Deficit  Charges,  the  scope  and  form  of which  are  undefined,  to  be  added  to 
interconnection charges. 
Germany  has opted for  a formula  whereby  interconnection prices must be oriented towards 
the  cost  of providing  efficient  service.  Costing  should  be  based  on  LRAIC  plus  an 
appropriate mark-up for  "common costs" (as far as these costs are necessary for the service 
provision)  and  a  reasonable  return  on  investment .  Interconnection  services  will  not  be 
covered by a price cap before 1 January 2000. 
Interconnection tariffs in France are based on the effective cost of using the network,  plus a 
mark-up  set by  the  French NRA,  of 7.72%  for  1998,  and  a return on capital  of 11.75  % 
prescribed  by  the  French  NRA  for  interconnection  with  France  Telecom.  In  addition,  a 
system of Access  Deficit Charges  was  adopted,  the compatibility of which law  may  be the 
subject of challenge under Community law.  As of 1999, interconnection tariffs must be based 
on the LRAIC formula.  The ART is currently working on the conditions and implementation 
of this new cost-based formula. 
In The Netherlands,  an express distinction has been drawn between the pricing which should 
be used for interconnection (defined narrowly, in terms of termination of a communication on 
a network) and any other form of requested access to a network (understood as embracing all 
forms of "originating traffic " on the network of a third party). In the case of call termination, 
the Dutch authorities have taken the view that interconnection should be charged on the basis 
of a forward-looking cost formula.  In the case of call origination, it is understood that tariffs 
will be the subject of commercial negotiation. 
The  variations  in  interconnection  tariffs  from  Member  State  to  Member  State  are  clearly 
illustrated in Table VII overleaf, which compares interconnection tariffs terminating on fixed-
line  networks  and  originating  from  mobile  networks  for  a  number  of commercial  mobile 
operators  in  the  European  Union.  A  broader  comparison  of key  regulatory  aspects  of 
interconnection and  access policies  in the  telecoms  sector can be found  in Table VIII which 
follows immediately thereafter. 
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290  Table VII is reproduced with the permission of Airtouch. Tariffs are calculated in terms of Italian Lire 
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o
u
n
t
r
i
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s
 
i
f
 
p
r
e
v
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o
u
s
 
o
p
t
i
o
n
s
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r
e
 
u
n
s
u
c
c
e
s
s
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u
l
.
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r
e
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r
e
 
c
o
l
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c
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t
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1
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u
l
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s
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Y
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.
 
I
n
 
t
h
e
 
t
e
r
m
s
 
s
p
e
c
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f
i
e
d
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n
 
D
e
c
r
e
e
 
o
n
 
i
n
t
e
r
c
o
n
n
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
a
s
 
i
n
t
e
r
p
r
e
t
e
d
 
b
y
 
A
v
i
s
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9
7
-
9
.
 
V
i
r
t
u
a
l
 
c
o
l
l
o
c
a
t
i
o
n
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s
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v
a
i
l
a
b
l
e
.
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r
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n
c
e
 
T
e
l
e
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m
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o
f
f
e
r
 
a
g
r
e
e
m
e
n
t
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l
s
o
 
c
o
n
t
a
i
n
s
 
r
u
l
e
s
 
o
n
 
c
o
l
l
o
c
a
t
i
o
n
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r
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c
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S
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/
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t
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r
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S
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n
a
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_
s
y
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r
e
 
I
C
 
a
g
r
e
e
m
e
n
t
s
 
s
u
b
j
e
c
t
 
t
o
 
e
x
p
r
e
s
s
 
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
r
 
i
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
 
n
e
g
o
t
i
a
t
i
o
n
?
 
I
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
 
n
e
g
o
t
i
a
t
i
o
n
,
 
s
u
b
j
e
c
t
 
t
o
 
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
 
r
u
l
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
o
r
y
 
r
e
v
i
e
w
.
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l
e
 
V
I
I
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:
 
T
e
l
e
c
o
m
s
 
I
n
t
e
r
c
o
n
n
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
I
s
s
u
e
s
 
(
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o
n
t
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A
r
e
 
t
h
e
r
e
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p
e
c
i
a
l
 
r
u
l
e
s
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o
r
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m
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n
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n
t
l
'
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p
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o
r
s
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d
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s
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y
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d
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h
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e
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r
e
 
s
p
e
c
i
a
l
 
o
b
l
i
g
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
p
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c
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"
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n
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t
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s
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c
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f
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c
 
n
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k
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o
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t
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n
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h
e
r
e
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C
 
m
u
s
t
 
t
a
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e
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c
e
?
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s
u
b
j
e
c
t
 
t
o
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r
i
n
c
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p
l
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n
o
n
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i
s
c
r
i
m
i
n
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i
o
n
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c
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c
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b
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c
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c
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s
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o
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e
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l
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f
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c
c
e
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s
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.
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c
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n
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l
 
n
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k
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n
c
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Y
e
s
,
 
p
r
o
v
i
d
e
d
 
t
h
e
 
u
n
b
u
n
d
l
i
n
g
 
i
s
:
 
1
 
)
 
n
e
c
e
s
s
a
r
y
:
 
2
)
 
t
e
c
h
n
i
c
a
l
l
y
 
p
o
s
s
i
b
l
e
:
 
3
)
 
n
o
 
o
b
j
e
c
t
i
v
e
 
r
e
a
s
o
n
s
 
f
o
r
 
r
e
f
u
s
a
l
 
o
n
 
t
h
e
 
b
a
s
i
s
 
o
f
 
c
o
m
p
l
i
a
n
c
e
 
w
i
t
h
 
e
s
s
e
n
t
i
a
l
 
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
m
e
n
t
s
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a
n
d
 
4
)
 
o
p
e
r
a
t
o
r
 
u
s
e
s
 
s
a
m
e
 
f
u
n
c
t
i
o
n
s
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n
t
e
r
n
a
l
l
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.
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p
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c
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c
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n
a
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t
 
c
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e
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.
 
V
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r
t
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l
 
c
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o
c
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c
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e
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e
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m
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I
n
t
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r
c
o
n
n
e
c
t
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o
n
 
I
s
s
u
e
s
 
(
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o
n
t
.
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A
r
e
 
I
C
 
a
g
r
e
e
m
e
n
t
s
 
s
u
b
j
e
c
t
 
A
r
e
 
t
h
e
r
e
 
s
p
e
c
i
a
l
 
r
u
l
e
s
 
A
r
e
 
t
h
e
r
e
 
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
 
I
s
 
t
h
e
r
e
 
u
n
b
u
n
d
l
e
d
 
I
s
 
t
h
e
r
e
 
a
 
p
r
e
f
e
r
r
e
d
 
p
r
i
c
i
n
g
 
A
r
e
 
t
h
e
r
e
 
r
u
l
e
s
 
o
n
 
M
e
m
b
e
r
 
t
o
 
e
x
p
r
e
s
s
 
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
r
 
f
o
r
 
"
d
o
m
i
n
a
n
t
"
 
n
e
t
w
o
r
k
 
l
o
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
a
c
c
e
s
s
 
t
o
 
i
n
t
e
r
n
a
l
 
f
o
r
m
u
l
a
 
f
o
r
 
I
C
 
c
h
a
r
g
e
s
?
 
c
o
l
l
o
c
a
t
i
o
n
?
 
S
t
a
t
e
 
i
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
 
n
e
g
o
t
i
a
t
i
o
n
?
 
o
p
e
r
a
t
o
r
s
 
o
r
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
-
w
h
e
r
e
 
I
C
 
m
u
s
t
 
n
e
t
w
o
r
k
 
f
u
n
c
t
i
o
n
s
?
 
w
i
d
e
 
r
u
l
e
s
?
 
t
a
k
e
 
p
l
a
c
e
?
 
G
r
e
e
c
e
 
I
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
 
n
e
g
o
t
i
a
t
i
o
n
,
 
b
u
t
 
W
i
t
h
 
t
h
e
 
e
x
c
e
p
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
N
o
 
N
o
 
N
o
,
 
b
u
t
 
i
n
t
e
r
c
o
n
n
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
N
o
 
s
u
b
j
e
c
t
 
t
o
 
g
e
n
e
r
a
l
 
p
r
i
n
c
i
p
l
e
s
 
d
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
 
c
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
o
n
 
c
h
a
r
g
e
s
 
m
u
s
t
 
b
e
 
'
'
c
o
s
t
-
s
e
t
 
o
u
t
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
l
a
w
 
a
n
d
 
r
u
l
e
s
,
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
-
w
i
d
e
 
r
u
l
e
s
 
b
a
s
e
d
"
.
 
'
·
i
n
t
e
r
c
o
n
n
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
a
p
p
l
y
 
t
h
u
s
 
f
a
r
 
(
o
r
 
a
t
 
l
e
a
s
t
 
g
u
i
d
e
l
i
n
e
s
"
.
 
t
o
 
t
h
o
s
e
 
p
a
r
t
i
e
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
e
x
c
l
u
s
i
v
e
 
r
i
g
h
t
s
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.
 
I
r
e
l
a
n
d
 
P
r
i
m
a
r
i
l
y
 
a
 
m
a
t
t
e
r
 
f
o
r
 
W
i
t
h
 
t
h
e
 
e
x
c
e
p
t
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o
n
 
o
f
 
N
o
 
N
o
 
N
o
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h
e
 
g
e
n
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r
a
l
 
N
o
 
a
g
r
e
e
m
e
n
t
 
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
o
n
 
r
u
l
e
s
 
a
s
 
t
h
e
y
 
u
n
d
e
r
s
t
a
n
d
i
n
g
 
i
s
 
t
h
a
t
 
p
r
i
c
e
s
 
p
a
r
t
i
e
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h
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A
 
w
i
l
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o
n
l
y
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p
p
l
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t
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d
o
m
i
n
a
n
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s
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o
u
l
d
 
r
e
f
l
e
c
t
 
c
o
s
t
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i
n
t
e
r
v
e
n
e
 
i
n
 
c
i
r
c
u
m
s
t
a
n
c
e
s
 
c
o
m
p
a
n
i
e
s
,
 
g
e
n
e
r
a
l
 
r
u
l
e
s
 
w
h
e
r
e
 
t
h
e
 
p
a
r
t
i
e
s
 
h
a
v
e
 
f
a
i
l
e
d
 
c
a
n
 
b
e
 
d
e
d
u
c
e
d
 
f
r
o
m
 
t
o
 
r
e
a
c
h
 
a
g
r
e
e
m
e
n
t
.
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p
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t
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p
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c
i
a
l
 
o
r
 
e
x
c
l
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i
v
e
 
r
i
g
h
t
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.
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e
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I
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t
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r
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I
C
 
a
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e
e
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n
t
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u
b
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c
t
 
A
r
e
 
t
h
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r
e
 
s
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e
c
i
a
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r
u
l
e
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A
r
e
 
t
h
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r
e
 
s
p
e
c
i
f
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I
s
 
t
h
e
r
e
 
u
n
b
u
n
d
l
e
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I
s
 
t
h
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r
e
 
a
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r
e
f
e
r
r
e
d
 
A
r
e
 
t
h
e
r
e
 
r
u
l
e
s
 
o
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M
e
m
b
e
r
 
t
o
 
e
x
p
r
e
s
s
 
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
i
o
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o
r
 
f
o
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1
1
d
o
m
i
n
a
n
t
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o
p
e
r
a
t
o
r
s
 
n
e
t
w
o
r
k
 
l
o
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
a
c
c
e
s
s
 
t
o
 
i
n
t
e
r
n
a
l
 
p
r
i
c
i
n
g
 
f
o
r
m
u
l
a
 
f
o
r
 
I
C
 
c
o
l
l
o
c
a
t
i
o
n
?
 
S
t
a
t
e
s
 
i
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
 
n
e
g
o
t
i
a
t
i
o
n
?
 
o
r
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
-
w
i
d
e
 
r
u
l
e
s
?
 
w
h
e
r
e
 
I
C
 
m
u
s
t
 
n
e
t
w
o
r
k
 
f
u
n
c
t
i
o
n
s
?
 
c
h
a
r
g
e
s
?
 
t
a
k
e
 
p
l
a
c
e
?
 
I
t
a
l
y
 
T
h
u
s
 
f
a
r
,
 
i
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
 
Y
e
s
.
 
"
D
o
m
i
n
a
n
t
"
 
N
o
 
N
o
,
 
b
u
t
 
t
h
e
r
e
 
i
s
 
a
 
L
R
A
I
C
-
b
a
s
e
d
 
c
o
s
t
i
n
g
 
N
o
 
n
e
g
o
t
i
a
t
i
o
n
s
,
 
s
u
b
j
e
c
t
 
t
o
 
o
p
e
r
a
t
o
r
s
 
h
a
v
e
 
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
 
g
e
n
e
r
a
l
 
o
b
l
i
g
a
t
i
o
n
 
t
o
 
a
p
p
r
o
a
c
h
 
w
i
l
l
 
b
e
 
p
o
t
e
n
t
i
a
l
 
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
o
r
y
 
o
b
l
i
g
a
t
i
o
n
s
.
 
o
f
f
e
r
 
i
n
t
e
r
c
o
n
n
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
i
n
t
r
o
d
u
c
e
d
 
(
h
o
w
e
v
e
r
,
 
i
n
t
e
r
v
e
n
t
i
o
n
.
 
T
h
e
 
D
e
c
r
e
e
 
i
n
 
a
 
s
u
t
l
i
c
i
e
n
t
l
y
 
u
n
-
p
r
i
c
i
n
g
 
p
r
i
n
c
i
p
l
e
s
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
i
m
p
l
e
m
e
n
t
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
 
F
u
l
l
 
b
u
n
d
l
e
d
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o
r
m
.
 
l
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r
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i
n
 
C
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
o
n
 
D
i
r
e
c
t
i
v
e
 
n
a
t
u
r
e
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e
n
t
e
r
e
d
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n
t
o
 
f
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r
c
e
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n
d
 
r
e
g
u
l
a
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s
 
I
C
 
i
s
s
u
e
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.
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i
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t
h
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u
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r
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.
 
N
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o
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t
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n
 
T
e
l
e
c
o
m
 
L
a
w
 
i
n
t
e
r
c
o
n
n
e
c
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n
.
 
T
h
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p
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v
i
d
e
s
 
t
h
a
t
 
a
 
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
 
o
f
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s
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e
c
i
f
i
c
 
D
e
c
r
e
e
 
w
i
l
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b
e
 
r
e
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u
l
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o
r
y
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r
a
m
e
w
o
r
k
 
f
o
r
 
a
d
o
p
t
e
d
 
e
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
i
n
g
 
I
C
 
i
s
 
i
n
 
i
t
s
 
p
r
e
l
i
m
i
n
a
r
y
 
t
h
e
 
p
o
i
n
t
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
s
t
a
g
e
s
.
 
n
e
t
w
o
r
k
 
a
t
 
w
h
i
c
h
 
i
n
t
e
r
c
o
n
n
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
w
i
l
l
 
t
a
k
e
 
p
l
a
c
e
.
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3.3  THE CONCEPT OF "ACCESS" IN BROADCASTING 
Unlike the  telecoms  sector,  in which  the  concept  of interconnection is  directed  towards 
ensuring  any-to-any  communications,  the  broadcasting  sector  deals  with  the  issue  of 
"access" only  in so  far  as  it reflects the public policy goals  of universal availability,  fair 
competition  and  pluralism.  The  concept  of "interconnection"  has  been  irrelevant  in  the 
broadcasting  sector because  broadcast  networks  have  not  been  used  to  convey  two-way 
communications between customers of different networks (cable TV networks which have 
already been granted the right to provide voice telephony services are the exception to this 
rule;  however,  they are  likely  to  be  licensed as  telecoms  service provides  in order to  be 
able to do so). 
Broadcast regulations often include a variety of "access rights" for the benefit of the public 
at large. The principal argument in support of such access  rights  is  that the public need to 
hear a representative range of opinions held by different groups,  so  that citizens can make 
sensible decisions regarding political and social issues. Most Member States guarantee certain 
access rights and have adopted specific legislation to afford certain groups such rights. 
Given the  essential  role  of broadcasting  in  the  democratic  and  social  fabric  of today' s 
society,  it is  often argued that the  "freedom of speech"  doctrine includes  a constitutional 
right of access to broadcasting media.  More usually, the case is made for a statutory right of 
access.  Rights  of reply  also  perform a similar function  to  access  rights,  by ensuring  that 
audiences hear both sides of a given issue. 
More recently, convergence has meant that traditional broadcasting networks are being seen 
by a  range of new market actors  as  having  the potential  to  provide them with access  to 
consumers for  both new  types  of media  services  and  new  information-based  services.  In 
this  developing  environment,  access  to  broadcast  networks  is  beginning  to  raise  policy 
issues similar to those which have already been considered in the telecoms sector. Requests 
for  such  access  are  already  being  made  by  content  and  service  providers.  In addition, 
conditional access technology will mean that an ever-increasing number of broadcasters will 
in the future be seeking access to set  -top boxes operated by what may be little more than a 
handful of digital  delivery platforms.  Access  to  set-top  boxes  for  television broadcasting 
purposes  is  governed  by  the  terms  of the  Television  Standards  Directive  (discussed  In 
Section 4 of Annex I). 
Access to the content of broadcasters is possible where the content in question is tantamount 
to an "essential facility"  for market actors.  Access to content is  governed primarily by the 
application of competition rules on a case-by-case basis and, in certain respects relating to 
events  of particular  public  interest,  by  the  terms  of the  Television  Without  Frontiers 
Directive (discussed in Section 4 of Annex I). 
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(i)  Constitutional Access Rights 
The  question  whether  there  exist  constitutional  access  rights  has  arisen  in  a  number  of 
Member States.  The nature of access rights has often been the  subject of debate in Italy.  In 
1974, the Italian Constitutional Court held that RAI's public monopoly could only be justified 
if access  were  afforded to  the political,  religious and  social  groups  representing the various 
strands  of public  opinion  in  society. 
292  The  Court  confirmed  clearly  that  the  statutory 
provision of access  was  required  by  Article  21  of the  Constitution,  which  guarantees  the 
freedom  of expression.  The Court thus  recognised that it was  for  Parliament to  determine 
which groups should enjoy access and pursuant to what rules. In Germany,  the Constitutional 
Court has  interpreted broadcasting  freedom  to  be  a constitutional  value,  requiring  in some 
circumstances positive action by the legislature. 
293  The Court held that legislative rules should 
determine,  inter alia,  how much time  should be allocated to  access  programmes,  how long 
they should be, and which groups should be entitled to produce them. 
(ii)  Legislative Rules 
In a number of Member States, legislative provisions have been adopted to provide statutory 
access rights. 
In Germany, for example, the laws governing public and private broadcasting channels confer 
rights on the churches and some other denominations to appropriate time for the transmission 
of their services and other religious programmes. In France,  a specific legislative provision 
provides  that  broadcast  time  should  be  given  to  churches,  trade  unions  and  professional 
bodies.
294Also,  in Italy,  the Law of 1975  requires that the public broadcaster, RAI,  reserve a 
certain  amount  of transmission time  for  the  parties  and  groups  represented  in Parliament, 
trade  unions,  political  and  cultural  associations  and  other  socially  relevant  groups  which 
request access. 
295 
It  is  also  arguable  that  the  widespread  obligation  to  allocate  a  minimum  amount  of total 
programme time to  independent productions  (refer to  Table IX)  is  in part directed towards 
broadening  the  base  of society  which  can have  access  to  broadcasts.  For example,  in the 
United  Kingdom,  the  1990 Broadcasting Act places  a legal obligation on the lTC to ensure 
that  the  Channel  3  licensee  will  allocate  not  less  than  25%  of total  programme  time  to 
independent productions. 
296 An equivalent obligation is imposed on the BBC. 
297 
292 
293 
294 
295 
296 
297 
Decision 22511974[1974] Giur.cost.l775. 
The Third Television Case,  57 BverfGE 295.319-21 (1981). 
Article 56 of the 1986 Law. 
Article 6 of Law  103 of 14 April  1975.  At  least,  5%  of television time and 3%  of radio time, must be 
reserved for such access. 
Section 16(2)(h). The same requirement is imposed on Channels 4 and 5. and domestic satellite channels. 
Section 186 of the  1990 Broadcasting Act. 
~-«~  ~-.  of..;n~  7tl ff Y:f~ny~t-M:y 
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(iii)  Rights of Reply 
Most  Member  States  also  provide  individuals  and  organisations  with  rights  of reply.  The 
Television Without  Frontiers  Directive  requires  that  all  Member  States  provide  a  right of 
reply  or  equivalent  remedies  to  any  person  whose  interests  have  been  damaged  "by  an 
assertion  of  incorrect  facts". 
298  Rights  of reply  provide  the  person  concerned  with  an 
opportunity  to  place  information  before  the  public;  these  rights,  like  access  rights,  thus 
indirectly facilitate the expression of a variety of views. 
Throughout  the  European  Union,  rights  of reply  are  primarily  exercised  to  respond  to 
allegations of fact.  Statutory provisions in France,  Germany,  and Italy,  unlike those dealing 
with access in general, clearly confer legally enforceable rights of reply. 
In Germany,  rights of reply are regarded as protecting the constitutional rights of dignity and 
the free development of personality. 
299 The contribution which their exercise may make to the 
goal of public discussion is of secondary importance.  The provision in the ZDF Staatsvertrag 
is  typical of the German rules; a person or body directly affected by a factual  allegation may 
claim a right of reply. 
300 
In Italy,  the  right of reply  can only  be  successfully  claimed against  broadcasters  when the 
allegation of fact is untrue. 
301  In contrast, in France,  and generally in Germany,  it is sufficient 
for  the  complainant to  allege  that  the  broadcast was  inaccurate.  A right  of reply  must be 
provided unless the reply is known to be untrue. 
302  If the broadcasting authority fails  to grant 
a right of reply, or imposes unjustifiable restrictions on its exercise, the right can be enforced 
through the civil courts. 
In the  United Kingdom,  there is no right of reply as  such, but complaints of unfair treatment 
and invasion of privacy may be made to the Broadcasting Complaints Commission ("BCC"). 
The BCC may  direct the broadcasting body to  publish its  fmdings,  a sanction which bears 
some resemblance to the compelled publication of a reply. 
A  number  of Member  States  have  thus  concluded  that  access  rights  are  compatible  with 
broadcasting freedom.  The contribution which the exercise of such rights makes to informing 
the  public  is  believed  to  outweigh  the  relative  interference  with  the  broadcasters' 
298 
299 
300 
301 
302 
Article 23 of Council Directive of  3 October 1989 on the coordination of  cenain provisions laid down by 
law,  regulations  and  administrative  action  in  Member  States  concerning  the  pursuit  of television 
broadcasting activities, OJ  1989 L298/23. 
ZDF Staatsvertrag, 122-3. 
Section 9. 
Article 10 of Law 223 of 6 August 1990 requires both public and private broadcasters to provide a right 
of reply in appropriate cases. 
The  Sudwestfunk State Treaty  and the Hesse  Public Broadcasting Statute  are exceptions to  this general 
rule. 
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programming  freedom.  Indeed,  statutory  access  provisions  are  normally  regarded  as 
promoting, rather than restricting, broadcasting freedom. 
(iv)  "Must-carry" Rules and Access to Cable TV 
Only  recently  in the  evolution of the  cable  TV  industry  have  issues  relating  to  "access" 
involved  the  same  economic  arguments  which  underlie  requests  in the  telecoms  sector. 
Originally,  however,  access  to  cable  TV  had  the  hallmarks  of  a  policy  based  on  the 
preservation of plurality. In the United States, FCC rules issued in 1976 required all cable TV 
operators with over 3,500 subscribers to set aside four  "access" channels (one for free public 
access,  another for  educational access,  one for  local  government access  and  a final  one  for 
leased access). As the number of subscribers and/or channels grew, these access requirements 
increased accordingly. 
In the European Union,  access  to  cable TV  has  usually taken the  form of so-called  "must-
carry" rules, which require the carriage of free-to-air television stations, often combined with 
a "minimum content"  requirement for  European productions.  These  "must carry" rules are 
summarised in Table IX below. In countries such as  Germany,  private broadcasting laws also 
make provision for the existence of an open channel (Offener Kanal)  which can be used by 
anyone wishing to broadcast. 
Access  to  cable  TV  networks  has  recently  developed  more  "economic"  connotations,  as 
satellite  broadcasters  and  others  have  developed  an  interest  in  obtaining  access  for  their 
programming  to  the  customers  served by  cable  TV  operators.  For example,  satellite  DTH 
broadcasters argue that, because cable TV networks are currently the only broadband path to 
the home, cable TV operators should be required to  "terminate" satellite broadcaster traffic. 
Further, they  argue that termination charges should be calculated using the  same principles 
that underlie those used for voice telephony. 
The Member State in which this issue has arisen most often is  The Netherlands,  where recent 
precedent has clarified the extent to  which cable TV  operators are obliged to provide others 
with  access  to  their  networks  under  an  ONP-style  regime,  which  is  otherwise  usually 
associated with the telecoms sector. 
In three decisions taken in late 1996, the Minister of Economic Affairs concluded: 
•  The right of access to cable networks must be considered within the context of Article 
10  of the  European  Convention  for  Human  Rights  (freedom  of speech)  and  of 
Community  and  national  policies  with  respect  to  the  liberalisation  of telecoms 
infrastructures, telecoms services and media. 
•  An  exclusivity  clause  which  prohibits  television producers  from entering  into  other 
agreements  with  respect  to  the  distribution  of their  television  programmes  is  not 
permissible and is therefore null and void. 
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•  An exclusivity  clause  which  prohibits  a  cable  TV  company  from  allowing  certain 
competitors access to the cable network is  not permissible and is  therefore null  and 
void. 
•  Because access to a cable network is more or less the only way to reach consumers of 
(radio  and)  television  programmes  or  related  services,  a  cable  television  network 
operator may hold a position of market dominance. 
•  The existence of a dominant position may  prevent a cable television operator from 
denying access to a television producer where the capacity of the cable network is not 
fully utilised. 
•  A cable operator may charge television producers a fee for access to its cable network. 
The  existence of a  dominant position,  however,  may  prohibit a  cable  TV operator 
from charging discriminatory fees for access, unless it has objective reasons for doing 
so and such differentiation does not inhibit competition. 
303 
Market interviews indicate,  however,  that the indiscriminate application of ONP-style rules 
derived from the telecoms sector should have a limited role to play in the context of one-way 
broadcast networks. For example, video is a one-to-many (or point-to-multipoint) service, not 
an any-to-any (or point-to-point) service.  In contrast to voice telephony, there is  no network 
externality  involved,  i.e.,  the  network  does  not  get  more  valuable  in economic  terms  to 
individual users as the number of users increases. 
304 However, the ability of networks to carry 
both any-to-any and one-to-many services may further call in question any  argument for the 
application of ONP-style  rules  in a  future  multimedia  environment.  Similarly,  there  is  no 
overriding public interest argument supporting communications among  citizens  where mere 
entertainment services are provided. 
305  Finally, there is  no  "essential facility"  parallel with 
the networks of incumbent telecoms operators, because the programmer has multiple options 
to  obtain  access  to  customers,  including  building  its  own cable  DTH  satellite,  accessing 
digital  terrestrial  networks,  using  telecoms  networks  (with  xDSL  technologies),  or  even 
getting to consumers through the use of video cassettes. 
306 
303 
30-l 
305 
306 
Decisions of 17 December 1996, Staatscourant No. 247 of 20 December 1996. 
It does, of course, get more valuable to the network operator which relies on advertising for revenues, or 
is attempting to spread fixed costs over a larger base. 
The cultural interest which may be promoted by public  broadcasters,  for  example,  can be more than 
adequately served by existing  "must carry" obligations on private broadcasters.  In  a  truly competitive 
environment with access to multiple forms of content, it is arguable that "must carry" obligations may be 
unnecessary. 
The fmal  option is  no less important from an economic perspective simply because it  does not involve 
scheduled transmissions.  Ultimately, the most valuable renewable resource available to a broadcaster is 
its subsisting copyright over a work, which can be realised just as effectively through the sale of a video 
cassette as through its direct broadcast. 
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Consequently, the application of European competition rules would appear to be sufficient to 
control the potential for abuse without the risks associated with the application of ONP rules 
to this industry. More recent events in The Netherlands,  where the issue has arisen before the 
courts on a number of occasions (see above), suggest that such an approach may be the only 
realistic means of dealing with the issue of access in such a dynamic environment. 
The Dutch government recently announced that the use of ONP-style regulations may not be 
efficient in dynamic environments such as multimedia. Therefore, it has decided that the issue 
of access to cable TV networks should be based exclusively on the Dutch competition rules. 
After  1 January  1998,  access  to  cable  networks,  which  has  to  date  been  overseen by  the 
Supervisory  Board  for  the  Media,  will  be  transferred  to  the  new  Dutch  Competition 
Authority. 
307 
3.4  DIFFERENTIATING BETWEEN "INTERCONNECTION" AND "ACCESS" 
"Interconnection" is defined in Article 2( 1) of the Interconnection Directive as: 
" ... the physical and logical linking of telecommunications networks used by the same 
or  a  different  organisation  in  order  to  allow  the  users  of one  organisation  to 
communicate  with  users  of the  same  or another  organisation,  or to  access  services 
provided by another organisation.  Services may be provided by the parties involved or 
other parties who have access to the network". 
"Access", on the other hand, is a broader concept which, although undefmed in the Directive 
itself,  is  generally understood to  embrace the  full  range  of requests  by  market players  for 
access to  a network operator's assets (usually to be  able to provide a service to  the network 
operator's customers) or to  its  customers.
308  In doing  so,  a service provider might wish to 
incorporate some of the network operators' resources as part of its service to customers (e.g., 
leased lines) or it may  simply need to transit through a network to reach a customer (e.g.,  a 
'gateway' facility). 
Empirical  research  indicates  that  the  concept  of "access"  has  become  blurred  both  under 
existing Community law and especially under various Member States laws (e.g.,  in Germany 
and in Denmark,  where the concept of interconnection is  treated as  a form of access).  This 
has  created  a  significant degree  of confusion  for  both  regulators  and  market  actors  alike, 
given the  different range of legal obligations which may apply depending on the regulatory 
characterisation of what is being provided. Market interviews further suggest that the issue is 
307 
308 
Staatscourant of 27 January 1997. 
The  difference  between  the  two  concepts  is  implicit  in  the  fact  that  Directorate-General  IV 
(Competition)  of the  European  Commission  had  two  studies  completed  for  it  in  1995,  namely: 
"Competition Aspects  of Interconnection Agreements  in  the  Telecommunications  Sector"  (Coudert, 
June  1995)  and  "Competition  Aspects  of  Access  by  Service  Providers  to  the  Resources  of 
Telecommunications Network Operators" (Wilmer Cutler &  Pickering,  1995). 
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becoming more, rather than less,  complex,  in light of the fact that the regulatory status of a 
"service provider" and a "network operator" is becoming increasingly harder to draw in light 
of the different levels of network build-out and configuration adopted by market actors. 
The  onset  of a multimedia  environment  will,  in  the  view  of the  Study  Team,  exacerbate 
existing  regulatory  difficulties  encountered  in  the  delineation  between  the  two  concepts 
because of the greater range of market actors seeking interconnection and/ or access and also 
the greater range of facilities  and  services to which interconnection and/  or access  is  sought. 
Seen in this light, the existing regulatory environment needs to be adapted in such a way as to 
give effect to the following policy goals: 
•  on the assumption that the local loop is a contestable market, embrace an economic 
model of the concept of "access" which allows market actors to determine the price 
and terms of access on commercial terms free of regulatory review,  subject to the 
application of the competition rules to prevent the abuse of market power (Article 
86 of the EC Treaty); 
•  not  undermine  the  investments  of new  operators  of networks  with  broadband 
capabilities by establishing  a regulatory  model  which allows  service providers  to 
take a "free ride" on their new investments; and 
•  identify the policy goal of supporting the provision of any-to-any communications 
as  having overriding public interest, while acknowledging that most forms  of one-
way communications are less likely to require direct regulatory review because the 
dynamics of a 'network' in the latter case are not identical in the former. 
Bearing  these policy  goals  in mind,  the  Study  Team sees  the  approach undertaken in  The 
Netherlands,  where the distinction between interconnection and access has been drawn on the 
basis of whether calls are being terminated on a network by  either a network operator or a 
service provider ("interconnection") or are being originated on a network in order to provide 
a service or to reach a customer on another network ("access"), as providing the key elements 
for workable model for a multimedia environment. What is required, however, is that careful 
consideration  be  given  in  a  consultation  process  as  to  which  elements  of service  in  a 
multimedia environment are akin to the respective functions of "termination" or "origination" 
in a telecoms world. 
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Table IX: 
Member 
States 
Austria 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Gennany 
"Must-Carry" and Other Progranuning Obligations in the Audiovisual Sector 
Description of Nature of Obligations or 
Restrictions on Programming/  Access to Programming 
Cable  TV  operators  must  carry  ORF.  ORF  is  subject,  under  the  broadcasting  laws,  to  the 
requirement  to  include  a  sufficient  amount  of  time  for  programmes  on  different  subjects, 
educational programmes, arts,  science,  family  entertainment and  sports.  Pursuant to  a ruling of 
the  Austrian  Constitutional  Court  on  27  September  1995,  cable  TV  operators  were  able  to 
produce  or  commission  their  own  programming  and  broadcast  programming  on  their  own 
networks  as  of 31  July  1996.  Following  this  ruling,  a  regulation  has  been  adopted  which 
liberalises the cable TV and satellite sectors.  A regulation to  liberalise the  terrestrial television 
sector is currently subject to consultation. 
French Speaking Community: a cable TV operator must carry: 
a)  the public broadcasting service of the French Community (RTBFl and Tele 21); 
b)  programmes of international broadcasters as specified by the Executive; 
c)  one  or more  programmes  of the  public  broadcasting  service  of the  Flemish  and  German 
Community insofar as  a similar obligation is  imposed on the authorised cable network operators 
in the respective Community; 
d)  programmes of authorised pay TV operators (Canal Plus); and 
e)  programmes of local TV channels. 
Flemish Speaking Community:  Flemish cable TV  operators must carry the two  Dutch language 
public  channels  (BRT1  and  TV  2):  VTM  (which  operates  VTM  and  Kanaal  2);  private 
broadcasters as authorised by the Executive; and French public channels on a reciprocal basis. 
French  and  Flemish  communities  have  prevented  cable  TV  networks  from  controlling 
programme  services  or generating  their  own  programming.  The  role  of networks  has  been 
restricted to retransmissions. In Flanders, however. the Decree of the Flemish Community of 20 
December 1995 has empowered the  municipalities providing cable TV services to  participate in 
companies which operate interactive communications services. 
If the cable TV operator carries more than eight channels,  it  must carry the two national public 
service  channels  and  one  local  channel.  There  is  no  obligation to  provide  access  to  the  cable 
network to third parties. 
A  cable  TV  operator  must  retransmit  the  public  television  broadcasts  intended  for  national 
reception  (YLE  1,  YLE2  and  MTV3)  and  the  broadcasts  of YLE  which  are  intended  for 
reception in that operator's area. If  several cable TV operators use the same network, they may 
jointly comply with this obligation.  There are a variety of obligations to provide access to  third 
parties. 
A cable TV operator must carry the terrestrial television services broadcast in its area.  There is 
no  obligation  to  provide  access  to  the  network  to  third  parties.  There  are  no  restrictions 
preventing cable TV operators from producing or providing their own programming.  Cable TV 
service  providers  which  broadcast  cinematographic  or audiovisual  works  must  spend  10%  of 
their turnover on European works from independent programmers (as per the Television Without 
Frontiers Directive). 
Terrestrial,  cable  TV  and  satellite  operators  must  carry  the  programmes  of the  two  public 
broadcasters,  ARD  and  ZDF.  They  must  also  carry programmes  prescribed in the  individual 
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Member 
States 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
The 
Netherlands 
Ponugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
United 
Kingdom 
Description of Nature of  Obligations or 
Restrictions on Programming/  Access to Programming 
Lander as  being for the general public.  Broadcasters must also keep progrannnes in the ranking 
order  determined  by  the  Landesmedienanstalten.  The  Lander  are  planning  to  build  into  the 
National  Convention on  Broadcasting  a  "must  carry"  requirement  for  channels  which  already 
have a terrestrial licence and wish to extend their reach through cable TV networks. 
There is no specific requirement under Greek law for the carriage of other channels. 
Cable TV  operators must carry the  RTE  radio and television progrannnes,  and  it  is  likely that 
they will have to carry the new commercial station. 
There are no ''must carry" obligations. 
There  are  no  "must  carry"  obligations  nor  any  "local  content"  or  "independent  content" 
obligations imposed on cable TV operators (other than those set forth  in the Television Without 
Frontiers Directive). 
The "must carry" obligations on cable TV companies require them to carry: 
a)  the three national terrestrial channels; 
b)  the two Dutch language channels from Flanders in areas of "national overspill"; 
c)  local and regional channels; and 
d)  European television progrannnes aimed at the Dutch public. 
The Dutch Competition Authorities have been considering whether to  apply  ONP-type rules to 
cable TV companies. 
Until  1997  amendments  in  the  law  reversed the  policy,  cable TV  networks  could  not produce 
their own programming. 
There is  an  obligation to  provide access  to  the  cable TV  network to  third parties based on an 
access regime. Cable TV operators must also carry the public service channels. 
Must-carry obligation on cable TV operators in the nature of a 40%  independent programming 
requirement. 
Restrictions on broadcasting of certain sports events on Pay-TV. 
Cable TV operators are legally obliged to transmit the national public service channels (Kanal  1 
and TV2),  as  well as  the  connnercial channel  (TV4).  Cable TV operators must also keep  one 
channel available for a local television station if this has  been authorised by the municipality in 
question by the Radio and Television Authority. 
Cable TV  operators licensed under the  1984  Broadcasting Act have  a  "must carry"  obligation 
with respect to the three public broadcasting terrestrial TV channels, namely,  BBC1,  BBC2  and 
Channel  4.  That  obligation  does  not  apply  to  cable  TV  operators  licensed  under  the  1990 
Broadcasting Act.  The  1996  Broadcasting Act,  however,  reimposes  a must carry obligation on 
cable  TV  operators  and  digital  broadcasters.  There  are  no  formal  progrannning  restrictions 
imposed on cable TV operators aside from the commitment to require 10%  of their programming 
from independent producers (25%  of European origin).  On the contrary, the general policy is to 
encourage such activity in programming (although reliance on the progrannning of BSkyB is seen 
as restricting their ability in practice to engage in the production of content for use over their own 
cable TV networks). 
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I Implications for Multimedia  i 
Our review of the existing legal regimes at both the Community and Member State level suggests some confusion  1 
regarding  the  scope  of the  concepts  of interconnection  and  access.  The  Study Team  therefore  suggests  that  the  I 
existing  telecoms  regulatory  framework  be  adapted  as  set  forth  below  to  render  it  sufficiently flexible  in  a  '==: 
multimedia environment: 
j  =>  The  concept  of "access"  should  embrace  all  requests  by  an  operator  or  service  provider for  access  to  the I 
resources  or  customers  of other  network  operators  and/or  service  providers  (this  would  include  the  I 
origination of the full range of communications on someone else's network).  Requests for  access should  be  j 
assessed in the context of European competition rules, especially in tenns of Article 86 of the EC Treaty or  ! 
its national equivalents (i.e., abuse of market power). Measures designed to increase transparency will assist  '==, 
regulators in detecting abusive pricing practices. 
~  =>  The concept of "interconnection" should be restricted to the tennination of communications on the network  j 
of an  operator.  Unlike  the  concept  of "access",  the  availability  of which  should  in  principle  reflect  a  ~ 
competitive marketplace (i.e., a contestable market), there is an overriding public policy in mandating that  · 
interconnection  be  provided  at  cost  in  order  to  ensure  "any-to-any"  communications.  To  this  end, 
Community legislation could prescribe that termination to a bottleneck be provided at prices that reflect cost 
(preferably under a LRAIC formula).  In  the view of the Study Team,  a designated number or address may 
constitute a bottleneck where the initial caller has no option other than to terminate its communications on 
that particular designated number or address.  309 
!~ 
The use of Article 86 to detennine the terms and conditions pursuant to which access will be granted may, 
in the long term, require a determination as  to what constitutes an  "essential" or "bottleneck" facility for  1 
access purposes. It may be necessary, in the longer term, to adopt a statutory definition of such facilities  in  I,_ 
order  to  enhance enforcement  (as  has  been  done  recently  in Australia).  It would  be  premature  to  do  so, 
however, before the multimedia market has been given an opportunity to mature. 
Until the multimedia market develops further, it would also  be premature to apply ONP principles beyond  j 
the  scope of access  to  traditional voice services.  For example,  in the context of the  cable TV industry, the  I 
application of ONP rules to the benefit of content providers or service providers seeking access to cable TV i 
networks would probably have a negative impact on the  investment decisions of  cable TV operators (i.e., it  j 
is  a  low  margin  business  which  is  subject  to  competition  from  a  variety  of sources,  and  it  is  not  :=,_;'=,,_ 
characterised by a significant degree of vertical integration in the multimedia value chain). 
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309  The calculation of "costs"  in the  context of termination on a mobile network, however,  should take 
into account the  fact mobile communications are still offered in most Member States under different 
competitive conditions when compared to  voice  services over fixed networks (e.g.,  mobile  services 
are usually premium price services,  there is no existing network infrastructure in place,  handsets are 
often subsidised,  and so on).  Moreover, if a caller makes an informed decision to forego termination 
on a fixed network for the premium service offering of termination on a mobile network, the mobile 
terminating number need not have the character of a n enduring bottleneck. 
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Moreover,  the  application  of ONP rules  is,  to  date,  premised  on  the  existence of a vertically  integrated 
monopoly network provider and, in a liberalised environment, on the enduring nature of market power held 
by that former monopolist. 
=>  Any attempt to apply GNP-style rules  to  the broadcast industry should give due  regard  to  the fact  that the 
structure of this industry differs from  that of telecoms market (with  infrastructure markets dominated  by an 
incumbent monopolist or, even after the introduction of  competition, by a relatively small number of  players). 
=>  Today,  programmers can choose to obtain capacity from a variety of transmission  providers such as  cable TV 
operators or terrestrial  broadcasters.  Some of these players have a global  scope of operations,  as  in the case of 
satellite providers.  In  addition,  imposing a general  obligation  on  providers of broadcasters  to grant  access  to 
their  networks  at  standard  cost-based  rates  may  result  in  these  operators  loosing  control  of their  main 
competitive advantage, i.e., the offer of quality content packages to  their subscribers.  They would, presumably, 
become mere providers of "dumb channels" for content providers; this would have an unpredictable impact on 
the structure of the value chain in this industry. This would, in turn, provide the wrong investment signals to 
the market, possibly discouraging investments in broadband transmission infrastructure and delaying (or even 
preventing) the full development of  new interactive services in the Community. 
=>  Aside from  the  application  of Article 86  on  a case-by-case  basis,  mandated  access  to  content  should  be  I 
avoided in the absence of strong public policy reasons justifying intervention. Although access on fair and  I 
reasonable terms may be appropriate in certain circumstances for  programmes which are "perishable" (i.e.,  I 
of short  commercial  life,  such  as  large  sporting events),  the  ability of Member  States  under  the  revised  I 
Television  Without Frontiers  Directive of 30 June  1997 to  prevent broadcasters from  obtaining exclusive I 
access to events of "major importance to society" appears to provide adequate protection against the abuse  I 
of market  power.  Where  content  providers  are  vertically  integrated,  analogies  with  telecoms  legislation  I 
suggest that they be compelled to provide access to third parties, on conditions no less favourable than those  I 
applied to their own services arms or affiliates (refer to discussion in Section 4 of  Annex I). 
j  =>  In  a mature multimedia market,  "must carry"  obligations  may no  longer  be  necessary.  An abundance of j 
i  content  may  mean  that  such  obligations  no  longer  serve  the  social  goals  they  once  sought  to  satisfy.  i 
1  Moreover,  in a world of excess  digital  capacity,  carrying other channels  may become an  economic,  rather I 
L  ........ J~~!.!:  ..  qJ~s.:q?.~  ..  !!:~~~~~-~-~Y.  ......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................  .l 
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4.  Access to Scarce Resources 
The Regulatory Issues 
Liberalisation  measures,  having  created  a  regulatory  environment  conducive  to  the 
provision  of a  wide  variety  of digitalised  services  by  new  market  entrants,  must  be 
complemented by  a commitment on the  part of the  Member States  to  promote the  more 
intensive use of public  resources  such  as  rights-of-way,  spectrum and  numbering  plans. 
Because public resources are not infinitely elastic,  they need to be managed efficiently in 
order to accommodate new competitors. 
Similarly,  individual  market  actors  may,  in  a  multimedia  environment,  control  certain 
types  of tangible  or  intangible  assets  to  which  competitors  require  access  in  order  to 
compete  in some or all  levels  of the  multimedia value  chain.  In certain circumstances, 
these private assets  may  be tantamount to  a  "resource"  whose  relative  importance to  the 
market is no less significant than public resources. Usually, the existence of such private 
resources flows  from the existence of proprietary rights over technology or certain types 
of information.  A notable example of a private resource in the digital era is a conditional 
access  system  (or  so-called  set-top  box)  which  is  used  in  the  decoding  of  digital 
broadcasting signals and potentially all types of digital interactive services. 
The  manner  in  which  both public  and  private  resources  are  managed  in  a  multimedia 
environment  will  inevitably  affect  the  evolving  structure  of the  market  because  of the 
market signals given to potential new entrants. For example, the market value of access to 
certain types of scarce public resources may be so high as to erect significant entry barriers 
to all parties other than those which can "pay and play". Conversely, the sharing of limited 
public resources at little or no  economic cost may  result in the  "spillover" of cooperation 
between competitors into other areas which may be inimical to competition.  In the case of 
private resources,  competition rules  should be applied in a way  which realistically opens 
the market while at the same time differentiating between those private assets acquired by 
skill (in which case they may be protected by legal rights under intellectual property laws) 
or  by  mere  circumstance  (usually  resulting  from  a  "first  mover"  advantage  in  the 
marketplace). 
This Section focuses on the ways in which the Member States of the European Union are 
addressing the management of both public and private resources and the possible ways in 
which  regulation  can  foster  the  efficient  use  of  those  resources  in  a  multimedia 
environment,  while  at  the  same  time  encouraging  greater  competition.  The  regulatory 
challenge  is  to  ensure  that  public  resources  are  available  to  all  on  fair  and  non-
discriminatory terms that reflect the value of the resource.  The issue for private resources 
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is  to determine the level of regulation necessary to avoid the abuse of bottlenecks, whilst 
ensuring that regulation does not inhibit market development and innovation. 
4.1  PuBLIC RESOURCES 
The regulatory traditions of the telecoms and broadcasting sectors are ill-suited to promoting 
the efficient use of public  resources.  This  is  because the  resources  in question have  either 
been dedicated to the use of an entity operating what was perceived to be a natural monopoly 
(telecoms)  or  by  an  entity  or  limited  range  of  entities  with  a  public  service  mission 
(broadcasting).  As  such,  public resources  were  neither  sold nor  leased to  those  entities  at 
market value, even though these resources conferred significant economic value. 
Access to the following types of public resources is examined below: 
•  the allocation of frequencies; 
•  access to rights-of-way; 
•  access  to  adequate numbers  and  other numbering  resources  such as  Internet 
addresses (domain names). 
Frequencies for telecoms purposes have until recently been allocated by national authorities 
throughout the European Union using methods that do not value the spectrum and do not take 
account of market forces.  In the broadcasting sector,  the  scarcity of available spectrum has 
been a key regulatory driver and is  reflected in the relatively small number of market actors, 
operating  in  each  national  Member  State  (excluding  retransmitted  broadcasts).  Although 
clearly a finite resource to which many new market actors seek access, as the Member States 
have used  spectrum to  limit the  number  of market actors  providing  particular  services  or 
services  via  particular  technologies.  In addition,  spectrum has  been artificially  limited  by 
Member State allocations for military and governmental purposes. Such allocations have been 
a major cause of much of the existing cellular telephony frequency congestion. 
Many of the inefficiencies of current frequency allocation methods are being overcome by the 
onset of digitalisation, which is facilitating the more efficient use of spectrum.  Nevertheless, 
the high penetration of wireless services throughout the European Union and the expansion of 
new  communications  applications  will  create  pressure  on regulators  to  make  even  more 
efficient use of spectrum, minimise congestion and promote market entry through the proper 
market signals. 
Although access to rights-of-way is  a condition precedent for  any new entrant to  invest in 
infrastructure,  there  are  few  policies  in  place  throughout  the  European  Union  that  are 
designed to  facilitate  the  use of alternative  infrastructure  already  benefiting  from access  to 
existing rights-of-way,  and even less  defmed policies regarding  access to  rights-of-way  for 
new entrants wishing to build their own infrastructure. 
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Access  to  adequate  numbers  was  historically  the  prerogative  of the  incumbent  national 
telecommunications operator. It has only been relatively recently that numbering policy has 
fallen within the  competence of national  regulators.  The increase in competition has  meant 
that numbering,  rather than being a mere technical issue,  is now a key  competitive resource 
which must be  readily available to  new market entrants.  Particular numbering  issues which 
need to  be  addressed include matters  such as  equal access  (or so-called dialling parity) and 
number  portability.  Most  recently,  the  broader  issue  of addressing  has  arisen  within  the 
context of the Internet and raises  a new generation of numbering-related problems;  some of 
these arise from the  fact that Internet Domain Names have thus  far  not been allocated by  a 
public entity or regulator, but by an informal private body or bodies. 
By way of contrast, the publishing and information technology sectors have thus far not been 
hampered by the scarcity of any relevant resources in the public domain. The only  "scarcity" 
issue  that might arise  in the  information technology  sector would  result from  the  abuse  of 
proprietary  standards  to  restrict the  access  of competitors to  new  technologies,  services  or 
customers. 
4.1.1  Spectrum Allocation 
(i)  International Methods of Allocation and Regulatory Systems 
Spectrum  exploitation  has  a  clear  international  dimension,  since  the  propagation 
characteristics  of some  frequencies  are  such that a  signal  can cross  the  globe,  let  alone 
national  borders  (e.g.,  long  wave  transmissions).  Accordingly,  frequency  management 
often involves the interplay of a number of regulatory bodies: 
•  at an international level, the ITU; 
•  at a regional level, CEPT; and 
•  at a national level, the regulatory authorities of the Member States. 
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(a)  The ITU 
The International Telecommunications Union ("ITU") is an international body responsible, 
inter  alia,  for  managing  frequency  spectrum.  At  its  World  Radiocommunications 
Conferences ("WRC"), held every four years,  the ITU revises the Radio  Communications 
Regulations,  divides frequencies between services and establishes co-ordination procedures 
for bands that are shared by a number of services.  The Table of Attribution of Frequency 
Bands  sets  the  bands  and  allocates  them to  particular  services.  Services  are  divided  into 
three  regulatory  categories:  "primary  status"  (i.e.,  with  priority  over  other  services); 
"secondary status"  (i.e.,  must not interfere with primary services);  and  "permitted"  (i.e., 
secondary status rights, except at the planning stage). 
The  ITU' s  International  Frequency  Registration  Board  and  its  International  Radio 
Consultative  Committee  are  its  two  major  permanent  bodies.  The  former  registers 
frequencies  and orbital positions notified by member countries,  maintains the international 
frequency file,  deals with interference complaints and ensures that international regulations 
are  respected.  The  ITU  has  recently  reviewed  its  operating  procedures.  The  1989 
Plenipotentiary Conference set up  a voluntary group of experts to  review  the methods  of 
frequency allocation, including the definitions of service categories, and to consider ways to 
simplify  the  Radio  Regulations.  In  addition,  a  high-level  Committee  was  established  to 
reassess the structure and role of the ITU, its spectrum management and regulation system, 
and the role of its permanent bodies. 
At  WRC-97,  held  in  October  1997,  a  number  of  initiatives  were  approved  for  the 
development of a new generation of satellite systems to supply broadband communications 
services to consumers. 
(b)  The CEPT 
The  European Conference  of Postal  and  Telecommunications  Administrations  ("CEPT") 
represents  the  postal  and  telecommunications  administrations  of EC  countries  and  most 
EFT  A  members.  CEPT  coordinates  the  use  of frequencies  in  member  countries  and 
establishes joint positions at ITU conferences. Through its European Radiocommunications 
Office ("ERO") in Copenhagen,  the CEPT has  a specialised radio communications centre 
responsible for research related to long-term planning for the use of spectrum in Europe. 
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(c)  Member State Regulatory Authorities 
The explosion in the use of spectrum for  transmissions over shorter and shorter distances 
has led to increasing amounts of frequency allocation and use that fall within the control of 
individual Member States. Historically, the major role of national frequency regulators was 
to prevent interference,  so  that services would not be impaired.  To  ensure the  "equitable" 
distribution of resources,  all  frequencies,  regardless  of their  propagation  characteristics, 
were treated as  falling within the national public domain.  Allocations were essentially free 
(other  than for  a  management or administrative  fee),  were  made  on a  "first-come,  first-
served"  basis  and  were  subject  only  to  technical  conditions.  When  existing  regulatory 
mechanisms were put under pressure by new services, increasing numbers of users, or new 
technologies,  regulators  responded  by  addressing  each  new  situation  individually  by 
modifying the existing rules. 
The explosion of demand for  spectrum and the difficulty of meeting  that demand through 
incremental changes in existing allocation and management systems have forced regulatory 
authorities  to  fundamentally  reconsider  frequency  allocation.  Where  spectrum  cannot 
accommodate significant increases in the number of service providers, it may act as a brake 
on the broader attempt to introduce competition into the market. 
The  United Kingdom 
The  national  government is  responsible  for  spectrum regulation.  General  coordination of 
telecommunications  policies  is  undertaken  by  an  inter-ministerial  committee,  which  has 
several  specialised  working  groups.  The  National  Frequency  Planning  Group  formulates 
policy for allocating national frequencies,  and the International Frequency Planning Group 
considers the requirements of different spectrum users in preparing for WRCs.  Frequency 
assignments are made by the Radiocommunications Agency (" RA "), the Home Office,  the 
Ministry of Defence ("MoD") and  a number of other bodies.  The  RA  issues  licences  to 
almost all civil users,  except broadcasters (whose licences are issued by  the  Home Office 
through the lTC). Many government bodies are allowed to broadcast on an unlicensed basis 
on  bands  reserved  for  their  specific  use.  Some  major  users  (e.g.,  the  BBC,  BT  and 
Mercury)  are  licensed  to  broadcast  on  very  broad  bands,  make  their  own  assignments 
within  these  bands,  and  choose  their  own  transmitter  sites.  A  frequency  assignment  is 
registered in the national table of frequency allocations.  The RA attempts to accommodate 
all spectrum uses that have no alternative means of transmission, and its assignment policy 
contains a set of detailed rules tailored to specific applications and user groups. 
Licence fees  were traditionally tied to  the  RA' s costs.  This prejudiced its  ability  to  meet 
demand for  spectrum and was  generally considered to  distort the market.  As  a result,  the 
Government has  introduced legislation allowing  fees  to  reflect more closely the economic 
value of spectrum, provide selective financial  assistance to  accelerate changes in spectrum 
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usage and enhance a licensee's security of tenure.  Further reforms allowing auctioning and 
administrative  pricing  are  under  consideration.  Regulatory  powers  over  anti-competitive 
practices  have  been  retained,  and  the  RA  is  committed  to  developing  competition  and 
maintaining diversity in spectrum use. 
The  RA  only manages  civilian spectrum.  The  MoD  retains  control of military  spectrum. 
Spectrum  sharing  between  civil  and  military  users  has  been  introduced  to  address  the 
spectrum  needs  of new  and  expanding  civil  systems.  Whilst  the  MoD  must  provide 
sufficient  capacity  for  increasingly  sophisticated  military  systems  (which  are  also 
demanding  greater bandwidth),  retain access  to  spectrum to  meet  its  training  needs,  and 
ensure  reliable  and  secure  means  of control  of  service  personnel,  it  recognises  the 
importance  of civil uses  to  the  national  interest,  and  supports  sharing.  The  MoD  is  also 
vacating  some  parts  of the  spectrum,  to  the  extent  that  its  equipment  allows.  However, 
migration that would render entire generations  of equipment obsolete is  precluded by  the 
short  -term budgetary considerations. 
France 
The  initial  division of the  national  spectrum is  made  at  the  Comite  de  Coordination des 
Telecommunications  ("CCT")  level.  The  CCT  is  an  ad  hoc  inter-ministerial  body, 
reporting  to  the  Prime  Minister,  composed  of administrations  that  use  spectrum.  It has 
several  committees  and  working  groups  which  co-ordinate between areas.  The  three  key 
groups are discussed below. 
The  Commission  des  Conferences  Radioelectriques  ("CCR")  produces  statements  of the 
French position in,  and  determines  the  composition of delegations  to,  ITU  Conferences. 
The  Commission d' Etude de  la Repartition Geographique des  Stations Radioelectriques  is 
responsible for the siting of radio stations. It addresses some scarcity issues, encourages the 
grouping of stations, provides safeguards and designates a coordinator amongst site users. 
The Commission Mixte des  Frequences ("CMF") divides the spectrum in accordance with 
international regulations and  is  responsible for  maintaining the national table of frequency 
allocations.  The  Commission  Executive  d'  Assignation  des  Frequences  ("CAF")  makes 
specific assignments where bands are shared between several services, and records them in 
the national frequency allocation file. 
The Law of  30 September 1986 established the Commission Nationale de la Communication 
et des  Libertes, which was  superceded by the Conseil superieur de 1' Audiovisuel ("CSA") 
under  the  Law of 19 January  1989.  In  addition,  the  Direction  de  la  Reglementation 
Generale  ("DRG") was  established,  as  an  independent  regulatory  body.  Administrations 
belonging  to  the  CCT  may  use  their  frequencies  without  seeking  prior  authorisation. 
However,  other users must obtain an operating licence from the DRG or the CSA  (in the 
case of broadcasters). 
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The CSA has full authority over the frequencies assigned to it;  the CSA can authorise,  set 
the  conditions of,  and oversee their use,  and  can prescribe measures  designed to  ensure 
adequate service quality. It also has a consultative role in the assignment of spectrum to the 
CCT administrations and in the preparation by the Ministry of Posts & Telecommunications 
of draft standards on telecommunications equipment and techniques. 
The  DRG  coordinates  relations  with  the  ITU  and  foreign  administrations,  deals  with 
interference complaints  and  notifies  frequency  assignments.  It also  authorises  the  use of 
equipment  other  than  that  owned  by  the  State  or  used  in  broadcasting,  specifies  and 
publishes the standards and procedures of approval for terminal equipment, and processes 
licence applications  and prior notifications.  With the CCT,  it prepares the allocations of 
spectrum to different services and assigns frequencies allocated by the Ministry of Posts & 
Telecommunications. 
Germany 
Only  the  Federal  government  has  the  right  to  install  and  operate  telecoms  equipment, 
including  radiocommunications  systems.  It does  so  through  the  Ministry  of  Posts  & 
Telecommunications and the Ministry of Defence. There is a clear distinction between civil 
and military applications.  Historically, spectrum organisation was the result of investment 
and policy decisions by Deutsche Bundespost.  It incorporated frequency management into 
the organisational and executive  structure of its  telecoms  services.  The role of Deutsche 
Bundespost as  both operator and spectrum manager led to  frequency  allocation becoming 
subordinated to  its  operational interests.  Indeed,  all revenues from user fees  were part of 
Deutsche Bundespost' s consolidated income. 
In  1989,  the  roles  of operator  and  regulator  were  separated.  Policy  goals  are  set  by 
consultative committees  representing  all  interested parties.  Various  allocation procedures 
are used:  Deutche Telekom ("DT") frequencies  are assigned through official notification; 
as  regards  other operators  which  operate in relatively  wide  bands,  the  Ministry  awards 
concessions  for  which  operating  fees  are charged.  Other users  are  allocated  individual, 
collective or general permits for relatively narrow frequency bands. Individual permits are 
issued by regional branches of the Ministry for a  fee.  Collective and general permits are 
generally free. 
The 28 ten-year trunk system concessions and the second fifteen year GSM concession were 
awarded through an open tender procedure. The GSM concessionaires paid approximately 
2,270,000 ECU, and pay an annual fee  of  27,240 ECU.  Trunk system concessions cost 
around 28,148 ECU with an annual fee of almost 3,632 ECU per channel. A fee of 8,145 
ECU is  charged for individual permits, which are awarded on a "first-come, first-served" 
basis. 
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Italy 
The Ministry of Posts & Telecommunications is responsible for managing civil frequencies, 
and  the  Ministry of Defence  is  responsible  for  frequencies  assigned to  the  armed  forces. 
Within the  Ministry of Posts  &  Telecommunications,  the  Direzione  Centrale deit  Servici 
Radioelettrici  allocates  frequencies.  The  Ministry  itself  represents  Italy  in  international 
organisations and notifies frequency allocations. 
Licences  for  radiocommunication services  are  granted primarily on the  basis  of technical 
criteria.  Other criteria include the  area served by  the  operator and transmission power.  A 
two-part procedure is used for  allocation:  spectrum planning,  followed by assignment on a 
"first-come, first-served" basis. Allocation on a "first-come, first-served" basis is generally 
used  for  "new"  resources,  as  an  essentially  temporary  expedient.  However,  once 
regulations  are  in place they  are difficult to  change,  and may  remain in force  indefinitely 
(albeit in an amended form). 
Denmark 
Danish  frequency  management  policy  has  two  objectives:  to  ensure  the  efficient  use  of 
frequency  through  active  administration;  and  to  contribute  to  the  framework  for 
competition.  In keeping  with the  liberalisation goal  of providing consumers with the best 
and  cheapest telephony,  frequencies  are  offered free  of charge  (other than administrative 
fees  based on actual  administration costs).  Every two  years,  the  Minister of Research  & 
Information  Technology  establishes  the  usage  and  priorities  for  the  following  five  year 
period.  The National Telecoms  Agency  ("NTA") is  responsible  for  day-to-day  frequency 
administration, and makes a submission to the Minister for the five year plans. 
Analy_sys ---------------------------------------Comparative Overview of Current Regulatory Environment in Telecommunications and Broadcastmg Sectors/Resources  Page 192 
To  foster  the  most  flexible  frequency  planning,  the  following  range  of administrative 
methods are used: 
•  public tendering; 
•  administrative redistribution; 
•  requirements for migration to more effective uses or technology; 
•  administrative withdrawal; 
•  increased fees;  and 
•  increased administrative pricing. 
The Minister specifies which method is  to  be used and ensures that the method adopted is 
no  more  radical  than  necessary,  given  frequency  scarcity.  He  or  she  may  prescribe  the 
method for an individual component of the frequency plan or geographic area. The military 
are allocated certain parts of the spectrum. If the military requires more frequencies, it must 
apply to the NT  A.  The Ministry,  NT A and broadcasters agree annually on the frequencies 
to be allocated for broadcasting purposes. 
(ii)  Technical and Economic Issues 
The economic characteristics of spectrum as  a scarce resource reinforce its  heterogeneity 
and  finite  capacity.  Technical  progress,  coupled  with  rapidly  escalating  demand  and 
regulation,  have  led  to  both  a  spectrum  shortage  and  demand-driven  pricing.  The 
development  of "scarcity"  pricing  for  spectrum,  in  the  absence  of specific  and  explicit 
pricing  principles,  raises  the  risk  of  poor  resource  management;  the  State  has  no 
mechanism  to  protect  consumer  interests  and  users  have  no  incentive  to  allocate  the 
resource in the most efficient or effective way. 
The propagation characteristics  of different frequencies  mean that  there are  two  types  of 
heterogeneity that cannot be fully overcome by technical means.  The higher the frequency, 
the  less  it  will  propagate  beyond  obstacles  and  the  greater  the  separation  that  must  be 
allowed between channels.  Access to  the  "best"  frequencies  minimises  equipment  costs. 
Technical progress has made it possible to modify the ways in which spectrum can be used 
by expanding the  spectrum that can be exploited (i.e., higher and higher frequencies),  by 
reducing the separation required, and by reducing the cost and size of equipment. 
The most  striking feature  in spectrum allocation has  become  scarcity,  and  the  increasing 
competition to  use  particular parts  of the  spectrum.  This  scarcity  is  neither  general  nor 
homogeneous,  since  it  is  confined  to  certain  frequency  bands.  In  addition  to  technical 
development  and  increasing  demand,  the  effects  of deregulation  have  highlighted  the 
scarcity of particular frequency bands. For example, a recent study reviewed the amount of 
unused frequency in the two GSM bands. The distribution analysis showed that 80%  of the 
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930-960 MHz band and over half of the 960-3000 MHz band are allocated to broadcast and 
government use. 
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The  evolution  of  regulatory  frameworks  reflects  the  changing  political  environment, 
favouring  market  mechanisms  and  competition,  and  making  it possible  to  accelerate  the 
development of innovation and achieve a better correlation between supply and demand.  In 
addition to  opening  access  to  spectrum,  there  is  a clear trend towards  liberalising  its  use 
(e.g.,  the  elimination  of public  broadcasting  monopolies).  For  example,  a  number  of 
Member  States  now  have  regulatory  systems  that  either  allow  or  actively  encourage 
wireless local loops, as a means of breaking traditional local loop monopolies, to encourage 
advanced telecoms services and to reduce the cost of universal service. Access to  spectrum 
is  vital to the  success of wireless local loop,  since spectrum will determine the range and 
capacity of the  system,  and,  to  some extent,  the applications which can be provided (i.e., 
broadband). 
Despite the significant market changes in spectrum use,  the principles governing resource 
allocation  and  management  have  remained  relatively  stable.  It  is  almost  as  though  the 
mechanisms to introduce competition were created without consideration of the potential for 
bottlenecks  resulting  from  spectrum  scarcity.  The  problem  has  arisen  because  spectrum 
management rules were developed in an environment of relative abundance, and were more 
concerned  with  controlling  already-allocated  frequencies  than  providing  a  cohesive 
approach to allocation. There are, accordingly, serious questions about the compatibility of 
competitive market-style frequency allocations and management rules established to manage 
public activities in a multi-operator environment. 
The  existing  frequency  allocation  processes  operating  across  the  Member  States  do  not 
appear to lead to the  most efficient resource allocations.  If spectrum is  free,  there are no 
price signals  indicating  its  intrinsic value to users.  Wastage,  in the  circumstances,  seems 
inevitable.  For  example,  radio  wave  systems  will  always  be  preferred  to  cable  if the 
transmission medium is free.  Frequency will be more heavily used whether or not it has  a 
positive  monetary  value.  However,  a  lack  of value  tends  to  slow  the  development  of 
technology that intensifies the use of the resource (particularly since technology making the 
most  efficient  and  effective  use  of spectrum  tends  to  be  more  expensive).  Users  with 
adequate  available  frequencies  have  little  incentive  to  use  efficient  (and  expensive) 
technology.  Conversely,  those  with  insufficient  spectrum  will  put  greater  effort  into 
developing  efficient  systems  to  make  the  best  use  of their  available  resources.  In  all 
Member States,  first-comers  remain particularly favoured by the existing regime of access 
without  payment.  Late-comers  have  to  be  satisfied  with  limited  access  to  "holes"  of 
spectrum still remaining in allocation plans. 
In its  1993 paper on The Economics of Radio Frequency Allocation, the OECD concluded 
that regulation (at least at  the  international  level)  is  necessary  to  avoid  interference,  and 
310  OECD publication, "The Economics of Radio Frequency Allocation", 1993. 
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favoured  the  standardisation  of equipment  and  harmonised  national  frequency  plans.  It 
found  that  regulation  that  establishes  a  zero  price  for  spectrum  is  incompatible  with 
innovation and the increasingly efficient use of spectrum. 
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(iii)  Spectrum Policy 
As the momentum of liberalisation and competition in the provision of multimedia services 
grows and demand increases exponentially, resource management issues become central. In 
a  multimedia  environment,  spectrum  management  has  the  capacity  to  either  inhibit  or 
facilitate development and change. Despite digitalisation,  and the spread of other spectrum-
efficient technology, the pressure on spectrum is maintained by multimedia applications that 
are  increasingly  spectrum-intensive.  Clearly,  the  economic  implications  of  spectrum 
allocation must be a central part of policy making, alongside traditional technical efficiency 
criteria. 
Generally,  the  more spectrum made  available,  the  lower the  development and  investment 
cost for  its  effective use  and  the  cheaper  the  service  provided to  the  customer.  Current 
debate centres on determining the most appropriate mechanisms, whether market driven or 
otherwise,  for  the  adoption  of  forward-looking  spectrum  allocation,  migration  and 
"refarming"  policies.  Recent  reviews  of spectrum  allocation practices  have,  universally, 
accepted that the traditional  "first  -come,  first -served"  approach cannot be  sustained in the 
face of increasingly heavy use of spectrum. However, there is little consensus regarding the 
appropriate approach to be adopted for the future.  The approach taken has  varied between 
Member States,  although most have  accepted that  spectrum management must be part of 
overall  communications  policy,  and  cannot  be  treated  as  a  purely  technical  issue.  The 
pressure  on  scarce  resources  created  by  the  spread  of new  digital  services  is  focusing 
attention on the  market value  of spectrum.  Where primary frequency  allocation has  been 
conducted  competitively  (i.e.,  through  auctions  or  competitive  bids),  there  have  been 
multiple  applicants  for  each  frequency.  Similarly,  where  frequencies  can  be  assigned  or 
sold, a healthy secondary market has developed. 
The first official acknowledgement of the need to  alter policy to reflect this approach came 
in the  opening  address  of the  Secretary-General  of the  ITU  1992  World  Administrative 
Radiocommunications Conference, where he stated: 
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"It  is  no  longer  in  question  that frequency  spectrum  is  an  important  economic 
resource.  In  view  of congestion  and  scarcity,  there  is  increasing  interest  in 
apportioning frequency rights in accordance with economic value.  Some economists 
hold that nothing  short of a market system  can  reflect the  economic  value...  and 
achieve most efficient use  ... little consideration has been given as to whether or how 
OECD publication, "The Economics of Radio Frequency Allocation",  1993 at p.  41. 
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a  market  or fee  system  might  be  helpful  on  an  international  scale.  It  will  be 
interesting to see the results of  national studies and trials. " 
(iv)  Methods of Allocation 
Competing demand for spectrum is most evident in the frequencies most suited to new uses, 
especially  the  high bandwidth usage  associated with  multimedia  applications.  Whilst  the 
trend in spectrum planning is  to  allow  sharing,  it is  not always possible.  There is  a clear 
distinction between exclusive frequency allocation systems and frequency sharing systems. 
The number of operators in exclusive systems must be fixed, since the bandwidth is divided 
into  blocks.  Systems with dynamic  frequency  sharing  do  not  necessitate a  set number of 
operators. However, to maintain quality of service it may be necessary to limit the number 
of operators. In exclusive systems, mechanisms are needed to  identify the most appropriate 
use.  Regulators are, increasingly, looking to market valuation methods when making these 
decisions. 
There  are  at  least  six  methods  of allocating  spectrum.  The  philosophical  differences 
between them essentially hinge on the issue of who should benefit from the fees  charged. 
Under a system based on selection on merit, the fees  benefit the ultimate consumer.  In the 
case of resale of licences,  the benefits pass to the licence holders.  In the case of lotteries, 
the rent is  appropriated by the winner,  as a form of windfall profit. In instances of "first-
come, first-served", the benefit may be appropriated by the users of the spectrum. Finally, 
the rent derived from spectrum auctions should benefit the government.  The four principle 
methods of spectrum allocation are discussed below. 
1.  "First-Come, First-Served" 
Allocation  on a  "first-come,  first-served"  basis  amounts  to  a  "rationing  through  time" 
approach. The price charged is, in economic terms, a measure of the time spent "waiting" 
to  be able  to  use  the  resource.  There is  no  limit on the quantity  that an individual  may 
obtain.  For this  reason,  quotas  are  normally  imposed.  Assignment on this  basis  favours 
applicants with the best access to information or who are able to wait. It is  often linked to 
"qualification standards" that make it possible to limit the range of potential candidates and 
then select them on the basis of merit.  Merit  -based selection requires an evaluation of the 
requirements  or  qualifications  of each  applicant  and  implies  distribution  to  as  many 
applicants  as  the  available  supply  allows.  This method of allocation is  widespread,  with 
regulators often assigning frequencies to the "best qualified" first applicant. 
There are many disadvantages to this approach, despite the fact that it has been widely used 
in the Member States. From an economic point of view, there is  no guarantee that the first 
(qualified)  applicant  will  make  the  best  use  of  frequency.  In  addition,  the  process 
encourages  applications  to  be  lodged  long  before  technically  efficient  equipment  is 
developed, forcing the use of technological solutions that leave much to be desired from the 
point of view of spectral efficiency. 
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2.  Tender 
Call for tender procedures establish a market where the authorities define the specifications 
to be met and then award the licence to the bidder, which minimises costs and prices within 
the constraints prescribed. In this  sense, calls for  tender can be considered to be a process 
of selection on merit.  This  method of allocation has  been widely  used  in  many  Member 
States, especially for the allocation of spectrum for GSM licences (including those for DCS-
1800 systems).  To distinguish between "directly competing"  candidates (and assuming that 
objective criteria can be defined),  selection on merit seems  to  be  an  effective method of 
allocation.  Although costly,  lengthy  and not necessarily impartial,  it  seems  to  be  the  one 
most likely to meet predetermined objectives. In cases with multiple criteria, it is  generally 
cheaper and easier to  use  selection through the market (i.e., auction)  or random selection 
(i.e., lottery among eligible candidates that satisfy the qualification threshold).  In general, 
auctions or lotteries seem to be more objective than attribution on merit even if neither of 
them is free of the risk of "corruption", since the choice of "eligible" candidates can always 
be made in a discretionary manner.  However, the  risk of corruption is  the greatest in the 
final phase of selection if selection is based solely on merit. 
There  have  been  a  number  of instances  where  a  user  of spectrum  agrees  to  transfer, 
generally without monetary award, part of its frequencies to one or more other users. Such 
agreements  are  usually  between  public  entities.  The  body  responsible  for  managing 
frequencies  reserved for commercial use should negotiate the re-allocation of radio waves, 
and  assign  them  to  civil  uses  whose  development  has  been hampered  by  a  shortage  of 
frequencies.  This  is  particularly  common  for  frequencies  that  have  been  assigned  for 
military use.  In France,  the  United Kingdom and  Italy,  bands of military frequency  have 
been,  or are  in the  process  of being,  re-allocated  for  use  in public cellular networks.  In 
most  Member  States,  rights  of use  are  granted  for  limited  terms.  The  transferability  of 
rights depends on the original method of allocation. Generally, where a right was attributed 
by  lottery  or auction,  it  may  be  sold.  However,  where allocation was  on a  "first-come, 
first-served" basis, rights of use are not generally transferable. 
Where rights of use are allocated through a lottery, the government has to identify the lots, 
define the concession clauses and organise and conduct the draw. If renewal procedures are 
determined  initially,  the  authorities  need  not  intervene  in  transfers  until  the  concession 
expires.  With  a  lottery  procedure,  the  eligible  candidates  all  have  an  equal  chance  of 
selection. The allocation of licences by lottery is being increasingly questioned throughout 
the world, because of the number of speculative applications filed  and the speculation that 
accompanies the subsequent transactions. 
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3.  Auction 
Sale  by  auction  theoretically  maximises  state  revenue.  However,  some  countries  do  not 
believe that the primary reason for 
11 competitive bidding" should be revenue maximisation. 
This approach to allocation benefits those who are able and willing to pay the most.  There 
are a number of different types of auction that can be used, including the following: 
•  the traditional auction,  where bids  are oral,  start low  and  increase until the 
highest bidder "wins" and pays the price at which the  second highest bidder 
dropped out; 
•  second-bid auctions,  where bids  are  written,  each bidder states  a price and 
the highest bidder pays a price equal to the second highest bid; 
•  a variation  on the traditional auction, where the bids are written and the 
highest bidder "wins  II  at the price he has stated; or 
•  "Dutch auctions", where the auctioneer announces a (high) starting price and 
then reduces it until at bidder accepts the price. 
The  United  Kingdom  used  a  "hybrid  II  procedure  for  the  allocation  of the  lTV  television 
channels  and  Channel  5  (both  frequencies  and  operating  licences).  It was  something 
between  a  request  for  tender  and  an  auction  sale.  A  number  of Member  States  are 
considering making greater use of the auctioning process in particular circumstances.  For 
example, The Netherlands is using an auctioning process to allocate DCS-1800 numbers (as 
is  likely to be the case in Italy).  In both the  United Kingdom and  Germany,  a number of 
market  actors  have  long  argued  in  favour  of wider  use  of allocation  procedures  that 
introduce  elements  of  market  criteria.  They  argue  that  auctions  have  a  number  of 
undeniable  advantages,  since  they  are  rapid,  inexpensive,  flexible  and  have  a  relatively 
small  degree  of  uncertainty.  They  should  also  facilitate  risk  capital  funding  of  the 
investment required for the development of new technologies. 
However, there is debate over the suitability of auctioning as a general policy for frequency 
valuation, particularly in the context of broadcasting. The public interest issues arising from 
the  fact  that  broadcasting  involves  the  carriage  of content,  the  diversity  and  quality  of 
which  must  be  protected  or  preserved,  are  difficult  to  reconcile  with  the  economic 
justifications for auctioning. It is argued that there is  also a risk that uses of spectrum with 
significant  social  value  would  be  put  under  pressure  by  other  uses  with  more  easily 
calculable  economic  value.  For  example,  it  seems  unlikely  that  financial  and  economic 
criteria  will  be  introduced.  These  factors  are  clearly  also  going  to  be  relevant  to 
increasingly content  -oriented multimedia applications. 
Those opposed to the widespread use of an auction procedure argue that it would lead to 
appropriation  of  the  greater  part  of  the  spectrum  by  very  large  enterprises,  thus 
endangering  competition.  For example,  in the  UMTS  debate,  many  industry participants 
are arguing that auctions tend to overprice spectrum, create uncertainty and undermine the 
development of a healthy industry. The majority of national users are opposed to auctions. 
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4.  Administrative Pricing 
Administrative pricing is most suited to circumstances in which demand exceeds supply and 
in which users or potential users have genuine technological alternatives which are available 
and transferable. The "comparative" basis of the approach means that regulators must make 
judgements about allocation,  rather than apply precise objective criteria.  Value  will  vary 
significantly  depending  on  the  availability  and  prices  of  alternatives.  Generally, 
technological alternatives from which marginal values can be derived are likely to be most 
evident in  congested areas  (i.e.,  where  administrative pricing  is  required).  However,  the 
rapid evolution of much technology  suggests  that marginal  values  are likely to  be  highly 
unstable. 
The current approach to telecom spectrum allocation in the  United Kingdom is based on the 
administrative pricing model.  Operators argue that administrative pricing is  most suited to 
circumstances  where new  spectrum is  made  available  for  new  purposes,  since this  is  the 
context  in  which  alternative  choices  are  likely  to  be  meaningful.  However,  an 
administrative pricing mechanism is likely to fail when different users, confronting different 
choices in a non-competitive way, seek access to the same spectrum. 
(  v)  Trends in Resource Allocation 
Whilst  all  of the  spectrum  management  reviews  that  are  either  underway  or have  been 
completed  by  the  Member  States  have  a  common  goal  of maximising  efficiency,  the 
approaches that have been (or are  to  be)  adopted vary  significantly.  There appears  to  be 
much  common  ground  at  the  level  of general  principle,  insofar  as  all  Member  States 
acknowledge the need for  greater flexibility  in allocation procedures  so  that rights  can be 
reallocated speedily without jeopardising planning objectives. By and large, it is universally 
recognised that spectrum has  an economic value, and that it must be taken into account in 
its  allocation. 
312  However,  differences  of opinion are  most  pronounced  on  the  following 
three issues: 
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•  the type of mechanism that should be used to make users aware of the value 
of spectrum (i.e. , lump-sum tax payments or quasi  -commercial systems, like 
auctions); 
•  whether spectrum should be paid for by all those who use it; and 
•  whether the same rules should be applied to all end-users (i.e., those who 
have alternative means of transmission and those who do not). 
Denmark is  a notable exception to  this rule,  showing no indication that it is  willing to  depart from its 
policy of charging only administrative fees for spectrum use. 
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The  differences  in  approach  to  these  issues  have  highlighted  the  fact  that  changes  in 
spectrum  allocation  procedures  will  require  examination  of the  relationship  between  the 
regulator  and  users.  It may  well  lead  to  a  change  in  the  nature  of the  property  rights 
enjoyed by users. 
1.  Factors Emerging From Recent and Current Reviews 
Pressure on spectrum availability has now  reached the point that "traditional"  methods  of 
allocation  are  widely  perceived  to  be  wholly  inadequate  for  a  multimedia  environment. 
Objective and transparent procedures for  assessing requirements and  demand are essential. 
This transparency also needs to prioritise "use" (i.e., service type) rather than "user" (e.g., 
many  spectrum  allocations  to  public  broadcasters  are  linked  to  the  identity  of  the 
broadcaster  rather  than  the  provision  of the  services).  Long-term  planning  must  take 
account  of technological  change,  and  especially  emerging  multimedia  services.  There  is 
general  consensus  that the  new  procedures  must not  become  a means  simply  to  generate 
additional  tax  revenue.  However,  it  should  be  noted  that  most  spectrum  reviews  and 
proposed new  valuation systems  require the State to  recover rent from the exploitation of 
spectrum. 
Identification  of a  single  selection  criterion  has  proved  to  be  virtually  impossible.  The 
factors that have to be considered include: 
•  priorities for spectrum use; 
•  principles relating to resource use; 
•  socio-economic factors; 
•  possibilities of using resources other than spectrum; 
•  economy and efficiency of spectrum; and 
•  the potential for spectrum sharing and transfer and migration. 
There  is  also  an  important  policy  issue  in  identifying  the  "efficiencies"  intended  to  be 
maximised. Economic efficiency means guiding resources to their highest valued use at the 
lowest cost, using the best technologies,  to maximise customer satisfaction. However, it is 
often interpreted to be little more than the technical criterion used by engineers, which is  a 
poor  indicator  of both  social  utility  and  the  economic  interests  of users.  In  the  United 
Kingdom,  the policy focus  is on supporting the introduction of spectrally efficient systems, 
technical  innovation and  greater  spectrum  sharing,  the  shutdown of obsolescent products 
and services and the re-farming of associated spectrum. 
The proposals for spectrum "pricing", thereby eliminating free  access,  generally have two 
levels (i.e., administrative costs and the value of a scarce and useful resource). The former, 
aimed  at  ensuring  that  each  user  covers  this  administrative  cost,  has  been  seriously 
discussed  in  Germany,  as  a  first  "tier"  of charges.  Alongside  this,  auctions  have  been 
considered to  represent the best way in which to  determine the value of frequencies  (i.e., 
representing  either  the  intrinsic  value  of a  frequency  or  the  opportunity  cost  of using 
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alternatives).  The  favoured  approach  in  Germany  is  to  operate  three  allocation  systems 
together: auctions (to establish market prices to be used as benchmarks for non-commercial 
use);  consultative fee  setting  (the price being  essentially  a compromise,  more than a real 
market price); and administrative pricing. 
There is general consensus that spectrum licences should be granted for fixed terms, should 
be  transferable  and  should  be  issued  separately  from  other  authorisations  (e.g., 
authorisations to supply telecommunications services).  This would allow frequencies to be 
licensed for  shorter periods,  so  the  fees  could be  adjusted  during the  longer term of the 
other authorisation to reflect the state of the market. 
2.  Transfer of Spectrum and Migration 
There  is  little  doubt  that  some  spectrum  is  currently  being  used  inefficiently,  that  the 
introduction of market  -driven pricing would encourage some incumbents to release spectrum, 
and that it could then be transferred to other users to be applied to more efficient ends. 
This  presupposes  dynamic  arrangements  in which  spectrum  can be  readily  reallocated  and 
transferred  and  that  the  transaction  costs  in  doing  so  - financial  and  other  - are  small 
compared with the longer term efficiency  gains  which  result.  This  is  clearly true in some 
contexts, but not others.  Transaction costs  occur for  a number of reasons.  There may  be 
substantial non-price barriers which restrict the  ability of users to transfer spectrum,  even if 
pricing signals tell them that this is the most efficient course of action. 
Changes  in  ownership  arrangements  can be  particularly  disruptive  in industries  which  are 
built on fixed  assets,  such as  telecoms,  or which have historically been structured in a way 
that makes  the  division of assets,  including  spectrum on which other commercial  activities 
may  depend,  problematic.  The whole  structure of property rights in this  area is  unlikely to 
have been established so as to facilitate transfer transactions. 
Such  difficulties  are  not  insurmountable,  as  the  transfer  of licences  between  terrestrial 
television broadcasters in the  United Kingdom,  whose  principal assets  consist of creativity, 
indicates. 
However,  there  are  often  formidable  difficulties  associated  with  the  transfer  of spectrum 
between telecommunications  companies,  for  example,  whose  principal  assets  are  difficult, 
sometimes  impossible,  to  replicate.  The  transfer  of  spectrum  between  wireless 
telecommunications  providers  presents  social  and  technical  challenges  which  are  quite 
different from those associated with the transfer of spectrum between,  for example, different 
PMR users. 
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There is also a significant policy difference between users for whom spectrum is a peripheral 
part  of their  business  activities  and  those  for  whom  spectrum  is  an  integral  part.  The 
spectrum  held  by  a  Regional  Electricity  Company  or  taxi  firm  is  peripheral  to  its  core 
business,  and can be readily separated from the other assets of the business.  This is not the 
case for many public telecoms operators, for whom the transfer of spectrum means the sale of 
all assets and the winding up  of  their business.  The transaction costs incurred in the latter 
situation are  of a different order of magnitude  and  could  involve the  loss  of the  telephone 
service to  many  millions of users.  The  only means  by  which the  Government could avoid 
such costs would be to require the licensee to transfer the assets of the business, or to exercise 
some form of compulsory purchase power.  Since these options are unlikely to be politically 
or legally acceptable,  certain types of spectrum are likely to be relatively difficult to transfer 
during  the  lifetime  of the  business  using  them.  Opportunities  may  arise  as  assets  are 
exhausted or made redundant. 
Both the  United Kingdom  and Denmark have adopted refarming elements  in their spectrum 
management policies.  It provides both the means and the incentive for increasingly efficient 
use of spectrum. For example, the United Kingdom must decide on the timing for the closure 
of analogue  television  services  (and  the  release  of their  frequencies)  by  the  summer  of 
2002. These frequencies could be used for a variety of services, not only digital terrestrial 
television. The current MVDS trials will increase the pressure on broadcasting frequencies, 
as will broadband Interactive Multimedia Services. 
Migration is proving to be a complex and potentially expensive process in all Member States. 
For this reason, regulators only migrate users from parts of the spectrum that are particularly 
congested. The spectrum for broadband and other multimedia applications is gradually being 
cleared. In the United Kingdom,  the RA  is attempting to balance the costs of migrating and 
congestion.  For example, the cost of migration to vacate frequency for audio broadcasting 
was  calculated to be about 29m GBP  (19,168,014 ECU) and the cost of lost opportunities 
due to  congestion of the frequencies used for  fixed  links  was  estimated at over 31m GBP 
(490,000 ECU)
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•  Much of the RA's planning focus  is  on relieving congestion.  The four 
areas  of heavy  congestion  are  PBR  (particularly  in  urban  areas),  mobile  telephony, 
terrestrial  broadcasting  (new  national  services  can  only  be  digital)  and  fixed  links  (in 
telecommunications  trunk  networks).  The  congestion  problem  for  mobile  and  trunk 
networks is  particularly acute.  In mobile services, the RA  has introduced shared channels 
for  low-traffic  users,  promoted  the  use  of  spectrum-efficient  services,  advanced  the 
introduction of digital technology and assigned narrowband channels. In fixed services, the 
RA  has  moved  users  to  less  congested  higher  frequencies  (when  technology  permits), 
encouraged the development of technology and has started to match required link lengths to 
bands 
313  Radio  Communications Agency,  "UK Spectrum Strategy.  Strategy for  the  Future Use  of the  Radio 
Spectrum in the UK", 1997 at p. 22. 
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As  a result of their migration and transfer reviews, many Member States are considering the 
underlying  bases  on which they allocate  commercial,  governmental  and  military  spectrum. 
Currently, many of the frequencies that are ideal for  multimedia applications are being used 
by  military  organisations.  The  review  recommendations  range  from  frequency  sharing  to 
migration and "out-sourcing" of some military functions (as the United Kingdom is beginning 
to  do).  Similarly,  the reviews have exposed the imbalance between the  amount of spectrum 
allocated  to  broadcasting  and  telecoms  uses.  There  is  a  clear  trend  amongst  regulators  to 
encourage  analogue  broadcasters  to  migrate  to  digital  frequencies,  freeing  up  the  old 
frequencies for telecoms uses. This would re-balance the allocation. 
An  overview  of the  existing  frequency  allocations,  based  on  a  representative  number  of 
Member  States,  is  found  in  Table  X  below.  Table  X  breaks  down  existing  frequency 
allocations  in terms  of their  particular use  (i.e.,  telecoms,  broadcasting  or governmental), 
expressed as a percentage of the total spectrum allocated. 
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3.  Current Issues 
There  are  a  number  of current  frequency  management  issues  that  are  having,  and  will 
continue to have, a significant impact on multimedia development, including: 
•  satellite broadcasting; 
•  wireless local loop; and 
•  UMTS. 
Satellite Broadcasting 
At the October 1997 WRC-97, steps were taken to improve the rules for Broadcast Satellite 
Service  ("BSS")  and  the  administrative  practices  for  satellite  registration.  Each  of the 
particular issues considered at WRC-97 is discussed below. 
Non-Geosynchronous Satellite Systems 
Perhaps  the  most  contentious  issue  at  WRC-97  was  a  proposal  by  Alcatel  to  launch 
SkyBridge,  a non-geosynchronous ("NGSO") satellite system that would operate in the Ku 
band  by  protecting  geosynchronous  ("GSO")  satellite  and  terrestrial  systems.  Prior  to 
WRC-97, the Radio Regulations prohibited (or substantially restricted) NGSO operations in 
the  Ku  and  Ka  bands.  France,  with  the  support  of  CEPT,  proposed  to  replace  the 
restrictions with a schedule of power flux density ("pfd") limits on NGSO systems designed 
to protect GSO satellite and terrestrial systems.  In the final days of the conference, WRC-
97  adopted the changes.  The exact pfd limits that will be imposed on NGSO  systems are 
subject to further study and review by WRC-99. 
While WRC-97 agreed to impose pfd limits on NGSO operations in the Ku  and Ka bands, 
the conference made an exception for Teledesic, which is a NGSO system composed of 288 
satellites that received approval at WRC-95 to operate in a section of the Ka band.  Rather 
than requiring it to  comply with pfd limits, the conference gave it priority over all  future 
GSO  systems in 500 MHz because it was one of the first systems to notify the ITU of its 
intent to operate in the band. 
315 
315  At  the time that  Teledesic  notified the  ITU  of its  intent  to  operate  in the  Ka  band,  Ka  band GSO 
systems  already  existed  in  Italy  and  Japan.  Teledesic  is  required  to  provide  protection  to  these 
systems through a process of coordination. 
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Broadcast Satellite Service 
Another extremely contentious issue at WRC-97 was  a proposal to  revise significantly the 
plan for the Broadcast Satellite Service ("BSS") in Regions  1 and 3 (all parts of the world 
except North and South America). BSS is unique among satellite services because its orbital 
positions and frequency assignments were allocated to countries and regions under the 1988 
plan.  It is  widely accepted that the plan is  out-of-date,  due both to changes in technology 
and geo-political boundaries.  At WRC-97,  studies were called for to consider doubling the 
number  of channels  per  country.  If this  proves  to  be  feasible,  a  conference  will  be 
convened before the year 2001 to re-plan. 
The  conference  addressed  the  highly  political  issue  of BSS  systems  capable  of serving 
multiple countries  in a region.  Some  countries,  mainly  those  of the  Middle  East,  argued 
that  sovereignty requires  a country deploying  a regional  BSS  system to  have the  express 
permission of all  countries covered by  the BSS  signal before initiating a service (i.e.,  for 
the purposes of general content control).  Although the conference declined to  adopt such 
mandatory  language,  a  Resolution  was  approved  indicating  that  countries  deploying 
regional BSS systems should seek the permission of all countries covered. 
Mobile-Satellite Service 
The United States backed several proposals to increase the available global spectrum for the 
Mobile-Satellite Service ("MSS").  It faced  substantial opposition to  these proposals,  but 
had some success.  First, it managed to  overcome opposition to  its long-standing proposal 
to establish a "generic" allocation for MSS in the L-band (around 1.5 GHz) by eliminating 
existing  sub-designations.  Second,  it  won  support  for  a  proposal  to  make  additional 
spectrum available (about 1-3 MHz) to narrowband MSS  systems below 1 GHz (referred to 
as  "Little LEO" systems).  It was unsuccessful, however, in obtaining additional spectrum 
for  MSS  in the 2 GHz  band,  largely due to  an international perception that an additional 
allocation would encroach excessively on existing and planned terrestrial systems in other 
countries. 
While the  United States  supported additional MSS  allocations in several bands, it strongly 
opposed a European proposal to permit MSS operations in a portion of the spectrum (1559-
1567  MHz)  used by  satellite-based  navigation systems,  such  as  GPS.  The  International 
Civil Aviation Organisation and the International Maritime Organisation also  opposed the 
proposal.  As  a compromise,  an  allocation for  MSS  in the  GPS  band  was  delayed until 
WRC-99,  to  allow  sharing  feasibility  studies  to  be  conducted.  The  compromise  result 
raises serious concerns for defence and aeronautical communities because of the significant 
possibility that studies will indicate that limited MSS operations may be feasible in the GPS 
band (probably 4 MHz). 
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Discouraging  "Paper Satellites" 
Recently,  the ITU has  faced growing problems with "paper satellites"  (i.e.,  satellites that 
countries  have  notified  the  ITU  they  intend  to  construct  (ensuring  "reservation"  of the 
orbital slots and spectrum, but which are unlikely to ever be launched).  Countries often file 
these  applications  in order to  speculate on orbital positions  and  guarantee availability  for 
future  use.  Unfortunately,  such  filings  make  it  difficult  to  identify  orbital  positions  for 
genuine systems. 
WRC-97  attempted  to  deal  with  the  problem  by  adopting  due  diligence  requirements. 
Countries  must  disclose  implementation data  for  satellite  systems  (i.e.,  the  name  of the 
spacecraft  manufacturer,  the  date  of delivery,  the  name  of the  launch  provider  and  the 
launch date). WRC-97 also shortened the period for a county to bring a satellite system into 
use (from seven years to five).  If a country fails  to comply with any of these requirements, 
its filing may be discarded and the orbital positions made available to others. WRC-97 also 
considered,  but did  not  implement,  financial  due  diligence  requirements  such  as  annual 
registration fees,  a refundable deposit system, and a financial ability test for operators.  It is 
expected  that  the  issue  will  be  considered  further  at  the  next  ITU  Plenipotentiary 
Conference, scheduled for September 1998. 
Wireless Local Loop 
Historically, the use of radio to connect telephone subscribers has almost exclusively been 
reserved for locations which are either remote, difficult to access, or have a low telephone 
penetration rate.  Today,  the  possibility  of using  radio  links  to  replace  the  local  loop  is 
considered  to  be  a key  factor  in  the  development  of telecoms  for  at  least the  following 
reasons: 
•  it encourages the development of advanced telecommunications services; 
•  it is a way of stimulating the introduction of competition into the local loop; 
•  it can contribute to decreasing the cost of the universal service in some areas; 
and 
•  it is an important potential market, lending it a strategic character for network 
operators and manufacturers. 
The frequencies  used by  a radio local  loop  determine the  range  and  traffic capacity of the 
system.  Accordingly,  low  frequencies  allow  for  a  wider  coverage  area  due  to  better 
propagation. However, high frequencies require "line-of-sight" transmission and do not allow 
cellular coverage. The ERO has launched a study aimed at designating harmonised bands for 
the introduction of the radio local loop.  Informal harmonisation on a pan-European basis also 
appears to be developing independently. Most Member States are introducing radio local loop 
on the same frequency bands. 
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UMTS 
A regulatory framework for UMTS is currently under development.  A key component of the 
framework is  the certainty of frequency allocations.  The industry has made it clear that lack 
of certainty on this issue will deter the investments required.  Member States  are supporting 
the ERC's work to find  designated UMTS frequency bands.  At the same time,  a number of 
Member  States  (e.g.,  France  and  Finland)  have  suggested  that  the  European  Community 
should consider adopting a Frequency Directive, if the ERC mechanism fails. 
There are two discrete UMTS spectrum issues that are particularly important: 
•  pricing; and 
•  the amount of spectrum that will be required. 
There are fears that high pricing of spectrum would distort the market and damage the uptake 
of the service. In this context, there has been little support for spectrum auctioning. However, 
the  majority  of Member States  have  agreed that the  pricing  mechanism ultimately  adopted 
should reflect the spectrum's economic value. 
At the moment,  two 40 MHz bands are designated for UMTS.  The industry believes that a 
further 20 MHz is necessary in the start-up phase, and that it is likely that some 155 MHz will 
be  required  by  the  year  2005  and  a further  185  MHz by  the  year  2010.  The  differences 
between the  industry position and the current allocation are such that lobbying has begun to 
have  the  issue  included  on the  WRC-99  agenda.  The  idea  of sharing  a common pool  of 
spectrum has  been broadly rejected by  industry,  arguing  that  it  would be  a disincentive  to 
investment, and may not be technically feasible. 
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.................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 
~Implications for Multimedia  · 
I Member  State  proposals  contain  increasingly flexible  allocation  procedures  to  speed  up  adjustments  and  to 
i promote and facilitate  the development of new services and  technology.  Spectrum  management  policies  entail 
i three forms of  optimisation goals: 
•  technical  optimisation  -- allocating frequencies  amongst  uses  and  users  to  prevent  interference  and  to 
maintain service quality; 
•  economic optimisation -- maximising the value of the resource at minimum cost; and 
•  management organisation - depending  on  the objectives set,  ranging  between  total  centralisation  (heavy 
handed regulation) and market-based (light touch regulation). 
The issue is how to balance and prioritise these goals in a multimedia environment, so as to create a system that 
allows  allocation,  recovery  and  migration  of frequencies  as  uses  and  technology  require.  Deregulation  and 
liberalisation,  with  rapid  technological  development  that  makes  it  possible  to  design  systems  with  short 
development cycles, create a complex frequency management situation. The pressure to accommodate short-term 
requirements  is  a real  threat  to  the  effectiveness  of spectrum  use.  There  is  a real  danger  of implementing 
competing systems in conflicting ways. 
Whilst digitalisation and increasingly efficient technology are overcoming many of the regulatory inefficiencies 
in existing frequency allocation systems, the large frequency demands of multimedia and broadband services will 
ensure  that  the  pressure  towards  more  efficient  spectrum  allocation  and  management  is  maintained.  In  this 
rapidly changing environment, spectrum regulation has the capacity to either stifle or encourage development. 
i New mechanisms may therefore  be needed to  accommodate  the increasing demands  of multimedia services for 
spectrum. 
The  commercial  pricing  of radio  spectrum  can  be  used  to  promote  its  efficient  use  and  to  reduce  competitive  ~ 
distortions  between public and private entities.  However,  it may not  be appropriate in  all  cases.  It  appears  to  be  I 
most appropriate where there are genuine technological alternatives, where demand exceeds supply and where new  1 
spectrum capacity is being made available for new applications. 
:  ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................  ]. 
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4.1.2  Numbering and Addressing 
The Regulatory Issues 
It  is  widely  accepted  today  that  numbering  is  a  key  competitive  resource  which  must  be 
available to new market entrants and must be managed efficiently by an independent regulator 
or independent third party. 
In addition, the pursuit of the goal of platform independence will be conditioned, to a certain 
extent, by the success  of a system of number portability which allows customers to  change 
service and network providers without incurring significant transactional costs  or having to 
change their numbers.  Number portability is  defined,  broadly,  as  a facility provided by one 
telephone  operator  to  another  which  enables  customers  to  retain  their  telephone  numbers 
when switching their business between those operators. One of the biggest obstacles at present 
for  commercial  and  residential  customers  wanting  to  take  their  business  elsewhere  is  the 
necessity of changing their numbers when they do so. 
316 
Another aspect of "platform independence" is the concept of equal access or carrier selection, 
as  has been developed at the Community and Member State  levels.  Carrier selection is  the 
facility  that allows  a user to  choose  a long-distance  carrier independently of the local  loop 
provider. 
317 
316 
317 
There are three types of portability: 
•  operator portability.  This  allows  an end-user to  retain his  number when he/she changes operator. 
The emphasis is that the end-user's location remains fixed (i.e., has not moved permanent location or 
rate centre); 
•  location portability.  This  allows  the  end-user to  retain his  number when he/she  moves  from  one 
permanent physical location to another; and 
•  service  portability  (i.e.,  POTS  to  ISDN).  This  allows  the  end-user  to  retain  the  number  when 
changing services. 
There are a number of ways to achieve carrier selection: 
•  pre-selection. The carrier is chosen at the time of subscription and is used unless call-by-call override 
is used; 
•  call-by-call selection.  Typically, a prefix is inserted in front of the dialled number; or 
•  allowing the local loop provider to choose the carrier, on criteria such as market share. 
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Unlike telephone numbers, the short regulatory tradition of the Internet has been characterised 
by  the  existence  of an  addressing  regime  which  is  neither  run  by  national  government 
regulatory authorities nor by incumbent operators. It is arguable that the system of addressing 
on the Internet is not dynamic enough to accommodate the pressures of the growing Internet. 
Moreover,  any  future  regulatory framework needs to  consider the  role which the  European 
Union or its Member States will play in the management of the regime. 
The deficiencies in the addressing system have become pronounced in conflicts between trade 
mark and domain name owners.  There appear to  be two  approaches to  resolving the  issues 
arising  from  the  rush  to  register  domain  names.  One  approach  is  that  there  is  no  law 
harmonising  trademarks  and  the  Internet and  that domain  name  problems  will  be  resolved 
when Internet Law develops sui generis. 
318  The other approach is  to  treat trademark law as 
applying to protect domain names, with blame for the current problems faced by the industry 
being  attributed  to  the  structural  flaws  in the  mechanisms  used currently  by  domain name 
registrars. 
319 
(i)  Community Legal Framework for Numbering 
In  November  1996,  the  Commission adopted  its  Green  Paper  on  a Numbering  Policy for 
Telecommunications  Services  in  Europe  ("Numbering  Green  Paper"),  which  presented  a 
number  of alternative  approaches  to  achieving  its  policy  goals  for  numbering.  Since  a 
telephone  number  is  the  key  interface  of a  user  to  his  electronic  communication,  an 
appropriate  numbering  strategy  facilitates  competition in the  local  loop  (including  Internet 
access) and on long distance and international calls. In proposing the development of an EU-
wide numbering policy, the following recommendations were made by the Commission in its 
Numbering Green Paper: 
318 
319 
•  Carrier selection.  Member States  should be required to have a carrier selection 
policy in place as of 1 January 1998; 
•  Portability.  Member  States  would  be  required  to  ensure  that  all  technical 
restrictions preventing local loop portability be removed as  soon as  possible, and 
that number portability be available in major population centres, at least; and 
•  Restructuring of national numbering schemes.  The Commission proposed to 
adopt a phased approach to restructuring national numbering plans to provide new 
entrants  with  "equal  access"  to  numbering  resources.  Member  States  would  be 
Duecker, Kenneth Sutherlin,  'Trademark Law Lost in  Cyberspace: Trademark Protection for Internet 
Addresses" (1996) Harv.J. Law & Tee. 483 
Brunei, Andre J., Billions Registered,  But No  Rules: The  Scope of Trademark Protection for Domain 
Names", March 1995, Proprietary Rights, 2. 
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required  to  start  adapting  their  national  numbering  schemes  according  to  the 
harmonised guidelines, and would need to complete this process by the year 2000. 
The consultation process which followed the release of the Numbering  Green Paper indicated 
that there was wide support for the proposals to introduce call-by-call carrier selection, carrier 
pre-selection and number portability.  Briefly,  the  Commission's main policy conclusions  at 
the end of the consultation process were: 
•  By 1 January 1998, call-by-call carrier pre-selection (with a default carrier and 
call-by-call override procedure) should be offered by all local access providers 
with significant market power; and 
•  By  1 January  2000,  number  portability  should be  offered  by  all  fixed  local 
access providers and all operators should offer portability for non-geographic 
special service numbers. 
The  Council  confirmed  both  the  Commission's  policy  approach  and  its  proposals  in  its 
Resolution of 22 September 1997.  The European Parliament also adopted a Resolution,  and 
called on the Commission to make proposals for the introduction of carrier pre-selection and 
number portability by 1 January 2000. 
In furtherance of these policy commitments,  the Commission has proposed that amendments 
be made to the Interconnection Directive as follows:
320 
•  acceleration of the date for the introduction of number portability to  1 January 
2000; and 
•  addition of an obligation relating  to  carrier pre-selection,  with  NRAs  being 
obliged  to  require  the  provision  of carrier  pre-selection  by  fixed  network 
operators by 1 January 2000. 
(ii)  Internet Addressing 
To establish  World  Wide  Web  sites  and  home pages  on the  Internet,  organisations  must 
receive an Internet Domain Name  ("IDN"), which enables users to  locate machines  on the 
Internet by mapping between human-friendly mnemonic names and their underlying assigned 
Internet  Protocol  ("IP")  numerical  addresses  (e.g.,  the  hypothetical  IDN  "skdy3.com" 
triggers the assigned IP address "5.13.20.15 "). 
ID  N  s are assigned to organisations by  Internet registrars which are the  entities  entrusted 
with the administration of the Internet naming system. At the international level and for the 
United States,  Internet addresses are assigned by only one registrar, Network Solutions Inc. 
320  Proposal of 1 October 1997 for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending 
Directive 97 /33/EC with regard to  operator number portability and carrier preselection; as  published 
in OJ  1997 C330/19 (Agreement on a Common Position reached on 1 December 1997). 
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This  entity  is  responsible  for  the  administration of the  very popular Generic  Top Level 
Domain Name ("TLDs") ".com". In the European Union,  Internet addresses are assigned 
by registrars located in the different Member States concerned (e.g.,  in Belgium,  managed 
by the University of Leuven, in Greece, managed by the University of Crete). 
Generally  speaking,  Internet  registrars  assign  Internet  addresses  without  giving 
consideration  to  intellectual  property  issues  which  might  arise  from  the  use  of  any 
particular name. 
321  Such registrars assign IDNs on a "first-come,  first-served"  basis and do 
not  determine  the  legality  of the  Domain  Name  registration.  In  particular,  they  do  not 
research whether the proposed IDN is  already  the  registered trade  mark of another entity. 
Moreover,  registrars often do not perform any  research to  determine whether the proposed 
Domain Name is likely to be confused with another registered Domain Name. 
In  1997,  certain  members  of the  Internet  Society  proposed  the  establishment  of a  new 
Internet  naming  system,  partially  under  the  auspices  of the  World  Intellectual  Property 
Organisation  ("WIPO").  Under  this  new  system/
22  the  monopoly  of Network  Solutions 
notably on the TLD ".com" will be ended by creating the following additional TLDs: ".firm", 
".store",  ".web",  ".arts",  ".rec",  ".info",  and  ".nom".  These  new  TLDs  would  be 
administered by a number of Internet registrars located in different countries all around the 
world.  In  addition,  a  new  mechanism  for  the  resolution  of disputes  in  relation  to  the 
registration of IDNs would be created. 
Recently, a number of countries, including the  United States,  have expressed their general 
support for the new Internet naming system. There are, however, certain outstanding issues 
which  could  be  viewed  as  critical  to  the  success  of this  system.  One  of these  issues  is 
whether  Network  Solutions  will  release  its  database,  which  includes  the  ".com"  TLD. 
Another issue is whether the new system is technically feasible in view of the current "tree 
structure"  used  for  Internet addresses  and the control  exercised by  the Internet Assigned 
Numbers  Authority  ("lANA"), under the  chairmanship  of Dr John Pastel  (an  American 
citizen), regarding certain aspects of the routing of Internet communications. 
The new proposed system for Internet addresses also raises certain other regulatory issues. 
In particular, it appears that there is  a need to ensure effective competition with respect to 
access  to  ID N  resources.  It  is  arguable  that an artificial  limit placed  on the  number of 
Internet registrars,  without any appropriate justification,  would run contrary to European 
competition rules. 
321 
322 
Although the Study does not cover intellectual property issues, the need to protect trade mark owners 
within the framework of the  registration of IDNs is  currently the  subject of a wide debate.  Refer to 
"The  Internet  Domain  Name  System  and  Trademarks",  working  document  of the  Commission 
Services  (unpublished);  "Internet  Domain  Names  and  Trade  Marks",  Jonathon  Stoodley,  [1997]  9 
E.I.P.R.  509;  "Internet  Domain Names  and  Rights  in  Distinctive  Marks:  A  German  and  Austrian 
Perspective", Reinhard Schanda, [1997]  5 C.T.L.R. 221;  and "Trademarks Along the Infobahn:  The 
Emerging Law of Cybermark", Dan Burk (unpublished). 
Refer  to  Memorandum of Understanding  (MoU)  on  the  Intemet  TLD  Space  of the  Intenzet Domain 
Name  System  on  May  1,  1997.  The  two  characters  national  TLDLs  made  of country  codes  are  not 
subject to the Mo U. 
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It is  also necessary to  examine closely whether the new proposed system sufficiently takes 
into consideration the need to protect the trade mark and other intellectual property rights 
of genuine holders. 
Finally,  it is  necessary  to  address  the  issue of the  role which Community institutions  and 
the  Member States  will play in the  management of the  future  Internet addressing  system. 
Once a position is taken in this respect,  it would be necessary to  ensure that the European 
position is strongly advocated at the international level. 
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The transfer of numbering issues from  the telecoms incumbent to an independent regulator has  been an essential 
element in pursuing the policy goal of  platform independence. It has also inhibited abusive behaviour with respect to 
access to a vital resource.  The goal of platform independence has also been furthered by discrete number portability 
and carrier selection policies which have lowered the costs that would otherwise be incurred by consumers wishing 
to change network operators or service providers. 
A new generation of "numbering" (i.e.,  addressing) issues are arising in the multimedia world.  They are likely to 
require  the application of competition  rules  to  ensure that  the allocation  of addresses  such  as  Internet  Domain 
Names is not: 
administered by organisations in a manner that would foreclosure potential market entrants; or 
a process in which an incumbent telecoms operators or a broadcaster with market power can become involved, 
thereby opening up the possibility for abusive behaviour (e;g., in the allocation of inappropriate addresses to end 
users who use a competing network or service provider. 
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4.1.3  Rights-of-Way 
The Regulatory Issues 
The  transmission  of multimedia  services  to  end  users  may  involve  a  complex  system  of 
interoperable networks carrying each message to  its  fmal  destination.  Networks must  often 
traverse  federal,  regional,  municipal  and  private  land.  One  of  the  fundamental  issues 
underlying the success of liberalisation in the telecoms sector (and also to new entrants which 
postion htemselves in the market as broadcasters) is the means of access to rights-of-way over 
the public and private domain, and the costs to new market entrants of such access. 
Rights-of-way are essentially the privileged use of public and private property for economic 
purposes.  In the telecoms  sector,  rights-of-way  are used to  allow  the  laying  of fibre  optic 
cable  or copper wire,  the  erection of poles  and  the  location of radio  antennae  at  suitable 
locations. The integrity of these facilities is preserved, even though their access or installation 
may  require  crossing  public  or  private  property.  Their  regulatory  status  is  becoming 
increasingly complicated for a number of reasons: 
•  They  are  granted  by  a  range  of national,  state,  regional  and  local  authorites.  Often, 
jurisdiction  is  split  between  these  entities.  Jurisdictional  conflicts  between  legal 
authorities have increased in the recent past, especially since charges for usch rights are 
often seen as a lucrative form of taxation. The number of jurisdictional conflicts can only 
increase in a multimedia environment in countries  such as  Germany  and Belgium  since 
jurisdiction  for  telecoms  and  broadcasting  matters  is  split  strictly  along  Federal:State 
lines. 
•  The  legal  regimes  under  which  access  to  rights-of-way  are  granted  traditionally 
presuppose the  existence  of "natural monopolies"  for  transport services  (especially  the 
railways), utility functions (gas, electricity, water and telecoms) and, in many parts of the 
European  Union  until  recently,  cable  TV  companies.  Consequently,  in  the  past 
governments invariably granted exclusive concessions to such entities either in perpetuity 
or for a lengthy period. In the past decade the economic belief that these services always 
need to be provided on a monopoly basis has been undermined. 
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•  The services which benefited from rights-of-way were by and large considered to include 
a large element of "public service". In liberalised markets, it is often the case that market 
forces will provide public service or that the provision of public service will be more than 
offset by the business goodwill which accrues to it. 
•  The  existence  of exclusive  rights-of-way  has  meant  that  network-wide  planning  could 
occur with little disruption to  the environment.  Increased competition,  however,  means 
that more pressure will be put on the environment. Insofar as these pressures can be offset 
by greater customer acceptance of wireless broadband services, access to frequencies may 
become congested. 
•  Governments  have  thus  far  to  allocated rights-of-way  at  prices  related to  market value. 
Rather,  they  have  sought  either  to  confer  such  rights  at  nominal  costs  or  at  no  cost 
Gustified on the ground that public services are being performed). At most, rights-of-way 
have attracted fees  expressed as  a very  small percentage of total  revenues (e.g.,  2%  of 
revenues). 
The resolution of these policy issues  will be of critical importance in determining the future 
shape of the competitive environment for the provision of multimedia services. 
(i)  Community Law 
At present, the sum total of legislative involvement at the Community level regarding rights-
of-way  can be found  in one  provision of the Full  Competition  Directive, 
323  which provides 
that: 
"Member  States  shall  not  discriminate  between  providers  of public  telecommunications 
networks with regards to the granting of  rights of  way for the provision of  such networks. 
Where  the  granting of additional rights of way  to  undertakings  wishing  to provide public 
telecommunications  networks  is  not  possible  due  to  applicable  essential  requirements, 
Member States shall ensure access to existing facilities established under rights of  way which 
may not be duplicated,  at reasonable terms. "
324 (emphasis added). 
The  limits  of Community  involvement  in  property  issues  is  illustrated  by  the  general 
statement of competition law  principles  outlined above.  The application of the  principle of 
subsidiarity  is  arguably  nowhere  better  illustrated  than  with  respect  to  differences  in the 
regulatory treatment of rights-of-way,  which are often administered by  local authorities and 
which are subject to overlapping competences (e.g., roads, the environment, waterways).  In 
323 
324 
Commission  Directive  90/388/EEC  of  28  June  1990  on  competition  in  the  markets  for 
telecommunications services. 
Ibid. , Article 4( d). 
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this context,  "reasonable"  terms for access to  rights-of-way may vary greatly from Member 
State to Member State, in accordance with national legislative traditions. 
Finally, it should be noted that facilities sharing, of whatever kind, must always be monitored 
in a developing competitive environment. Whilst facility sharing may encourage entry by new 
market  actors,  it  will  inevitably put them in  a position of cooperation with respect to  key 
elements of network management;  the potential spill-over of such cooperation in related and 
unrelated markets must be carefully policed. 
(ii)  Comparative Overview 
An outline of the widely varying approaches to the regulation of rights-of-way in a number of 
Member States is set out below. 
France 
Operators of Public Networks are entitled to rights-of-way over public highways and private 
property.  Decree  No.  97-683  ("Decree")  sets  out  the  rules  governing  rights-of-way. 
Authorities responsible for managing public land (other than roads) may conclude agreements 
with  operators  for  access,  to  the  extent  that  the  occupation  is  not  incompatible  with  the 
purpose of the property or available capacity.  There is  no absolute legal obligation to grant 
access; however, any grants must be transparent and non-discriminatory. 
Public  Network  Operators  have  a  right  to  occupy  public  roads  if the  occupation  is  not 
incompatible with the purpose of the  road.  An authorisation may define installation and 
operating specifications designed to preserve the utility of roads.  Sites may be shared if the 
parties  can  reach  commercial  agreement.  The  owner  of the  facilities  is  responsible  for 
maintaining the infrastructure and equipment.  The ART has the power to settle disputes over 
the sharing of infrastructure. The Decree makes detailed provision for the grant of rights over 
both  public  and  private  property.  Rights-of-way  over  national  roads  are  granted  by  the 
Prefect.  Over secondary roads, they are granted by the President of the General Council, and 
local roads are dealt with by the local Mayor.  They are awarded on a transparent and non-
discriminatory basis,  within two  months  of an application.  If the  issuing  authority  realises 
that the right can be secured using existing infrastructure, it will invite the parties to reach a 
shared use agreement. 
Rights-of-way over private property allow the installation of infrastructure in communal parts 
of buildings  and  above  and  below  the  ground  of un-built  sites.  The  authorisation of the 
Mayor in the affected region is required, after the owners have been informed and invited to 
comment.  The  sharing  of sites  on private  property  is  also  encouraged.  Easements  over 
private property operate without prejudice to  the owner's right to demolish,  repair,  alter or 
shut down the property, on giving three months notice of his or her intention to do so. 
Requests for the grant of easements over private property are made to the Mayor of the area 
where  the  property  is  situated.  The  Mayor  encourages  the  parties  to  make  their  own 
agreement.  However,  he  or  she  has  the  power  to  grant  an  easement  in the  absence  of 
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agreement. The easement expires automatically if works are not undertaken within 12 months 
of its grant. 
Annual fees for rights-of-way may not exceed the following: 
Germany 
•  20,000 FF for  mountain motorways,  10,000 FF for all  other motorways  (per 
kilometre); 
•  150 FF for national, secondary and local roads (per kilometre); 
•  1,000  FF  for  the  establishment  of a  radio-electrical  station  (over  twelve 
metres) and 2,000 FF for each pylon; or 
•  100 FF for all other installations (per square metre). 
The  German  Telecommunications Act of 1996 (the  "TKG")  contains  a  series of provisions 
regulating  access  to  rights-of-way  in both the public  and  private domain.  It authorises  the 
federal  government to  allow  the  use of public  roads  for  the  provision of public  telecoms 
networks to ensure the full coverage of telecoms services as  required by Article 87(t) of the 
German Constitution.  The government may  not charge  for  this  use  so  long  as  it does  not 
constitute  a lasting  encroachment  on the  normal  use  of infrastructure.  (The  scope  of this 
provision is  the  subject of an ongoing Federal government - Lander dispute).  So  that all 
enterprises  providing  telecoms  network  may  compete  on  an  equal  footing,  the  Federal 
government allows all telecoms licensees to exercise this right.  Telecoms transmission lines, 
however,  must  be  laid  so  that  they  comply  with  existing  safety  laws,  public  policy,  and 
technical requirements.  Operators wishing to  lay new lines or alter pre-existing lines must 
obtain the  agreement  of the  authority  responsible  for  constructing  and  maintaining  public 
ways (Trager der Wegebaulast).  An application to lay or modify transmission lines can only 
be refused on technical grounds. 
Where  transmission  lines  are  laid  above  ground,  the  interests  of  the  licensee,  the 
infrastructure operator and the city planning authorities must all be balanced.  Clearly, there 
is  scope for conflicts between municipal authorities seeking to limit construction by network 
operators. This is exacerbated by the fact that the balancing of interests requirement does not 
apply to underground cables. 
In cases where  a licence holder is  responsible  for  maintaining a public way,  or if there is 
cross ownership of 25%  or more between the operator and the landholder, the  NRA stands 
in for the landholder where another licence holder seeks to use that pathway.  In cases where 
an entity has a right to  use traffic infrastructure, but where the construction or alteration of 
existing  networks  is  either impossible  or prohibitively  expensive,  the  entity has  a right to 
demand  that the  owner  of the  existing  network  allow  concurrent use  of its  pathway.  The 
proposed use must be reasonable and not require the pathway owner to perform additional 
construction.  The intent of this  section is  to  ensure that decisions to  establish independent 
transmission lines,  rather than use pre-existing lines,  are market driven.  Where additional 
construction is wastefully expensive, the parties should reach agreement for concurrent use. 
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Those  using  transmission  infrastructure  must  avoid  interfering  with  infrastructure 
maintenance and must minimise encroachment on the primary purpose of the infrastructure. 
Where use increases maintenance costs or damages existing infrastructure, the user must pay 
those  additional  costs.  Moreover,  a  user  performing  construction  work  must  return  the 
infrastructure to its proper working order as quickly as possible, unless the entity responsible 
for  maintaining  the  infrastructure  chooses  to  make  the  repairs.  A telecommunications  line 
must  be  altered  or  removed  if  it  substantially  encroaches  on  the  use  of  the  traffic 
infrastructure, or when the path's purposes are impaired.  When infrastructure is  removed, 
the  authorisation to  use the path for telecoms purposes lapses.  The licence holder may  only 
demand  that  a  special  installation  operator  make  changes  to  existing  lines  where  the  line 
otherwise could not  be  established,  if the  purposes  of the  original installation may  still  be 
fulfilled  and  when  installation would  not  impose  unreasonably  high  costs  on the  special 
installation  operator.  Conversely,  where  special  installations  are  established  after  a 
transmission line is  installed, they must not disturb the telecoms line.  Where a line precedes 
the establishment of a special installation that is in the public interest, the telecoms user must 
pay the costs of any  necessary alterations to or removal of its lines.  The network operator 
must bear its  own costs  where  the  construction of a special  installation requires protective 
upgrades to the transmission line. 
Where an entity that maintains traffic infrastructure transfers its rights to a third party with no 
maintenance obligation, the transferring entity must reimburse a telecoms user for the added 
costs incurred, including changes to and added protection to the transmission line.  Where an 
existing telecoms line is  disturbed by the  addition of a special installation not designated as 
being in the public interest, the telecoms provider is entitled to reimbursement for its costs. 
An owner of property that is not a public road may not block the use or construction of,  or 
improvements to, telecoms lines where the property is already used for telecoms purposes or 
where the added use does not materially impede the use of the property on a short-term basis. 
However,  the landowner may  demand compensation for  costs  resulting from the use  of the 
property and loss of income.  Moreover, for ongoing use of the property, one-off payments 
are  available.  These  provisions  are intended  to  assist  new  private  telecoms  enterprises  to 
compete  with public  utilities  which  already  possess  rights-of-way.  The  underlying  policy 
behind these provisions is that it would inhibit to competition if new entrants were required 
to pay market rates when public utilities obtained cost-free rights to lay cable across private 
land. 
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The Netherlands 
Until  recently,  a  tri-partite  system  of public  domain  regulation was  used  in  the  telecoms 
sector,  largely  reflecting  the  partial  liberalisation  of voice  telephony  prior to  1 January 
1998. Different rules applied depending on whether the public domain was to be used: 
•  in the public interest; 
•  in cases where its use had to be tolerated; or 
•  for a commercial activity. 
Only  a very  limited  number  of entities  including  public  broadcasters  could use  the  public 
domain in the  "public interest" (category 1).  Rights-of-way to the public domain which were 
acceptable (category 2) included the activities of the two new telecoms operators, Telfort and 
Enertel, in addition to the local telecoms incumbent ("KPN"). These entities were entitled to 
special "digging rights" over the public domain which local authorities were obliged to grant, 
without compensation. 
All  other  new  market  entrants  which  entered  the  liberalised  telecoms  sector  in  The 
Netherlands (category 3) during its transitional phase incurred significant costs in their build-
out of infrastructure over the public domain.  At present, the Dutch authorities are proposing 
that access to the public domain be made subject to the payment of an annual fee based on the 
extent of the public domain crossed.  It is  unclear whether KPN will bear equivalent costs. 
New entrants are citing the Full Competition Directive in support of their objectives to avoid 
any  I discriminatory  I  treatment. 
In its clearance of BT's Telfort joint venture (i.e.,  with the Dutch railways), the European 
Commission 
1 s Merger Task Force was not required to consider any issues of network access 
arising from special rights over rights-of-way, since there was no exclusivity under the joint 
venture  agreement.
325  However,  subsequent  to  the  Commission's  Decision  clearing  the 
transaction,  the  Dutch authorities  have proposed,  in a draft law  establishing  the  post  -1998 
regulatory environment, that railway tracks not be included within the concept of the "public 
domain". 
The natural result of any such change in the legal definition of the public domain will be that 
new entrants seeking rights-of-way from the national railway company will be obliged to do 
so under the more onerous private property regime.  Access to private property requires the 
permission of all  property  owners  affected  on commercially  negotiated  terms.  The  Study 
Team  is  aware  that  a  complaint has  been  lodged  with  the  European  Commission,  which 
asserts  that  the  Full  Competition  Directive  prevents  the  imposition  of charges  of  such 
magnitude. 
325  Prior notification of a concentration (Case IV /M.855- BTINS!Telfort). 
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Belgium 
The division of Belgium into semi-autonomous regions complicates the governance of rights-
of-way.  For example, under a 1992 Decree, the Flemish government has the power to  issue 
orders  about  the  uses  and  charges  for  rights-of-way,  to  be  amplified  in  greater  detail  in 
subsequent or subordinate laws.  At present, a proposed annual fee  structure for access to the 
public domain is  under discussion,  and may  be raised by  as  much as  1000% . It is  unclear 
whether these rates would apply to Belgacom's existing rights-of-way. 
Similarly, at the time of writing, the Commune of Brussels was considering adopting a law 
regulating access to the public domain which would require that new market entrants such as 
MFSWorldcom/CODITEL deposit significant guarantees with the local authorities if repairs 
to the public domain are not effected adequately.  In addition,  it was proposed that operators 
would only be  allowed to  dig  up  roads for  a limited period of time  every two years.  This 
narrow  window  of opportunity  could  cause  significant  delays  to  network  rollout  for  new 
entrants. No fees have as yet been proposed. 
Spain 
Under  a  preliminary  draft  of the  new  Spanish  Telecommunications  Law 1997,  operators 
licensed to provide public telecommunications networks with universal service obligations are 
entitled to request access to the public domain,  subject to the approval of the competent local 
authority. These operators also have the right to request the expropriation of private property 
or the establishment of a right-of-way under an expedited procedure. In practical terms, these 
provisions may mean that only the incumbent telecoms operator, Telefonica, will be entitled 
to automatic access to rights-of-way. 
When  a  request  is  made  for  access  to  the  public  domain  or the  expropriation of private 
property, the Minister has the discretion to  invite other public network operators to express 
their interest in sharing the use of the property in question.  Should any  operator declare an 
interest within 20 days, the parties must negotiate conditions for shared use. 
If an agreement  is  not reached  within 20  days  from  the formal  declaration of interest,  the 
CNMT must take a reasoned decision about the obligation to share and set the conditions of 
use.  This decision must take into account:  (i)  the economic viability of the proposed shared 
use;  and  (ii)  whether  significant  works  will  be  required  in order to  permit the  sharing  to 
occur. In addition, the operator benefiting from the shared use is obligated to pay reasonable 
financial compensation. 
United Kingdom 
Because  the  United  Kingdom's  telecoms  regulatory  regime  is  premised on infrastructure-
based  competition,  regulation  has  favoured  relatively  simple  access  to  rights-of-way  by 
network operators with rights under section 8 of the Telecommunications Act 1984.  This 
approach has  resulted  in a virtual  commoditisation of the  different  elements  of the  public 
domain, with a "market" developing for the individual elements of rights-of-way access. This 
has meant that ducts, fibre and other elements are largely available as discrete items. 
Analy_sys -----------------------------Overview of Current Regulatory  Environment in TelecommumcatiOns and Broadcasting  Sectors/Re~ources  Page 222 
However,  BT  has  no  obligation to  share  much of its  existing  ducting,  tunnel  or on-site 
facilities.  OFTEL decided,  in 1996, that the economic benefit and effect on competition of 
shared access did not warrant regulation of rights-of-way.  It decided to leave BT's system 
of self-regulation in place.  Briefly, OFTEL's views on duct and site sharing are as follows: 
•  OFTEL has no immediate plans to force sharing of ducts and poles on public land; 
•  OFTEL  does  not  intend  to  interfere  with  the  informal  trench  sharing  arrangements 
currently in place; and 
•  OFTEL is prepared to allow BT to continue to allow access to on-site and customer access 
on terms that have been developed by the industry·
326 
The  application of different regulatory  regimes to  rights-of-way can create complications 
where  services  are  provided  across  national  boundaries.  For  example,  under  the 
Francemanche licence used by Eurotunnel, there is a right to establish a subsidiary providing 
telecoms  services.  Under  French  law,  this  subsidiary  has  the  right  to  obtain  dark  fibre 
("connectivite optique") from  Francmanche on the  same  terms  as  other providers of public 
telecoms service (including their own telecoms subsidiaries). By way of contrast, there is no 
equivalent  explicit  obligation  under  the  law  of the  United  Kingdom;  market  interviews 
suggest  that  this  application  of two  conflicting  systems  of law  is  creating  a  significant 
degree of regulatory uncertainty. 
326  OFTEL Consultative Document, February 1996,  "Duct and Pole Sharing". 
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, Implications for Multiemdia 
The administration of rights-of-way displays  widely diverging patterns of regulation  between  the Member  States 
(and,  in  some  cases,  between  regions  of Member  States).  This  diversity  may  result  in  the  development  of 1 
distinctively different  patterns of local  loop  competition across  the  European  Union.  To  overcome the  difficulties  ! 
inherent in developing a truly pan-European multimedia internal market in the absence of harmonised policies on 
rights-of-way (especially in light of the limited powers of the Community to take action in this regard), it would at 
least  be advisable for the Member States to adopt consistent valuation policies.  This  would give potential network I 
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4.2  PRIVATE RESOURCES 
The Regulatory Issues 
The existence of proprietary rights in the hands of one or a small number of entities may result 
in  their  owners  acting  as  "gatekeepers"  for  other  industry  participants.  This  gatekeeping 
function may, in certain circumstances, create what is tantamount to an "essential facility" or a 
"bottleneck"; this can result in the foreclosure of competitors unless access to private resources 
is  administered  in  an  objective,  proportional  and  non-discriminatory  manner.  The  anti-
competitive  potential of such  gatekeeping  functions  is  magnified  as  the degree of vertical 
integration by the  "gatekeeper"  increases  along  the  length of the  multimedia  value  chain. 
These types of issues can be regulated through the application of competition rules, whether on 
a case-by-case basis under Article 86  of the EC Treaty or its  national  equivalents,  or under 
issue-specific legislation. 
Particular types of "gatekeeping" functions which are likely to be key competitive elements of a 
multimedia regulatory framework include: 
•  the control of conditional access systems for digital services; 
•  directory services in the telecommunications field and,  in the context of new  digital 
services, "navigation" systems; 
•  the control of the "inside wire" in a home; 
•  the existence of a dominant position for the provision and packaging of  content, 
where that market dominance is  leveraged into other levels  of the  multimedia  value 
chain; and 
•  private proprietary standards supported by strong intellectual property rights. 
This list is not exhaustive, but represents the key types of foreclosure issues which may arise in 
a multimedia environment. 
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4.2.1 Conditional Access Systems 
The Regulatory Issues 
Conditional access  systems are effectively "gateways" through which content pours.  Where 
that gateway is dominated by a firm which is vertically integrated across most or all layers of 
the  multimedia  value  chain,  the  systematic  foreclosure  of competitors  and  the  preference 
given to the content provided by the operator of the conditional access system may result in 
enduring  market  power  being  enjoyed  by  that  operator  as  a  result  of its  "first  mover" 
advantage.  At  the  same  time,  there  is  widespread  acknowledgement,  at  least  in  the 
broadcasting sector,  that the number of entities that can achieve the minimum cost efficient 
scale  of operation  may  inevitably  lead  to  an  oligopolistic  market  where  there  are  few 
alternative  routes  to  the  customer.  Moreover,  it  is  claimed  that  consumers  will  be  very 
reluctant  to  invest  in  a  set  -top  box,  unless  subsidised  by  the  conditional  access  operator. 
Whilst many  acknowledge  the  need to  "kick-start"  this  highly risky  market by  subsidising 
equipment,  allowing  such  subsidisation  runs  the  risk  of further  entrenching  the  market 
dominance of the "first mover". 
The challenge for  regulators  in a fledgling  multimedia market is  to balance the  interests of 
investors, who require an incentive to enter the market and some guarantee of a return, with 
the interests of consumers and other operators who  need fair,  open and non-discriminatory 
access and a choice of access and content suppliers. Achieving the correct regulatory balance 
is  further complicated by the  fact that the operator of a conditional access  system may also 
operate other "gateway" equipment with intelligent functions,  such as Internet search engines 
and Electronic Programme Guides. 
At a minimum, a policy of partial openness, drawing on the traditional approach of European 
competition law to long-term contracts and exclusive relationships, should be implemented. In 
this context, the approach taken by the European Commission to resolve the SIM -card case in 
the  mobile  telecoms  sector,  thus  preventing  customers  becoming  "locked-in"  to  a  single 
access supplier, may be instructive. 
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There  are  at  least  five  significant  regulatory  issues  associated  with  the  introduction  of 
conditional access systems: 
•  the  ability  of the  first  mover  to  exert  gateway  power  over  other  content 
suppliers  (and  ultimately  customers,  thereby  distorting  the  market  and 
generating excessive profits); 
•  the  potential  anti-competitive  restnct1ons  inherent  in  the  deployment  of 
proprietary  or  delivery-specific  standards  (i.e.,  limiting  the  ability  of 
subscribers to receive programming from other broadcasters); 
•  the  possibility  that  the  first  mover  will  undermine  the  financial  viability  of 
established broadcasters (in a context where established broadcasters are seen 
to  play  a particular public  or social  role),  thus  raising  concerns  over media 
pluralism and the fate of public broadcasting; 
•  the  opportunity  for  the  conditional  access  provider to use  (and  to  abuse)  its 
upstream  and  downstream  market  power  (owners  of exclusive  programme 
rights  could  combine  these  gateway  functions)  to  distort  competition  in the 
market and also to deprive a broad range of consumers with access to content; 
and 
•  the  possible  cross-subsidisation  of  conditional  access  equipment  by  an 
integrated entity involved in many levels of the multimedia value chain. 
(i)  Community Legal Framework 
1.  Television Standards Directive 
According to the Television  Standards Directive (the "Directive")/
27 conditional access rules 
for  digital television services were to have been implemented at the Member State level by 
September 1997, regardless of the particular means of transmission used for such services. 
The principal regulatory effect of the Directive of relevance to multimedia concerns  "set-top" 
boxes which are required to  receive and  display  digital  signals.  The Directive  applies with 
equal  force,  regardless  of whether  the  set-top  box  is  used  for  the  transmission  of digital 
signals on cable, terrestrial or satellite television systems. Article 4 of the Directive is the key 
provision dealing with conditional access.  It requires operators of conditional access systems 
to  offer access  to  all  broadcasters on fair,  reasonable and non-discriminatory terms.  Such 
systems must have the capacity for cost-effective trans-control at cable head-ends (to allow the 
possibility of full  control  of access  by cable  TV operators).  Finally,  licences  of industrial 
property rights must be granted to conditional access systems and products on fair, reasonable 
and non-discriminatory terms; this presumes that a number of proprietary conditional access 
327  Directive 95/47  /EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the use of 
standards for the transmission of television signals. 
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systems  may  be  developed  over  time.  The Directive  neither prohibits  proprietary  access 
systems  nor  mandates  common interface  set-top  boxes.  It does,  however,  mandate  open 
access.  It gives powers to  cable operators to  obtain trans-control and removes  some of the 
possible barriers to  the production of multi-system set-top boxes or receivers.  The Directive 
envisages  three  levels  of potential  open access  to  facilitate  the  development  of the  digital 
television market: 
•  Use of a single box providing fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory access to 
all broadcasters: 
•  capability of trans-control at cable head-ends; and 
•  no deterrents to a common interface or secondary access capabilities; 
•  lnterworking  between  individual  boxes,  based  on contractual  arrangements 
between broadcasters and programme suppliers; 
•  Use of a common interface which may include: 
•  plug-in modules to a common port; 
•  proprietary encryption; and 
•  no regulation of players at the common interface; and 
•  a system of "open architecture TV", possibly adapted for the future. 
The Directive establishes a framework for open access, but leaves open the choice between a 
common interface  and  access  to  proprietary  systems,  where  there  are  economic  trade-offs 
(i.e.,  it is not prescriptive, but permits what is economically viable). 
There had been concerns expressed by a broad cross-section of industry that the conditional 
access regime proposed by the Directive could be interpreted sufficiently broadly to  require 
that  all  delivery  platforms  to  satisfy  a  "must  carry"  obligation  for  all  programming. 
However, a Statement issued by the Council contemporaneously with the Directive indicates 
that there is no intention that the Directive should be interpreted in this way. 
2.  Proposed Conditional Access Directive 
In addition to the access  requirements set out in the Television  Standards Directive,  further 
harmonisation requirements at the Community level have been proposed for a future Directive 
that  would  address  the  broader  issue  of piracy  of conditional  access  equipment,  without 
regard  to  whether  such  equipment  is  used  for  "television  broadcasting" .
328  The  proposed 
Directive  would  apply  to  broadcasting  and  "Information  Society"  services  provided  on a 
328  In 1996 the Commission produced a Green Paper on the Legal Protection of Encrypted Services, and has 
proposed the adoption of a Directive on the Legal Protection of  Conditional Access Services,  as a follow-
up to both the Green Paper and the European Parliament Resolution of 13 May 1997, OJ 1997 C314/7. 
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conditional  access  basis,  without distinguishing  between methods  of delivery. 
329  It aims  at 
ensuring the legal protection of conditional access services against unauthorised reception and 
the  free  movement  of these  services  within the  Internal  Market.  Under  the  terms  of the 
proposed Directive,  Member States will have to provide appropriate sanctions and remedies 
against  acts  of commercial  "piracy"  (e.g.,  the  manufacture,  marketing  and  sale  of illicit 
devices  and  the  installation,  maintenance  or  replacement  of such  devices).  Providers  of 
conditional access services will be entitled to bring an action against infringers for  damages, 
apply for injunctive relief or have the illicit devices seized. 
The proposed Directive, once adopted, will constitute a clear instance of horizontal regulation 
across  all  industrial  sectors  affected  by  convergence.  Consequently,  it  will  extend  the 
relevance of conditional access well beyond the traditional domain of broadcasting. 
3. Case Law: SIM-Lock Case330 
One  of the  principal competition law concerns  stemming  from  the  operation of conditional 
access  systems  is  the potential for  customers to be  "locked in"  to  the programming of the 
broadcaster operating its conditional access system, to the exclusion of other broadcasters and 
service providers. By locking in a customer to the use of a particular proprietary system for a 
long period of time,  the "gatekeeper" might take advantage of its first mover position in the 
market and seek to prevent entry by new competitors. An analogous situation was confronted 
by the European Commission in 1996 in the SIM-Lock Case. 
On 30 May  1996, the Commission's Directorate-General for Competition (DG IV)  wrote to 
GSM/DCS 1800 handset manufacturers and network operators in the EEA limiting the use of 
the "SIM Lock" feature in mobile phone handsets: the feature effectively tied the customer to 
one GSM operator or service provider.  According to the Commission, it was important that 
the handset could be unlocked upon demand by the consumer.  This would prevent the anti-
competitive  effects  of  the  feature  vis-a-vis  existing  or  new  operators,  and  avoid  a 
reinforcement  of  the  division  of  the  mobile  phone  market  along  national  lines.  The 
Commission  also  wrote  to  ETSI,  the  European  Telecommunications  Standards  Institute, 
which was proposing to standardise this feature as part of the GSM standard. It became clear 
that most operators  did  not  feel  it necessary  to use  the  SIM  Lock  feature,  and  in certain 
countries, such as  France  and Denmark,  the risk of anti-competitive uses of the feature had 
been foreseen and would be avoided by the establishment of special rules overseeing its use. 
The investigation was settled after the Commission wrote to the manufacturers to ensure that 
they  only  supply SIM-locked handsets  which could be unlocked by  consumers themselves. 
The Commission also indicated to ETSI that this should be taken into account in determining 
how  the  SIM  Lock  feature  should be  standardised.  Operators  were  also  contacted  in this 
regard, it being pointed out to them that SIM Lock should only be used if the handset can be 
329 
330 
The  definition of conditional  access  includes  access  to  services  such  as  pay-TV,  video-on-demand, 
music-on-demand, electronic publishing and a wide range of on-line services, as well as the provision 
of conditional access as a service. 
See Commission Press Release, IP/961791  of 8 August 1996. 
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unlocked by the consumer on demand. In particular, the end-user should be made aware at the 
time  of purchase  of the  handset  whether  that  handset  is  locked  to  a  particular  network 
operator/service  provider.  According  to  the  Commission,  a  form  of SIM-locking  device 
which allows the end-user to unlock the handset, on the basis of information provided by the 
network  operator  I  service  provider,  should  not  be  problematic  from  a  competition  law 
viewpoint. 
Network operators or service providers were informed that they  should inform end-users of 
the possibility of unlocking the handset,  or provide the information necessary to unlock the 
handset to all end-users on request. Moreover, in circumstances where the sale of the handset 
is  combined with the provision of a telephony  service and the  sale of the handset has been 
subsidised  by  the  network  operator  I service  provider,  the  existence  and  amount  of any 
subsidy,  and the  conditions for  repayment of all  monies  due under the contract,  should be 
made clear to the end-user at the time of purchase.
331  The practical effect of this, in the view 
of the  Commission,  would be that  consumers  will  no  longer be  charged what  were often 
significant amounts of money for the privilege of linking their own handset to the services of 
another operator  I  service provider. 
There are clear parallels between the types of foreclosure concerns voiced by the Commission 
in the context of the SIM-Lock Case and those which might arise in the context of conditional 
access  systems.  In addition,  the inevitable subsidisation of conditional access  equipment,  as 
occurs widely in the mobile sector, will also raise concerns from new entrants who feel  that 
the  first  mover  advantage  enjoyed  by  the  first  conditional  access  provider  will  become 
entrenched over time into a position of market dominance as the multimedia market develops. 
(ii)  Comparative Approach 
Only  a  number  of Member  States  have  fully  implemented  the  terms  of the  Television 
Standards Directive.  For example, in Germany the Lander have introduced a requirement for 
equal and non-discriminatory access to services that control access to television-based services 
through  decoders  in Article 53  of the  AOB  Agreement.  French legislation,  drafted  by the 
previous Government, is currently under review and the subject of a new series of bills which 
will address digital satellite, digital cable and digital terminal equipment respectively. 
In the case of Spain,  the Commission commenced the second stage of formal  infringement 
proceedings  regarding  the  terms  of Law 1711997,  enacted  to  implement  the  Directive.
332 
There were three elements of the Law that were of particular concern to the Commission: 
331 
332 
Network operators or service providers may need to withhold the relevant unlocking information from 
end-users  until  one  billing  cycle  has  been  completed,  thus  ensuring  that  a  subscription  has  been 
properly  set  up  in  respect  of the  handset.  The handset  need  not  be  unlocked  (and  the  information 
required  to  unlock  it  need  not  be  provided)  until  the  outstanding  amount  of the  subsidy  has  been 
repaid by the end-user. 
Commission Press Release, IP/97/680 of 23 July 1997. 
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•  the imposition of specific technical solutions for conditional access systems (as 
a "technical rule" that should have been notified under Directive 831189;  as  a 
restriction on the free  movement of decoders,  violating Article 30 of the EC 
Treaty;  and  as  a  restriction  on  the  use  of  decoders  to  access  services 
originating in other Member States, violating Article 59 of the EC Treaty); 
•  the  requirement  for  prior  certification  of  equipment  (again,  requiring 
notification under Directive  831189 and in violation of Articles  30 and 59 of 
the EC Treaty); and 
•  the implementation of powers granted by Law 1711997 to the regulator to fix 
tariffs  for  use  of conditional  access  systems  (which  might  be  in  breach  of 
Article 4( c) of the Directive). 
The key regulatory issue which arose in the context of the  Spanish law was  the fact that it 
sought to mandate the use of a fully  open system (thereby preventing the use of proprietary 
systems)  in the  absence  of an  access  agreement  between the  two  major  delivery  platform 
operators. Since that time,  the Spanish Government has amended its legislation to reflect the 
precise terms of the Directive.  As regards the future details of the proposed conditional access 
regime in Spain,  the Study Team understands that the regulatory model adopted in the United 
Kingdom is likely to be adopted (see below). 
In the United Kingdom,  OFTEL is  the regulator with jurisdiction over all conditional access 
issues.  Similarly,  a number  of other Member States  have,  or intend to,  vest jurisdiction in 
their respective telecoms regulators (i.e.,  Spain and The Netherlands).  OFTEL is responsible 
for enforcing both the Access Services  Class Licence and the Advanced Television  Standards 
Regulations.  OFTEL has  identified  the  following  five  objectives  in its  conditional  access 
policy: 
•  to  ensure that control of conditional access technology  is  not used to distort, 
restrict or prevent competition in television and other content services; 
•  to  ensure  that control  of conditional  access  technology  does  not  lead  to  the 
unreasonable constraint of consumer choice (in relation to equipment, range of 
services available and packages of services); 
•  to facilitate consumer access to services on more than one delivery mechanism 
(or switch between mechanisms without unnecessary additional expense); 
•  to  facilitate  consumer  choice  by  ensuring  ease  of access  to  comprehensive 
information about the services available; and 
•  to ensure that control of conditional access technology is not exploited through 
excessive pricing for use of that technology. 
To further these aims, the Class Licence contains a number of pro-competitive clauses.  It has 
fair trading provisions, prohibitions of undue preference and discrimination and a prohibition 
against  linked  sales.  The  lTC  and  OFTEL  have  appreciated  the  very  real  potential  for 
overlapping  jurisdictional  competence  presented  by  conditional  access  regulation. 
Accordingly, OFTEL's regulatory guidelines clearly set out their co-operative procedures. 
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Competition rules must, as a priority, ensure that the "gatekeeping" function of conditional access systems is not, 
and cannot be abused.  Conditional access should not  be allowed to  limit consumer choices.  Care must be taken  to 
ensure that the conduct of conditional access providers during the service start-up period is not discriminatory and 
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4.2.2  Directory Services and Navigation Systems 
The Regulatory Issues 
Dominant  market  actors  in  the  telecoms  and  broadcasting  sectors  have  often  sought  to 
leverage  their  market  power  in  their  respective  primary  markets  into  ancillary  markets. 
Leveraging  into  ancillary  or secondary  markets  not  only  reinforces  their  dominance  in the 
primary market,  but also  tends  to  create  a dominant position in the  ancillary  or secondary 
market.  This  dual  dominance  reinforces  the  effects  of foreclosure  on new  market entrants 
wishing to become full  line service providers or niche market players. It also facilitates anti-
competitive bundling or discriminatory pricing practices by a dominant operator. 
In the telecoms sector,  this  leverage is  best reflected in the attempts  of incumbent telecoms 
operators  to  dominate  the  lucrative  market  for  directory  publications  and  services333  by 
asserting  that  the  provision  of such  services  falls  within  their  reserved  monopoly  until  1 
January 1998. In moving from a regulatory environment in most Member States in which the 
incumbent  telecoms  operator  for  many  years  had  the  exclusive  right  to  provide  directory 
information  and  services,  and  therefore  enjoys  a  critical  "first  mover"  advantage  in  a 
liberalised  environment,  it  is  vital  that  the  database  information  used  to  create  those 
directories  and  services  not  be  used  or  withheld  abusively,  nor  should  access  to  such 
information  be  provided  on  unreasonable  terms.  This  undoubtedly  requires  the 
implementation  of rules  governing  access  to  such  databases  on fair  and  equitable  terms, 
because access to such data is tantamount to an "essential facility" for new operators. 
In the broadcasting sector, the abusive behaviour of broadcasters with respect to advertising334 
or programme guides
335  has been the source of important case precedent under Article 86 of the 
EC Treaty. When broadcasters enter the multimedia field,  the "directory" to which a customer 
turns will be much more complex because it will include a wealth of digitalised entertainment 
and information services. 
333 
334 
335 
Refer  to  Commission  Press  Release,  IP/97/292  of 11  April  1997.  Case  T-111196,  /IT Promedia  v 
Commission, OJ  1996 C269 p 27. 
Centre  Beige  d"Etudes  du  Marche-Telemarketing  SA  (CBEM)  v  Compagnie  Luxembourgeoise  de 
Teledijfusion [1985] E.C.R. 3261. 
Radio Telefis Eireann v Commission [1991] E.C.R. 485. 
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The directories  of the  multimedia world,  navigation  systems  and  electronic  programme 
guides  ("EPG"),  have  the  potential  for  serious  anti-competitive  abuse  if  operated  by 
broadcasters or affiliated content providers. In both instances, alternative platform providers and 
content creators are likely to be severely disadvantaged unless the navigation system is operated 
in  an  open,  transparent  and  non-discriminatory  manner.  A  fundamental  adaptation  of the 
existing regulatory framework may therefore be required to address these potential information 
bottlenecks in a high-value part of the multimedia value chain. In the long term, many of the 
functions  performed  by  telephone  directories  will  be  incorporated  into  more  sophisticated 
navigation systems. 
(i)  Regulatory Framework for Directory Services and Information 
The  legal  framework  being  developed  for  the  regulation  of  directory  services  and  the 
information contained in them consists of the following instruments: 
The Commission's Directory Services Communication of 1995; 
336 
The Full Competition Directive of 1996; 
337 
The ONP Voice Telephony Directive of 1995;
338 
The Database Directive of 1996; 
339 
The Data Protection Framework Directive 1995; 
340 and 
The proposed Data Protection Telecommunications Directive. 
341 
Of the  legal  instruments  listed  above,  the  Directory  Services  Communication  and  the  Full 
Competition Directive are of most direct regulatory significance. 
In  its  September  1995  Communication,  the  Commission  acknowledged  the  importance  of 
extending EC competition law and telecommunications regulatory principles to directory and 
enquiry information services, including universal service principles. Directory services raise  a 
variety of issues  of concern to  the  Commission  particularly  in relation  to  the  abolition  of 
336 
337 
338 
339 
340 
341 
Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  Council  and  the  European  Parliament  - Future 
development  of the  market  in  Directories  and  other Telecommunications  Information Services  in  a 
Competitive Environment, COM (95)431. 
Directive 90/388/EC of 28 June 1990 on competition in the markets for telecommunications services, 
OJ  1990 L192/10 (as amended). 
Directive  95/62/EC  of the  European  Parliament  and  of the  Council  of 13  December  1995  on  the 
application of open network provision (ONP) to voice telephony, OJ  1995 L321!6. 
Directive  96/9/EC of the  European  Parliament and  of the  Council  of 11  March  1996  on the  legal 
protection of databases, OJ  1996 L 77/20. 
Directive  95/46/EC  of the  European  Parliament  and  of the  Council  of 24  October  1995  on  the 
Protection of Individuals with regard to the processing of Personal Data and on the free movement of 
such data.  OJ  1995 L281!31. 
Amended  proposal  for  a  Directive  of the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council  concerning  the 
processing  of  Personal  Data  and  the  Protection  of  Privacy  in  the  Telecommunications  Sector. 
COM(97)94. 
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special  or  exclusive  rights,
342  conditions  governing  access  to  databases  and  marketing,  and 
universal service obligations. 
The Directory  Services  Communication  takes  the  view  that special or exclusive  rights are 
contrary to the competition rules and that the extension of exclusive rights for basic telephony 
to  directory  services  runs  counter to  Article  86  of the  EC  Treaty.  As  a consequence,  the 
Directory  Services  Communication  envisages  the  liberalisation  of these  services  before  1 
January 1998. The Commission has otherwise indicated its readiness to  use its enforcement 
powers under Article 90(3) of the EC Treaty in the form of individual decisions or directives 
(this view is also reflected in the terms of the Full Competition Directive). 
The Directory Services  Communication also states that access to raw consumer data must be 
guaranteed to new market entrants, in accordance with the application of the competition rules. 
In this regard,  ONP rules may also apply in a wide variety of circumstances where access is 
sought to information on non-discriminatory or reciprocal terms. 
The Directory Services Communication also takes the view that, in a competitive environment, 
all users of voice telephony services must have at their disposal at least one complete White 
Pages  directory  containing  the  particulars  of subscribers  to  both  fixed  and  mobile  services, 
while having  access  to  at least one  information  service  at  marginal  cost.  To  this  end,  the 
Revised ONP Voice Telephony Directive imposes obligations on Member States to ensure that: 
•  subscribers have the right to  an  entry in publicly available  directories,  and  to 
verify and (if necessary) correct or request the removal of that entry; 
•  directories  of all  subscribers  who  consent  to  be  listed,  including  fixed  and 
personal numbers, must be available to users in printed and,  where appropriate, 
electronic form, and be updated regularly; and 
•  directory  enquiry  services  covering  all  listed  subscriber  numbers  must  be 
available to all users,  including users of  public pay-phones. 
The Revised ONP Voice  Telephony Directive requires  organisations  which  assign  telephone 
numbers to  make available, upon request, the relevant information in an agreed format on fair 
and non-discriminatory terms.  Where no organisation is willing to make telephone directories 
publicly available or to  provide enquiry services to  all  users, the net cost of providing these 
services may be shared amongst operators providing public basic telephony under a universal 
service financing scheme. 
Clearly,  the  special  quality  of directory  information  as  the  means  to  access  users  raises 
particular sensitivities about exclusivity of rights and the abuse of dominant positions.  The 
Commission's  elimination  of exclusive  rights  over  this  information  seeks  to  promote  the 
dynamic development of supply,  while  respecting  the  rules  of competition and  taking  into 
342  As a result of the protracted dispute between BELGACOM and  ITT, Belgium, along with Gennany and 
France,  has opened up the directory services sector to competition, at least insofar as  it relates to  basic 
telephony. 
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account  both  market  liberalisation  and  the  anticipated  development  of  trans-European 
networks and services.  The key market importance of raw directory data,  and the potential 
for abusive conduct in relation to that data by telecoms incumbents, has led a small number of 
Member  States,  including  France  and  Denmark,  to  treat  it  akin  to  an  essential  facility. 
Accordingly,  both  of these  Member  States  require  that  an  independent  third  party  be 
responsible for  the management and dissemination of directory  service data to  all  interested 
economic actors. 
(ii)  A Workable Regulatory Model for Navigation Systems 
The  regulatory concerns  which are  relevant to  the  administration of directory  services  and 
customer data apply, with even greater force,  to the directory service which will prevail in a 
multimedia environment (i.e.,  navigation systems or "EPGs"). In a multimedia environment, 
directories will become increasingly important as  the means that enable users to identify and 
extract information from  the  increasing  volumes  of material  available  to  them.  EPGs  and 
Internet search engines are mere tastes of what is  to come. In the near future,  home viewers 
will be  able  to  access  up  to  500 channels of content.  The average consumer will be  able  to 
interact with a set-top-box which, through a combination of pattern recognition technology and 
user inputs, will select a desirable line-up of content. This custom-tailored supply of information 
will draw from the entire world's resources of available content. 
Foreclosure Concerns 
Regulators would be concerned if the  terms of access to  such intelligent programme guides 
and search engines restricted the access of consumers to services, particularly those used most 
frequently.  That concern is  exacerbated if,  by virtue of their links with content providers or 
their vertical integration, the operators of such guides favour their own sources of content to 
the  detriment of other content  and  service  providers.  Consequently,  the  policy  priority  of 
maintaining fair and effective competition is closely linked with the goal of ensuring consumer 
choice  through  access  to  navigation  systems  that  allow  users  to  be  both  selective  and 
intelligent. 
Two scenarios are of particular concern, unless addressed by regulators. The development of 
multiple  proprietary navigation systems  would force  the consumer who  wished  to  access  as 
much information  as  possible  to  use  multiple pieces  of hardware  and  subscribe  to  multiple 
services.  The result would be the  inefficient flow  of information  and the  potential  for  anti-
competitive practices;  these concerns are particularly acute where first-mover  advantages  in 
the  market result  in  enduring  market  dominance.  Alternatively,  the  development of open 
technology  navigation  systems  without  some  form  of prescribed  conditions  of competitive 
access would allow the owner of the set-top-box to  provide complementary information from 
other providers while blocking providers with similar product niches. 
The potential concerns for competition are compounded when one considers the already well-
established  content  providers  who  may  become  the  creators  and  owners  of  navigation 
technology.  The ideal scenario will be the establishment of a navigation system based on open 
Analy...sys -------------------------------
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technology  to  which  access  will  be  granted  according  to  market  forces.  This  is  ultimately 
beneficial for consumers because it promotes efficiency and transparency. 
United Kingdom Experience 
In view of the similarities between the role currently played by EPGs and the anticipated role 
of future generation navigation tools, it is worth considering the current regulatory position of 
EPGs at the Member State level.  The only country that has  dealt with the regulatory issues 
flowing from EPGs is the United Kingdom.  There are four principles underlying the approach 
adopted  in  the  United  Kingdom  by  the  lTC. 
3 ~
3  The  lTC  is  attempting  to  establish  an 
environment which encourages investment and which provides viewers with easy access.  It 
intends that providers of EPGs be able to  earn a return on investment in the development of 
their services and from the provision of these services to  broadcasters.  It is  also concerned 
that broadcasters negotiate with EPG providers on a fair,  reasonable and non-discriminatory 
basis, and that the broadcaster not face any unreasonable barriers in accessing a service where 
this would inhibit the provision of  services to viewers. To this end the lTC has developed a 
Code of  Conduct on Electronic Programme Guides ("Code").
344 
The  lTC'  s  Code  prevents  EPG  providers  from  discriminating  between  free  and  pay  TV 
services  in  selecting  the  services  to  be  included  on  the  EPG  or  in  its  operation.  EPG 
providers must give due prominence to public service channels.  If an EPG provider is  also a 
broadcaster (or is  connected to,  or affiliated with,  a broadcaster),  any display must not give 
priority or prominence to  its  own (or affiliated)  service.  All agreements  with broadcasters 
must be  made  on fair,  reasonable  and  non-discriminatory  terms.  Agreements  may  not be 
conditioned on a broadcaster's accepting  to refrain from  using  any  other EPG service,  nor 
may they include technical terms designed to achieve that end. 
The  approach  to  EPG  regulation  is  a  logical  extension  of the  approach  being  taken  to 
conditional access systems in the United Kingdom. 
343 
344 
To  the  extent  that  EPGs can be  considered to  be conditional  access  systems,  the  ITC 's regulatory 
authority is shared with OFTEL. 
The ITC Code of Conduct on Electronic Programme Guides, June 1997. 
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Analogous Regulation 
A case-by-case  application of general  competition rules,  as  in the context of the guidelines 
developed by the lTC, is arguably the least intrusive regulatory action which can address the 
potential  for  abusive  behaviour arising  from  the  operation of EPGs.  In the  longer  term, 
however,  evidence  of market  failure  and  the  possibility  of enduring  abuse  by  powerful 
industry players may require more intrusive regulation.  To this end, important parallels can, 
in the view of the Study Team, be drawn with the Commission's policy approach to computer 
reservation systems  in the  airline  industry.  The block exemption regulation concerning  the 
development of computer reservation systems
345  contains guidelines that have been developed 
with  a  view  to  achieving  the  most  competitive  industry  structure  possible,  in light  of the 
obvious vertical integration which would favour the service elements of a particular provider 
at the expense of its competitors. 
Article 85(1) of the EC Treaty prohibits any agreement between undertakings which prevents, 
restricts or distorts competition. This prohibition is subject to an Article 85(3) exemption being 
available when the Commission determines that the agreement, despite the existence of certain 
anti-competitive  elements,  allows  an  effective  degree  of  workable  competition  to  be 
maintained.  In  order  to  facilitate  certain  types  of  regularly  occurring  transactions,  the 
Commission  may  also  grant  "block  exemptions"  under  Article  85(3),  which  enable  the 
contracting parties to execute their agreement without notifying the Commission when certain 
objective requirements are satisfied. 
The underlying  rationale behind the  CRS Block Exemption Regulation  is  a recognition that, 
while the airline industry has oligopolistic characteristics, the capital intensive requirements of 
creating  a  CRS  requires  a degree  of regulatory  flexibility.  Therefore,  the  block  exemption 
permits four types of otherwise prima facie restrictive obligations: 
345 
•  an  obligation  on  any  party  not  to  engage  in  the  development,  marketing  or 
operation of another CRS; 
•  an obligation on the system vendor (the undertaking running the CRS) to appoint 
parent carriers or participating carriers as distributors; 
•  an obligation  on  the  system  vendor to  give  distributors  exclusive  rights  in  a 
defined territory; and 
•  an obligation on the  system vendor not to  allow distributors to  sell competing 
distribution facilities. 
Refer to Commission Regulation 3652/93 of 22  December 1993 on the application of Article 85(3) of 
the Treaty to certain categories of agreements between undertakings relating to  computer reservation 
systems for air transport services,  OJ  1993  L333/37.  The essential elements of the  block exemption 
were drawn from  the  London  European!Sabena  decision.  Sabena  was  fined  100,000  ECU  for  not 
allowing  London European to  register its  flights  on Sabena's CRS  system ("Saphir").  Saphir had a 
market  share  of  between  40  and  50%  of  the  relevant  market.  Accordingly,  the  Commission 
considered that a listing on Saphir was critical for  success on the  relevant route.  Sabena's refusal to 
list London European's flights  reflected a desire  to  maintain high prices.  Sabena  also  attempted  to 
make listing conditional on entry into a contract for baggage handling (to recoup the lost revenue). 
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To benefit from this exemption, however, participating entities must: 
•  provide equal and non-discriminatory rights of access to and participation in the 
CRS for any air carrier; 
•  provide a principal display which presents all participating carriers'  data in an 
accurate, comprehensive and  non-discriminatory manner; 
•  ensure the comprehensive and accurate provision of data by air carriers and the 
equal treatment of the system vendor in loading and processing it; 
•  charge transparent, non-discriminatory fees which are reasonably cost-related; 
•  limit the distribution of information generated by the CRS; 
•  provide  distribution  facilities  to  subscribers  on  a  non-exclusive,  non-
discriminatory basis with a right to withdraw; not tie CRS subscribers to the sale 
of their products or to encourage it by linked incentives; and 
•  not enter into any market-sharing arrangement between system vendors.346 
The  CRS  Block  Exemption  Regulation  provides  a  flexible  legal  framework  designed  to 
overcome  bottlenecks  and  to  prevent  abusive  behaviour  such  as  discrimination,  tying  and 
cross-subsidisation  by  integrated  providers.  As  such,  it  constitutes  an  effective  and  light-
handed  regulatory  response to  a  situation that  is  analogous  to  that presented by  integrated 
EPG providers. 
The future  multimedia environment will  be  made  up  of several  key  players.  There  will  be 
navigation providers,  service providers,  and  consumers.  The  service providers,  who  provide 
access to services through set-top boxes, will distinguish themselves on the quantity and quality 
of programming  they  make  available  and  the  ease  with  which  consumers  can  access  that 
programming. This future multimedia scenario has strong parallels with the way in which an 
airline's CRS  system operates. A CRS system is desirable if many airlines and routes will be 
represented and if the mechanisms for viewing flight information and making reservations are 
uniform,  assuring  the  ticket  purchaser that  all  available  route  and  price  options  have  been 
accessed. Likewise,  a navigation provider which provides competitive  access  to  its  platform 
enables the viewer to select from all available information at the most competitive price. 
CRS  information on flights  and prices  originates  with  airlines  themselves.  Similarly,  in the 
multimedia  environment,  navigation  providers  disseminate  content  which  originates  with 
content providers. Therefore, while an airline ticket purchaser might forego a ticket on a name 
brand  airline  for  a  cheaper  flight  on  a  charter,  the  purchaser  is  unlikely  to  do  so  if the 
information on the charter is difficult to locate. 
See discussion in Bellamy and Child, Common Market Law of Competition,  4th ed., Sweet &  Maxwell, 
1996. 
Analy...sys  _ Overview of Current Regulatory Environment in Telecommunications and Broadcasting Sectors/Resources  Page 239 
.................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 
!  Implications for Multimedia  ' 
i Access  to  directory  and  customer  information  is  likely  to  become  increasingly  important  in  a multimedia 
environment, as the shift from voice communication to combined forms of traffic continues. The key to maintaining 
a competitive environment will be to ensure that access to customer information does not perpetuate "control" over 
customers (thereby deterring market entry). 
The competition law concerns of  foreclosure  are strongest where "navigation systems" and  EPGs are operated by 
vertically integrated entities.  It is important that such systems are operated in a neutral and non-discriminatory 
way. It is arguable that the competition rules, applied on a case-by-case basis, can provide an appropriate short-term 
response.  It is important that the regulatory response is proportional to the potential for anti-competitive conduct, 
and that the developing market is not unnecessarily restricted. However, if there are long-term foreclosure concerns, 
more  restrictive  regulation  may  become necessary  which  is  designed  to  promote a competitive structure for  the  ! 
i  ....  ~.r:~.~~~:J!  ..  ~:!.~  ..  ~?.  ..  ~~-~~~--!..~~~-~P..~.:.~.~--~-~--~~~--:.~~-~-~~?..:!~~-~P..~  .. ?f  .. !.~~-···?.~~~-?..~~---~~~~~:~  ..  ~.'!:  .. !.~~-···f!!~J~~f!!:~~~--?.~!.~.~--~~~~'!:.:  ................ · 
Analy_sy_s -------------------------------------Overview of Current Regulatory Environment in Telecommunications and Broadcasting Sectors/Resources  Page 240 
4.2.3  Inside Wire 
In a significant number of Member States  (e.g.,  Spain,  Belgium  and  Germany),  either by 
express legislative decree or by virtue of a legal presumption or trade practice, the incumbent 
telecoms operator "owns" the inside wire which runs through the property of the owner of the 
premises  from  the  point  of entry  into  the  home.  This  prescription  or  presumption  of 
ownership is premised on the existence of a monopoly situation.  Clearly,  this can no longer 
by justified in a liberalised, multi-operator environment. The Scandinavian countries and the 
United  Kingdom,  having  liberalised  their  telecoms  markets  well  ahead  of  the  1998 
liberalisation timetable, have already addressed this issue. 
In these latter countries, the transfer of ownership of the inside wire to the individual property 
owner  has  been  acknowledged  as  facilitating  the  entry  into  the  home  of alternative  local 
access providers via the same point of entry (because it is not necessary to obtain permission 
from the incumbent telecoms operator to use the wiring). 
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The  build-out  of competitive  broadband  networks  may  need  to  overcome  the  important  practical  impediment 
\'=,  presented by the continuing ownership of inside wire by the incumbent telecoms operators in many Member States.  . 
In  the  absence  of consumers  being able  to  move freely from  one network operator to  another  without  incurring 
I significant transaction costs or inconvenience, the ownership of inside wire by telecoms operators poses a threat to  ! 
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4.2.4.  Access to Content 
The Regulatory Issues 
In a multimedia environment, operators with exclusive access to content with a high market 
value will be in a particularly powerful position. Whilst it is generally true that the overall 
volume  of content  and  the  number  of content producers  is  increasing  exponentially,  the 
qualitative divide  between commercially valuable content and  other types  of content will 
continue to exist. This divide is illustrated by the relative importance attached to exclusive 
football  broadcasting  rights  throughout  the  European  Union,  the  "perishable"  nature  of 
which has led such programming to become a key driver of the Pay-Per-View market. 
Where access to high value, perishable (i.e.,  very short shelf life) content such as  sporting 
events and first release films lies in the hands of a small number of operators, other market 
actors may consider that content to be an "essential facility"  or "bottleneck" to which they 
should  be  provided  access  on fair  and  equitable terms.  To the  extent that these  content 
providers are vertically integrated across  the  transmission and  service provision levels of 
the  multimedia  value  chain,  there  may  be  scope  for  applying  some  telecoms  regulatory 
principles  to  the  broadcasting  sector.  The  policies  designed  to  introduce  greater 
transparency in the commercial dealings of integrated operators (e.g.,  the principles of non-
discrimination) and to address  particular instances of abusive conduct (e.g.,  bundling and 
excessive pricing) may be particularly relevant. 
(i)  Community Legal Framework 
(a)  Competition Rules 
The potentially anti-competitive effects of exclusive and long-term arrangements for content 
distribution,  particularly  for  content that  is  essential  for  subscriber take-up,  have,  to  date, 
been dealt with at the Community and Member State level, pursuant to Articles 85  and 86 of 
the EC Treaty and their national equivalents. 
Market Defmition 
It  is  generally  accepted  that  a  distinction  should  be  drawn  between  "content"  per se, 
channels,  means  of (or platforms  for)  delivery,  and  encrypted or free  access  signals.  In 
addition,  there is  a large,  and  increasing,  number of service and product markets  in the 
multimedia sector. Although defining product markets by reference to programme content 
has proved to be difficult, the rapid increase in the number of specialised channels (brought 
about by digitalisation and the spread of cable TV) has opened the possibility of particularly 
narrow product markets being  defined in terms of their limited substitutability with other 
programmes (e.g.,  whether coverage of one sport is  substitutable for  another, or whether 
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international  and  national  level  compettttons  are  substitutable). 
347  Issues  of  market 
definition can only  be  settled  on the  facts  of each case.  However,  there  appears  to  be  a 
general  trend  towards  treating  specialised  services  as  less  and  less  substitutable,  as  the 
industry develops and consumer expectations continue to rise. Already, the Commission has 
identified separate product markets for motor racing  and football  rights.  On basis of such 
narrow  market  definitions,  it  appears  that  the  Commission  and  the  European  Court  of 
Justice are prepared to accept that access to certain types of content is a significant factor in 
shaping the competitive structure of the developing multimedia market. 
In addition,  there may exist different functional  levels  of the market for the  same type of 
content.  For example,  the  effects  on competition may  vary  between wholesale  and  retail 
markets for content.  In the case of wholesale markets,  the relevant relationship is  between 
the content provider and the broadcaster (e.g.,  cable TV), whereas the retail market is  the 
relationship between the content provider or broadcaster and the end user. 
348 
The geographic markets for content appear to be largely national or regional, with linguistic 
factors, rather than geo-political issues, as the determining factor. 
Exclusivity 
Exclusivity per se  is  not contrary to  the  terms  of Article 85(1)  of the  EC  Treaty,  which 
prohibits  anti-competitive  agreements  and  practices.  Justifications  for  exclusive 
broadcasting  rights  are  frequently  made  in the  context of  the  existence  of "perishable" 
content (e.g.,  sports and new  release feature  films).  It is  often contended that exclusivity 
with  respect to  these  forms  of content  is  necessary  for  the  major  investments  needed  to 
launch a new service (be it digital television, conditional access or a pay-per-view service); 
accordingly,  Article 85(1)  does  not apply  in those  cases where the  investment would not 
have been made at all in the absence of a grant of exclusivity. The case-law accepts that, in 
extreme  cases,  no  rational  investor  would  accept  the  risks  of the  investment  without 
obtaining substantial exclusive rights in return. 
349  The test to determine whether exclusivity 
is  justifiable  is  made  on  the  basis  of objective,  not  subjective,  factors.  In  some  cases, 
exclusive rights may be necessary, at least for an initial start  -up period in order to penetrate 
new markets. However, any rights extending beyond the basic minimum required are likely 
to fall  within the Article 85(1) prohibition.  Similarly,  the cumulative effects of a series of 
agreements may also trigger Article 85(1). Exclusivity must, in any event, be reasonable, in 
terms of its duration and scope.  Both of these factors are assessed on a case-by-case basis, 
depending  on  the  market  power  exerted  by  the  respective  parties  to  the  exclusive 
agreement.  The  existence  of a  sub-licensing  policy  will  also  be  helpful  in  limiting  the 
harmful effects of any exclusivity granted. 
347 
348 
349 
See EBU-Eurovision System, OJ  1993 L179/23 (annulled in Case T-528/83). 
See  Commission  Notice  on  the  definition  of the  relevant  market  for  the  purposes  of Community 
competition law, OJ  1997 C372/5. 
Case  258178,  Nungesser v  Commission,  1982  ECR 2015;  Case  262/82,  Coditel  v  Cine-Vog  Films, 
1982 ECR 3381. 
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The nature of the content itself may  also  affect the treatment to  be  afforded to particular 
instances  of exclusivity.  For example,  the  right to  broadcast  a sports  event live  acquires 
greater value if it is  exclusive.  By  contrast,  exclusivity is  not necessary to  put a value on 
rights to films  (unless they are "new releases"). Similarly, the rights to a sporting event or 
a connected series of events may  be difficult to  split up  satisfactorily  or easily  (e.g.,  the 
Olympics are more marketable as a whole, rather than by each discipline), while there is no 
reason to deal with a film  studio's catalogue or output as  a whole.  In addition, the greater 
the  number of forms  of exclusive distribution enjoyed by  the  same  product,  the  less  the 
anti-competitive effect of such exclusive arrangement (i.e.,  exclusivity regarding the same 
event or film for terrestrial TV, satellite TV, Pay-Per-View, etc.) 
If there is a risk that Article 85(1) will apply, the question becomes whether the conditions 
of exemption under Article 85(3) are satisfied, and,  if so,  the period of time for which an 
exemption should be given. This issue should be addressed on the facts at the time that the 
agreement is  made,  because  the  Commission cannot  "wait-and-see"  how  the  market will 
develop, since that would essentially compel it to take a position on future developments. 
In addition to the calculation of market share, market power for purposes of Article 86 can 
be measured by a variety of other factors. A content provider's dominance may be based on 
the  ownership  or  acquisition  of exclusive  rights  over  large  volumes  of commercially 
valuable  content  (e.g.,  new  release  feature  films,  sports  or  a well-known news  service). 
The effect of these rights as  barriers to entry are likely to be more serious in new, already 
concentrated markets than in long-established markets.
350 
(b)  Public Interest Legislation 
In addition to the competition rules, legislation has been adopted at the Community level to 
ensure consumer access to content of significant public interest. 
To this end, the revised Television Without Frontiers Directive
351  reflects the adoption of a 
light-touch  regulatory  regime  which  ensures  that  market  power  does  not  extend  to  key 
sporting and  cultural events  (identified on a individual Member State basis).  It requires  a 
Member State to ensure that broadcasters under its jurisdiction do not exclusively broadcast 
events,  which the  State  regards  as  being  of major  importance  for  society,  in a way  that 
deprives a substantial proportion of the public of the ability to receive the event via live or 
deferred coverage, free to air.  The Member State must draw up  lists of national and non-
national events which it considers to be of major importance for society. 
352 
350 
351 
352 
Some  sectors of the media are said to  exhibit a ''flow on"  effect which is  important in assessing the 
effects of exclusivity.  Essentially,  this  occurs when one company  obtains  market share substantially 
greater than its competitors, and this itself attracts further customers.  The risk of  a "flow on" effect 
is  cited by some commentators as  a strong reason for authorising exclusivity only for limited periods 
of time, so as to reduce the risk of creating or entrenching a dominant position. 
Directive 97 /36/EC of 30 June  1997  amending Council Directive 89/552/EEC on the coordination of 
certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning 
the pursuit of television broadcasting activities. OJ  1997. L202/60. 
Refer to list of specified events in individual Member States reports at Annex II of this Study. 
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(c)  Analogies from Other Forms of  Regulation 
The increasingly complex relationships  developing  between content,  service  and  platform 
providers, and the growing number of vertically integrated multimedia operators may mean 
that a certain degree of direct regulatory intervention is required where access to key forms 
of content is  tantamount to the ownership or control of an essential facility  or bottleneck. 
Existing  case-law  and  administrative  practice illustrates  that  intangible  rights  can display 
the  characteristics  of an essential  facility  (e.g. ,  copyright),  in  the  same  way  as  tangible 
rights  (e.g.,  access  to  infrastructure).  Seen  in  this  light,  more  intrusive  regulation  that 
ensures fair,  non-discriminatory and transparent access to  "essential" content could well be 
justifiable  in  a  future  multimedia  environment  (i.e.,  on  terms  similar  to  those  in  the 
Interconnection Directive which prohibit operators  from  discriminating  in favour  of their 
own  service  arms  as  compared  to  third  parties)  where  the  content  is  subject  to  the 
ownership  or control  of entities  which  is  vertically  integrated  across  many  layers  of the 
multimedia value chain. 
353 
In considering whether to mandate stricter content control rules for vertically integrated or 
concentrated  multimedia  operators,  the  approach  taken  in  the  United  States  may  be 
instructive.  According  to  United  States  law,  programme  access  rules  have  four  key 
elements: 
•  Unfair  practices.  The  rules  prohibit  unfair  methods  of competition  and 
unfair  or  deceptive  acts  or  practices  with  the  purpose  or  effect  of 
significantly hindering the supply of programming to consumers. 
•  Exclusive contracts.  The rules prevent cable operators from  using  vertical 
integration to deprive competitors of essential programming. 
•  Vendor discrimination. The rules prohibit the use of vertical integration to 
disadvantage  competitors  through  discriminatory  terms  of  programme 
access. 
•  Undue  or  improper  influence.  The  rules  prohibit  operators  from 
improperly influencing an affiliated content provider's decision whether (and 
on what terms) to supply programming to an unaffiliated distributor. 
(ii)  Comparative Overview 
The issue whether access to  specific forms  of content should be  mandated has  arisen in a 
number of Member State jurisdictions. In each case,  access to  football broadcasting rights 
on an exclusive basis has been the subject of legal challenge. 
353  Directive  90/387 /EEC on the  establishment of the  internal  market  for  telecommunications  services 
through the implementation of open network provision, OJ  1990, L 19211. 
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Spain 
Law  2111997  regulates  television  and  radio  broadcasting  of particular  sporting  events 
(including  national  level  professional  competitions,  national  teams  and  events  of special 
importance). No agreement (whether exclusive or otherwise) can prevent access to coverage 
of these events in general news programmes (free, for up  to three minutes of coverage per 
event).  The owner of the broadcast rights must authorise transmission of specialised sports 
programmes. The Council of Sport Broadcasting prepares a catalogue of events of "general 
interest" at the beginning of each season. These events must be broadcast live, unencrypted 
and over the whole of Spain. 
Licences of sporting rights have been examined by the Spanish authorities and the European 
Commission on three notable occasions: 
•  A joint venture agreement to  pool football  television rights  for  the  Spanish 
League and  Cup  Championships  for  a five  year period was  notified to  the 
Commission on  12  March  1997.  Pay-per-view rights  to  the  pool  are  to  be 
exclusively  sub-licensed to  a subsidiary of one of the joint venturers.  The 
joint venture is still under review. 
•  The Spanish Competition Tribunal held, in 1993, that the National League of 
Professional  Football  held  a  dominant  position  on  the  market  for  the 
television broadcasting of football. 
•  In  early  1997,  the  Spanish  Competition  Service  requested  details  of the 
agreements  with  football  clubs  from  the joint venturers  referred to  above. 
Although  as  yet  not  resolved,  it  is  clear  that  the  acquisition of exclusive 
rights to Spanish football matches is the subject of great controversy. 
The Netherlands 
The key role of particular kinds of content, and the power to be derived from access to it, 
have been considered in two contexts recently: 
•  Dutch Football Rights. The Dutch Football Association, which had sold its 
rights  to  public  broadcasters,  became  a  partner  in  a  commercial  sports 
channel (and offered it exclusive rights to  all matches in the Dutch league). 
Although  the  commercial  channel  collapsed,  and  the  public  broadcasters 
were given access to matches, the Competition Authority ruled that the rights 
of the  Football  Association  to  all  football  matches  should  not  be  used  to 
exclude  public  broadcasters.  Essentially,  no  broadcaster  can  exercise 
exclusive  rights  unless  those  rights  have  been  offered  to  all  other 
broadcasters (who have declined to broadcast the events). 
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•  Holland Media Group.
354 The Commission's Merger Task Force refused to 
grant  clearance  to  the  Holland  Media  Group  concentrative  joint  venture 
(HMG) between the largest Dutch TV producer and a number of independent 
TV channels.  The Merger Task Force concluded that HMG would occupy a 
dominant  position  in  the  Dutch  market  for  advertising  and  that  the 
producer's existing dominance in the market for independent TV production 
would be strengthened, on  the following grounds: 
•  the  independent  broadcasters,  combined,  would  give  HMG  a  high 
audience share in advertising; 
•  the broadcasters would be able to coordinate their schedules to attract 
a greater number of viewers and to  target the most attractive groups 
for advertisers; 
•  the  "combined  mass"  of the  HMG  broadcasters  would  be  able  to 
match  (or better)  the  programming of competing  channels  and  new 
entrants; 
•  HMG would have advertising market share of at least 60%; and 
•  the  structural  link to  the  largest Dutch  independent producer would 
give HMG preferential access to some very successful productions. 
The HMG case illustrates the fact that the existence of structural links between broadcasters 
and  content  provision  is  capable  of distorting  content  markets  because  of the  natural 
tendency  of the  vertically integrated broadcaster to provide preferential access  to  its  own 
content at the expense of other independent broadcasters. 
United Kingdom 
Much  of the  United  Kingdom  experience  in  relation  to  access  to  content  centers  on the 
activities  of,  and  investigations  into,  the  practices  of  BSkyB  (the  dominant  satellite 
broadcaster).  There  are  currently  a  number  of  separate  reviews,  both  before  the 
Commission  and  the  United  Kingdom  authorities,  that  involve  BSkyB's  practices.  For 
example: 
35-t 
355 
•  British Interactive Broadcasting ("BiB") notified a joint venture agreement to 
the Commission in August 1997.
355  BSkyB  and  BT are two of the parties to 
the  agreement.  The  Commission  is  still  reviewing  the  notified  agreement. 
However,  press  reports  suggest  that  the  Commission  has  "fundamental 
concerns"  about  a  digital  broadcasting  venture  involving  BSkyB  and  BT, 
since both hold  dominant positions  in their traditional market sectors.  The 
Commission is also apparently concerned that BSky B and BT might use BiB 
to  cross-subsidise  other  parts  of their  respective  businesses,  and  that  BT 
Decision of 20  September  1995  relating to  a proceeding pursuant  to  Council  Regulation (EEC)  No 
4064/89 (IV /M.553 - RTL!Veronica!Endemol) OJ  1996 Ll34/32. 
British Interactive Broadcasting-BiB, OJ  1997 C259/3 (Case No.  IV  /36.539). 
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would  have  little  incentive  to  improve  its  own  network  if it  were  to  be 
involved in BiB. 
•  The  Commission  is  examtmng  the  ways  in  which  BSkyB  supplies 
programming to  the  United Kingdom  cable TV  industry.  Both OFTEL and 
the DTI have been assisting in the collection of information about BSky B  's 
conduct,  particularly  in  relation  to  its  setting  of prices.  According  to  the 
press,  the  cable  companies  in  the  United  Kingdom  are  alleging  that  the 
charges  in  BSkyB's  rate  card  (cleared  by  the  OFT  in  1996)  have  forced 
subscription  cost  increases,  and  have  consequently  deterred  customer 
subscriptions. In addition, concerns have been expressed that BSkyB's access 
to  a large portfolio of content  (e.g. , new  release  film  library and  sporting 
rights)  provides  it  with  both  the  opportunity  and  incentive  to  bundle  its 
programming on a wholesale basis to cable TV operators. BSkyB's practices 
relating  to  content  are  also  the  subject  of ongoing  proceedings  before  the 
United Kingdom's Restrictive Trade Practices Court. 
Prior to these current proceedings, BSkyB's proposed participation in a consortium in 1996 
(together  with  two  terrestrial  analogue  broadcasters)  bidding  for  a  digital  terrestrial 
television licence ("BDB") was  also the  subject of review.  In those proceedings,  the lTC 
sought  the  advice  of the  European  Commission,  realising  that  BSkyB's  presence  in the 
consortium  raised  Article  85  and  86  issues.  On  the  strength  of  the  Commission's 
recommendation, the lTC informed the joint venture that no licence could be issued unless 
BSkyB ceased to be a shareholder. Again, the reasons cited included BSkyB's dominance in 
the  analogue  satellite  broadcasting  market  and  its  extensive  content  portfolio.  BSkyB 
withdrew, selling its shares to the other shareholders. 
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I Implications for Multimedia  · 
' In  the absence of overriding public  reasons justifying regulatory intervention, it would  be premature to  mandate  !,'=,,,'=. 
access to content, except in a limited range of circumstances. Case law and administrative practice under European 
competition  rules  are  sufficiently  well  developed  to  deal  with  situations  where  exclusive  rights  to  key  content 
packages  raise  barriers  to  entry for  competitors  or foreclose  content  providers from  distributing their content  to 
delivery platforms. 
The list of events designated in the Television  Without Frontiers  Directive constitutes a proportional response by 
the Member States  to the issue of which types of "perishable" content (particularly sporting events) cannot  be the 
subject of exclusive broadcast rights.  Coupled with this, the practice of the Commission has been to define relevant 
product markets in terms of sporting events in very narrow terms (e.g.,  "Formula One Racing", "Pay-TV Football 
Rights"), allowing it to determine that parties may be "dominant" with respect to a variety of sporting rights and 
raising  the  possibility of compulsory  licensing  to  ensure  that  access  is  available  to  such  content  in  appropriate 
circumstances . 
By analogy with the regulatory treatment of interconnection in  the telecoms  sector,  it  is  arguable that vertically 
i  integrated entities with access to key elements of content (e.g., exclusive rights to sporting events) might be required 
! to provide access to such content on fair and equitable terms.  They should offer terms that are comparable to those 
I pursuant to which it supplies its service arm or connected or affiliated service providers. Conceptually, there is no 
! regulatory rationale why an intangible right such as "content" cannot be an "essential facility" if  the legal elements 
I satisfying that categorisation are otherwise satisfied. 
:  .................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................  : 
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4.2.5  Proprietary Standards
356 
The Regulatory Issues 
Private  proprietary  standards,  particularly  those  supported  by  strong  intellectual  property 
rights, can serve a gatekeeping function,  and have the potential to be key competitive factors 
in a multimedia environment.  They also have the potential to  affect a broad range of areas, 
ranging  from  equipment  standards,  to  software  protocols,  to  access  to  content  (i.e., 
conditional access  systems).  Solutions exist for nearly all of the interoperability problems at 
an  infrastructure  level.  The  focus  of  future  standardisation  practices  in  a  multimedia 
environment  will  be  at  the  level  of service  creation  and  conditional  access  to  delivery 
platforms.  In the  converging multimedia environment,  there are a number of lessons  which 
can be learnt from the computer and IT sectors, which have already experienced the potential 
of proprietary standards to either foreclose or facilitate market entry.  The existing spread of 
proprietary  standards  for  conditional  access  systems  in  the  broadcasting  sector  might  also 
benefit from the experiences of the IT sector. 
(i)  Standardisation and Competition Rules 
There are two clear benefits of standardisation in a multimedia environment: 
•  Market integration. Since  Cassis de Dijon, 
357  it has  been clear that Member 
States  may  impose  product  specifications  to  protect mandatory  requirements 
(e.g.,  safety  and  consumer  protection).  If national  standards  differ  or  are 
incompatible, the effect may be the creation of technical trade barriers between 
Member  States.  European  standards  may  be  the  mechanism  to  combat  this 
problem. The current European approach increasingly seems to be to establish 
essential requirements and then confer power on one or more regulatory bodies 
to develop or design standards or specifications to meet the requirements.  For 
example,  telecoms  equipment  standards  to  ensure interoperability  have  been 
established in this way. 
•  Efficiencies.  It  is  widely  recognised  that  standardisation  can  lead  to 
rationalisation of production,  economies of scale and  increased efficiency for 
research and development. 
Despite these  positive effects  of standarisation,  there  is  a wealth of administrative  practice 
which suggests that standards, if abused by individual companies or groups of companies, can 
foreclose  competition  and  stifle  innovation.  The  effect  on  competition  of standard-setting 
356 
357 
Article 1 of Council Directive 831189 provides that: 
"Standard  shall  mean  a  technical  specification  approved  by  a  recognised  standardising  body for 
repeated and continuous application,  compliance with which is in principle not compulsory. " 
Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolvenvaltung fr Branntwein 1979 E.C.R. 649. 
~~-,  c£~~  fJr  ib~fl..k':.Y· 
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bodies is, in many respects, dependent on the identity of the parties involved in the standard-
setting  process.  For example,  single  firm  de facto  standards,  as  the  IBM  and  Microsoft 
experiences demonstrate,  have  the  potential  to  create a significant bottleneck effect.  Multi-
firm commercial standards have a somewhat less restrictive effect,  while formal commercial 
standards  and  government  standards  are  generally  the  least  detrimental  to  competition. 
358 
Standardisation  in  the  multimedia  environment  is  becoming  increasingly  dominated  by 
multilateral and formal commercial standards. This is particularly the case in areas relating to 
content and  service packaging,  which tend  to  be  characterised by  innovation and  high  risk 
(but with low sunk costs). 
The  competition  issues  that  stem  from  multilateral  standardisation,  as  reflected  1n  the 
Commission's existing administrative practice/
59 can be broadly grouped as follows: 
358 
• 
• 
• 
359 
360 
•  Access to the standardisation process. Generally, the greater the competitive 
advantage to be derived from participation in the  standardisation process,  the 
more open a standards-setting group  should be.  As  a general  rule,  standards 
groups should be as  inclusive as  possible.  Current cooperation between ETSI 
and the DVB group suggests that, at least in the European Union,  as  broad a 
group  as  possible  is  actively  involved  in  the  standardisation  process. 
360 
Accordingly,  no  obligations  to  share  technology  should  be  imposed  as  a 
condition for membership.  Standard licence agreements should be on fair and 
reasonable terms. 
•  Spill-over effects.  Standards should be avoided unless they  are necessary for 
legitimate objectives. In addition, the selection of standards should be based on 
objective,  relevant,  qualitative  and  verifiable  criteria.  Testing  must  be 
conducted  in  a fair,  open  and  verifiable  manner  by  someone  with  no  direct 
interest in the outcome, with the possibility of appeal to an independent body. 
Information  exchange  should  be  limited  to  the  extent  necessary  for  actual 
standards development. 
The main standard-setting authorities at the European level are: 
CEN (European Committee for Standardisation); 
CENELEC (European Committee for Electro-technical Standardisation); and 
ETSI (European Telecommunications Standards Institute) . 
Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  Council  and  the  European  Parliament  on 
"Standardisation and the  Global Information Society:  European Approach,  COM  (96)  359 final;  cf. 
1992  Commission  Communication  on  "'Intellectual  Property  Rights  and  Standardisation", 
COM/92/445 final.  Decision 87/69, XI  Open Group, OJ  1987 L35/36, February 6;  1987.  Notification 
of ETSI IPR Policy, OJ  1995.  C76/5, 28  March,  1995 /GR Stereo TV!Salora,  11th Comp.  Rep.  1982; 
14th  Comp.  Rep.  1984;  Decision  75/570,  Bronbemaling/Heidemij,  OJ  1975.  1249/27,  25 
September1975;  Philips/Matsushita DCC, OJ  1992 C333/8, 17 December 1992. 
The DVB  Consortium has  set standards  for  terrestrial,  cable and satellite based digital broadcasting 
systems  (DVB-T,  DVB-C  and  DVB-S).  The  Consortium's  standard-setting  exercise  focussed  on 
defining compression standards that would be economically viable in light of the microprocessor and 
compression  technology  available  at  the  time  and  its  objective  to  increase  the  variety  of channels 
(rather than improve the quality of signals). Accordingly, it chose the cheapest available standard. 
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•  Access  to standards.  The results  of standardisation arrangements  should be 
available  on fair,  reasonable  and  non-discriminatory  terms  and  conditions  to 
participants and outsiders, as soon as reasonably possible. 
•  Reduction  of  product  differentiation  and  over-standardisation. 
Standardisation  should  not  be  exclusive  nor  should  it  prevent  the  use  of 
additional technology, particularly in the case of de facto  or de jure mandatory 
standards or where the standard-setter has a large market share. In addition, to 
maintain  maximum  competition  on  the  basis  of  quality  and  product 
differentiation,  the level  of standardisation should be limited to  that which is 
indispensable (to achieve the standard's objective). 
•  Access  to  technology  required  to  comply  with  standards.  There  are  a 
number of key issues which arise in the context of the compulsory licensing of 
intellectual property rights, namely: 
•  whether a refusal to license limits products or markets to the prejudice 
of consumers; 
•  whether  a refusal  to  license  can be justified (e.g. , on the  grounds  of 
insufficient capacity); 
•  whether the party seeking access  has  a legitimate interest in access  to 
the rights; and 
•  whether competition is excluded by the licensing process. 
(ii)  Standardisation in a Converging Environment 
Digital broadcasting provides one of the clearest illustrations of the role of standardisation 
in industry development. The European Community is a leader in terms of digital broadcast 
services. Its advantage is  largely due to the industry-driven open standards (for terrestrial, 
cable and satellite systems) that have been adopted as ETSI standards. There is no basis for 
separating audiovisual signals and other forms of data streams, and it is  difficult to predict 
which hardware platforms will be accepted.  Accordingly, the industry has developed open 
standards that are aimed at ensuring that new media forms  are compatible with a range of 
hardware platforms (whether PC-based multi-purpose platforms, dedicated platforms with a 
lower level of interactivity or something else). 
The adoption of a compression standard that distinguishes  between platforms  would,  for 
example, have significantly delayed convergence of technologies.  Standards that perpetuate 
the  separation  of computers  and  "entertainment  hardware"  would  make  it  difficult  to 
overcome  consumer  resistance  (due  largely  to  uncertainty  and  unfamiliarity)  and  would 
retard the development of the relevant  software and  hardware industries.  Broadcasting  is 
essentially  only  one  of several  competing  distribution  media  for  data,  voice  and  video 
services.  Digitalisation will allow the simultaneous carriage of services over a variety of 
distribution networks.  Broadcasting signals should be interoperable with other distribution 
forms  (particularly  those  using  switched  or routed  networks).  Regulators  throughout the 
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European  Union  should  therefore  continue  to  develop  or  allow  open,  platform-neutral 
standards. 
The issues that have arisen in the digital broadcasting standard-setting process are common 
to most parts of the converging environment.  A similar attitude  to  open standards  can be 
seen in the experience of the IT  industry over the past few  decades.  Early systems were 
proprietary and,  for  that reason,  exhibited significant interoperability problems.  AT&T' s 
Unix system and IBM's introduction of DOS were the first hardware independent systems. 
By way of contrast, the TCP/IP (Internet working protocol) is the most recent step towards 
an "open" system.  When the United States government removed the restrictions on the use 
of the  Internet for  commercial  purposes,  it  "exploded"  almost  overnight into  one  of the 
most successful IT standards ever developed.  In turn, the industry worked to develop open 
standards  to  support  the  free  flow  of information,  and  to  prevent  the  Internet  from 
becoming  a proprietary  system.  It has  subsequently  summarily  rejected  all  attempts  by 
hardware manufacturers to create closed (and proprietary) standards for client servers. 
In a "traditional" telecoms context, it is worth noting the approach currently being taken to 
the development of an appropriate  UMTS  standard. 
361  Agreement has  been reached with 
respect  to  extending  coverage,  higher  bit  rates,  better  spectral  efficiency  and  greater 
flexibility for the consumer. It similarly appears to be accepted that backbone infrastructure 
will continue to  evolve to  support UMTS  applications,  and that  multi-mode terminals (for 
global  roaming)  are  likely  to  be  required,  since  the  development  of different  regional 
systems that will  support different air-interfaces appears to be virtually inevitable.  At this 
point, the standard is likely to be no more prescriptive than requiring the support of certain 
elements. 
361  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, the Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Strategy and Policy Orientations with regard to 
the  further  development  of Mobile  and  Wireless  Communications  (UMTS).  COM(97)513  of  15 
October 1997. 
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Implications for Multimedia 
•  Standardisation based on open standards is an important means of  ensuring platform independence. 
•  The creation of a fully converged environment should be characterised by interoperable distribution 
• 
• 
media, particularly between broadcasting and switched or routed systems. 
Proprietary  systems  should  not  be  developed  in  a  way  that  will  inhibit  integration  and  I,,, 
interoperability of systems. 
Despite very real competition issues, regulators must be sensitive to the commercial need to recoup  ! 
the massive investments required  to  launch new multimedia services  (which  are usually based on I 
proprietary standards).  : 
Analy_sys Overview of Current Regulatory Environment in Telecommunications and Broadcasting Sectors/Regulatory Authorities  Page 255 
5.  Regulatory Authorities for Multimedia 
The Regulatory Issues 
In a multimedia  environment,  the  effective  implementation and  enforcement of fundamental 
policies  on market entry  (e.g. ,  licensing)  and  market operation  (e.g. ,  interconnection and 
access) will depend on the existence of regulatory bodies with enforcement charters that are 
both broad and flexible enough to deal adequately with new issues. 
Unfortunately,  the  different regulatory traditions  which underpin the telecoms,  broadcasting 
and  publishing  sectors  are  still  reflected  in  the  fundamentally  different  regulatory  bodies 
responsible for these vertically separated sectors. Until recently, regulators have been able to 
operate  within  these  vertical  boundaries.  However,  our interviews  suggest  that  vertically 
segregated regulation is  increasingly creating difficulties for  regulators and market players 
alike, as evolving multimedia services often fall  within the jurisdiction of multiple regulators 
(e.g. , conditional access systems).  The boundaries between jurisdictions are thus becoming 
artificial, uncertain and difficult to enforce. 
The pressure of convergence has led some jurisdictions to review their traditional regulatory 
structures, and to contemplate a shift towards horizontally defmed jurisdictional competence. 
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5.1  EXISTING REGULATORY STRUCTURES 
5.1.1  Telecoms 
(i)  Community Legal Framework 
Community law imposes  a number of legal obligations on Member States  in relation to  the 
structure and responsibilities of their regulatory authorities in the telecoms sector.  The key 
legislative instruments are: 
Terminal Equipment Directive361 
Services Directivtf63 
Interconnection Directive364 
Revised ONP Framework Directive1
65 
For example,  Member States  are obliged under both the Terminal Equipment Directive  and 
the  Services  Directive  to  draw  a  clear  distinction  between  the  regulatory  functions  of 
regulatory authorities and the operations of incumbent telecoms  operators.  Since  1991,  as  a 
result of these directives, the powers to grant operating licences, to control type approvals and 
mandatory technical specifications, to allocate frequencies and numbers and to monitor usage 
conditions, have been vested in bodies independent of the incumbent telecoms operators. 
The  Interconnection  Directive,  while  confirming  that  the  telecoms  national  regulatory 
authorities  ("NRAs")  should  be  legally  distinct  from  and  functionally  independent  of the 
telecoms incumbents, requires that additional regulatory functions be vested in the NRAs.  In 
particular, the NRAs must be able  to  eliminate prohibitions on cross-border interconnection 
and be able to arbitrate interconnection disputes among operators. 
Finally,  under  the  Revised  ONP  Framework  Directive,  Member  States  are  subject  to  the 
following notable additional obligations: 
• 
362 
363 
36-1 
365 
In  order  to  guarantee  the  independence  of the  NRA,  Member  States  that  retain 
ownership  or a  significant  degree  of control  of telecoms  incumbents  must  ensure 
effective structural separation of the regulatory function from activities associated with 
their ownership or control of the incumbent. 
Council  Directive  of  29  April  1991  on  the  approximation  of the  laws  of  the  Member  States 
concerning  telecommunications  terminal  equipment,  including  the  mutual  recognition  of  their 
conformity, OJ  1991  L128/23. 
Commission  Directive  of 28  June  1990  on  competition  in  the  markets  for  telecommunications 
services, OJ  1990 L 192/ 1  0. 
Directive  97 /33/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  30  June  1997  on 
interconnection in telecommunications with regard to  ensuring universal service and  interoperability 
through application of the principles of Open Network Provision (ONP), OJ  1997 L199/32. 
Informal  consolidated  text  of the  ONP  Framework  Directive  (Directive  90/387  /EEC  revised)  -
European Commission DG XIII, of 10 June 1997. 
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•  Suitable mechanisms  must exist at the national  level  to  enable  a party  affected by  a 
decision of the NRA to appeal to a body independent of the parties involved. 
•  The functions of the NRA must be made public and transparent. 
Notwithstanding these requirements regarding the independence of NRAs, Community law is 
without prejudice to the institutional autonomy and constitutional obligations of the respective 
NRAs  of the  Member  States.  Consequently,  Community  law  is  neutral  with  regard  to  the 
public or private  status  of NRAs,  the  issue  of whether  NRAs  must  be  independent  of the 
Ministry responsible for telecoms, and the exact composition of NRAs.  In addition, Member 
States are relatively free to  determine the precise regulatory functions  of their NRAs  in the 
telecoms sector. 
(ii)  Telecoms Regulatory Authorities 
In the light of fullliberalisation, all Member States will have established a telecoms NRA by 
1 January 1998. At the time of writing,  Member States such as Belgium, Denmark,  France, 
Finland,  Greece,  The Netherlands,  Portugal,  Spain,  Sweden,  and the  United Kingdom,  have 
fully  operational  telecoms  NRAs.  For instance,  in France,  the Auto rite  de  Regulation  des 
Telecommunications  ("ART") has  been operational  since  1 January  1997,  whilst OPTA  in 
The  Netherlands,  the  Institute  Luxembourgeois de  Telecommunications in Lzaembourg,  and 
the  Office of the Director of Telecommunications Regulation in Ireland have  been in place 
since the summer of 1997.  OFTEL, in the United Kingdom,  has been fully operational since 
1984. 
In  other  Member  States  (i.e.,  Austria,  Germany,  and  Italy),  the  legislative  decision  to 
establish an NRA must still be implemented through further regulatory action.  The German 
NRA is scheduled to begin to operate and assume its responsibilities by 1 January 1998.
366 
In almost all  Member States,  the  NRA  shares or will  share its  competence in the  telecoms 
sector with the relevant Minister responsible for telecoms matters. Sweden provides a notable 
exception to  this  rule;  the  National Post and Telecoms Agency  ("NPTA") performs  all  the 
regulatory functions  in the  telecoms  sector (i.e.,  there is  no  Ministerial  involvement in the 
day-to-day  regulation  of the  sector,  nor  in the  granting  of licences).  Of course,  there  are 
numerous  instances  of  telecoms  NRAs  seeking  to  expand  the  scope  of  their  existing 
jurisdiction under national laws (e.g. , Belgium). 
367 
It is usual for the Ministry to be responsible for the granting of licences and the formulation 
of general  regulatory policy.  The NRA,  on the other hand,  is  usually  assigned the  task of 
regulating  market  behaviour  in  a  competitive  market.  This  involves  an  important  dispute 
366 
367 
In  fact,  as  of mid-October  1997,  the  German NRA  had not  received  Parliamentary  approval  of its 
operating budget for  1998. 
Refer to the 1996 Annual Report of the BIPT. 
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resolution function, plus the responsibility for overseeing policies on the equitable distribution 
of operating resources such as numbers, frequencies, and rights-of-way. 
368 
In addition,  certain  Member  States  have  created  separate  bodies  to  advise  the  telecoms 
Minister  or to  supervise  compliance  with  various  telecoms  regulations.  For example,  the 
Regulatory  Council  in  Germany  provides  advice  on telecoms  matters  and  the  Independent 
Decision-Making  Chambers,  (Beschluj3kammer),  supervise  compliance  with  telecoms  laws. 
Finally,  it should be noted that in Federal States,  such as  Belgium and  Germany  (and,  to  a 
lesser  extent,  Spain),  telecoms  is  primarily  a matter  which  falls  within the  powers  of the 
Federal government (with the States or provinces being responsible for broadcasting matters 
and/  or audiovisual policy). 
(iii)  Composition of the Telecoms Regulatory Authorities 
The efficiency of an NRA in a liberalised market will depend in large measure on its  degree 
of "independence", both from the telecoms incumbent and,  to the extent that the government 
continues  to  be  an  influential  shareholder  in  the  telecoms  incumbent,  from  the  Ministry 
traditionally responsible for the regulation of the telecoms sector. 
The composition of the telecoms NRA varies from one Member State to another. However, it 
is  possible  to  group  the  Member  States  into  three  broad  categories,  based  on the  general 
approach taken in establishing their respective NRAs: 
1.  In Austria,  Germany  and Italy,  the composition of the  NRA  is  still in the process of 
being fmally determined. The telecoms NRAs in this group are currently comprised of 
civil  servants  appointed,  in  a  competitive  process,  by  the  Minister  responsible  for 
telecoms.  A small  number  of experts  may  be  appointed  for  a  limited  time  under 
"expert" individual contracts. 
2.  In Belgium,  Denmark,  France,  Portugal,  Ireland,  Spain,  Sweden  and  the  United 
Kingdom,  the  NRA is  not fully  independent from the  government and is  essentially 
composed  of civil  servants  which  are  appointed  by  the  Minister  responsible  for 
telecoms  matters.  In France,  the members of the ART  are appointed by  the  French 
Parliament.  The Irish  Director of Telecommunications Regulation is  a civil  servant 
directly  answerable  to  the  Irish  Parliament.  In Spain,  the  members  of a  special 
Council of the telecoms regulator, the CMT, are appointed by Parliament. In Sweden, 
the National Posts &  Telecoms Agency (the "PST") is chaired by a Director General 
who is  appointed by the Government (the Ministry of Transport & Communications) 
and  is  assisted  by  a  Board  of eight  members  which  are  also  appointed  by  the 
Government. 
3. 
368 
In contrast, Member States such as Finland and The Netherlands have decided that the 
NRA must have  a significant degree of independence from the government,  and that 
With  respect  to  the  latter,  it  is  usually  only  general  policy  guidelines  which  are  developed.  It is 
usually up to local authorities to develop detailed policies regarding rights-of-way. 
~~~.  o£~~3-%  {j)~#0..W-1f 
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some  of its  members  must  also  represent  other  broader  industry  interests.  For 
example,  some members of the Telecommunications Administration Center ("TAC") 
in Finland represent equipment manufacturers and users. 
Telecoms NRAs  are usually financed through the collection of licence fees  and  fees  for 
the type-approval functions  which they may perform, coupled with frequency fees  which 
may be imposed.  In the more liberalised countries such as Denmark and Finland,  where 
most  telecoms-related  activities  are  not  subject  to  licence  fees,  the  telecoms  NRA  is 
financed  primarily  by  the  fees  collected  for  frequency  usage.  In The  Netherlands,  the 
shortfall  in  fees  which  arise  from  the  fact  that  few  services  require  a  licence  is 
counterbalanced by a system whereby the telecoms NRA charges companies professional 
fees  (charged on an hourly basis)  for  its  services in acting as  an arbitrator in "disputes" 
between market players;
369  a similar approach had been adopted by the telecoms  NRA in 
the United Kingdom in the early 1980s (i.e.,  OFTEL), but was soon abandoned. 
5.1.2  Broadcasting 
(i)  Background 
In  contrast  to  the  situation  in the  telecoms  sector,  Community  law  does  not  impose  any 
institutional obligations on Member States in the broadcasting sector with regard to the nature 
and composition of NRAs.
370  Indeed, the Amsterdam Protocol of 1997 confirms the freedom 
of Member States to  organise the regulation of the broadcasting sector. 
371  Consequently,  the 
relationship between the government and a broadcasting NRA tends to vary significantly from 
Member State to Member State. 
In  all  of the  Member  States,  a  licence  to  broadcast  must  be  obtained  from  the  relevant 
regulatory authority. This authority is normally the body that combines the licensing function 
with  supervisory  and  regulatory  powers  over  programme  standards  and  compliance  with 
permit conditions. Typically, these regulatory authorities enjoy considerable discretion in the 
exercise  of their  licensing  powers  and  in the  formulation  and  enforcement  of programme 
standards.  They  may  also  have  some  responsibility  for  enforcing  competition rules  in the 
interests of media pluralism.  These powers  are often shared with the  national  competition 
authorities. 
369 
370 
371 
Some  new  market  entrants  have  argued  that  this  procedure  raises  entry  costs  for  them,  as  it 
encourages  the  incumbent  telecoms  operator  to  characterise  many  interpretations  of the  law  as  a 
"dispute". 
The Television  Without Frontiers Directive, for example,  sets forth a series of harmonised standards 
for  the  quality  of television  broadcasts,  but  simply  places  obligations  on  Member  States  to  apply 
these. 
Protocol on the System of Public Broadcasting in the Member States. 
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(ii)  Broadcasting Regulatory Authorities 
The regulatory authorities in the broadcasting sector differ significantly as  between Member 
States,  creating  a fragmented  pattern of regulation for  that  sector  in  the  European Union. 
However,  it  is  possible  to  distinguish  broadly  between  those  Member  States  where 
broadcasting  is  under  the  direct  responsibility  of the  national  government,  those  Member 
States where broadcasting is regulated by national bodies that are relatively independent of the 
government,  and those Member States where broadcasting is  primarily the responsibility of 
regional (State) authorities. 
1.  Ministerial Responsibility 
In  the  Member  States  where  broadcasting  is  the  responsibility  of  the  Federal 
government,  regulatory  power  is  vested  in  either  the  Prime  Minister  or  another 
Minister with a more specific portfolio. 
In Austria,  Finland, France, Luxembourg,  and Portugal, broadcasting is primarily the 
direct  responsibility  of the  Prime  Minister.  However,  in Austria,  the  Authority  on 
Regional  Radio  and  Cable  Broadcasting  (Regionalradio  und Kabelrundfunkbehorde) 
has  some  broadcasting  regulatory  powers.  In  Luxembourg,  the  Minister  of 
Communications  is  responsible  for  the  broadcasting  infrastructure.  In  Finland,  the 
Council of State is primarily responsible for the regulation of the broadcasting sector, 
both  in  terms  of its  drafting  of the  broadcasting  regulations  and  its  granting  of 
broadcasting  licences.  Other Ministries  also  share  responsibility  for  this  sector  (the 
Ministry of Transport &  Communications, the Ministry of Education &  Culture, and 
the Ministry of Commerce & Industry). 
In countries  such  as  Belgium,  Denmark  and  Ireland,  broadcasting  is  primarily  the 
responsibility of the Minister responsible for  cultural matters.  In Spain,  the Minister 
of Development has  certain responsibilities  in the broadcasting  sector;  responsibility 
for broadcasting is shared between this Minister and the regional and local authorities. 
In Belgium,  the powers of the Minister of Culture and Social Affairs are shared with 
the  Conseil  superieur  de  l 'Audiovisuel  for  the  French  Community  and  the  Media 
Council  for  the  Flemish  Community.  In Denmark,  certain  technical  questions  fall 
within  the  scope  of  the  powers  of  the  Ministry  of  Research  and  Information 
Technology and the National Telecom Agency. 
In  Italy,  broadcasting  is  the  responsibility  of  the  Ministry  of  Post  & 
Telecommunications (to be renamed the Ministry of Communications).  In Italy,  until 
the  recent  creation  of a  Communications  Authority  for  both  the  telecoms  and  the 
broadcasting sectors, the situation was complicated by the fact that public broadcasting 
was regulated differently to private broadcasting.  The regulatory authority for public 
broadcasting was a joint committee of the two chambers of the Italian Parliament, the 
Commissione parlementare per l'indirizzo generale e la  viligenza dei  servizi televisi. 
In addition,  certain  regulatory  powers  were  also  vested  in  one  senior  officer,  the 
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Garante  per la  radiodiffusione  e l'editoria.  The  Garante  per  la  radiodiffusione  e 
l 'editoria' s powers included supervisory and enforcement powers over both public and 
private  broadcasting.  Its  principal  functions  were  to  keep  a  national  register  of 
broadcasting  companies  (and  the  press),  to  examine  the  accounts  of broadcasting 
companies, programme producers and distributors and advertising agents,  to monitor 
the rating systems and to apply a range of administrative sanctions for breach by the 
broadcasters  of their  programming  duties.  It  also  had powers  to  enforce  rights  of 
reply, which are shared with the ordinary civil courts. 
Reflecting  their  relative  importance  in the  cultural  life  of many  Member  States,  a 
number of national regulatory structures include the voluntary regulations established 
by the major national public broadcasters (e.g.,  the BBC  in the United Kingdom,  the 
ARD and ZDF in Germany,  and RTE in Ireland). 
2.  Independent NRAs 
In  France,  Greece,  Italy,  The  Netherlands,  Portugal,  Sweden  and  the  United 
Kingdom,  the regulation of broadcasting is  primarily the responsibility of NRAs that 
are relatively independent of the government.  For example,  the Commission for  the 
Media and the  National  Broadcasting  Organisation in The  Netherlands,  the  Institute 
for the Media in Portugal,  the  Radio  and Television Authority and the Broadcasting 
Commission  in  Sweden,  the  Independent  Television  Commission  ("lTC")  in  the 
United Kingdom and, most recently, by the new Communications Authority in Italy. 
The scope of the powers of the Conseil superieur de l 'Audiovisuel (CSA) in France is 
unusual,  insofar as  it enjoys both supervisory  and  some  administrative powers with 
regard to both public and private broadcasting.  Its powers of programme control are 
much wider in the private sector, where it determines the terms of licensees' contracts. 
In relation to public broadcasting channels,  it is obliged to guarantee the plurality of 
opinion. It also has the power to require the head of a public broadcasting company to 
remedy a serious breach of its programming obligations within a fixed time. It is also 
required to give published advice to the government on the public broadcasters' cahier 
des  charges  (the documents setting forth programme standards).  However,  it has  no 
regulatory  power regarding  advertising  or  sponsorship  matters  on either  public  or 
private  channels.  Furthermore,  it cannot ban particular programmes,  and  it has  no 
control over the financing of public broadcasters. In certain respects, the CSA has less 
regulatory powers than its predecessor. It may only issue general rules in the context 
of election broadcasts,  the  right of reply to  government announcements  and  access 
rights  (see  Section 3 of Annex 1).  In all other circumstances,  rule-making power is 
vested in the government. 
The  United  Kingdom  has a complex regulatory  structure,  since  regulatory  authority 
over broadcasting  is  shared among  a  number  of regulatory  bodies  (i.e  over twenty 
separate bodies).  The lTC has authority over programme standards,  issues licences 
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and  deals  with some  complaints  in the  private television broadcasting  sector.  The 
Radio  Communications Agency  is  the licensing body for private radio broadcasting. 
The BBC (the public radio and television broadcaster) operates under a Charter, and 
produces  its  own  programme  standards  and  has  a  complaints  body.  The  new 
Broadcasting Standards Commission ("BSC") deals with complaints in both the public 
and  private  television  broadcasting  sectors  concerning  issues  relating  to  privacy 
infringement, programme standards and unfair treatment. The Monopolies &  Mergers 
Commission ("MMC") and the Director-General for Fair Trading deal with a number 
of competition  issues  in  the  broadcasting  market.  By  contrast,  conditional  access 
systems for digital broadcasting are licensed by the Telecoms NRA (OFTEL). 
In Sweden, the regulation of non-content elements in the field of radio and television is 
the responsibility of the independent Radio  &  TV Authority (Radio-och TV  -verket). 
The  Authority  grants  licences  for  commercial  local  and  community  radio  and  also 
appoints  non-commercial local  cable TV  stations.  The  Authority  is  also  responsible 
for  suggesting  to  the  government  which  companies  should  be  granted  licences  for 
digital broadcasting. Fees for all such licences are payable to the Authority. 
372  By way 
of contrast, the Swedish Broadcasting Commission is  a State authority which reviews 
and monitors radio  and television programmes in Sweden,  whether it be on a local, 
regional or national basis.  However, the supervision of compliance with programme 
content rules  is  effected strictly on an ex post facto  basis. 
373  Failure to  comply with 
such  rules  may  lead  to  censure,  fmes,  injunctions  and  the  publication  of censure 
decisions. 
In  Italy,  a  new  law  has  been  adopted  to  establish  the  Autorita  Garante  per  le 
Communicazioni ("CA") as a body structured to operate in a converged environment. 
Accordingly,  the  CA has  been established  as  an  independent  regulatory  body  with 
competence in a full  range of both broadcasting and telecommunications matters.  In 
the broadcasting sector, theCA will have, in particular, the power to:  (1) grant private 
broadcasting  licences;  (2)  draft  the  conditions  relating  to  the  public  broadcasting 
concession;  (3)  determine the  existence of a position of dominance  in the radio and 
television  broadcasting  sectors,  respectively;  and  (4)  ensure  compliance  with 
legislation relating to issues such as advertising, distribution of audiovisual works, the 
protection of minors and minorities. 
3.  Regional Responsibility 
372 
373 
Broadcasting regulation in Germany and Belgium is unlike that of any other Member 
State. 
In  addition,  the  Authority  is  responsible  for  the  registration  of  the  names  and  addresses  of 
broadcasters in Sweden and the designation of their programme services, as well as the registration of 
persons who are legally responsible for the content of the programme services. 
For example, as occurs in the publishing sector in most Member States. 
~tun.,  u£nu:4-~ f!- f))~fi-M'!f 
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In Germany,  it  is  essentially the States  (the  "Lander") which regulate  broadcasting. 
However, there do exist some differences between the regulation of public and private 
broadcasters.  Each  public  broadcaster  within  a  Lander  is  a  separate  public 
corporation. These public corporations are broadly structured under two models --the 
so-called "parliamentary" model and the "corporate" model (most public corporations 
are  organised under  the  "corporate"  model).  Under  this  model,  the  corporation  is 
governed by the  Broadcasting Council (Rundfunkrat)  which  shares  responsibility for 
the control of the corporation with two other institutional organs, the  Administrative 
Board (Venvaltungsrat) and the Intendant (Director-General). 
In contrast,  private  broadcasters  are  regulated  by pluralistic  public  institutions,  the 
Landesmedienanstalten  (or  Landesrundfunkansalt  or Landesmedieenzentrale)  which 
are independent regulatory and  licensing authorities are not answerable to either the 
governments  of  the  Lander  or  the  Federal  Government.  The  decisions  of  the 
Landesmedienanstalten  are  administrative  acts  and  are  therefore  subject  to  judicial 
review  by  the  administrative  courts.  Within  the  Landesmedienanstalten,  the  State 
Broadcasting Commission takes all major decisions, with a smaller Directorate dealing 
with financial and daily administrative matters. 
Despite the  above,  all  powers  over the construction and operation of terrestrial  and 
cable television stations, satellite earth station equipment, as well as the allocation and 
supervision  of  frequencies  for  broadcasting  services,  are  vested  in  the  Federal 
Government. On the other hand, the particular use of frequencies,  is regulated by the 
Lander. 
In Belgium,  with the relatively narrow exception of national broadcasts generated by 
the Federal Government, all matters relating to content regulation fall within the legal 
competences of the regional governments which represent the major language groups 
of Belgium (French and Flemish). 
In Spain,  regional  authorities  have  certain  limited  powers  with  respect  to  content 
controls,  with the  Federal Government exercising overall control of most aspects  of 
regulation in the  sector.  In addition,  recent legislation has provided that the  regional 
governments each have the legislative power to grant concessions for the operation of 
new regional channels. 
In Austria,  the  Authority on Regional Radio  and Cable Broadcasting (Regionalradio 
und Kabelrundfunkbehorde)  is  responsible for  the granting of licences  for cable and 
satellite television broadcasting.  In addition,  the Ministry for Science & Transport is 
responsible  for  frequency  allocation  in  the  broadcasting  sector,  as  well  as  for  the 
approval  of  systems  and  devices  used  in  the  broadcasting  sector;  the  Federal 
Chancellery is  responsible for  general sectoral policy (including shared responsibility 
for content issues) in the broadcasting sector. 
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(iii)  Composition of the Broadcasting Regulatory Authorities 
As  mentioned above,  some  Member States have  created national  regulatory bodies that are 
relatively independent of the government. All of the Member States with such national bodies 
have  also  adopted  organisational  rules  to  ensure  that  their  composition  is  broadly 
representative of major societal interests. 
In Portugal,  for example, the High Authority for the Media is composed of thirteen members 
(which cannot be removed from office) which serve for a four-year term.  The membership is 
drawn from:  a judge nominated by  the  Higher Council for  the  Magistracy,  who  also  chairs 
the  High Authority;  five  members  elected by  Parliament;  three  members  nominated by  the 
Government;  four  members  representing  public  opinion,  social,  commercial  and  cultural 
interests. Members of the High Authority are subject to rules which are directed towards them 
not engaging in activities which might be incompatible with their roles on the High Authority. 
Some Member States use these organisational rules to ensure that different political interests 
are represented. This reflects the need to  safeguard the values of public service broadcasting 
and  to  avoid the  domination of the media by  the  governing  political  party.  Other Member 
States  have  gone  a  step  further  and  have  also  taken  steps  to  ensure  the  representation of 
economic, cultural and social interests in their national bodies. This reflects a desire not only 
to  have  a broad representation from  industry,  but  also  a desire  to  protect the  cultural  and 
social diversity of broadcasting. 
1.  Political Representation 
Among the Member States with national regulatory bodies, Austria,  France  and the  United 
Kingdom have taken steps to ensure the representation of different political interests in their 
national broadcasting regulatory bodies. 
In Austria,  the Regionalradio  und Kabelrundfunkbehorde has  twelve members.  Six of them 
are proposed by  political  parties  and  three by  the  conference  of the  State  governors.  The 
remaining members  are proposed by  the union of communities,  the union of towns  and the 
State in which the licence is exercised. 
The  Conseil  superieur de  l'Audiovisuel  ("CSA") of France  is  composed of nine members, 
nominated in the same way as the Conseil Constitutionnel (i.e.,  one-third by the President of 
the Republic, one-third by the President of the Assembly and one-third by the President of the 
Senate). The Conseil Constitutionnel has ruled that the independence of the CSA has not been 
compromised by its dependence on annual funding from the government. 
Until the creation of the Communications Authority in Italy,  the Commissionne parlementare 
per l'indirizzo generale  e la  viligenza  dei servizi televisi had forty  members,  chosen by the 
Presidents  of the  two  chambers,  and  representatives  of all  the  Parliamentary  groups.  The 
Garante per la radiodiffusione e l'editoria was appointed for three years (renewable once) by 
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the State President, on the joint nomination of the Presidents of the Chamber of Deputies and 
the Senate.  He had to be chosen from judges of the Constitutional Court, presiding judges of 
sections  of  the  Court  of  Cassation,  or  similar  figures  from  universities  or  the  mass 
communications industries. On the other hand, the Communications Authority is made up of 
eight members  elected  by  Parliament  and  a President  appointed  by  the  government.  The 
Communications  Authority  is  divided  into  two  separate  units,  with  the  first  dealing  with 
infrastructure and network issues and the second dealing with services and products. 
The Independent Television Commission ("lTC") of the United Kingdom  is  a statutory body 
established under the Broadcasting Act. It is composed of a Chairman, a Vice Chairman and 
eight  to  ten  other members.  The  monopoly  selection power  of the  Secretary  of State  for 
National Heritage has raised concerns in the past that appointees might have uniform political 
attitudes.  The  abolition  of statutory  advisory  councils  and  committees  and  the  views  of 
important business and social groups and the  general public they  represented is  regarded as 
having weakened the representative nature of the system. In addition, the British Broadcasting 
Standards Commission ("BSC"), a statutory authority responsible for content-related issues, 
also has members who are government appointees. 
2.  Broader "Pluralist" Representation 
Belgium,  Germany,  Greece and The Netherlands have attempted to balance the representation 
of economic and social interests in their respective broadcasting NRAs. 
The Belgian  Conseil superieur de l'Audiovisuel (for the French Community)  is  composed of 
forty -one  members  and  eight permanent experts.  It represents  the  interests  of the  different 
elements of the audiovisual  sector.  The Media Council (for the  Flemish Community) has  a 
staff of thirty-six, and represents different media organisations such as BRTN and SABAM. 
The issue of balancing the composition of the broadcasting NRA has been felt most strongly 
in  Germany.  From  the  outset,  the  Lander  statutes  have  provided  for  proportionate 
representation on the State Broadcasting Commission (the regulatory authority responsible for 
broadcasting  within  the  Landesmedienantalten  of  the  Lander).  The  State  Broadcasting 
Commission has  at least forty  members,  all of whom are chosen by specified organisations 
such as  the Churches,  trade unions,  chambers of commerce and  employers'  bodies,  sports, 
educational,  cultural,  and  women's associations.  Political parties  may  nominate  a member, 
but members of the State or Federal Government are often deemed to be ineligible. 
The National Council of Radio & Television in Greece has members from various professions 
related  to  the  broadcasting  sector  generally,  proposed  on a pro-rata  basis  by the  political 
parties. 
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The Commission for the Media in The Netherlands  is nominally independent and is  made up 
of civil  servants  and  ex  public  broadcasting  officials.  Funding  is  obtained  primarily  from 
licence fees. 
The maintenance of pluralism and  diversity  in the broadcasting  sector also  depends  on the 
rules  relating  to  the  composition  of the  various  public  and  private  broadcasters  (in  this 
respect,  the  contrast  between  the  positions  of  Germany  and  the  United  Kingdom  is 
noteworthy). 
3.  The Independence of Public Broadcasters 
Very precise and strict rules are aimed at ensuring the pluralism and diversity of public and 
private broadcasters  in  Germany.  The  Broadcasting  Council  (Rundfunkrat),  which  governs 
public broadcasters,  is  composed of representatives  of important social  groups  such  as  the 
churches,  the  Jewish  Community,  women's  organisations,  unions,  and  Chambers  of 
Commerce,  as  well  as  the  government  and  political  parties.  The  Administrative  Board 
(Verwaltungsrat),  which shares the responsibility of controlling public broadcasting with the 
Rundfunkrat,  is a much smaller body composed typically of seven to  nine members who are 
generally chosen by the Intendant (an officer appointed by the Rundfunkrat). 
In the  United Kingdom,  the BBC  is  constituted by Royal  Charter which has  a specific term 
(formerly 25, now  10 years), rather than by statute. As a result, the BBC is less secure than 
most  continental  European  public  broadcasters,  since  periodic  "review"  of the  BBC  is 
automatic upon each renewal of its Charter. The BBC  is controlled by its twelve Governors. 
One  is  nominated  as  Chairman,  another  as  Vice-Chairman,  and  three  of the  others  are 
designated  as  the  National  Governors  for  Scotland,  Wales  and  Northern  Ireland.  All 
Governors are appointed by the  Prime Minister.  Accordingly,  the government,  through the 
Prime Minister, has the sole power to appoint the members of the controlling body, which in 
theory puts at risk the impartiality of the BBC. 
Whereas  in  other  Member  States  there  exists  a  clear  allocation  of powers  between  the 
governing elements of public broadcasters, in the  United Kingdom there is little definition of 
the Governors' powers or their relationship with the Director-General and the BBC staff. The 
BBC's  1996  Charter,  for  the  first  time,  enumerates  the  elements  of  the  role  of  the 
Government,  which  relate  essentially  to  consumer  protection  and  standards-monitoring 
functions.  The  inclusion  of  these  clauses  in  the  Charter  is  an  attempt  to  overcome 
uncertainties  in the  division of responsibilities  which,  together with weak conventions,  was 
overridden on a number of occasions  by  the  BBC' s Governors.  Despite these new  clauses, 
there are few formal guarantees of the BBC' s independence. 
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5.1.3  Publishing 
The publishing sector is  largely unregulated.  Most of the  regulations applicable  are ex post 
regulations, dealing principally with content control issues. 
In  Member  States  such  as  Austria  and  Denmark,  the  Prime  Minister  has  some  residual 
regulatory powers. In Finland,  the Minister of Justice has some powers that relate essentially 
to  content  control  issues.  In  other  Member  States,  content  control  issues  are  handled  by 
separate regulatory bodies which can either be public,  such as  the Institute for  the Media in 
Portugal,  or private such as the Dutch tri-partite self-regulatory body for advertising content, 
or the Press Complaints Council ("PCC") in the United Kingdom.  The PCC is a non-statutory 
body  with  no  powers  of sanction,  with jurisdiction only  over  the  press.  In Italy,  the  new 
Communications Authority will also have authority over publishing matters. 
Finally,  in  Germany,  the  Lander have  the  power  to  regulate  all  matters  in the  publishing 
sector,  subject to  the need to comply with the provisions of the German Constitution on the 
freedom of the press. Under the German Constitution, the Federal Government has the power 
to draft framework laws in the publishing sector.  The Federal Government has not,  to  date, 
sought to use this power. 
Table  XI  overleaf outlines  the  respective  regulatory  authorities  which  are  responsible  for 
telecoms and broadcasting matters at Member State level. 
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5.2  OVERLAPPING COMPETENCES 
In evaluating  the  extent to  which  the  convergence  of regulatory  functions  and  policies  is 
possible across the telecoms  and broadcasting sectors,  it is  necessary to  understand existing 
and developing areas of mutual or overlapping competence. To this end, Table XII compares 
the powers and functions of the respective NRAs in the telecoms and broadcasting sectors. 
5.2.1  Licensing 
The  regulatory  authorities  responsible  for  granting  telecoms  licences  vary  from  Member 
States to Member State. In the majority of Member States, telecoms licences are still granted 
by  the  relevant  Minister  responsible  for  telecoms  matters.  In  countries  such  as  France, 
Germany, Luxembourg and The Netherlands,  a formal system has been established in order to 
ensure that the Minister makes his decision after discussion or consultation with the relevant 
NRA.  In Belgium, Denmark and in Sweden,  telecoms licences are granted exclusively by the 
NRA. 
Broadcasting licences are granted by the Minister responsible for broadcasting in a majority 
of Member States (e.g., Denmark, Italy, Luxembourg,  and Portugal).  However,  the identity 
of the appropriate licensing authority varies in some Member States if the licence relates to 
broadcasting infrastructure as opposed to services, or if the broadcasts are national or local in 
character.  For example,  in  The  Netherlands,  the  Minister of Transport &  Communications 
grants  infrastructure licences  (including  cable  TV  licences)  and  the  Minister of Education, 
Culture &  Science grants service licences for public national broadcasters.  In Denmark,  the 
national television stations are licensed by the Ministry of Cultural Affairs,  but licences for 
local  radio  and  television are  granted  by  the  local  councils.  Transmission  facilities  in the 
broadcasting  sector  are often licensed  separately  from  broadcast  services  (e.g.,  the  United 
Kingdom,  Spain,  The  Netherlands,  France  and Italy).  Unlike the telecoms  sector,  however, 
there is little competition in the provision of terrestrial broadcasting infrastructure. 
In France  and  in  the  United  Kingdom,  broadcasting  licences  are  granted  by  the  national 
regulatory body.  In Austria, Belgium and Germany,  broadcasting licences are granted by the 
regional (local) authorities. The licensing of cable TV infrastructure (as opposed to services) 
is predominantly a function of telecoms NRAs,  with the notable exception of France  (where 
both cable TV infrastructure and services fall within the sphere of broadcasting). 
Finally, a number of Member States ensure that the process of granting broadcasting licences 
requires  the  collaboration  of both  national  and  regional  authorities  (i.e.,  Spain)  or  the 
Minister and a national body (i.e., Luxembourg). 
In the  majority  of Member  States,  the  authorities  responsible  for  the  granting  of telecoms 
service licences are different from those responsible for  the granting of broadcasting service 
licences. In general, the telecoms NRAs which are currently being established by the Member 
States  in  compliance  with  telecoms  liberalisation/harmonisation  measures  do  not  have 
responsibilities  in  both  the  telecoms  and  broadcasting  sectors.  Notable  exceptions  to  this 
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general rule can be found in the regulatory structures of Italy,  and to lesser degrees, Finland, 
The Netherlands and Spain. 
In Luxembourg, the Ministry of Communications grants telecoms infrastructure licences and 
licences  for  the establishment of cable  TV networks.  In The  Netherlands,  the  Minister of 
Transport & Communications grants all infrastructure licences, including licences for CATV 
networks.  In  Spain,  telecoms  licences  to  establish  cable  TV networks  are  granted  by  the 
Ministry of Development. In Italy, the new Communications Authority will be responsible for 
the  granting  of all  relevant  licences  for  infrastructure,  services  and  "products"  (which 
includes content), in addition to a broad range of other matters (including publishing). Austria 
has  also  indicated that the  convergence of regulatory  functions  is  envisaged for  the  future 
(albeit not specified expressly in recently enacted legislation). 
Although vertical analysis continues to characterise licensing in the telecoms and broadcasting 
sectors, the consolidation of licensing along horizontal lines is increasingly being considered a 
viable  policy  option  by  a  number  of  Member  States.  This  regulatory  convergence  is 
particularly profound with  respect to  the  licensing of infrastructure  for  both telecoms  and 
broadcasting.  The proliferation of cable TV networks  throughout the  European Union will 
increase  the  pressure  for  such  a  cross-sector  licensing  approach,  and  possibly  even  the 
consolidation  of licensing  functions  in  a  single  regulatory  body  except  where  a  Federal 
division of powers precludes such an option, e.g., Germany, Belgium. 
5.2.2  Frequency Allocation 
The regulatory authorities responsible for frequency allocation in the telecoms sector vary 
between  Member  States.  In  countries  such  as  Austria,  Belgium,  Luxembourg  and  The 
Netherlands,  spectrum  allocation  is  still  currently  the  responsibility  of  the  Minister 
responsible  for  telecoms.  In Denmark,  Finland,  France,  Greece,  Ireland,  Portugal  and 
Sweden,  spectrum  allocation  for  telecoms  purposes  is  primarily  the  responsibility  of the 
telecoms NRA. The NRA will also be responsible for spectrum allocation in the near future in 
Germany  and  Italy.  In the  United  Kingdom,  responsibility  for  spectrum  allocation  is  split 
between  a  number  of  governmental  agencies.  The  key  institutions  are  the  Radio 
Communications  Agency  and  the  National  Frequency  Planning  Group  (NFPG),  which 
formulates  long  term  frequency  allocation policies.  In the  majority of Member  States,  the 
Ministers of Interior and Defence can intervene in the allocation of the frequencies to ensure 
that adequate spectrum is available for certain civil and military functions.  No Member States 
vest responsibility for telecoms spectrum allocation in regional (local) authorities. 
Similarly, broadcasting frequency allocation is  either the responsibility of the Minister or 
the NRA. In Greece, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, and Spain, it is primarily 
the responsibility of the Minister, who is also responsible for telecoms matters. In Denmark, 
France and Portugal, it is the responsibility of the NRA. In Belgium and Germany,  spectrum 
allocation is  the responsibility  of regional  (State)  authorities,  subject  to  certain overriding 
powers  of the  Federal  government.  In the  United  Kingdom,  spectrum  allocation  is  the 
responsibility of the Independent Television Commission (lTC) for television and the Radio 
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Authority  for  radio.  In  France,  frequency  allocation  for  broadcasting  purposes  is  split 
between a number of authorities.  It is  also the case  that the  national  Ministry  for  Defence 
plays a role in frequency allocation. 
In sharp contrast to the fragmented number of licensing authorities among the Member States, 
the  authorities  responsible  for  frequency  allocation  in both  the  telecoms  and  broadcasting 
sectors  are the  same  in a number of Member States.  These Member States include Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg,  The Netherlands,  Portugal and Spain.  The management of 
frequency allocation across all sectors is centralised most completely in Portugal. 
374 
Perhaps surprisingly, the legal requirement that Member States establish telecoms NRAs may 
have the short  -term effect of splitting previously unified responsibility for spectrum allocation 
among a number of  national authorities. For example, spectrum allocation for both telecoms 
and  broadcasting  in  Ireland  before  June  1997  was  controlled  by  the  Minister.  This  is  no 
longer the case  now  that responsibility  in the  telecoms  sector has been vested  in the  newly 
created NRA. 
5.2.3  Interconnection & Access 
By  and  large,  the  regulatory  authorities  responsible  for  the  resolution  of interconnection 
disputes  in the  telecoms  sector are the  national  NRAs.  With the  exception of Greece,  all 
Member States appear to have established a stable regulatory framework which would allow 
their respective telecoms NRAs to play a key role in both the development of interconnection 
policy (including issues of access and so-called Special Network Access) and in the resolution 
of interconnection  disputes  (or  have  at  least  commenced  that  process  with  framework 
legislation e.g., Austria, Belgium, Ireland and Portugal). 
In the context of broadcasting,  issues of access to  the cable TV sector are dealt with in The 
Netherlands by the Competition Authority. Otherwise, access issues in the broadcasting sector 
are the responsibility of the broadcasting authorities (refer to Section 5.3. of Annex I). 
Most  recently,  the  issue  has  arisen  as  to  which  regulatory  authorities  should  have 
jurisdictional  responsibility  for  the  implementation  of  conditional  access  policies  (see 
discussion in Section 4 of Annex I), whether pursuant to the terms of the Television Standards 
Directive  or otherwise.  Of those  Member States  which have  implemented the  terms  of the 
Directive,  there appears  to  be  a general disposition to  assign responsibility to  the  telecoms 
NRA,  rather than  to  the  broadcasting  NRA  (e.g.,  the  United  Kingdom,  The  Netherlands, 
Spain).  In a number of other Member States,  it is  as yet uncertain as  to  the particular NRA 
which  will  be  responsible  for  conditional  access  issues  (e.g. ,  France).  In  Germany,  the 
regulatory governance of conditional access issues rests with the Lander. 
374  The ICP is responsible for all broadcasting, telecoms, radio, army, police and other services. 
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5.2.4  Price Controls 
The regulatory  authorities  responsible  for  price controls  in the telecoms  sector vary  from 
Member  State  to  Member  State.  In  Austria,  Belgium,  Germany,  Greece,  Ireland,  Italy, 
Luxembourg  and  Spain,  price  controls  are  the  responsibility  of the  relevant  Minister.  In 
Denmark,  The  Netherlands,  Portugal,  Sweden  and  the  United Kingdom,  responsibility  rests 
with the NRA.  A number of Member States will transfer responsibility for price controls to 
the NRA by  1 January 1998. In France,  the Minister is  responsible for retail tariffs for basic 
voice services which are the subject of universal service obligations, with the NRA having the 
power to give and publicise its  (non-binding) views on such tariffs.  Responsibility for  price 
controls is never vested in regional (local) authorities. 
In Germany, Luxembourg, The Netherlands,  Spain and the United Kingdom,  there is currently 
no regulatory framework for  price controls  in the terrestrial broadcasting sector. 
37s In the 
Member States which have set up  such a regulatory framework, price control generally vests 
in the responsible Minister. In the cable TV sector, price controls are rare, being found only 
in Belgium and in Germany, which are both characterised by Federal legal structures. 
5.2.5  Regulation of Content 
The majority of Member States have not adopted a specific framework for  the regulation of 
"content" in the telecoms sector.  Regulatory power in Austria is  split between the Federal 
Ministry of Science &  Transport and the Ministry of Justice.  In the  United Kingdom,  to  the 
extent  that  there  are  any  content  controls,  they  are  the  responsibility  of OFTEL.  In the 
telecoms sector, the issue of content control has  arisen in the context of consumer protection 
issues regarding 'chatlines' and related services. 
By way of sharp contrast, most Member States specifically regulate the content of audiovisual 
services in the broadcasting sector. The Swedish Minister of Culture has regulatory power in 
this respect, as does the Italian Minister of Telecommunications and the Italian Parliament. In 
most  Member  States,  however,  the  regulation  of content  is  the  responsibility  of separate 
agencies  such  as  the  French  Conseil  superieur de  l'Audiovisuel,  the  National  Council  for 
Programmes (in Luxembourg), and the Portuguese High Authority for Mass  Communication 
(and, most recently, the Communications Authority in Italy). 
In the  United Kingdom,  a number of bodies are responsible for content regulation.  The BBC 
(the  public  broadcaster),  the  Independent  Television  Commission  ("lTC")  and  the  (new) 
Broadcasting  Standards  Commission  ("BSC")  all  have  authority  over  content  issues;  they 
develop  and enforce programme standards,  and have jurisdiction over complaints  regarding 
unwarranted  invasions  of privacy,  unfair  reporting  and  breaches  of programme  standards. 
The  Radio  Authority  and  the  BBC  have  similar  powers  and  duties  in  relation  to  content 
control  in  radio  broadcasting.  In The  Netherlands,  the  Media  Commission  is  generally 
375  With the exception of the setting of licence fees for public broadcasters, which is the responsibility of 
the government. 
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responsible for  content issues,  subject to  the  National Broadcasting Organisation's power to 
prescribe  public  broadcast  programme  content.  In  Germany,  regulatory  power  over 
broadcasting content is vested in the respective Lander. 
Of all the issue-specific matters dealt with by national regulatory structures, content regulation 
appears to be the least susceptible to any form of regulatory convergence from an institutional 
point of view across sectors.  This is primarily due to the very broad range of public policy 
issues which have their own particular national (or indeed, regional) character. 
5.2.6  Appeals from NRA Decisions 
In general,  appeals  from decisions  of the  relevant Ministries or the respective  NRAs  in the 
telecoms and broadcasting sectors are made to the administrative courts of the Member States. 
There  are  two  notable  exceptions  to  this  rule,  namely,  The  Netherlands  and  the  United 
Kingdom.  In the  former,  the  civil  courts  have been given express jurisdiction to  deal  with 
appeals from the  NRAs  consistent with other actions of a commercial nature.  In the case of 
the latter, litigation brought by Mercury Communications against BT in 1994
376 confirmed that 
appeals may be made to the English commercial courts in disputes between market players, in 
addition  to  the  usual  powers  of judicial  review  where  the  actions  of  OFTEL  were 
challenged. 
377 
The ability to appeal directly to  the commercial courts greatly expedites judicial review and 
stimulates the growth and effectiveness of liberalisation measures. 
376 
377 
Mercury Communications Limited v.  Director General of  Telecommunications [1996]  1 WLR 48. 
The  Telecommunications  Act  severely  curtails  the  scope  for  administrative  review  of OFTEL's 
decisions, setting out very narrow grounds for review. 
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5.2.  7  Numbering Issues 
Recent  Community  developments  will  require  the  review  of the  current approach  in the 
telecoms  sector  to  numbering  in most  Member States.  The  timetable  for  equal  access, 
number  portability  and  the  introduction  of  European  numbers  proposed  in  the 
Commission's Communication to the European Parliament, and subsequently included in a 
draft  Directive,378  will  require  a  prompt regulatory  response  from  the  Member  States. 
With the exception of those Member States which have received derogations, most Member 
States are able to satisfy Community legal requirements by conferring upon their telecoms 
NRAs  (or  the  relevant  Minister,  as  a  transitional  measure)  the  authority  to  administer 
numbering plans and requirements relating to the use and availability of numbers (for both 
mobile  and  fixed  networks).  Luxembourg  does  not  currently  have  an  independent 
numbering scheme, but proposes to introduce one in the near future,  with the  NRA being 
responsible  for  the  allocation  of  numbers.  In  Portugal,  the  law  foresees  a  national 
numbering  plan  to  be  established  by  the  NRA,  but  this  plan  has  yet  to  be  fully 
implemented. 
The  relative  importance  of numbers  as  a  key  common  'resource'  is  illustrated  in  recent 
litigation  in  Ireland,  where,  on  28  November  1997,  the  High  Court  in  Dublin  ordered 
Telecom Eireann to restore 8 choice phonenames and to allocate a further 270 such numbers 
to the Zockall Group. 
As regards Internet addressing, the existing process of self-regulation on both an international 
(e.g.,  Network Solutions Inc.) and a national basis through private and public registrars  is 
currently being re-assessed at a Community level, with a view to establishing a new Internet 
addressing  system  within  a  framework  managed  by  the  World  Intellectual  Property 
Organisation ("WIP0").
379 Thus  far,  the  Member States have not shown a strong interest in 
asserting jurisdiction over  addressing  issues,  either  through  their  respective  Ministries  or 
through  their  telecoms  NRAs.  In order  to  defend  the  interests  of the  European  Union, 
however, it is clear that the Community as a whole may need to become more involved in the 
future policy direction of Internet addressing in international organisations such as WIPO. 
378 
379 
Proposal of 1 October 1997 for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending 
Directive 97 /33/EC with regard to operator number portability and carrier preselection;  as  published 
in the  Official  Journal  of 1 October  1997,  OJ  1997  C330/19  (Agreement  on  a  Common  Position 
reached on 1 December 1997). 
Refer to Memorandum of Understanding for the Internet Council of Registrars, May 1997. 
(~'~.  d~~u:k~ p  Q~..u:y· 
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The role of certain national incumbent telecoms operators as  administrators and registrars of 
their respective national Internet addressing regimes has also raised the possibility of abusive 
behaviour  by  those  operators  as  regards  the  non-discriminatory  allocation  of  Internet 
addresses between all telecoms operators on the market (comparable to the situation in which 
incumbent telecoms operators found themselves in the administration of numbering schemes). 
To date, this has not been the subject of a decision under competition rules. 
Although numbering and addressing issues have not been relevant to the broadcasting sector 
thus  far,  the  ability  of broadcasters  to  provide  interactive  services  via  conditional  access 
systems will increase the importance of these issues to broadcasters in the immediate future. 
A  common approach  across  sectors  to  addressing  issues,  administered  by  an  independent 
NRA, may be necessary in a future multimedia environment. 
5.3  ROLE OF COMPETITION AUTHORITIES 
The roles and powers of the respective Competition Authorities in the various Member States 
vary  in a number of respects.  Generally  speaking,  however,  the regulatory  model  adopted 
throughout  the  European  Union is  that  of a  national  Competition  Authority  with  powers 
similar to those exercised by the European Commission pursueant to Articles 85 and 86 of the 
EC Treaty.  The recent creation of sector-specific rules  and NRAs in some Member States 
has  added  a  degree  of uncertainty  regarding  the  jurisdictional  divide  between  national 
Competition Authorities and the NRAs in the telecoms sector. 
Luxembourg  does  not  have  a  Competition  Authority.  In  contrast,  the  United  Kingdom's 
telecoms NRA (OFTEL) exercises stronger competition powers than exist in other industrial 
sectors  in the  United  Kingdom.  This  is  achieved  through  the  inclusion of so-called  "Fair 
Trading" conditions, which impose even greater obligations than Articles 85 and 86 of the EC 
Treaty, in the licences of telecoms operators in the  United Kingdom.  The telecoms NRA in 
the United Kingdom also shares a number of the general powers with the Director General of 
Fair Trading. If the proposed Competition Bill,380  is  enacted,  it will  significantly bolster the 
non sector-specific competition powers of the national competition authorities (by  mirroring 
Articles  85  and  86  of the  EC Treaty).  In Finland  and  Spain  the powers  of the  respective 
NRAs  are  formally  distinct  from  those  of the  Competition Authority,  but are  in practice 
applied  in a  manner  which  reflects  a  competition  law-based  approach.  The dividing  line 
between  the  powers  of the  NRA  in  Greece  and  the  local  Competition  Authority  is  also 
difficult to discern at times. 
Germany, France, Italy,  Spain, Austria, Belgium and Sweden all exhibit regulatory structures 
which  draw  a  clear  dividing  line  between  the  powers  of  the  NRA  and  the  national 
Competition Authority,  with  powers  of referral  available  to  the  NRA  where  the  NRA  is 
380  Draft Competition Bill of  August 1997. 
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initially seized with jurisdiction.  In France,  the NRA and the Competition Authority (  Conseil 
de  la  Concurence)  must  cooperate within their respective  fields  of competence.  The 1996 
Telecommunications Act requires that any  instance  of abuse of a dominant position or anti-
competitive practice in the  telecoms  sector  which  is  brought to  the  attention of the  French 
NRA must be referred to the Competition Authority.  In turn, the Competition Authority must 
refer  to  the  NRA  any  matters  brought  to  its  attention  which  lie  prima facie  within  the 
jurisdiction of the  latter.  In addition,  the  opinion  of the  NRA  must  be  sought  when an 
investigation  takes  place  under  French  competition  rules.  In Germany,  the  Competition 
Authority  (the  Bundeskartellamt,  or  Federal  Cartel  Office)  is  an  independent  body  with 
narrowly defined powers  to  deal  with certain cartels,  agreements  and  mergers.  The basic 
competition law in Germany grants to the Federal Cartel Office exclusive jurisdiction over all 
cases involving the incumbent public telecoms operator. 
381 
A number  of cases  decided  over  the  past  five  years  in Italy,  Spain,  Germany  and,  most 
recently,  France,  suggest  that  national  competition authorities  have  the  potential  to  play  a 
very  active  role  in the  introduction of competition in national  telecoms  markets,  especially 
where allegations of the abuse of a dominant position are involved (e.g., price discrimination, 
refusal to deal, market foreclosure and so on). 
382 
As regards broadcasting, the NRAs of Ireland and United Kingdom have limited authority to 
apply  general  and  sector-specific competition laws  to  broadcasters  (see  also  Section  1.6 of 
Annex  I).  Notably,  however,  they  have  relatively  expansive  powers  to  control  ownership 
concentration and cross-media ownership (as do the broadcasting NRAs in France,  Italy,  and 
Spain).  In The Netherlands,  the non-sector specific Competition Authority has responsibility 
for determining access issues affecting cable TV networks. 
381 
382 
Article 44(l)(e) of the ''Gesetz gegen Weltbewerbeschrankungen". 
For  example,  the  Federal  Cartel  Office  and  the  European  Commission  have  recently  decided 
independently that the essential elements of DT' s discount scheme for corporate users of its telecoms 
services could be justified, but subject to the condition that certain aspects of the discount package had 
to be  waived or postponed because of their exclusionary effect on competitors (see also  Commission 
Press Release, IP/96/543 of 25 June 1996). 
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g
e
d
 
I
r
e
l
a
n
d
 
•
 
T
e
l
e
c
o
m
s
 
T
h
e
 
O
f
f
i
c
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
T
h
e
 
O
D
R
T
.
 
T
h
e
 
O
D
R
T
.
 
T
h
e
 
O
D
R
T
.
 
N
.
A
.
 
T
h
e
 
I
r
i
s
h
 
C
o
u
r
t
s
.
 
D
i
r
e
c
t
o
r
 
o
f
 
T
e
l
e
-
o
m
m
u
n
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
T
h
e
 
D
i
s
t
r
i
c
t
 
C
o
u
r
t
 
R
e
g
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
(
"
O
D
R
T
"
)
.
 
a
g
a
i
n
s
t
 
d
e
c
i
s
i
o
n
s
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
D
e
p
a
r
t
m
e
n
t
 
o
f
 
P
u
b
l
i
c
 
E
n
t
e
r
p
r
i
s
e
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
O
D
R
T
,
 
w
i
t
h
 
a
p
p
e
a
l
s
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
H
i
g
h
 
C
o
u
r
t
.
 
•
 
B
r
o
a
d
c
a
s
t
i
n
g
 
T
h
e
 
I
n
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
 
R
a
d
i
o
 
T
e
l
e
c
o
m
m
u
n
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
N
.
A
.
 
N
.
A
.
 
T
h
e
 
M
i
n
i
s
t
e
r
 
f
o
r
 
o
f
 
T
h
e
 
D
i
s
t
r
i
c
t
 
C
o
u
r
t
.
 
a
n
d
 
T
e
l
e
v
i
s
i
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
R
a
d
i
o
 
D
i
v
i
s
i
o
n
s
 
o
f
 
A
r
t
s
,
 
H
e
r
i
t
a
g
e
,
 
C
o
m
m
i
s
s
i
o
n
.
 
t
h
e
 
D
e
p
a
r
t
m
e
n
t
 
o
f
 
G
a
e
l
t
a
c
h
t
,
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
T
h
e
 
M
i
n
s
t
e
r
 
f
o
r
 
T
r
a
n
s
p
o
r
t
,
 
E
n
e
r
g
y
 
&
 
I
s
l
a
n
d
s
.
 
C
o
m
m
u
n
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
.
 
C
o
m
m
u
n
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
.
 
I
t
a
l
y
 
•
 
T
e
l
e
c
o
m
s
 
T
h
e
 
C
o
m
m
u
n
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
T
h
e
 
C
o
m
m
u
n
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
T
h
e
 
C
o
m
m
u
n
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
T
h
e
 
C
o
m
m
u
n
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
T
h
e
 
C
o
m
m
u
n
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
T
h
e
 
a
d
m
i
n
i
s
t
r
a
t
i
v
e
 
A
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
y
.
 
A
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
y
.
 
A
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
y
.
 
A
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
y
.
 
A
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
y
.
 
c
o
u
r
t
s
.
 
•
 
B
r
o
a
d
c
a
s
t
i
n
g
 
T
h
e
 
C
o
m
m
u
n
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
T
h
e
 
C
o
m
m
u
n
i
c
a
t
i
o
r
 
T
h
e
 
C
o
m
m
u
n
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
T
h
e
 
C
o
m
m
u
n
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
T
h
e
 
C
o
m
m
u
n
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
T
h
e
 
a
d
m
i
n
i
s
t
r
a
t
i
v
e
 
A
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
y
.
 
A
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
y
.
 
A
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
y
.
 
A
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
y
.
 
A
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
y
.
 
c
o
u
r
t
s
.
 
A
n
a
l
y
_
s
y
s
 O
v
e
r
v
i
e
w
 
o
f
 
C
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
R
e
g
u
l
a
t
o
r
y
 
E
n
v
i
r
o
n
m
e
n
t
 
i
n
 
T
e
l
e
c
o
m
m
u
n
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
a
n
d
 
B
r
o
a
d
c
a
s
t
i
n
g
 
S
e
c
t
o
r
s
/
R
e
g
u
l
a
t
o
r
y
 
A
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
 
i
e
s
 
P
a
g
e
 
2
8
5
 
T
a
b
l
e
 
X
I
I
:
 
P
o
w
e
r
s
 
a
n
d
 
F
u
n
c
t
i
o
n
s
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
R
e
g
u
l
a
t
o
r
y
 
A
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
i
e
s
 
(
c
o
n
t
.
)
 
M
e
m
b
e
r
 
S
t
a
t
e
s
 
L
i
c
e
n
c
e
s
 
o
f
 
S
p
e
c
t
r
u
m
 
A
l
l
o
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
I
n
t
e
r
c
o
n
n
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
P
r
i
c
i
n
g
 
C
o
n
t
r
o
l
s
 
C
o
n
t
e
n
t
 
C
o
n
t
r
o
l
s
 
B
o
d
i
e
s
 
t
o
 
w
h
i
c
h
 
I
n
f
r
a
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
 
&
 
A
p
p
e
a
1
s
 
a
r
e
 
S
e
r
v
i
c
e
 
P
r
o
v
i
s
i
o
n
 
L
o
d
g
e
d
 
L
u
x
e
m
b
o
u
r
g
 
•
 
T
e
l
e
c
o
m
s
 
T
h
e
 
M
i
n
i
s
t
r
y
 
o
f
 
T
h
e
 
M
i
n
i
s
t
r
y
 
o
f
 
T
h
e
 
I
L
T
.
 
T
h
e
 
M
i
n
i
s
t
r
y
 
o
f
 
T
h
e
 
M
i
n
i
s
t
r
y
 
o
f
 
T
h
e
 
M
i
n
i
s
t
r
y
 
o
f
 
C
o
m
m
u
n
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
C
o
m
m
u
n
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
t
o
g
e
t
h
e
r
 
C
o
m
m
u
n
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
C
o
m
m
u
n
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
C
o
m
m
u
n
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
.
 
t
o
g
e
t
h
e
r
 
w
i
t
h
 
t
h
e
 
l
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
 
w
i
t
h
 
t
h
e
 
I
L
 
T
.
 
t
o
g
e
t
h
e
r
 
w
i
t
h
 
t
h
e
 
I
L
T
.
 
t
o
g
e
t
h
e
r
 
w
i
t
h
 
t
h
e
 
I
L
 
T
.
 
L
u
x
e
m
b
o
u
r
g
e
o
i
s
 
d
e
s
 
T
h
e
 
a
d
m
i
n
i
s
t
r
a
t
i
v
e
 
T
e
l
e
c
o
m
m
u
n
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
c
o
u
r
t
s
.
 
(
"
I
L
T
"
)
.
 
•
 
B
r
o
a
d
c
a
s
t
i
n
g
 
T
h
e
 
M
i
n
i
s
t
r
y
 
o
f
 
T
h
e
 
M
i
n
i
s
t
r
y
 
o
f
 
N
.
A
.
 
N
.
A
.
 
T
h
e
 
N
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
C
o
u
n
c
i
l
 
T
h
e
 
a
d
m
i
n
i
s
t
r
a
t
i
v
e
 
C
o
m
m
u
n
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
.
 
C
o
m
m
u
n
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
.
 
f
o
r
 
P
r
o
g
r
a
m
m
e
s
.
 
3
8
8
 
c
o
u
r
t
s
.
 
T
h
e
 
P
r
i
m
e
 
M
i
n
i
s
t
e
r
.
 
T
h
e
 
C
o
m
m
i
s
s
i
o
n
 
o
n
 
R
a
d
i
o
 
B
r
o
a
d
c
a
s
t
i
n
g
.
 
T
h
e
 
N
e
t
h
e
r
l
a
n
d
s
 
•
 
T
e
l
e
c
o
m
s
 
T
h
e
 
I
n
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
 
P
o
s
t
 
&
 
T
h
e
 
M
i
n
i
s
t
r
y
 
f
o
r
 
O
P
T
A
.
 
N
.
A
.
 
N
.
A
.
 
T
h
e
 
c
i
v
i
l
 
c
o
u
r
t
s
.
 
t
e
l
e
c
o
m
m
u
n
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
T
r
a
n
s
p
o
r
t
,
 
P
u
b
l
i
c
 
W
o
r
k
s
 
A
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
y
 
(
"
O
P
T
A
 
"
)
.
 
&
 
W
a
t
e
r
 
M
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t
.
 
T
h
e
 
A
g
e
n
c
y
 
f
o
r
 
R
a
d
i
o
 
F
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
i
e
s
.
 
O
P
T
A
 
3
8
7
 
I
n
 
t
h
e
 
n
e
a
r
 
f
u
t
u
r
e
,
 
t
h
e
 
I
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
e
 
w
i
l
l
 
a
s
s
i
s
t
 
t
h
e
 
M
i
n
i
s
t
r
y
 
i
n
 
g
r
a
n
t
i
n
g
 
f
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
i
e
s
.
 
3
8
8
 
T
h
e
 
N
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
C
o
u
n
c
i
l
 
f
o
r
 
P
r
o
g
r
a
m
m
e
s
 
a
d
v
i
s
e
s
 
t
h
e
 
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
 
o
n
 
c
o
n
t
e
n
t
 
o
f
 
r
a
d
i
o
 
a
n
d
 
T
V
 
p
r
o
g
r
a
m
m
e
s
.
 
A
n
a
l
y
~
s
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
_
_
_
 O
v
e
r
v
i
e
w
 
o
f
 
C
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
R
e
g
u
l
a
t
o
r
y
 
E
n
v
i
r
o
n
m
e
n
t
 
i
n
 
T
e
l
e
c
o
m
m
u
n
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
a
n
d
 
B
r
o
a
d
c
a
s
t
i
n
g
 
S
e
c
t
o
r
s
/
 
R
e
g
u
l
a
t
o
r
y
 
A
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
i
e
s
 
M
e
m
b
e
r
 
S
t
a
t
e
s
 
T
h
e
 
N
e
t
h
e
r
l
a
n
d
s
 
(
c
o
n
 
'
t
)
 
•
 
B
r
o
a
d
c
a
s
t
i
n
g
 
P
o
r
t
u
g
a
l
 
•
 
T
e
l
e
c
o
m
s
 
•
 
B
r
o
a
d
c
a
s
t
i
n
g
 
T
a
b
l
e
 
X
I
I
:
 
P
o
w
e
r
s
 
a
n
d
 
F
u
n
c
t
i
o
n
s
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
R
e
g
u
l
a
t
o
r
y
 
A
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
i
e
s
 
(
c
o
n
t
.
)
 
L
i
c
e
n
c
e
s
 
o
f
 
I
n
f
r
a
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
 
&
 
S
e
r
v
i
c
e
 
P
r
o
v
i
s
i
o
n
 
T
h
e
 
C
o
m
m
i
s
s
i
o
n
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
M
e
d
i
a
.
 
T
h
e
 
M
i
n
i
s
t
r
y
 
o
f
 
E
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
,
 
C
u
l
t
u
r
e
 
&
 
S
c
i
e
n
c
e
.
 
3
8
9
 
T
h
e
 
M
i
n
i
s
t
r
y
 
o
f
 
E
q
u
i
p
m
e
n
t
,
 
P
l
a
n
n
i
n
g
 
a
n
d
 
T
e
r
r
i
t
o
r
i
a
l
 
A
d
m
i
n
i
s
t
r
a
t
i
o
n
.
 
T
h
e
 
P
o
r
t
u
g
u
e
s
e
 
I
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
e
 
o
f
 
C
o
m
m
u
n
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
(
"
I
C
P
"
)
.
 
T
h
e
 
C
o
u
n
c
i
l
 
o
f
 
M
i
n
i
s
t
e
r
s
,
 
a
f
t
e
r
 
c
o
n
s
u
l
t
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
H
i
g
h
 
A
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
y
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
M
e
d
i
a
.
 
S
p
e
c
t
r
u
m
 
A
l
l
o
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
T
h
e
 
M
i
n
i
s
t
r
y
 
o
f
 
T
r
a
n
s
p
o
r
t
,
 
P
u
b
l
i
c
 
W
o
r
k
s
 
&
 
W
a
t
e
r
 
M
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t
.
 
T
h
e
 
I
C
P
.
 
T
h
e
 
I
C
P
.
 
I
n
t
e
r
c
o
n
n
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
O
P
T
A
 
(
w
i
t
h
 
t
h
e
 
C
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
o
n
 
A
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
y
 
t
o
 
d
e
t
e
r
m
i
n
e
 
a
c
c
e
s
s
 
i
s
s
u
e
s
 
r
e
l
a
t
i
n
g
 
t
o
 
C
a
b
l
e
 
T
V
)
.
 
T
h
e
 
I
C
P
.
 
N
.
A
.
 
P
r
i
c
i
n
g
 
C
o
n
t
r
o
l
s
 
N
.
A
 
.
 
N
.
A
 
.
 
N
.
A
.
 
C
o
n
t
e
n
t
 
C
o
n
t
r
o
l
s
 
T
h
e
 
M
i
n
i
s
t
e
r
 
o
f
 
E
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
,
 
C
u
l
t
u
r
e
 
a
n
d
 
S
c
i
e
n
c
e
.
 
T
h
e
 
C
o
m
m
i
s
s
i
o
n
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
M
e
d
i
a
.
 
T
h
e
 
N
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
B
r
o
a
d
c
a
s
t
i
n
g
 
O
r
g
a
n
i
s
a
t
i
o
n
.
 
3
9
0
 
N
.
A
.
 
T
h
e
 
H
i
g
h
 
A
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
y
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
M
e
d
i
a
.
 
3
8
9
 
F
o
r
 
t
e
r
r
e
s
t
r
i
a
l
 
T
V
:
 
(
1
)
 
t
h
e
 
M
i
n
i
s
t
e
r
 
o
f
 
E
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
,
 
C
u
l
t
u
r
e
 
a
n
d
 
S
c
i
e
n
c
e
 
g
r
a
n
t
s
 
s
e
r
v
i
c
e
 
l
i
c
e
n
c
e
s
 
f
o
r
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
b
r
o
a
d
c
a
s
t
i
n
g
 
o
r
g
a
n
i
s
a
t
i
o
n
s
;
 
a
n
d
 
(
2
)
 
t
h
e
 
M
e
d
i
a
 
C
o
m
m
i
s
s
i
o
n
 
a
w
a
r
d
s
 
a
i
r
t
i
m
e
 
l
i
c
e
n
c
e
s
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
7
 
m
a
j
o
r
 
b
r
o
a
d
c
a
s
t
i
n
g
 
c
o
m
p
a
n
i
e
s
.
 
3
9
0
 
T
h
e
 
N
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
B
r
o
a
d
c
a
s
t
i
n
g
 
O
r
g
a
n
i
s
a
t
i
o
n
 
i
s
 
r
e
s
p
o
n
s
i
b
l
e
 
f
o
r
 
p
r
e
s
c
r
i
b
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
n
t
e
n
t
 
o
f
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
b
r
o
a
d
c
a
s
t
i
n
g
 
o
r
g
a
n
i
s
a
t
i
o
n
s
.
 
T
h
e
 
D
u
t
c
h
 
C
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
o
n
 
A
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
y
 
h
a
s
 
a
l
r
e
a
d
y
 
r
e
v
i
e
w
e
d
 
t
h
e
 
p
o
s
s
i
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
o
f
 
a
p
p
l
y
i
n
g
 
O
N
P
 
r
u
l
e
s
 
t
o
 
c
a
b
l
e
 
T
V
 
o
p
e
r
a
t
o
r
s
 
a
s
 
r
e
g
a
r
d
s
 
t
h
e
i
r
 
p
r
o
g
r
a
m
m
i
n
g
.
 
P
a
g
e
 
2
8
6
 
B
o
d
i
e
s
 
t
o
 
w
h
i
c
h
 
A
p
p
e
a
l
s
 
a
r
e
 
L
o
d
g
e
d
 
T
h
e
 
c
i
v
i
l
 
c
o
u
r
t
s
.
 
T
h
e
 
D
i
s
t
r
i
c
t
 
C
o
u
r
t
 
o
f
 
R
o
t
t
e
r
d
a
m
 
(
a
g
a
i
n
s
t
 
d
e
c
i
s
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
M
i
n
i
s
t
r
y
 
o
f
 
T
r
a
n
s
p
o
r
t
)
.
 
T
h
e
 
a
d
m
i
n
i
s
t
r
a
t
i
v
e
 
c
o
u
r
t
s
.
 
T
h
e
 
a
d
m
i
n
i
s
t
r
a
t
i
v
e
 
c
o
u
r
t
s
.
 
,
~
,
u
<
N
:
-
.
 
t
k
n
d
'
c
J
'
t
l
 
f
1
 
i
l
0
r
n
_
I
.
J
e
y
 
A
n
a
l
y
_
_
_
S
Y
-
S
 
L
L
P
.
 
:
-O
v
e
r
v
i
e
w
 
o
f
 
C
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
R
e
g
u
l
a
t
o
r
y
 
E
n
v
i
r
o
n
m
e
n
t
 
i
n
 
T
e
l
e
c
o
m
m
u
n
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
a
n
d
 
B
r
o
a
d
c
a
s
t
i
n
g
 
S
e
c
t
o
r
s
/
R
e
g
u
l
a
t
o
r
y
 
A
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
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1 Implications for Multimedia 
j  Resource allocation functions  are  currently undertaken  in different  Member  States  by a mixture of Government  ' 
j  agencies, Ministerial Departments and independent NRAs,  with a wide range of planning and strategic powers. 
I This  exacerbates the effects of sector-specific policies, and  leads  to fragmented  regulation  in  virtually all Member 
j  States, especially in the broadcasting sector.  In  the  United Kingdom, for example, there are in fact  more than  20 
I regulatory  authorities  responsible for  the  broadcasting  sector.  Such  an  approach  clearly  does  not  provide  the 
· coherence or flexibility needed in a  future multimedia environment. 
In  addition,  the  existing  infrastructure  licensing  and  regulatory  systems  in  most  Member  States  maintain  the 
distinction  between  telecoms  and  broadcasting  infrastructure.  In  an  environment  where  infrastructure  is 
increasingly used for both telecoms and broadcasting purposes, this split is becoming difficult both to justify and to 
administer. Converging technologies exacerbate this problem. 
The differences in the regulation of telecoms and broadcasting services raise further regulatory issues.  For example, 
the combined effect of heavy content regulation of broadcasters and light content regulation of telecoms operators 
may lead to imbalances in industry development. 
~  There  are a number of potential solutions  to  the  problems raised  by  the current regulatory structures which  are  I 
1  organised primarily along vertical, sectorally distinct lines.  ' 
Option 1 
The most appropriate, but radical option, is to create a "content" regulator and an "infrastructure and resources"  1 
I regulator.  This approach has been suggested by the United Kingdom in its current reform plan. At the same time,  ! 
I  the  United  Kingdom  is  currently  moving  towards  out-sourcing  some  resource  management  functions  (e.g., I 
I spectrum).  There  is  clearly  scope for  the  adoption  of a similar  approach  with  respect  to  all  such  resource I 
I  management functions.  Such  a split  of regulatory  competence  should  not  strain  the  regulatory  definitions  of I 
I  "communications" and  "broadcasting" put forward  by the Study Team  in  Section 2 of Annex I.  Under such  a I 
I definitional framework,  the significance  of being classified as  "broadcasting"  (as  opposed  to  "communications")  I 
!  would lie pri111£lrily in the fact that broadcasting would be subject to much heavier content regulatory oversight.  ' 
I  It is worth noting that in a country such as Australia all powers over infrastructure and competition have recently I 
l  been vested in  relation to  telecoms in the general competition authority.  Only technical regulatory and resource I 
I  management functions have been retained by the sector-specific regulator. At this stage, countries such as Finland I 
I  and The Netherlands display overlapping jurisdictional competences between the regulation of infrastructure and l 
I the administration of resources.  Italy,  on  the  other hand,  has  even gone  so far  as  to  include  content  regulation  l 
I within the sphere of responsibility of its new Communication Authority; some would argue that the position taken  ~ 
l in  Italy  might  be  more  appropriate  in  a mature  multimedia  where  the  distinctions  between  telecoms  and 
!  broadcasting may have lost much of their  current relevance. 
;  ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................  ; 
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:·······································""'····················································································································································································································································································: 
Option 2 
An alternative approach,  which  would not involve an  overhaul of the existing regulatory structure, would  be  to  I 
centralise  resource  management  (e.g.,  create  a single  body  for  frequency  or  numbering  management)  whilst  ' 
otherwise retaining sector-specific regulators.  Such an approach, however, would be short-term in nature, since it 
does  not  address  the  full  range  of issues  flowing  from  technological  convergence.  Procedures  to  address 
jurisdictional disputes  would  be necessary, and would need  to  be regularly revisited  to  reflect new developments. 
Such an approach, being reactive in nature, is open to the criticism that it is not sufficiently forward-looking. 
Option3 
: A further approach would  be to  leave the existing regulatory structure intact, and to  centralise policy-making for  . 
certain key issues such as conditional access. Such an approach, however, would be unsatisfactory, since it does not 
address the regulatory problems created by  convergence today, and would require a significant degree of ongoing 
policy overhaul in the not-too-distant future. 
Option 4 
The preferred approach of  the Study Team would be to adopt the following structure: 
•  Assist the process of technological and  service convergence by facilitating  common,  or at  least  consistent, 
regulation across industry sectors.  Common approaches are most readily achievable in areas of "economic" 
regulation  such as  the  licensing  of infrastructure and  services  and  the  management  of scarce  resources. 
Common  approaches  could  also  develop  over  time  with  regard  to  issues  such  as  "interconnection"  and  : 
"access", whether within the competence of the NRA or of a non-sector specific competition authority.  ' 
•  Exclude issues of a predominantly  "public policy" nature (i.e., content) from the convergence of regulatory I 
functions. Insofar as "content" or "public policy" issues might be considered to play some role (albeit small)  I 
in the process of licensing and resource management, the treatment of such issues would be subject to the  j 
principle of proportionality as regards the manner and extent to which such issues would be dealt with on a  !:_:',, 
'converged' basis. 
•  Create independent regulators (or, indeed, a single independent regulator for certain issues) responsible for  I 
the governance of both  the  traditional telecoms and  broadcasting sectors.  Liberalisation  brings with it the I 
need to create independent regulators which can arbitrate and adjudicate between the competing claims of I 
new  market  entrants  to  essential  resources  (e.g.,  numbers,  Internet  addresses,  conditional  access  issues,  I 
frequency allocation and so forth).  I 
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•  Consistent with the broader dynamics of convergence, vest responsibility for competition policy in a general i 
competition  body,  rather  than  in a sector-specific  regulator.  In  the  absence of knowing  whether  or  not a  1 
"multimedia" market will develop over time, it might be premature to invest a sector-specific regulator with  ! 
a  full range of competition powers. Moreover, the nature of  convergence is such that other sectors such as IT  ~ 
and publishing may be affected by competition law intervention, in any given case.  In  such a situation, it 
would be counter-productive to confine the role of the competition authority to a specific sector whose limits 
are as yet undefined. In addition, an appropriate system of  regulatory checks and balances arguably requires 
that regulatory powers not be overly centralised. 
~-...............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................  ~ 
Analy._SY-s ___________  _ 